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A Theory of Time

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ORIGINAL TITLE:「時間論」, in『体験と存在』(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1936): 1–95; later included in the author's *Complete Works,*『高橋里美全集』(Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1973), 3: 3–57.

KEYWORDS: Takahashi Satomi—philosophy of time—philosophy of love—eternity—Edmund Husserl—Martin Heidegger—phenomenology—Henri Bergson—dialectics—Plato

Translator's Introduction

Takahashi Satomi (1886–1964) first gained notoriety in the world of Japanese philosophy in 1912 when, still a graduate student at Tokyo University, he wrote an article titled "The Facts of the Phenomena of Consciousness and their Meaning" (「意識現象の事実と其意味」).[1] In it, he offered a critique of Nishida Kitarō's *An Inquiry into the Good* (『善の研究』), which had been published a year earlier. Takahashi's critique did not go unanswered, and the fact that Nishida felt compelled to pen a reply cemented Takahashi's status as someone to be reckoned with.[2] He assumed a post at the department of science at Tōhoku University (Sendai) in 1921, going on to from 1925 spend two years in Germany to study under Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl. In 1931 he published *Husserl's Phenomenology* (『フッセルの現象学』), establishing himself as one of Japan's leading interpreters of the same.[3] A year later followed *The Standpoint of the Whole* (『全体の立場』), in which Takahashi developed his own philosophical standpoint in contradistinction from what his more well-known counterparts in Kyoto were doing.[4] When Tanabe Hajime began to emancipate himself from Nishida's philosophy by developing his logic of species, in a 1935–1936 essay titled "On the Logic of Species" (「種の論理について」) Takahashi served him of cri-

1. Recorded in TSZ 4: 153–82.

2. For Nishida's reply, see NKZ 1: 299–316.

3. I have lifted these details of Takahashi's life from Cheung 2018, 261.

4. Tosaka Jun's essay "The Sorcery of Totality: Takahashi Satomi's Philosophical Method" (「〈全体〉の魔術：高橋里美教授の哲学法」) from his 1935 *The Japanese Ideology* (『日本イデオロギー論』) is a contemporary critique of this work; see Tosaka, 2024. I thank Kyle A. Peters for reminding me of the existence of this essay.

tique as well.[5] Takahashi is thus best understood as an independent thinker who followed the approach of neither Nishida nor Tanabe but engaged in a sustained dialogue with both—an attitude that the essay translated below, "A Theory of Time," exemplifies.

"A Theory of Time," first penned in 1933, serves as the first chapter of Takahashi's 1936 *Experience and Being* (『体験と存在』). The essays that comprise the work all presuppose what he in the prologue refers to as the "standpoint of the theory of experience-being" (体験ー存在論の立場)—a standpoint identical to the one put forward in *The Standpoint of the Whole*, but renamed because the latter could be misunderstood as subjectivistic.[6] *Experience and Being* must accordingly be seen as a further elaboration of *The Standpoint of the Whole*, to which "A Theory of Time" frequently refers.

To understand the task Takahashi sets for himself in "A Theory of Time," it is perhaps best to let him speak for himself. Concerning the standpoint of the whole, Takahashi writes:

> The totality of experience indicates the whole realm that embraces all of experience without remainder.... The totality of theoretical experience embraces the whole world of forms, situations, and objects that can be felt, symbolized, thought about, remembered, imagined, fantasized, and hallucinated, as well as the plurality of possible operations that correspond to it. And it can be expanded to include other realms of emotion and will. Thus, the object of our philosophical research is comprised of the complete realm of experience with all these possible expansions and their internal limitations.[7]

The significance of the problem of time readily presents itself as soon as we move from the whole of experience to inquire about the relationship of *our* experience to it. Takahashi elaborates:

> As a temporal and historical process, our experience does not constitute an absolutely perfected system but is constantly unfolding and expanding; at least, no change is ever final. For this reason, at any given moment the totality of our experience is never more than a relative totality. The object of philosophy is such a relative totality. Our interpretation of philosophy is never

5. Recorded in TSZ 4: 221–67. I thank Urai Satoshi for bringing this essay to my attention.
6. TSZ 7, 258.
7. TAKAHASHI 2011, 824.

> final and cannot escape the infinity of problems that are its nature. That said, this does not contradict the stasis of high potency within an absolute perfection of infinitely developing experience. When we ask how unlimited development is possible, we must anticipate a stasis in the totality of the development as an enveloping ground.[8]

Following this basic standpoint, in "A Theory of Time" Takahashi regards eternity—also referred to by him as "love" and "absolute nothingness"—as the inclusive ground of time, as that which "includes all activity but is at rest in itself."[9] The problem of time runs parallel to the problem of the relationship between the finite and the infinite, and can only adequately be understood in a theory that addresses both of these poles. In the prologue to *Experience and Being*, Takahashi clarifies this basic demand of a philosophy of time by way of a contrast with Heidegger, writing:

> Heidegger, who is regarded as Kierkegaard without God, is perhaps not entirely oblivious to the infinite and can be imagined to in the background presuppose something like a religious philosophy—but does his tendency to make light of the infinite stream of time in favor of finite existentialist temporality not show that he overlooks the infinite and is blinded by the finite? In the theory of experience-being, we must not only correctly appraise the value of the infinite stream of time, but furthermore also consider an infinite love, as a rest of a higher order, to include and transcend (包越する) that stream.[10]

To my knowledge, besides the above-cited excerpts translated by Gereon Kopf as part of the 2011 *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, no work of Takahashi has been translated into English. For this reason, the essay that follows is part of no more than the, so to say, "baby steps" of Takahashi translation. Normally when producing a translation one can consult translations of the same or other texts by the same author, making it possible to see how others have tackled certain tricky terms or idioms. Although I have tried to be as thorough as possible, not having other translated materials available to

8. Takahashi 2011, 823–4.

9. TSZ 3: 55. In line with the summary, written in English, of Takahashi's position recorded in TSZ 3: 316–17, I translate 包む and its variants using the language of "inclusion" rather than that of "envelopment," as Kopf does.

10. TSZ 7: 261.

me means that this translation of "A Theory of Time" is, to my mind at least, tentative in character. It is my hope that it will serve as a useful resource to those who, working with it, find room for improvement in future renditions of Takahashi's works, either in English or in other languages. Apart from this, I hope that this translation finds its way to those with an interest in the reception of phenomenology in Japan or those who study the philosophy of time, either as it occurs in modern Japanese philosophy, or in philosophy more generally speaking.

A note on the translation. There are some by now well-documented issues that in general plague the rendition of modern Japanese philosophical texts into English, and this essay is no exception. To facilitate close reading, in the case of ambiguous instances of "object" and its variants I have indicated whether Takahashi means *kyakkan* 客観 or *taishō* 対象. As far as I can tell, these terms correspond to the way Husserl uses *Objekt* and *Gegenstand*, respectively. I have done the same for variants of "subject"—so that the reader can tell *shukan* 主観 from *shutai* 主体—and "individual"—so that *kojin* 個人 and *kotai* 個体 can be differentiated. Unsurprisingly, the difference between the latter four terms is relevant most for Takahashi's discussion of the philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe. As one can gather from Takahashi's own explanation in "A Theory of Time," he appears to use *kojin* when speaking of individual *people*, while employing *kotai* to indicate other kinds of individuals, such as the world spirit. *Shukan* indicates the subject of the subject-object distinction. *Shutai* is used by Takahashi in two senses, both found in Nishida. It either means the "substrate" of the earlier Nishida (in which case I have translated it as such), or the "subject" that is juxtaposed to the environment (環境) of the later Nishida. Finally, in line with Kopf, I have chosen to translate *taiken* 体験 (*Erlebnis* in German) simply as "experience" rather than as "lived experience," mainly because the alternative term for "experience," *keiken* 経験 (*Erfahrung* in German), does not appear in the text.

I have worked from two editions of the text—both as it is recorded in the *zenshū* (Takahashi's *Complete Works*), and the standalone work published in 1936 by Iwanami Shoten. I primarily follow the *Complete Works*, in which the seven sections that comprise the text have been given short titles, and while Takahashi in the Iwanami version in various places points his reader to essays from *The Standpoint of the Whole*, in the *Complete*

Works these notes have been edited to point the reader to their location in the *Complete Works* instead. I have modified these notes to point the reader to both editions. I have changed Takahashi's abbreviated citations into full ones and modified them to be more in line with the conventions of English rather than German scholarship. Not having all of the editions of the works Takahashi cites available to me, I have left his usage of "f." and "ff." intact.

Translator's additions to the text and notes have been set off in square brackets.

Takahashi Satomi

A Theory of Time

Translated by Dennis Prooi

1. Introduction

Time can become a problem for us in various senses: for example, as mathematical time, as natural time, as historical time, as psychological time, as phenomenological time, or as ontological or metaphysical time. These are the usual senses—but not, of course, all of them—in which the question of time can be asked. We can pursue and raise the question of time in many more directions. It is of the essence to clearly distinguish these various senses of time beforehand, so that our problem can be clarified and our investigation made fruitful. Examples of useless disputes raging on because these distinctions are disregarded are by no means few. At the same time, problematizing the relations between these various kinds of time is also an indispensable task for the philosophical theory of time in particular. In order to accomplish this task, we cannot discuss the problem of time in isolation, separated from the various other fundamental problems of philosophy—such as that of subject and object, matter and mind, the individual [個体] and the universal, etc. Still, in this short essay I cannot expect to treat the problem of time in such detail as to settle it once and for all. I must be content simply to examine several of the main characteristics of time from my "standpoint of the whole of experience."

As long as time is considered from the standpoint of experience, it is experienced time or temporal experience. However, should the translation and reduction of all of time to the word "experience" in this manner ultimately be permitted? There might be those who already call this point into doubt. Taking into account that particularly in today's world of thought slogans such as "from consciousness to being" or "from consciousness to the meaning of being" have a captivating ring to them, that practice and history are generally held in high esteem, and that Marxist materialism, among others, continues to be promoted, it seems that only a negative answer to the former

question is to be expected. I have no room here to in detail defend my position in the matter, and would simply like to make the following remark: those who speak of being most concretely must go beyond merely speaking of being and speak of the whole experience of being. The same applies to speaking of the meaning of being. Even if our being is determined by nature, history, or society, as long as it is the case that it is us ourselves who are thus determined, while we exist in society we must each have our own standpoint that can be distinguished from society itself. Just as there exists a path that from society gets to each of us, there must in turn open a path that leads from us to society. Thus considered, not only is it not—as is usually thought—dangerous for each of us to set out from our respective experience, but as long as each of us experiences in their own way, this must actually also be a matter of course. This is why the examination of experienced time, if it is sufficiently broad as well as thoroughly carried out, should ultimately be able to cover every problem of time. However, neither this broadness nor this thoroughness can here be expected. I accordingly limit my examination mainly to experienced time in the narrow sense, and start off by discussing the relationship between time and the stream of experience, after which I deal with the various forms of experienced time and finally with the relationship between time and eternity. It is naturally expected from an examination of experienced time that the phenomenological and psychological views play an important role, but experienced time is by no means limited to them. Although the various kinds of time each have their own characteristics and should not be confounded, as long as they are each equally referred to as "time," they should mutually resemble one another or have qualities in common. This being the case, depending on the situation, I adopt various theories on time other than experienced time in the narrow sense to have them serve in the explanation of experienced time, or conversely extrapolate from the latter to the former. If possible, I would furthermore like to indicate two or three important connections that exist between these kinds of time.

II. Time and the Stream of Experience

If we follow the usual way of thinking about time and represent it as a stream, then experienced time cannot be considered apart from the "stream of experience" or the "stream of consciousness." What, then, is their

relationship to time? And what characteristics does such time have? In recent times there have been three brilliant thinkers who have aroused public interest in the basic fact of the stream of experience or the stream of consciousness: William James, Henri Bergson, and Edmund Husserl. Not only is what they say about this basic fact by no means the same in terms of content, but the standpoint from which they consider it is also already different. James's so-called "stream of thought" is something psychological—herein lies the limits of his approach. According to him, psychology is the science that has to do with the mind of us, finite individuals. He says that this science presupposes three facts as given: first, the existence of thoughts and feelings (in James, these are generic terms for the phenomena of consciousness in general); second, the existence of a physical world that is temporal and spatial; and third, that the mind can know about that world.[1] Although we can further problematize the ground of these givens themselves, in doing so we are, according to James, dealing with metaphysical problems that exceed the scope of psychology. On the other hand, in Bergson's concept of "pure duration" (*durée pure*) the psychological, biological, and metaphysical views are mixed together, the latter view being particularly dominant. Husserl's "stream of experience" (*Erlebnisstrom*) and "stream of consciousness" (*Bewusstseinsfluss*) are of course regarded from the phenomenological perspective—but compared to the other two views, which are rather simple, his is remarkably critical. For that reason, I take his view as primary and discuss the others only in relation to it.

The so-called "phenomenological reduction," which is the method Husserl adopted in the attempt to begin philosophy anew, "excluded" anything transcendent, and endeavored to render it immanent to the domain of our ego. At issue is whether this endeavor can ultimately succeed without presupposing some sort of idealist posit [定位]. I have previously written about this issue at length.[2] A radical Cartesianism—that is, the idea that our internal lives are the source of everything—is part of Husserl's fundamental conviction, and the phenomenological reduction is only possible by taking that idea as its premise. What is gained as the result of the phenom-

1. [See JAMES 1890, vi.]

2. See the chapter "The Possibility of the Phenomenological Reduction" in my *The Standpoint of the Whole*. [TSZ 4: 45–84.]

enological reduction is the absolute domain of so-called "pure consciousness" (*das reine Bewusstsein*). According to Husserl, all transcendent being is ultimately none other than something that is rooted here, established from here, and constituted through it. That this pure consciousness is called "pure" is because it is purely internal, completely without any transcendent posit mixed into it, and by no means because it is, like Kant's "consciousness in general," merely formal and supra-individual. On the contrary: it is a singular [個性的] consciousness that is fulfilled in terms of content. In this respect we can compare it to James's "stream of thought." Yet, this consciousness does not postulate a material world or brain outside of the self, as James's "stream of thought" does. It is a consciousness that includes even them as reduced contents of consciousness. Although this pure consciousness seems like the above-mentioned absolute domain, the concrete contents of consciousness that we ordinarily call "experience" are not yet truly absolute and are moreover constituted through the stream of consciousness, which is their ground. For this reason, we must distinguish the individual contents of experience from the stream of consciousness itself. Still, according to Husserl phenomenological time is an essential characteristic that belongs to all of experience, and a necessary form that connects and unifies all of experience. This being the case, the stream of consciousness that constitutes the concrete contents of experience must likewise be what constitutes phenomenological time as well. Accordingly, we must distinguish the stream of consciousness from phenomenological time. Husserl also refers to this "absolute subjectivity" [主観性] as "the constitutive stream of consciousness of absolute time" or "absolutely a-temporal consciousness."

In what respects is this absolute stream of consciousness distinguished from temporal concrete experiences? Whereas the latter endure as something identical in time, in the former this duration (Bergson's use of the term "duration" is different) is lacking. While the latter as durations that have been fulfilled are each a process, the former lacks processuality in this sense. Although a process has its substrate, the stream of consciousness lacks a substrate that bears it; whatever part we consider, it is a stream, and not a "non-stream." Objective [対象的] individual [個別的] contents of experience must either be undergoing change or remain unchanging—that is, at rest. Although these two states can mutually transition into one another, this is not the case for the absolute stream of consciousness, which is nec-

essarily a stream. And while individual contents of experience change and flow at a different pace, the absolute stream of consciousness has no pace. In their original sense, concepts such as "present," "past," "simultaneity," "before and after," and "succession" only apply to those contents, not to the stream of consciousness itself.[3]

Thus considered, Husserl's so-called "stream of consciousness" is, in respect of being a stream without a substrate, like Bergson's "pure duration." To a certain extent James's "stream of thought" can be recognized as something similar, as well. That "Thinking of some sort goes on" is what James deems to be the psychologist's primary fact; he furthermore argues that if English, next to "It rains" and "It blows," would permit an expression like "It thinks," then while we would be stating this fact most simply, since that expression is impossible we must simply say that "thinking goes on."[4] However, James's "stream of thought," in virtue of being a stream that is already made of various objective [対象的] thoughts, must be distinguished from Husserl's pure stream of consciousness, which constitutes objects [対象]. How, then, can we ultimately think that pure stream of consciousness to underlie our concrete contents of experience, as Husserl argues?

Introspection has taught me that to the back of all concrete contents of experience, supporting them, is a foundational stream of experience, which flows. While this forms the infinitely deep stratum of experience, it also accompanies any superficial experience whatsoever. When one, for example, perceives the movement of some object [対象] with one's eyes, recalls an object formerly seen, or is moved by a deep emotion, the stream of experience that supports them can always be felt. This support is sometimes felt shallowly, sometimes deeply; sometimes felt weakly, sometimes strongly. For that reason, the stream of experience cannot, as Husserl thinks, sharply be distinguished from each concrete content—between the former and the latter are many intermediate strata, and the deeper we descent into the depths of experience, the closer we get to the pure stream of experience, which relative to its degree of purity becomes more and more a-structural, more and more a linear progression. The same applies to the pace of the stream of

3. See the chapter "Time and the Stream of Consciousness in Husserl" in my *The Standpoint of the Whole*. [TSZ 4: 85–120.]

4. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, ch. 9.

experience: every process associated with a concrete content of experience has its changes in pace, and although the stream of experience—from which these processes are inseparable—at the upper stratum exhibits variations in pace, the more we approach to its foundation, the closer we get to a pace that is constant, to become completely constant at its limit. It is that linear and constant stream of experience, or the part that is closest to it, that I in particular refer to as the "foundational stream of experience."

This foundational stream of experience is, like Husserl's stream of consciousness, an unceasing stream—not a "non-stream." Bergson speaks of the unceasing stream of pure duration as well; James, too, counts it as the second of the five characteristics of "thought." The stream of experience, which is an unceasing stream, is also a continuous stream. In this respect Husserl's stream of consciousness and Bergson's pure duration are the same; in James, it is the third characteristic of "thought."

Is that stream of consciousness or stream of experience, then, ultimately something a-temporal, as Husserl argues? I do not think so. Rather, the stream of experience, which has the various characteristics pointed out above, is at the same time temporal, just as it is. It goes without saying that James's stream of thought is temporal. In Bergson, pure duration is time itself—it is so-called "flowing time." Only Husserl tries to refuse it temporality—but even he acknowledges a certain relation of correspondence between the stream of consciousness and the temporal objects [対象] constituted through it. According to him, inside of the stream of consciousness there are two forms of intentionality that require one another: horizontal and transverse. An enduring object is constituted through "horizontal intentionality"; the unity of the stream of consciousness itself is constituted inside of the stream of consciousness through "transverse intentionality." Although this constituted stream of consciousness is not temporal in the original sense, it forms a one-dimensional "quasi-temporal arrangement," and is said to have a "prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality."[5] If that is the case, then taking one step further the question presents itself whether the stream of consciousness itself is in some sense temporal or not. Let me

5. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, 435f. [Husserl 1991, 88.]

briefly summarize what I formerly wrote on this problem.[6] I think that as long as we think of the stream of consciousness as a stream, we cannot absolutely deny it temporality. The temporality of the stream of consciousness may not always be perceived very clearly. But it is experienced as something that is implicitly given together with the stream of consciousness or the stream of experience. Since this foundational stream of experience is the source of all contents of experience, I call it "primordial time" [根源的時間].

While this primordial time is something that is inseparable from the stream of experience, we should not, like Bergson and others, equate it with the stream of experience itself. It is a universal and necessary quality that the stream of experience has, a general mode of being that the stream of experience has as a "stream" of experience. In a sense, we can perhaps even consider it the transcendental form of the stream of experience. However, it is not a transcendental form that is independent from the stream of experience, but a transcendental form in the sense that its character is always fused with the stream of experience. It is not the transcendental condition that makes the stream of experience possible, but a fundamental condition that is discovered as something given together with the stream of experience. Kant thought that while phenomena flow in time, time itself does not flow. But just as Hegel says that "time itself is the becoming, this coming-to-be and passing away, the actually existent abstraction, Chronos, from whom everything is born and by whom its offspring are destroyed,"[7] the time of the stream of experience is not an unmoving form, but a form that flows together with the stream of experience—it is Bergson's so-called "flowing time." Time itself is not something that does not flow together with the phenomena; what flows together with them is time. Although primordial time is something that flows together with the stream of experience, just as at its foundation the stream of experience is an a-structural linear progression, primordial time is a-structural and linear, as well. Just as the stream of experience is a continuous and unceasing stream, so is primordial time. The characteristics of the foundational stream of experience mentioned above thus at the same time make up the characteristics of primordial time. How-

6. [See note 3, page 245.]

7. G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, §258. [Hegel 1970, 35.]

ever, we must clear up two to three errors about the continuous stream of primordial time.

The first error is to, like Bergson, claim that the temporal continuity must be understood as a continuity that is purely qualitative, at the complete exclusion of the quantitative view. People perhaps follow him in thinking that quantitative time is so-called "time flown"—which has been spatialized by means of the intellect—and not genuine "flowing time." Of course, although we can readily distinguish time that has been fixed from time that continues to flow, they are not necessarily two absolutely separated things. Even flowing time, *qua* flowing time, must have a size. The concept of continuity already cannot be thought apart from an extended or actually extending quantity. Either way, continuity can only be understood as the extension of a "one." Pure quality is for something to exist in the mode of being "one"; pure quantity is for it to exist in the mode of being "many." And a continuity is for "one" thing to exist in the mode of being "many"—it is, so to say, the compound form of pure quality and pure quantity. Even temporal continuity cannot be an exception to this.

The second error is to, like Brentano and Husserl, think of temporal continuity as a phase-continuity without extension. Such a continuity is not something that forms a genuine concrete continuity. This idea is essentially linked to their concept of intentionality. As I show below, the interpretation of temporal phenomena through intentionality is by no means the concrete view of those phenomena, and does not go beyond merely being an abstract view.

The third error is the dialectical interpretation of time, for it is none other than the denial of the essence of time itself as a continuous stream. This view is fundamentally Hegel's. According to him, time is that being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, and inasmuch as it is not, is. Time, as such a thing, is not only intuited becoming, but also continuous becoming.[8] Although Hegel's dialectical interpretation of time for that reason does not seem to be one that is entirely incompatible with our view, as long as the concepts of becoming and continuity are dialectically conceived it is not the same as our view. The dialectics of discontinuous continuity advocated by Dr. Nishida, Dr. Tanabe, and others, particularly challenges our view of time as a stream. That I cannot directly align myself with the claims made by our country's

8. Ibid.

brilliant scholars is perhaps due to the superficiality of my view—but at present, I find myself completely unable to relinquish the concept of time as a continuous stream. In actual experienced time, there is no such thing as the dialectical change from pure being into pure nothing—rather, time is the stream that runs between being and nothing, weaving them together. It is the compound of being and nothing. It is something that is part being and part nothing. It is the gradual, continuous transition from being to nothing and from nothing to being. When we consider life as well, we by no means die and are reborn at every moment. I think that to view it as such should actually be referred to as a dialectical abstraction, and is to lose sight of the fact that life is essentially gradual growth. The concrete shape of life is the accumulation of the gradual process whereby the old dies and the gradual process whereby the new is born, their unified expansion leading to growth. The same applies to time. It is a becoming that flows as gradual cessation and gradual generation accumulate. It must in every respect be grasped in a Bergsonian rather than a Hegelian manner. Because the dialectic of Dr. Nishida and Dr. Tanabe is neither merely objective [客観的] nor merely subjective [主観的] but established in the relationship between the subject [主体] and the object [客体]—concepts such as "action" [行為], "singularity" [個性], and "personality" [人格] playing a distinctive role in it—my primordial stream of time differs from that dialectic in several respects. If I may be permitted a simple conclusion, I think that we must acknowledge the sort of continuous stream of time—which is part quantitative and part qualitative—mentioned above as the fundamental form of time determining all forms of time.

Although the primordial stream of time already contains within itself the three moments of past, present, and future, it is not yet a temporal representation or temporal perception in the usual sense. Someone like Volkelt acknowledges a difference between direct temporal experience and temporal representation, as well. Within temporal experience he distinguishes experienced time itself as its objective side and the attitude of consciousness towards the act of experience itself as its subjective side. I think that in the case of the primordial experience of time this distinction is a relative one,

and that we can think of an extreme instance in which temporal experience itself is experienced time.[9]

Irrespective of whether it is something of which we have experience, this primordial experience of time, as a deep stratum of experience that strangely enough cannot be freely manipulated by any of us, in a certain sense is something that opposes us. It is an impersonal rather than a personal experience. This is also the reason why, as stated above, for James an expression like "It thinks," if it were possible, would be the most adequate for exhibiting the character of the "stream of thought." In German there is the expression "*Es dünkt mich* (*mir*)," although it has a slightly different meaning. However, instead of being conceived in accordance with the form of the experience of thought, primordial time should be understood in accordance with the form of the impulse, and is adequately captured by expressions such as "I am driven by something," "I am forced by something," "I am drawn by something," and "I am maintained by something." Relative to it, I am mainly passive or receptive rather than active. For this reason, even though it is something that belongs to impulsive experience, it is somewhat different from usual instances of impulse, and something that may well be said to be impulsive in the passive form. As we are maintained by it, we are pushed from behind and pulled from the front, and feel ourselves flowing in the midst of it. We can call such time "fated time" [運命時間]. The word *Schicksal* (fate) means "something sent" to us by something else. This primordial time, which is based on foundational experience, must be accepted by us as a fate that is sent to us. Although it is not something that has an unrelenting necessity to the point where it completely deprives us of our freedom, we utterly lack the power to completely control it. As limited beings, our fate is deeply rooted in it.

III. The Three Dimensions of Experienced Time and the Attitude of the Ego

The primordial stream of time is the fundamental form of time and something that readily contains within itself the past, the present, and the future, or the moments of time in general—but these moments are there

9. Johannes Volkelt, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Zeit*, 8, 17, etc.

still in a germinating state and have not yet developed into a clear structure. The appearance of the clear structure of time must await the generation of the active attitude of the ego. The active ego should be regarded as the starting point for the positing of time actually occurring in experience. Through it, one-dimensional time becomes three-dimensional time, and our world of experience comes to gain a perspective (*Perspektiv*) on the present, the past, and the future. The position of the ego in the stream of experience is thought to always be that of the present, the horizon of the future unfolding before it, the horizon of the past leaving traces behind it. Although time is usually thought of as one-dimensional, in the original sense, structural time is something three-dimensional. There are those, like Natorp, who argue that time has no dimensions in the strict sense. Perhaps time is something that constitutes a successive series—in this sense we can say that time has no dimensions in the same sense as space has them. However, if time does permit the application of the concept of "dimension," then there must be a reason why what is spatially thought to have one dimension, in time rather must at first be considered two-dimensional. This has to do with the important role that the ego plays as the starting point of the positing of time as it occurs in experience. Even in the case of space, if a living body such as a human is introduced into it as a positing point [定位点], then that body appears adopting six dimensions—front, back, left, right, up, down—rather than the three dimensions of geometry. Yet, the role of the ego in temporal experience is incomparably more important than its role in spatial experience. Originally, contrary to spatial experience, which has the natural inclination to try and extricate itself from the connection to the ego, temporal experience is strongly linked to the ego. This is why quasi-spatially considered, one-dimensional time, taking the present—where the ego is located—as its starting point, at first appears as two dimensions: the future and the past. What, then, about the dimension of the present? If we think of time as a line without width and regard the present as no more than a point on it, then to speak of the dimension of the present is meaningless. However, the present of our concrete experience is not a point in this sense. At its proper place, the ego always occupies some width of simultaneous experience. The present of experience is the simultaneity of various contents of experience. And yet, those who attempt to deny time simultaneity are by no means few. Although in works such as *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma*

et Principiis Kant considers succession the first dimension and simultaneity the second, in *Critique of Pure Reason* he argues that "simultaneity is not a modus for time itself, in which no parts are simultaneous but rather all succeed one another,"[10] and that "there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another."[11] Someone like Natorp argues that two series of phenomena are simultaneous, not two times.[12] This is perhaps an argument that results from regarding time as a pure form, in which case there is some truth to it—but to us, who consider experienced time based on concrete content, that view must be abstract. Our concrete experienced time by no means flows as a line, but like a band that has width. As Trendelenburg, Schopenhauer, and others claim, the argument also obtains that since simultaneity originally has a spatial sense, it cannot be regarded as a characteristic dimension of time.[13] However, time is always something inseparable from space, and the various forms of time are generated by combining with it—in a certain sense, it can even be said that time presupposes space.

Above we have come to know that experienced time has three dimensions and that these are connected to the existence of the ego, which adopts an active attitude. If we can roughly divide the attitudes of the ego in accordance with its main elements into intelligence, emotion, and will, then it is not hard to imagine that this distinction could have some sort of essential relationship with the distinction of time into three dimensions. In my opinion, the future mainly relates to volitional experience, the present mainly to intellectual and emotional experience, and the past partly to the intellectual and partly to the volitional attitudes. Since generally the generation of structural time is something that depends on the active attitude of the ego, volitional experience can be regarded as the unified base of the structure as a whole. That the a-structural time of the stream of experience, besides, as mentioned above, having a fated character, can furthermore be considered impulsive time, is also related to this. Now, what we must know beforehand

10. B. 226. [Kant 1998, 300.]

11. B. 232. [Kant 1998, 303.]

12. Paul Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*, 287.

13. Adolf Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 3.A.I, 230f.; Schopenhauer, *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*, §18.

is that the three kinds of experience—intellectual, emotional, and volitional—by no means each have their own independent existence, as is often said. In their respective operations, they contain the other two within themselves, and can only be distinguished from one another in accordance with their moment of control. From these facts results as follows: that structural temporal experience at its root is the mode of being of the experience of the intellect, emotion, and the will, which is unified through volitional experience. Let us first describe volitional temporal experience in particular.

In their original sense, volitional experience and the volitional attitude are things that belong to the active ego. Since the present is the place of the ego, the time of volitional experience must at first be considered to depart from the present. However, irrespective of this we might feel that volitional time, in always taking some future fact as its starting point, flows towards the present. For example, those who work towards the realization of a new ideal may have the experience that they are ahead of themselves and already in the future, and that time, from a future thus occupied, flows reversely, so to speak, towards the present. Volitional time is time marked by "projection" [企投的].[14] It is "ecstatic" (*ekstatisch*) and "anticipatory" [前走的].[15] However, rather than being conscious of the act of planning it and anticipating to already be there, we are conscious of time as coming closer to us from what has been planned and what has gone ahead. This is why it is only natural that Heidegger, using "care" (*Sorge*) as a clue and examining time based on "conscience" [良心] and "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*), ended up discussing authentic time as "self-temporalizing" (*sich zeitigen*) from the future.[16]

14. [For the translation into English of Heideggerian terms I follow the Stambaugh translation of *Sein und Zeit*: HEIDEGGER 2010.]

15. ["Anticipation" here is the translation of Heidegger's *Vorlaufen*, which the Japanese 前走的 captures better than the English: it is that which runs ahead.]

16. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, I, §65. At the ground of the derivative vulgar time of our everyday life, Heidegger considers there to be an original "primordial time" (*ursprüngliche Zeit*) that belongs to the self—that is, a "temporality" (*Zeitlichkeit*) as the "meaning" of the "being" (care) of beings—and argues that this original time temporalizes itself from the future. However, this is different from what we usually mean when we say that time flows from the future to the present or the past; it is for the self to "project" (*entwerfen*) itself onto the original self. It is for the self to, based on its original possibility, futurize its authentic selfhood. Yet, at the same time our finite self, as what has already been "thrown" (*geworfen*) into the world, is something that has its original past (that is, its pre-existing character). This self, as a thrown project,

is also one that bears its fate and should conduct itself in accordance with conscience. Where that solemn conduct takes place is in the original present. Temporality always only temporalizes itself as the "ecstatic" unity of the original future, past, and present, and the distinction into past, present, and future is no more than something that emerges when this unity is thought by taking one of these moments as primary. We can perhaps understand this ecstatic unity of primordial time as a form of dialectical movement occurring at the standpoint of the finite. To be a thrown project—which is the basic character peculiar to human being as finite being—already exhibits that dialectical character. And that in this ecstatic unity of temporality it is particularly the original future that has priority must be said to be only natural for Heidegger's ontological time, which can be understood as volitional time in the broad sense. However, as stated above, that primordial time temporalizes itself from the original future does not mean, in the usual sense, that time takes the future as its starting point and flows backwards—rather, in the usual sense it means arriving at the future; it just means to futurize towards the original self. The order of the ecstatic unity of temporality is not future → present → past, but future → past → present. Furthermore, this temporality is not, as with vulgar time, stretching out linearly as the past, the present, and the future. On the one hand, this temporality connects to vulgar time. On the other hand, it is something that, through the medium of a "resoluteness" towards the original self, seems to fundamentally transcend vulgar time, finding the self's authentic place in a new stratum or dimension, to there continue to rotate around the self-identical self. Although the sequence of this rotation is indicated, how it subsists is unclear, and even when it is said that primordial time temporalizes itself from the future, it is an open question whether it is ultimately right to think of it as flowing back from the original future to the original past. It rather seems like the three ecstatic states are considered inseparable. This ultimately leads to a denial of the essence of time. By contrast, we rather grasp finite being in its temporal character in every respect, and must accordingly distinguish the future self, the present self, and the past self as, to a certain extent, different selves. Instead of narrowly contracting the circle of primordial time to the surroundings of a self-identical self, we must instead expand it so that it can also include so-called "vulgar time." My so-called "stream of primordial time" must be thought of as the ground that bears the entire structure of original time itself. In time, what can on each occasion be regarded as the incessant backward stream from the future is only the remainder, so to say, that is left when, on the one hand, the temporal distance between the original future (which has already been arrived at by means of anticipatory resoluteness going ahead of itself) and the present, and, on the other hand, the length of the stream of the present (which is indispensable to the anticipation itself) are subtracted from one another. If we furthermore consider my so-called "thick love-present of inclusive time" [包時間的な厚き愛ー現在] (see below [Takahashi is referring to part vi of the present translation.]), then in this present of temporal including-transcendence [時間包超的な現在], it becomes possible for us to from the future first arrive at the present, and from the present arrive at the past, but also to, as Heidegger says, from the future first arrive at the past, and to arrive at the present as the unity of the future and the past. And as I argue in "On the Finitude of Human Being as the Fundamental Concept of the View of Human Life," (see below [TSZ 5: 109–21. Takahashi refers to the third chapter of *Experience and Being*, which has not been translated here.]) if we take into account the fragmentedness and scatteredness of human being, then although the temporal unity of the past, present, and future naturally should not completely be abolished, we can explain, besides the strict unity of time Heidegger thinks of, the fact of the existence of various degrees of temporal disunity. Among those suffering from mental disorders, it is said that there are those who live only in the present,

We should here be mindful of how Cohen, from the standpoint of creative pure thinking, based time in "anticipation" (*Antizipation*) [予料], and understood it as something that comes from the future.[17] Although Guyau regarded desire as the active foundation of time, he may have argued that time does not come from the future but that we move towards it because he primarily considered biological desire.[18] However, we must say that he overlooked the other main aspects of volitional experience by focusing on just one of them. What in particular clearly shows us that time comes from the future is the experience of trying to avoid with all our might the coming to pass of an event that we fear and try to resist. In the broad sense, we can say that volitional time is expected time [期待時間]. However, expected time in the narrow sense is something we should conceive of as volitional time having relaxed, so to speak, into a state of representational time.

Next, let us examine past time. The experience of the past is, like the experience of the future, "ecstatic." Although our ego that experiences the past is in the present, as long we experience the past as past, the ego in a sense is backwards [背走している],[19] once more inside of the past itself. Just as the experience of the future is anticipatory and marked by thrownness, the experience of the past exhibits backwardness and reanimatedness. The question of how we can experience the past while we are in the present is nothing but the reverse of the question of how we can experience the future while we are in the present. Although I leave answering this question for later,[20] for now we must be mindful of the ecstatic character of these temporal experiences. When we experience the past, we are already backwards in the past, and experience how time, having the past as its starting point, flows from there to the present. To regard time as flowing from the past to the present is the most general view about time—but according to it, time that flows from

those who live only in the future, and those who only live in the past. As, for instance, the will is mainly in the future and memory is mainly in the past, even the temporal experience of normal people is something fragmented and scattered precisely because there are differences in degree.

17. Hermann Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, 2.A, 154f.

18. Jean-Marie Guyau, *La Genèse de l'idée de Temps*, 33.

19. [In the Japanese original, there is a contrast between 前走的 (see note 15) and 背走的, where the latter means that which runs (走) backwards (背).]

20. [Takahashi returns to this issue in part VI of the present translation, only to there explicitly leave it unresolved.]

the future to the past is considered nothing if not completely impossible. However, this is not the only view of time, and this time is not the only form of time. That besides this time there moreover is volitional time, which is more fundamental, is something I have mentioned already. Time that takes the past as its starting point in a way is the experience of time as it occurs in the intellectual attitude—and it is particularly time as it occurs in memory. Bergson's time, as long as it is understood as pure memory, should also be regarded as something that to a significant degree exhibits the features of known time, and in respect of being a-structural can be said to mostly stand in an antipodal relationship to Heidegger's time, which is volitional and structural. Since experience of the past is thus something that is, on the one hand, intellectual, the past is always represented as something that has completely come and gone, about which we can no longer do anything, and is forever left behind us. Yet, in order to be able to conceive of time as something that does not merely rest in the past but flows from it, on the other hand we must reflect on its connection to volitional or impulsive experience. That is, the past is not something that has completely died, and must be considered something that has the power to determine the present and influence the future. Although Bergson thinks of time mainly as the past,[21] he also every now and then regards time as related to the future, and as creative. His theory of time in works such as *Creative Evolution* is somewhat different from that of *Matter and Memory*. I think that even when we conceive of time as pure memory, it must not only be understood as something purely intellectual, but also as something that is in some way active. I will below have the chance to once more explain why memory and knowledge must not at all be regarded as equal.

iv. The Experienced Present and the Primordial Stream of Time

What, then, is the present? Is it a point equal to nothing caught in between the infinite past and the infinite future? The present has often been considered such a thing. For example, Schopenhauer likens time to "an endlessly revolving sphere; the half that is always sinking would be the past, and

21. Compare Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, III, 216 f.

the half that is always rising would be the future; but at the top, the indivisible point that touches the tangent would be the extensionless present,"[22] and says that it is "infinite nothingness." However, even if we likewise think of the present as existing like a point, it is possible to accord the present a positive role and not merely understand it as a negative existence. In that way we can perhaps, besides time that takes the future as its starting point and time that takes the past as its starting point, conceive of time that takes the present as its starting point. The view of time that takes the present as its center attains its clearest form in Augustine.

According to Augustine, just as the past has come and gone and therefore no longer exists, the future is that which has not yet come to pass and therefore likewise does not yet exist. The only thing that does exist is the extensionless present. How, then, can we know about the past and future, given that they do not exist? And how can we measure their length? These are difficulties Augustine faced as he thought about time. He thought that he could only discover the key to solving the mystery of time by adopting the subjective perspective. That is, according to him, the past that no longer exists and the future that does not yet exist can together exist in our present mind. This is why we should not say that originally, there is the past, the present and the future—rather, we should say that there is a present of past things (*praesens de praeteritis*), a present of present things (*pr. de praesentibus*), and a present of future things (*pr. de futuris*). The first is memory (*memoria*), the second intuition (*contuitus*), and the third expectation (*expectatio*).[23] It is furthermore possible to measure time by taking the mind as a yardstick. It is not the future that is long, but the expectation of it. It is not the past that is long, but our memory of it.[24]

As we have just seen, the idea that is the point of departure of Augustine's theory of time is that only the present exists and that it has no extension. We can find the same idea in Brentano's theory of time. For him as well, to exist in the original sense means to exist as what is present, and what is present is none other than a limit point in the temporal continuity. How, then, is it possible for us to represent the past and the future, which are non-existent?

22. [Schopenhauer 1969, 279.]
23. Augustine, *Confessiones*, xi, 20.
24. Ibid., xi, 28.

According to Brentano, at the same time as we can represent the present "directly" (*modo recto*), we can "indirectly" (*modo obliquo*) represent the past and the future. Time, in short, is a mode of representation, and the continuity of time is none other than the continuity of modes of representation.[25]

However, is the present ultimately something that is entirely without extension, as Augustine, Brentano, and others think? I cannot but reply that this at least is not the case for the present as we experience it. It is usually said that our perception takes place in the present. Yet, upon closer inspection there is no actual perception that does not contain some retention of the past. Although this is particularly clear in the case of the perception of a rather large object [対象], it is likewise the case when perceiving a small object—the only difference being that it is experienced more subtly. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson too argues that memory of the past enters into perception to complement it. Still, not only in the case of the retention and memory of the past, but also in that of the anticipation (*protention*) and expectation of the future, we must recognize their collaboration with perception. As a process, perception is always anticipatory. For example, when I perceive the barrel of the pen that I hold in my hand to go from one end to another, at every moment I experience how where it comes from is accompanied by retention while where it is going is guided by anticipation. That is why perception of the present is by no means something like a point, but always something that has some degree of temporal extension. Retention and anticipation pervade actual perception, and since they collaborate with it, not only the past but also the future can have an influence on the present. Thus considered, the present is not the only thing that exists—so do the past and future. We can actually experience this in our actual perception. This experience of the extended present is something that people noticed early on. According to E. R. Clay,[26] when we hear part of a song, or watch a meteor shoot across the sky, the most recent past is not felt as past but rather as the present. This is what he called the "specious present." That is why according to him, time to our human perception consists of four parts: the obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. He considers the

25. Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus), I, II, III[1].

26. ["E. R. Clay" is the pseudonym of E. Robert Kelly, who influenced William James.]

past, the present, and the future as unreal, and—leaving to the side for now whether it is appropriate to deem the specious present a fiction—puts too much of the "specious present" into the past. James popularized the specious present introduced by Clay—but in him this bias towards the past can be said to have been rectified. He recognizes duration as the unit of the composition of our perception of time. The present that is actually perceived is by no means something like a knife-edge—James says that we should liken it to a saddle-back with a certain breadth.[27] William Stern would later concern himself with the same issue using the term "mental presence-time" (*psychische Präsenzzeit*). He put forward the proposition that "The psychological phenomenon that takes place within a certain timespan can, depending on the circumstances and without negating the non-simultaneity of its individual parts, form a unified and coherent act of consciousness,"[28] and called the timespan that covers one such act "mental presence-time."[29] We can cite many more similar theories from other psychologists—but that is not our aim here. What we should pay attention to is that even though presence-time is unifying, its unification is not simultaneous but successive. Stern is right to point this out in opposition to the theories of Wundt, Strong, and others. The characteristic that indeed distinguishes the extensionality of "presence-time" from spatial extensionality, which is simultaneous, is that it has extension while also being successive.

This idea of the extended present renders the endeavor by Brentano, Husserl, and others to interpret time by means of the concept of intentionality unnecessary. In our primordial perception of time, the past, the present, and the future do not merely continue intentionally—they form real continuities. If we conceive of the present as an extensionless phase that in the temporal series is the sole existing thing, then all our mental phenomena should be included in this phase, and the past and the future lose any room to exist. Even if they did exist, then they would merely do so inauthentically [非本来的], so that we would accordingly have no choice but to consider

27. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1: 609–10.

28. ["*Das Innerhalb einer gewissen Zeitstrecke sich abspielende psychische Geschehen kann unter Umständen einen einheitlichen zusammenhängenden Bewusstseinsakt bilden unbeschadet der Ungleichzeitigkeit der einzelnen Teile.*" See the following note.]

29. William L. Stern, "*Psychische Präsenzzeit*," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, 13: 326, f.

their relation to the present, like the so-called "intentional relation," something insubstantial [非実質的]. Furthermore, a temporal continuity that is thought to be made of unextended temporal phases is not a continuity in the original sense. It ought to be called a "discontinuous continuity" and, as a certain group of mathematicians think, at best is no more than a continuity of elements that lack a cord to tie them to one another. That the stream of time is not such a contrived continuity has already been explained by Bergson.

Still, as already mentioned earlier, Bergson's view, which understands time purely qualitatively and denies it any quantitative attributes, tends towards the other extreme. In this case the truth perhaps lies somewhere in the middle as well. That is, time is partly qualitative and partly quantitative, and accordingly permits division. And yet divisions in time do not imply complete rupture—they must themselves occur within the continuity of time. At their base, they should be thought of as limits that are contained in the continuity of experience. And this division of time can continue *ad infinitum*. The so-called "specious present," which is thought of as a unit in the temporal system, should not be taken as an absolute unit; neither should the unity of "mental presence-time" be thought of as an absolute unity. Volkelt discusses the present as the "smallest extension,"[30] which he distinguishes from the differential "minimum of thought"[31] and thinks of as the "minimum of experience"[32] that no longer permits division—but we can perhaps through division obtain a present that is even more minute than this.[33]

When we think of it in this way, the present is something for which we can keep seeking the bottom of experience. It is not something that we can grasp to declare: "this is the present." The bottom of experience is an immeasurable abyss. In the recesses of the present lies the present of the present, at the bottom of which lies a deeper present. In this manner, we can infinitely continue to flow down to a deeper present. We must fully examine this depthlessness and fluidity of the present. We must also realize that at its ground, the present of our structural temporal experience links with the a-structural primordial stream of time mentioned earlier. We cannot,

30. [*Kleinste Erstreckung*.]
31. [*Denk-Minimum*.]
32. [*Erlebnis-Minimum*.]
33. Johannes Volkelt, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Zeit*, 33.

as Brentano, Husserl, and others think, measure the true depth of the ego and the present—not even through inner perception or phenomenological reflection. The present of these acts, too, have their own time, and their fate is to flow together with the stream of experience. Are there some other means, then, by which we can grasp the ego and the present, which are difficult to get hold of? What here once more becomes our problem is the dialectical view. This view perhaps finds easier application to structural time, in which the opposition between the past, the present, and the future is clearly manifest, than to the stream of primordial time, in which the distinction between them is more opaque. Brentano's conception of the present is not dialectical; neither should Augustine's forcibly be understood in that way. Going back further, however, Plato's conception of the "moment" is clearly dialectical.

In *Parmenides*, Plato examines the "change" (μεταβολή) of the "one," and that the one must not exist in time but in the "moment" (τὸ ἐξαίφνης, *Augenblick*, *Plötzlich*) is argued by him as follows. If the "one" changes from a state of rest to a state of motion, or conversely from a state of motion to a state of rest, then this cannot at all be in time. This is because it is impossible for something in time to neither move nor be at rest. When, then, does the "one" change? It can neither change when it is at rest nor when it moves. Accordingly, when it is in time, it cannot change. When the one changes, then, what is the strange thing in which it is? "The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion."[34] The concept in Plato of the "moment," together with the concept of the "one" that simultaneously rests and moves, is thus understood dialectically. What merits our attention in this dialectic is that rest and motion are regarded as contradictory opposites, and that as long as they are, they are not related as a differential continuity, but thought of as severed, as discontinuous. That is why the "moment," which is where the "one" is when it changes from motion or rest to the opposite state, does not itself exist in either—hence, the outcome is that it must be thought to generally

34. 156 St. [Benjamin Jowett translation.]

not exist in time. This is not all. When Plato considers the change of the "one" as it occurs in the "moment," he conceives of the change itself, not as something one-sided, but as something two-sided—from rest to motion and from motion to rest. This is why we can extend what he said about motion and rest, and accordingly what he said about time, to "change" in general, which allows us to conclude that the "moment" and the "one" do not even belong to change itself. As a result, the "moment" increasingly transcends concrete time and motion until it eventually arrives at something like an "eternal now." However, if, as Plato says, the "one" is something that participates in change, then it is also possible for us to seek the "moment" in the direction opposite to the one mentioned above. That is, we can perhaps consider the moment to be in change, and furthermore to be in motion or in rest, and thus for it to again be in time. Although Plato seems to distinguish the temporal "present" (*νῦν*), which is located in between the past and the future, from the "moment," by means of the above-mentioned way the latter can come closer and closer to the former. I for one think that, in our experience, the continuous movement from the temporal present to the "eternal" now as well as the movement in the opposite direction are both possible, and that therefore there is no "moment" in them in the truly absolute sense. The plane of these various presents should in the ideal case intersect with the plane of the stream of time at a right angle, so to say, but in actual experience is never perpendicular to it and, approaching the foundation of experience while being constantly swept away by the primordial stream of time, comes to be something that has certain gradient. We must therefore consider the present that does not flow together with the present that does. As for this flowing present, it should not be thought of as something that, while there is an unchanging present, only changes its position in accordance with our stream of experience—the flowing present itself is the present as a stream. We can accordingly by no means capture it as a definite point. In experience it is always grasped in the guise of something like so-called "presence-time." This should be distinguished from spatial extension and has a certain quantity of fluid temporal extension. However, because that extension, as we argued above, is something that permits infinite division, we can furthermore consider the fluid stratum of an infinitely deep present to lie at its bottom.

Since the depth of the experienced present is thus itself a stream, we can-

not fix the present as an immobile center point to flush the past and the future from it. This present is laden with the past and pregnant with the future and something that itself flows temporally. That time takes the present at its starting point to flow in both the direction of the past and the direction of the future is, as I discuss below, possible in no more than a second sense. This present is not, like Plato's "moment," a point where the change from rest to motion or conversely from motion to rest occurs, but itself in motion. Is it not a dialectical contrivance to regard the "moment" as the dialectical unity of "rest" and "motion"? Is motion that has been placed in opposition to rest not no longer moving motion itself, but no more than the abstract concept of motion, no more than the category of motion?

Plato's concept of the "moment" is thought to have influenced Aristotle's theory of time. That Aristotle conceived of the "present" (νῦν) as something like a substrate that can adopt various modifiable states as its attributes is not necessarily a dialectical view—but when he abstracts the "present" from the stream of time, the connection to Plato is apparent.[35] We can moreover trace the influence of this idea via Plotinus' theory of time,[36] to that of Augustine. Closer to us, even someone like Kierkegaard, who criticizes Plato's concept of the "moment," himself understands it as the dialectical synthesis of eternity and time, and moreover even says that their contact only happens in time.[37] Heidegger is critical of Kierkegaard for, in defining the moment with the help of the present and eternity, not going beyond the vulgar concept of time. From his own ontological standpoint, he distinguishes the moment from the usual now (*Jetzt*) that belongs to within-time-ness, defines it existentially as the "authentic present," and argues that it temporalizes itself from the future.[38] In a restricted sense, his view of time can be said to be dialectical as well. In our country, Dr. Tanabe seems to regard the present, like Plato's moment, not as separated from time but in contact with it, and Miki Kiyoshi's *Philosophy of History* conceives of it, like Kierkegaard, more than that as rather inserted inside of time itself—but like Dr. Nishida, both attempt to understand time dialectically with a focus on the present

35. Aristotle, *Physica*, IV, 10–14.

36. Plotinus, *Enneades*, III, 7.

37. Søren Kierkegaard, *Der Begriff der Angst* (translated by Christoph Schrempf), ch. 3.

38. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, I, 338 [§68].

(of course, like Heidegger, Miki also recognizes the great significance of the future). At this point, I would like to say something about Dr. Nishida's and Dr. Tanabe's theories of time in particular.

Their theories of time have common characteristics. Simply put, their theories of time are present-centric, dialectical, and activist [行為的] or practical. We may well say that up until now—in Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Brentano, Marty, and Husserl—the theory of time has mainly been an examination of objective [対象的] and intellectual time. In present-day experimental psychology, the interest of the bulk of research on time leans in this direction. By contrast, the theories of time of Dr. Nishida and Dr. Tanabe reject that kind of intellectual, objective view—they try to understand authentic time from the perspective of practice and action. They claim that for practice and action to be possible there must be an opposition of, on the one hand, a personal individual [人格的個体] as the working subject [働く主体], and, on the other hand, an external world that is worked upon. Action, as what unifies this opposition between inner and outer, naturally must be something dialectical. However, since the opposition of inner and outer is particularly one that is discontinuous and ruptured, this dialectics of action must take the form of a discontinuous continuity.[39] Moreover, action is always undertaken in the present. Authentic time, then, must not be understood as future-centric, as Heidegger says, but as present-centric. Of course, this activist present is not a present that occurs in a series of objective [対象的] time, but should be considered something that is the practical point of unity of the actual world of objects [対象], which is the result of the past, and future possibility.[40]

While I have some room to raise various objections against the abovementioned dialectics of action, I here cannot undertake detailed criticism. I here restrict myself to examining whether we can ultimately truly capture the present through action or whether it is not precisely the activist present that is fluid. The activist present that is supposed to unify inner and outer

39. Dr. Tanabe has recently criticized the concept of discontinuous continuity in his essay "The Logic of Species and the World Schema" (「種の論理と世界図式」), *Philosophical Research* (『哲学研究』), no. 235. [See THZ 6: 169–264.]

40. See Dr. Nishida's *The Self-Conscious Determination of Nothingness* (『無の自覚的限定』) [NKZ 6.] and *Introduction to Metaphysics* (『形而上学序論』) [NKZ 7: 5–84.], and Dr. Tanabe's *Outline of Philosophy* (『哲学通論』) [THZ 3: 371–522.].

must be distinguished from the present of mere objective [対象的] time. In pure objective [客観的] time there is no special position such as the "present," and precisely to carve out a particular point in it and bestow upon it the significance of the present can be said to be an action or practice. Still, considered from another angle, for the very reason that action and practice are thought to unify inner and outer, in actually encountering, negotiating, combining, and linking with objective [客観的] temporal objects [対象], precisely action and practice must in some way flow together with those objects. Any practice or undertaking that relates to the external world is not something that happens instantly—for its completion, a certain amount of time is necessarily required. During that time, that which works continuously exists and flows together with objective [客観的] time, and in a sense must even be positioned in its midst. For instance, if we consider something on a large scale—such as the history of a people or the world—then even if the individual [個体] that works is viewed as the individual manifestation [個体的顕現] of the spirit of a people or that of the world, as long as it is at work as an individual, its existence must be allotted a certain objective [客観的] time. Of course, as the personal will [人格的意志], our practice is considered to, besides its external expression, possess an infinitely deep immanence. Yet, it is precisely this will that bears the fate of being impossible in the present. To work without end is indeed the essential character of the will. For that reason, the will fundamentally is a process, a stream. It should not only be thought of as momentary resolve, but also as the work that accompanies its execution. As such, there is no moment at which it halts. At all times, it is not something that halts in the present—it continues across the past, across the future, and across the present. The semblance of the "eternal now" cannot be sought in it. Even when there are those who think of time and history as the self-determination of the "eternal now," as long as it is time, as long as it is history, it should not resemble an eternal "now," but must always resemble a stream.

v. The "Thin Present" as Intellectual Time

If the above-mentioned present that does not flow should not be sought in the domain of the will, but rather precisely the guise of the will and of impulse is the stream of time itself, then in what direction should

that present be sought? I think two directions are possible. The first moves still further away from volitional experience; the second presses on towards the ground of volitional experience itself. To the former direction belongs contemplative experience, the most important of which is intellectual experience. Emotional experience belongs to the latter direction. To begin with, the time of intellectual experience is thought of as a single present. In the intellectual attitude, we can progressively raise ourselves higher and higher above the foundational stream of experience. There, various strata of experience are distinguished—from the sensuous via the perceptual to the judgmental—and accordingly various times are established, from which arise the various theories of time. There are those who, for instance, regard time as sensuous, such as Mach, and those who consider it primarily as a mode of representation and secondarily as a mode of judgment, such as Brentano. According to Marty, our temporal consciousness is partly indirect and partly direct. In direct temporal consciousness we can further distinguish two components. Although the first component belongs to representation, it does not belong to the modes of representation, but is based on substantial distinctions or distinctions of objects [対象]; the second component is the modes of judgment, which exhibit differences in quality. In contrast to the former, which is continuous, the latter is discontinuous.[41] From the standpoint of the critical philosophy, there are those like Kant who deem time to be a transcendental form of intuition. In the Marburg School time is logically purified further and taken to be a category. By contrast, there are also those who, like Rickert, attempt to recognize an illogical element therein. In Fichte, Heidegger, and others, it is brought back to the transcendental imagination. If we, on the other hand, regard it objectively [対象的], then the relation between time and number, the relation between time and space, the relation between time and motion, the relation between time and the things themselves, etc., become a problem from various standpoints and in various senses. In this short essay I cannot discuss these problems one by one—but I do want to call attention to the following two to three points.

First, in respect to the objective [対象的] time that appears in the intellectual attitude, we must differentiate between the part of the fluid present—and the past and future that are near to it—and the part that is

41. Anton Marty, *Raum und Zeit*, 230f.

comparatively distant from it. Husserl differentiates between retention as the intention of the primary past and protention as the intention of the primary future, and memory as the intention of the secondary past and expectation as the intention of the secondary future—but many other psychologists acknowledge similar distinctions as well.[42] That Marty felt it necessary to within temporal consciousness distinguish between elements belonging to representation and elements belonging to judgment perhaps also has its origin here. Those who accord great importance to consciousness of the meaning of the past, present, and future, and argue that temporal consciousness is only established by means of their definite *meaning*, for the most part are thinking of this comparatively distant intention of time, or conceive of it by transferring it to "presence-time," or the primary memory or anticipation that borders it. The various modes of time, which are the outcome of the absolute distinction of the meaning of the temporal modes, are mistaken as things that are mutually completely severed, thereby giving rise to the attempt to try to explain the relations between them by means of the concept of intentionality, or the endeavor to interpret them by means of a dialectical unity. I think that we, on the contrary, first discern the basic character of time in something like "presence-time" or the flowing present and extend it to comparatively distant temporal consciousness, and should understand distinctions of the meaning of the temporal phases as various limits occurring in the temporal continuity.

The purer our intellectual attitude becomes, the more the stream of time has the inclination to be fixed to the spatial present. Yet, at the same time it cannot avoid contracting to something increasingly superficial separated from foundational experience.[43] In this manner, at the limit of intellectual time we arrive at something like Newton's absolute time (*tempus absolutum*), which flows uniformly.[44] This indeed is precisely what is sought after: an absolute measure of time that defines all objective [客観的] motion unequivocally. We can now likewise understand the meaning of Kant's paradoxical

42. [See HUSSERL 1991.]

43. For the details, see "The Consciousness of Time and the Temporality of Consciousness" in my *The Standpoint of the Whole*. [TSZ 3, 58–83.]

44. Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, definition VIII, scholium I.

claim that while the phenomena flow in time, time itself does not.[45] That is, from the standpoint of his critical philosophy he brought up the problem of time as the transcendental condition that makes all temporal empirical objects [対象] possible, and had to conceive of this transcendental condition itself as something that remains the same and unmoved, unchanging in time. Although these views fundamentally differ—one is simple and one is critical—we can perhaps say that it is only one step that separates Newton's uniformly flowing absolute time from Kant's time that does not flow. The difference simply is that one of them conceives of the stream in the guise of something that flows, while the other grasps the stream itself as a form that does not flow. Here, I do not contest the possibility of grasping something that flows under the guise of what does not—that this is factually possible is something we continually experience in intellectual reflection and not at all remarkable. This is something that can be inferred as well from the fact that the verb "to become" (*werden*) [成る], can adopt a past, present, and future tense, and that it can be used as a noun—that is, can be objectively [対象的] captured in the word "becoming" [成]. We here witness the phenomenon of the spatialization, objectification [対象化], formalization, abstraction, etc., of time. If by means of intellectual reflection we take one step further in abstraction and formalization, we eventually enter the domain of numbers. In that domain, the cardinal and ordinal numbers correspond to space and time, respectively. If we take one step further still, we enter the world of pure logic, and discover how they respectively correspond to the disjunctive and hypothetical judgment.

Of course, as we move from the time of the experiencing ego to natural and historical time, experiences such as "empathy," (*Einfühlung*) "understanding," (*Verstehen*) "sympathy," (*Sympathie*), and the consciousness of duty have to be incorporated.[46] In a way nature and history belong to each of us—but they do not belong to each of us alone. They are not, so to say, private property, but intersubjective common property. Needless to say, something like so-called "labor time" has a social significance. Still, even when things such as natural scientific time and mathematical time necessarily lack a clear consciousness of human "being with" (*Mit-*

45. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B, 183, 224ff.

46. [For the influence of Max Scheler on Takahashi, see Cheung, 2018.]

sein), we must to a certain degree impartially recognize the fact that they can be established. Here, too, lies a problem concerning the relationship between the individual [個人] and society which we must consider deeply.

We must also be mindful that as intellectual time, the present is something that extends to the past and to the future. Just as the intellectual present should not—as most people carelessly tend to think—be regarded purely as the outcome of past events or actions, it must be distinguished from the past itself. This present is the simultaneity of the past, the future, and the so-called "present," and in this sense is at rest. However, at the point where the intellectual present is at rest, once more the danger arises of it being confounded with the past. Is the past not precisely that which is in a state of eternal rest? Still, in order to know that the past is not eternal death, it suffices to recall Bergson's theory of time. When people ordinarily argue that past history defines the present and the future, this should already be recognized. However, there is another reason why the intellectual present and the past itself are being confounded. Up to a point, this has to do with the essence of knowledge. Just as Hegel says that the owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk, it is not in the least difficult to understand why people think of knowledge wholly as recollection of the past. Apart from what we know "already" [既に], what on earth do we know? Is knowledge not something that essentially bears the character of the "already"? Still, we must give this some thought. Besides "already" knowing, next to "presently" [現に] knowing, there is also "finally" [やがて] knowing. Since we can thus distinguish the modes of the past, the present, and the future in "knowing" [知る] itself, "knowledge" [知] in general is not directly the same as "already knowing" [既知]. However, the distinction into modes of "knowledge" is something that occurs as the outcome of viewing them from the side of the act of knowing. The original direction of knowledge is the direction of the object [対象], and simultaneity and presentness are its peculiar characteristics. We "presently" know what has been known "already," and what we might "finally" know is also "presently" known. This is why instead of thinking of "knowledge" as "already knowing," we should rather think of it as "presently knowing" [現知].

That intellectual time is not the same as the past is particularly clear from the fact that it can extend into the future. It is a fact that what we can know about the past far exceeds what we can know about the future. And

yet, this is not a sufficient ground for principally denying foreknowledge of the future. For instance, we can roughly foresee tomorrow's events, today. If the future were a complete darkness that does not permit any prediction whatsoever, we would have no choice but to cease all purposive activity. The future, as Bergson and others say, is not something that is utterly unforeseeable, but as something that can to a certain extent be foreseen, and to a certain extent cannot be foreseen, stands in a certain special relation to the intellectual present. In order to explain this connection intuitively, it is illustrative to consider the reverse case—that is, the case in which the present is first given and the future comes to be linked to it. We consider the objects [対象] of external perception to be present. When I gaze at a hut on a distant hill, the picture that fills my field of vision to me is the present. When I think of walking towards the hut, then what happens? Needless to say, as I begin walking towards the hut, the shape and color of the hut, which at first were vague, become clearer and clearer, until they are perceived with complete clarity when I arrive at the hut. Herein lies the peculiar connection of the present to the future. The object of perception that is first thought of by me as the present, in a sense becomes a future object to me depending on whether I take it to be an object of action or not. This is perhaps why Guyau and others let space precede time. The connection of the future to the present that happens when we foresee the future is perhaps like this. We should of course not overlook that the matter is not so simple particularly when we foresee the comparatively distant future, in which case there exists the remarkable phenomenon of mistaken expectations. Still, this fact does not principally prevent the possibility of foreknowing the future. Illusions and errors do not exist only with respect to the future. We may wrongly remember or forget past experiences as well. This is not all. The past is ordinarily considered a fact about which we can no longer do anything whatsoever—but the concrete experience of the past cannot do without the interpretation of the past based on the future and the present, and through their interpretation the past constantly changes shape. The significance of moral and religious repentance must be sought there as well. While we may likewise pay insufficient heed to the past or be mistaken about it, interpretation based on the past or the future also forms a constitutive element of our concrete present experience.

In this way, present simultaneity is characteristic of our intellectual time,

and since it is not something that only covers the so-called "present" but also the past and the future, in a sense it is a present that is, as Augustine said, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things. However, in our case, this present is not the subjectification [主観化] of objective [対象] time—on the contrary, it must mean the objectification [客観化] of experienced time. The past and the future are not mere modes of this present. When we think of the past and the future as modes of the present, two views are distinguished. The first view, which Augustine can perhaps be considered to hold, considers the past and the future as each contained within the present—but it is distinguished from the above-mentioned present in that our intellectual present cannot completely include the past and the future within itself. While the second view considers the past as a present in the past, and the future as a present in the future, the present in this sense is no more than the present as an abstract generic concept. Our intellectual present differs from the present as such an abstract concept and rather should be considered the maternal experience that makes it possible. It is not completely past nor completely future, but, so to say, something half past, half future. It fully includes within itself neither the past nor the future, but is something that, while essentially connecting itself to both, is no more than a thin simultaneous stratum of experience that is spread across them. We might call this the "thin present" [薄き現在].

As mentioned above, the intellectual present is my so-called "thin present," which constitutes the upper stratum of our experience. This stratum is stratified: while maintaining a functional relation to the degree of purity of our intellectual attitude, the strata—from so-called "presence-time" at the bottom to pure objective [客観的] time at the top—are mutually linked. This is why we can conceive of our intellectual time as flowing in both the direction of the past and the direction of the future, with this movable "presence-time" in the center. And yet, this intellectual time, which flows in both directions, must itself, as a single stream, adopt the one direction from the subjective to the objective. Given the simultaneity of this intellectual time, we can attribute to it different degrees of reversibility and repeatability. However, to actually repeat it, each time an irreversible act is required.[47]

47. For details, see "The Consciousness of Time and the Temporality of Consciousness" in

In this manner, we can discover the following three forms of time: volitional time, which flows from the future to the present; the time of memory, which flows from the past to the present; and intellectual time, which flows from the present into both the direction of the past and the direction of the future. Although each of them is something ecstatic, among them it is intellectual time that has this character in the original sense and is even self-forgetful. These forms of time are furthermore established on the basis of the fated impulsive time of the foundational stream of experience, which underlies and carries each of them. Even intellectual experienced time, as long as it is experience, cannot be completely separated from it. No matter how lofty the intellectual reflection, it cannot be established without the time of the reflective act. Consciousness that is conscious of time is itself temporal.[48]

VI. The "Thick Present" as Emotional Time, or the Love-Present

Although I have thus far discussed "mental presence-time" and my so-called "thin present," I think that we can discern another kind of "present" in emotional time. In my opinion, the general quality of emotion lies in its being a state (*zuständlich*). In a sense, what is a state is simultaneous, and thus has a character that can be called "present" [現在的]. When we are happy, angry, or sad, we often forget about time. We can say that what lives in pure emotion is not affected by time. I think that we should call the simultaneity of emotion as a state the "thick present," distinguishing it from the "thin present" of intellectual time. It does not, like the intellectual present, merely thinly extend itself across the past and the future, but is a present that thickly wraps the two within itself. Except through deep feeling, there probably exists no way to penetrate into the inner reaches of the stream of time and capture them simultaneously. Just as knowledge can cover the will, feeling can include the will. I experience this fact strongly and deeply in love. Precisely love truly not only is the source and aim of the will, but next to being the place where its activity occurs is also the body [体] that includes

my *The Standpoint of the Whole*. [TSZ 3: 58–83.]

48. See the previously mentioned work.

it. The will flows in and through love. This is why the will or action or practice are not the final thing—precisely love is the ultimate reality.

The "thick present" of emotional time is not, like the other times, "ecstatic"—rather, it is "in itself" or "internal." That intellectual time, regardless of its presentness—better yet, exactly because of its presentness—can be considered ecstatic, is because the activity of the volitional, impulsive ego is external to the "thin present," opposing it. On the other hand, since, as "thick present," the emotional present can be considered to include the activity of the ego itself, the character of being "in itself" and "internal" can be attributed to it.

Although the emotional present must thus be distinguished from the intellectual present because of its thickness and depth, its thickness and depth can have various degrees. Sometimes it is diluted to the point where it almost wholly becomes the intellectual present. At other times it is distributed through various means to the future of the will, or to the past of memory. In this way, various forms of emotional time arise. While it is possible for us to study these forms of emotional time by means of psychological experiments and introspective methods, what I am also greatly interested in is understanding them through works of literature and art. Schiller writes the following on the "threefold pace of time":

> Threefold is the pace of time:
> The future approaches with hesitation,
> The present absconds as fast as an arrow,
> The past stands still forever. (Proverbs of Confucius)[49]

This poem is often cited as an example to clarify subjective time, and while this is of course applicable in certain cases, it does not necessarily cover all cases of temporal experience. We experience how an unfortunate future comes all too soon, and how the boring—*Langweile* or "long time"—present passes slowly. There are instances when the memory of happy days gone by extends its kind hand to ease the anguish of the present, and instances when, to the contrary, the past deepens the bitter sadness of

49. [*Dreifach ist der Schritt der Zeit / Zögernd kommt die Zukunft hergezogen / Pfeilschnell ist das Jetzt entflogen / Ewig still steht die Vergangenheit*. The last line can alternatively be rendered as "The past remains silent forever."]

the present. Confucius' lamentation on the river [川上の歎], Lu Shi Heng's [陸士衡] song of mourning bygone days [歎逝の賦], Kamo no Chōmei's lamentation on the "flowing river" [行く川のながれ], Walther von der Vogelweide's elegy "*Owê war sint verswunden*," Shakespeare's "The Rape of Lucrece," etc., are each works that express the role of emotion in temporal change, but we can also conversely think of them as forms of emotional time. It is usual for people to feel pessimistic or cynical about how the times are changing. And yet, just as Fichte said that he felt happier the more he was active, by those who have hope, by those who are strong-willed, change is rather gladly welcomed. Needless to say, there is an internal relation between emotion and the tempo and rhythm of music. In some cases, even the seemingly unimaginative time of physics, which flows in an infinite straight line, can appear connected to a special kind of emotion—even more so than the extremely effective horizontal lines in paintings by Van Gogh and others. Does not precisely the image of "time" as flowing endlessly in a straight line from the infinite past to the infinite future strangely enough strike a chord with us?

We must moreover pay attention to the present time that is peculiar to aesthetic experience. This, too, is a kind of emotional time—but it is not necessarily a "thick present," but should rather be thought of as a "thin present." Only, it is a unique kind of emotional presentness that cannot be regarded on par with the "thin present" of intellectual time. For example, Nicolai Hartmann speaks of the "appearance of the timelessness"[50] of art.[51] Something like Oskar Becker's "vacuity of art" can be understood as a negotiation between the pure aesthetic present and the temporality of actual existence. This is an existence that is like an untimely rainbow appearing in the transient autumn sky. In the desolate world of actuality, it is precisely the artist that yearns for easily fading appearances who must be a great adventurer.[52] Although I cannot delve into aesthetic time deeply here, it presents us with a compelling problem.

What I am particularly keen to convey is that pure emotional time is the

50. [*Erscheinung der Zeitlosigkeit*.]

51. Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, 400ff.

52. Oskar Becker, "*Von der Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers*," in the *Husserl-Festschrift*.

"thick present" having various degrees, and that the true thick present is deep love. Only by considering such a love-present [愛ー現在] can we understand the possibility of time's ecstatic character itself. Above I wrote that will-time [意志ー時間] flows from the future to the present and that memory-time [記憶ー時間] flows from the past to the present—but I want to leave unresolved how we, who consider ourselves to be in the present, can be ahead of ourselves to already be in the future or can once more return to a past that should already have passed. If we postulate the German-Austrian school's concept of intentionality as a basic phenomenon of consciousness, then the problem is already resolved before it can be posed. For me, it is the possibility of intentionality itself that is the problem. The dialectic of discontinuous continuity offers no solution, either. For me, the continuity of time understood as "discontinuous continuity" is the problem. And if, as Bergson says, our experience is an irreversible and unceasing stream, then how are we able to in memory once more dive into the past itself? If it were so that we are continually in a point-like present, and that in this point-like present the whole of the past and the future are presently contained as "temporal features" [時間徴表], then the matter would be different—but this theory has already been refuted psychologically by means of the concept of "presence-time." If it is the case that the real past and future exist apart from the point-like present—or if they must do so—then how can we reach them while being in the present? We must here at any rate think of something at rest that includes activity within itself. I think this is something that can be discovered in the present of love. In a certain sense and up to a certain degree, we can take the intellectual present as our guide to arriving at the past and the future. When we actually recollect a past beyond the past, or imagine a future beyond the future, it is mostly in this way. However, reliance on this way makes the past become more distant, the future more remote. They moreover increasingly become fixed spatially, so that the time that flows from the past to the present and the time that flows from the future to the present can no longer be established. On the other hand, intellectual time itself is only possible by presupposing the love-present. In order for the weak stream of intellectual time to cut through the strong stream of experience and flow back into the past or be able to anticipate the future, it must rely on the power of the deep love-present, which includes the stream itself. The love-present not only lets the intellectual present be established as a part of

itself, but also generally enables the return to the past itself and the anticipation of the future itself. Through this is established, not just the intellectual grasping and understanding of the past and the future, but also their emotional and volitional [情意的] grasping and understanding.

Because the love-present includes the stream of time itself in this manner, a view that is different from the usual view of temporal distance is also possible. In the usual sense, temporal distance is measured mainly by means of the standard of intellectual time. For this reason, Bergson and others argue that time that has been measured is time that has been spatialized and hence not real time. However, this is an extreme claim—all time permits being measured to a certain degree. It is just that the distance of our concrete experienced time is not necessarily always measured by means of a purely objective standard. It can also be measured by means of a subjective standard. The tempo of experienced time is not necessarily something uniform, but differs according to the experienced content and the subjective attitude. Just as James showed that the "stream of thought" is not something straight and flat but uneven, in our concrete experienced time certain parts leap into the foreground and other things recede into the background in accordance with what captures our attention and interest in any particular moment, forming a perspective on time that differs from so-called "objective [客観的] temporal relations." For instance, when we await the arrival of a friend, his time of arrival is, so to say, drawn into the foreground, approaching the present—and the uninteresting time that leads up to it recedes monotonously into the background, as a result of which we feel the objective [客観的] temporal order being inverted. This is why even phenomena that seem objective and simultaneous are subjectively heterochronic, and conversely what is objectively heterochronic can become subjectively simultaneous. What is objectively prior can moreover subjectively be later. This is the same for past time. That is why the relation between the past and the future sometimes allows for inversion. In those suffering from mental disorders, past and future events can be thought of as present events, and sometimes it is even possible that a phenomenon we might refer to as the "relativization of the present" occurs. As Husserl's diagram of time shows, even among those of sound mind concrete experienced time is by no means something that flows unidirectionally in a straight line and at a steady tempo. For it to do so belongs to the rare phenomenon in which, no subjective attitude in particular being

adopted, experience is left to flow as it is. Our concrete experience unifies the moments of the intellect, feeling, and the will in various proportions, and these variously change—so if we were to express experienced time as a line, it would have an indefinite curvature, and would form an extremely complex curve that intersects with itself at various points. However, experienced time is not a mere line, but is, so to say, a plane with width—better yet, a solid figure with thickness. Our concrete time should accordingly be thought of as a solid figure with various unevennesses and bulges.

The above is related not only merely to our individually experienced time, but can up to a certain degree also be said about world-historical time—on the method for attaining which I here remain silent. World-historical time not only has a natural side, but also a spiritual side. The present epoch in which we live in more ways than one may not necessarily be what is closest to us. Some may feel closer to the time of the ancient Greeks, some to the Nara period, and others to the society of the future. This can be said not only of individuals, but also of epochs. That is why what defines the thinking of individuals and epochs is not necessarily a recent epoch. Of course, without a connection to the recent past, neither the current epoch nor the individuals living in it could exist—but the strength of that connection and the extent of its influence cannot be measured to be in inverse proportion to the distance in objective [客観的] time. In this sense we can say that in history there is no such thing as objective [客観的] necessity. Just as an epoch long past can, so to say, skip over the recent past, it can influence the present and its individuals. What lays the foundation for this possibility must actually be the greater present that includes time. Only by considering this inclusive historical present [包歴史的現在] is it possible to solve a rather difficult problem of the philosophy of history in Hegel and others, namely, why history does not necessarily continue to progressively unfold, but can also retrogressively decline.

What is more, something like Nietzsche's eternal recurrence can be understood as a form of time as well. Dr. Kuki Shūzō, paying heed to this recurring time, has argued that it should, so to say, be positioned, as interrupted strata, in a direction perpendicular to the horizontal direction of the usual progression of time. What I call the "thick present" corresponds to

this perpendicular direction.[53] Miki Kiyoshi also made a separate attempt at an interesting essay on epochs, generations, etc., based on the concept of recurring time—but that work bends the structure of Dr. Kuki's pure recurrent time into the, so to say, horizontal direction, and by linking its interrupted strata to one another, can conceive of them as forms of time that appear as they historically and dialectically rotate. I think that these forms of time can be derived through the combination of my so-called "thick present" with the stream of time.[54] Time has various other complex forms besides these, and they all lie in between the time of the most foundational stream of experience and objective [客観的] time, the uppermost stratum. If we are to discover a pure temporality that can be distinguished from spatiality, then we must seek it in the irreversible fluid time that in every respect deeply belongs to the stream of experience.

VII. Time and Eternity

I have thus far discussed the primordial stream of time and the forms of experienced time. Finally, there is also something I must say about the relationship between time and eternity.

When the relationship between time and eternity is made into an issue, several famous passages from Plato's *Timaeus* may come to mind. In that text, using Timaeus as a spokesman, Plato attempts a mythological outline of the creation of the world, saying the following on the coming about of time: although the creating father wished to have the image of the sensible world resemble the eternal model as much as possible, he could not bestow perfect eternity upon it. "But he determined to make a moving image of eternity (εἰκὼ κινητόν αἰῶνος), and so, when he orders the heavens, he makes in that which we call 'time' an eternal image (αἰώνιον εἰκόνα), progressing according to number, of an eternity that rests in unity."[55] Thus considered, on the one hand time must, as an *image* of eternity, be distinguished from eternity itself; while on the other hand, it must, as an image of *eternity* or as

53. See Dr. Kuki's essay "Metaphysical time" in *Philosophical Essays in Commemoration of Dr. Tomonaga's 60th Birthday* (『朝永博士還暦記念哲学論文集』). (Also part of *Humans and Existence* [『人間と実存』].)

54. See Miki's *Philosophy of History* (『歴史哲学』).

55. 37 St. [Plato 2008, 27.]

an *eternal* image, be something similar to eternity, something that imitates eternity, and in a sense even be said to be something eternal. What, then, makes time an image of *eternity*? It is not entirely clear to me how Plato thought about this. As Hoffmann and others suggest,[56] we might be able to find the reason in how time moves in accordance with *number*,[57] or in how its movement is *cyclical*.[58] Just as Plato said that time moves in accordance with number, Aristotle defined time as "a number of change in respect of before and after (ἀριθμός κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον)."[59] In Plotinus the relation of number to time and motion is likewise discussed, and in Augustine, too, the measure of time becomes an issue. Especially in Kant time and number are claimed to be closely connected, and after him their order becomes a matter of dispute. However, to connect time to number on the one hand bestows upon time the ideal character of number and on the other hand makes it possess the perfection of the numerical order, in this double sense leading to the eternalization of time. Moving on, it is not hard to find—at present or in the ancient world, in the East or in the West—examples of the idea that the motion of time is cyclical. We are dealing with quite an interesting idea if we regard this as an interpretation of the essence of time itself.[60] Etymologically *Zeit* and *time* belong to the same family of words as *tide*, to which the Latin *dies* is also said to be related. From this angle as well the cyclicality of time results. On the other hand, we should not overlook that the concept of cyclical time from the first is considered related to the problem of the measurement of time. Regardless of whether time is recurring or not, in order to measure time we must use units such as, on a larger scale, recurring natural phenomena like the motion of the sun, the moon, and the stars, and, on a smaller scale, the repetitive motion of the hands, the feet, breathing, etc., or the periodic motion of the pendulum of a clock. For the same reason, when people speak of the cycle of generations and epochs, there is the need to obtain a unit to measure historical time.

56. Ernst Hoffmann, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung*, appendix to Eduard Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, A.II,I, 1092.

57. 37 St.

58. 38–9 St.

59. Aristotle, *Physica*, IV, 11. [ARISTOTLE 1999, 108.]

60. See Dr. Kuki's above-mentioned work.

This is why the line of thinking that regards time as following number and the line of thinking that regards it as recurrent in a way are related to one another. Whatever the reason may be, if we follow the Greek view of considering what is indefinite and indeterminate as imperfect and what is coherent and orderly as perfect, then that time through its recurrence and cyclicality is thought to be close to perfection and thus as something that can imitate eternity is not unreasonable.[61]

How, then, is it that time is no more than an *image* of eternity? This is precisely because in contrast to the archetypal world of Ideas, which is eternal and unmoving, time is motion, and has the distinction between past, present, and future. Even if we were to presuppose that the motion of time is recurrent, in order for it to recur, time is necessary. This is because each recurring motion is itself a motion, a process. The plurality of those recurring motions—if their infinity is considered—mutually coexist in the temporal order. Furthermore, even recurring motion, so long as it is a motion, must be thought to vary in its manner of recurrence, such as being clockwise, or counterclockwise. This is why as long as time itself does not become space, it cannot truly recur. In the strict sense, the concept of recurring time perhaps cannot evade self-contradiction. What we discover there is not eternity itself but at best nothing more than an *image* of eternity. As Plato

61. Plato tells us the following about the relationship between the model and the image: "For the model is a being for all eternity, while the heaven correspondingly has been and is and will be throughout the whole extent of time" [Plato 2008, 27]. I want to particularly call attention to the phrase "throughout the whole extent of time," since when Plotinus later discusses the relationship between eternal life and the life of this world, which is its image, he is considered to have mainly based himself in that phrase. That is, Plotinus says that in contrast to the unique, indivisible, absolute, infinite, and complete whole, the life of this world can only be one by means of continuity. It can imitate the whole only by way of succession in an endless series, striving to step by step approach the whole, ceaselessly desiring to acquire existence. (*Enneaden*, III, 7 (translated by von Kiefer), I, 283ff.) I think that the idea that appears here can be understood in a negative and a positive sense: 1) negatively, as signifying that the incompletely—because bearing the distinction between past, present, and future—existing world and the time that arose together with it are no more than mere *images* of eternity; and 2) positively, as signifying that the world and time, in order for them to as images of *eternity* be as similar to eternity as possible, must progress through the whole of an endless successive series. In the latter case, the relationship between the model and the image to a certain degree can be compared to the relationship between complete real infinity and indefinite pseudoinfinity, and as long as temporal pseudoinfinity is also a kind of infinity, it can be thought to be similar to eternal real infinity. In this way, a positive third meaning of the image can be established.

argues, of the Idea as the eternal model we should say simply that it "is"—expressions such as "was" or "will be" apply only to temporal events.[62] These are no more than the forms of time that imitate eternity.

I particularly wish to pay attention to how Plato here acknowledges an essential connection between eternity and being. Although he uses this fact mainly as the basis for clearing up the distinction between eternity and time, if we consider that the modes of time can likewise be expressed wholly in terms of the modes of being, then we can directly and clearly understand that time is not just an *image* of eternity, but also participates in *eternity* as its image. While Plato writes that "we use expressions as what has become *is* what will become, what is becoming *is* becoming, what will become *is* what will become, none of which is accurate,"[63] we can at the same time consider the positive side of this point. For instance, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a past fact—but that this fact *was* in the past can be said to be an eternal truth. Past facts are not the only ones that are true. The same goes for future facts. That certain events *will be* in the future is probable—but the probability that they will occur itself seems not probable but certain. This is why "was" and "will be" in themselves also "*are*," and if we view them "*sub specie aeternitatis*," temporal events themselves in a sense can likewise be thought of as an eternity. Hegel's remarks that "philosophy, which occupies itself with the True, is concerned with what is eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost to philosophy: the Idea is ever present, Spirit is immortal, i.e., Spirit is not the past, nor the non-existent future, but is an essential now," are also based on the same view.[64]

The eternalization of time in the sense conveyed above can, expressed in the language of experience, be interpreted as the presentalization [現在化) of time by means of the contemplative attitude, and chiefly intellectual reflection. We find the act of intellectual reflection there where the focus is on the numerical order of temporal events and their cyclicality—that is, lawfulness in the broad sense—and "was" and "will be" are leveled on the plane of "is." We have already mentioned that we can progressively transcend the stream of time by means of intellectual reflection to spatialize,

62. [See PLATO 2008, 27.]

63. [Ibid.]

64. G.W.F. Hegel, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Reclam, 125. [HEGEL 1988, 82.]

presentalize, and eternalize it. When we actually examine the propositions of logic and mathematics, while noetically we are in time, noematically we can truly attain something eternal and ideational. Perhaps apart from intellectual reflection, there exists no way to as a finite being grasp the semblance of something eternal in a comparatively clear manner. And yet, much is also lost in this way. The light of intellectual reflection cannot penetrate the depths of the abyss of time, which flows in darkness. Time that has been intellectually reflected upon seems like, on the one hand, an eternal image of the eternal Idea, and on the other hand, the eternal shadow of true time.

Are we, then, unable to grasp what is eternal at the heart of the stream of time itself? Experienced time is the original mode of being of the will, and moreover primordially the mode of being of the impulses. Can we not rather in such lived experience come into contact with what is eternal? The following poem by Goethe seems to tell us how matters stand:

> Enjoy abundance and blessings in moderation,
> Reason is present everywhere,
> Where life is pleased with life.
> Then the past is enduring,
> Alive, the future lies ahead,
> The moment is eternity. (Legacy)[65]

To like Otto Liebmann understand this poem as indicating the world process "*sub specie aeternitatis*," is to grasp a partial truth, but also cannot avoid being a view that is removed from reality.[66] To instead understand this poem as something born from Goethe's experience of the absolute value of every beautiful moment—that is, of symbolic eternity—as Gundolf does is perhaps closer to the truth.[67] Schiller also writes about "the favor of the moment" (*Die Gunst des Augenblicks*). Yet, in order to have itself be equal to eternity, Goethe's "moment" is both rational and receptive of life; because Schiller's favor of the "moment" is "the most powerful among all rulers," I cannot but feel that it is something beautiful yet momentary and fading.

65. [Geniesse mässig Füll' und Segen / Vernunft sei überall zugegen / Wo Leben sich des Lebens freut / Dann ist Vergangenheit beständig / Das Künftige voraus lebendig / Der Augenblick ist Ewigkeit.]

66. Otto Liebmann, *Ueber subjective, objective und absolute Zeit*.

67. Friedrich Gundolf, *Goethe*, 674.

To get a taste of eternity while alive, it is necessary to sink ever deeper into life itself. The moments of Bergson's pure duration, for example, can, up to a certain extent, be said to satisfy this demand. As unique states that are each laden with the past and pregnant with the future, they are states that are like Goethe's so-called "moments," in which the past endures and the future is active beforehand, but from which the rational element has been removed to have them dissolve more deeply into the stream of life. Still, Bergson's pure duration, rather than being "creative time" (*temps inventeur*), mostly seems like "the continuous progression of the past" (*le progrès continu de passé*). That moment, rather than living in hope for the future, is often too attached to past memories. Instead of signifying the eternal future, it rather seems to signify the eternal past. We seek a moment that is more pertinent.

If we from this somewhat contemplative attitude shift to an active, practical attitude, a different, new connection between the moment and eternity is established. According to Kierkegaard, for instance, if we only think of time as infinite succession, then the distinction between past, present, and future does not arise. This is because any part of an infinite succession continues to flow, so that a fixed present that can serve as the starting point for distinctions cannot be discovered. If we persist in trying to find distinctions in it, then we must appeal to representation—but regarded representationally, the infinite succession becomes a present devoid of content. That which provides time with the distinction into past, present, and future must be the "moment," which synthesizes time and eternity. The moment in this sense originally is not the atom of time, but the atom of eternity. It is what reflects eternity in time, the first advent of eternity. By means of the moment in that sense is the concept of "temporality" (*Zeitlichkeit*) first posited, and here the temporal distinction between present, past, and future is established. Among these three, what has the most significance is the future, which in a certain sense is the whole that even contains the past. Just as eternal life is usually thought of as a future life, eternity first and foremost means the future, and the moment and eternity establish the past anew. If the moment did not exist, then eternity would manifest as the past, just as what has been ordered to just go somewhere without having been given directions would turn back to travel along the road it came from. By contrast, if the moment has been established, then eternity does exist, and eternity is at the same time the future, and the future once again

comes back as the past. To the Greeks, who did not know about the moment and "temporality" in the true sense, eternity was the past, as Plato's theory of "anamnesis" illustrates. In Christianity the moment exists as eternity, and this eternity is simultaneously the future and the past. As the synthesis of eternity and time, the moment is what corresponds to spirit as the synthesis of the soul and the flesh—better yet, it is a manifestation of this spiritual synthesis.[68] According to Kierkegaard, in contrast to Bergson and others, in this way true spiritual "temporality" is not a continuous stream that flows from the past to the future. Such a thing is merely sensuous. In a pure continuous stream, there is nothing we can refer to as the determinate present. The moment is what sets up this present and distinguishes the past and the future relative to it, and what establishes the moment is eternity. This eternity is moreover first and foremost thought of as the future. We can therefore say that the moment is forward-looking and future-intending. That the moment is defined through its relation to the future in Heidegger's theory of time—who took a lot from Kierkegaard's thought and interpreted it "ontologically"—therefore does not amount to any difference. Still, the authentic time—that is, "temporality"—of his hermeneutics, as the "meaning" of human being as finite being, is itself finite, and no longer seems to be the Hermes! that delivers a direct message to us from eternity.

However, while emphasizing practice—better yet, precisely because of an emphasis on practice—the present and the moment can be restored from a predilection to the future to their own unique position, at the same time making possible the endeavor to attempt to understand eternity as the eternal present. This is the view of Dr. Nishida, Dr. Tanabe, and others. Even when in their case we cannot say that there is no preference for the possibilities of the future over the fixity [固定性] of the past, the peculiarity of their view lies in the attempt to recover the line that connects the present to eternity from the inclination towards the future and along this new dimension try to self-consciously and dialectically define its occasional moments of action as the self-determination of an "eternal now." Of course, I do not close my eyes to the strong points of this view. However, as I indicated above, my view is somewhat different. The effort of some to separate the dimension of activist time [行為的時間] from the dimension of intellectual objective

68. Søren Kierkegaard, *Der Begriff der Angst*, ch. 3.

[対象的] time and try to restore it to the, so to say, perpendicular position, can ultimately only succeed halfway. And precisely this intermediate position is actually the position that is peculiar to the stream of time. What I try to do is to leap, beyond the dimension that is peculiar to this time, into what is truly eternal. In my opinion, the method that makes this possible is not the will or action, but that which penetrates and includes them: love. Precisely love is the true moment where time and eternity are in contact. It truly is our *apex mentis*, truly the sparkle of the soul (*daz fünkeln der sêle*), truly the window into the absolute (*das Fenster ins Absolute*). Through it we can behold eternity, be illuminated by eternity, and "taste" eternity. In love, which is one and indivisible, the self first is the self, and action first becomes the action of the self.

In this way, the present of love, in which each of us stands truly as one self, is what partakes in eternity and harbors its trace—but it is not directly eternity itself. It moreover is a temporal now (*jetzt*), not yet the absolute Now (*Jetzt*); a determined being (*ist*), not yet the supra-determined Being (*Sein*). As such, it does not truly exist as "standing now" (*nunc stans*), but must be said to be something that has the aspect of flowing in accordance with the primordial stream of time. As Hegel puts it, "what is finite is what changes, what is temporal." This truly principally is the fate of actually finite beings. Our concrete ego is not Kant's so-called "standing and lasting I" (*das stehende und bleibende Ich*).[69] Ultimately, it is the ego that flows. The ego that is conscious of the stream of time is not, simply for being conscious of it, completely a-temporal, but consciousness of time itself arises temporally.[70] Augustine's consciousness-present [意識ー現在] of the so-called "present of past things," "present of future things," and "present of present things," must itself also be in time. Even considered from his own position, this present of the present, which belongs to the consciousness of limited creatures, should not be able to directly be the same as the "eternal now," or the "*hodie*" of God as the infinite master of creatures. The relation between time and eternity must therefore be raised for us as a question anew.

This metaphysical problem, considered formally, is the problem of the

69. [KANT 1998, 240 (A123).]

70. See "The Consciousness of Time and the Temporality of Consciousness" in my *The Standpoint of the Whole*. [TSZ 3, 58–83.]

finite and the infinite; considered in terms of content, it is the problem of God, the world, and the soul, as addressed by Kant in his transcendental dialectic. Since Kant merely took issue with natural time, he treated it especially in the context of the antinomies of rational cosmology—but considered from the history of philosophy, it is clear that it is a problem that relates to God, the world, and the soul. Of course, I cannot deal with all of these pervasive problems in this short essay. In fact, I do not have space to investigate even one of them in detail. If I can indicate how to resolve even one or two issues, then this will have to do.

Eternity is usually thought to transcend time. The issue is what "transcendence" means. Plato's later thought tends towards regarding the Ideas as immanent. The Marburg School, among others, strongly advocates the immanent interpretation. However, according to the usual view, Plato is someone who argues that the Ideas transcend the world of phenomena, and this is said to be the peculiarity of Plato's way of thinking. If we take the transcendent independence of the Ideas as absolute, and assume that they must moreover have some sort of relation to the world of phenomena, then, as Hoffmann and others suggest, the Ideas must be understood through *parousia* (παρουσία), and phenomena through *mimesis* (μίμησις), *methexis* (μέθεξις), and *koinonia* (κοινωνία). The *parousia* of Ideas is that the model is present in the image, in which the transcendence of the Ideas is moreover maintained. And the relation between *mimesis*, *methexis*, and *koinonia* expresses the striving towards the Ideas on the part of the phenomena. That the phenomena participate in eternity by means of time, which is the image of eternity, should only be understood in this sense—but eternity should not be thought to in this way be a power that comes to be immanently at work in temporal things. The theory of the "image of eternity" from the *Timaeus* shows that the concept of *methexis* remains unchanged from the *Phaedo*.[71] Whether Hoffmann's interpretation is accurate or not is a separate issue—what I think we have here is a typical view of the relationship between time and eternity. According to this view, eternity exists independently from time, and time can only exist as that which partakes in eternity, imitates eternity, and desires eternity as its goal. Eternity does not descend

71. Ernst Hoffmann, op. cit., 1093.

into time to be at work inside of it, but does no more than let it harbor a distorted trace of its perfect existence.

However, there are other views, such as, for example, Plotinus' emanationism. According to Plotinus, while the One and mind are both supratemporal, once the world soul stirs its desire, time is produced. Time is the life of the world soul, an image of what is eternal.[72] In Plotinus we can therefore see the view of the relationship between eternity and time continue to turn towards immanentism [内在観], even when we cannot speak of the direct immanence of the eternal absolute in time.

If we take immanentism one step further and bring in the dialectical view, we attain a view like Hegel's. Hegel's theory of time is mainly conveyed in his philosophy of nature. In it, only what is finite and natural is temporal. The true, the ideal, spirit—these are eternal. Still, he cautions that eternity should not merely be abstracted from time—as if it exists outside of time—and thought of negatively. The same applies to historical time. If we try to push Hegel's basic perspective, we ultimately arrive at a point where time itself is eternity—and until we get there, we have not yet been thorough enough. We can doubt whether Hegel himself actually managed to be thorough enough to reach that point. In this connection the thought of the Zen of the East can, among others, in a sense be said to have seen immanentism through to its ultimate point. Although we should of course not forget about its originality, Dr. Nishida's idea of the self-determination of the "eternal now" can be regarded as by and large belonging to this inclination in thought.

However, the view concerning the relationship between time and eternity of Christianity is different from the above in certain respects. There are of course many interpretations of Christian doctrine. This is why it is not possible to unequivocally define its characteristics. If we exclude the pantheist view as heretic and adopt the theist view, then, as Augustine says, God eternal can be understood to transcend the world, creating everything by means of the eternal "word" and furthermore establishing time along with

72. Plotinus defines time as "the life of the soul (the world soul) that moves from one manifestation to another," and also says that time is an extension of the world soul. He understands time subjectively as not existing apart from the soul, manifesting in the soul, and being contained in the soul to form one body [一体] with it (ibid., 284–5).

it. The relation of eternity to time is therefore a transcendent creation. Still, to those who do not believe in miracles, how that is possible presents itself as an extremely difficult problem. While Christian theology perhaps provides an adequate solution to it, I think that a work like Conrad-Martius' *Theory of Time* also attempts an interesting interpretation.[73]

Besides what I have raised above, many other views concerning the relationship between time and eternity are possible. Still, they all either belong to the following three forms of thinking, or can be understood as a mixture of these. The first view regards eternity as transcending time; the second view regards eternity as immanent to time; and the third view regards eternity as including time. The first is transcendentism [超越観], the second view is immanentism, and the third view can be called—with some difficulty in finding the right word—inclusivism [包摂観]. Insofar all three of them in some sense espouse the transcendent character of eternity, the first can be called transcendentism, the second immanent-transcendentism [内越観], and the third including-transcendentism [包越観]. The views presented up until here mainly belong to the first and second forms of thinking. By contrast, I advocate the third view. To regard eternity as something that transcends time is to stress the essential difference between them. That eternity is different from the finite temporal process goes without saying—but it should not be conflated with a temporal duration that is without beginning and without end.[74] It is something that is principally different from time. It must be something that exists in itself, and must be understood through itself. How, then, is its relation to time generally possible? Plato's theories of *methexis* and *parousia*, Plotinus' endeavor to harmonize transcendentism and immanentism in emanationism, and the Christian doctrine of transcendent creation arise as attempts to explain this. Compared to them, the dialectical interpretation can at least be said to be philosophically more thorough. According to its general formula, eternity-*soku*-time [永遠即時間], time-*soku*-eternity [時間即永遠]: the contradictory unity of eternity and time is true eternity. To take this one step further, eternity is not

73. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, "*Die Zeit*," *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, 11/2 and 4, 1927–1928. This work by Martius mentions the creation of the world, and without explicitly stating so seems to have Augustine's theory of time in mind.

74. For example, see the eighth definition of the first part of Spinoza's *Ethica*.

only identical to time, but must also be identical to every moment of time. Such moments are moments that are identical to eternity, not only merely in Goethe's sense, but also in the absolute sense. Moments are absolute just as they are. The three thousand realms are a single thought [一念三千]. I think that we see this espoused in the theory of time of Dr. Nishida and others as well. I do not completely reject this view. At the same time, not just when it is casually presented as the easiest solution to the problem of the relationship between time and eternity, but also when it is a conclusion reached only after deep thought and experience, I cannot express my complete agreement with it. Perhaps this is because I lack the ultimate reflection and the deepest experience. Still, in my opinion, even if we grant that the moment is an eternal moment, it is still a moment, and not eternity itself. The self-determination of the "eternal now" is not the eternal now itself. The eternal now must be what does not even need to determine itself in the moment. It is what contains every determination in itself but is itself without determination, what includes all activity but is at rest in itself. Such an eternity does not need to create the world or time—better yet, that would be impossible. This impossibility of creation does not signify a limit to God's power, but rather that that power is infinite. By contrast, the need for and possibility of creation rather indicates a lack of power. "Become!" is not even a "word" that God has a need to utter. God is eternal silence. Yet, the creatures refer to God's non-creation as creation, hear God's silence as "words," and see in God's eternity the production of time. Dialectics has meaning only among finite beings, or when finite beings face the infinite. The infinite absolute does not engage in a dialogue—not even a monologue. The eternal includes all time within it and is itself a-temporal. On the one hand, since it includes time, it is immanent to time. On the other hand, again because it includes time, it transcends time. What synthesizes immanence and transcendence is the eternal of inclusive time [包時間的な永遠者]. It is the infinite that transcends the finite by including it. This infinite actually is the transfinite comparable to the so-called "transfinite number" of the mathematicians—better yet, that which includes the finite. It is the absolute being, and since it readily surpasses [絶する] all opposition [対], instead of referring to it as a being it is more appropriate to refer to it as absolute nothingness [絶対無].

In conclusion, I will speak using the plain language of experience. Above, I stated that love includes time and transcends it. This is why eternity is love,

why absolute nothingness is absolute love. It is love that does not love—that is, loveless love [無愛の愛]. So-called "love of the other" or "love of the self" is love that is relative. Loving one's enemy and loving oneself by loving one's enemy are already the relativization of love. However, the love of us finite beings is necessarily finite. Therefore, it is temporal. On the one hand, we participate in eternal love; on the other hand, we drift down the boundless stream of love and hate. It is fated in the same way as the primordial stream of time is fated. Each moment is not eternity itself. Many moments—too many moments—are temporal. We are in the eternity of love only in moments of deep and wide love, when we can, in a sense, experience ourselves as avatars of the eternal. Everything is between love and fate. We must simply rejoice that we are able to discover in the lake of flowing "time" a few moments that emit the faint yet mysterious light of eternity.

* The translator would like to thank Cheung Ching-yuen for making his copy of Takahashi's complete works available to me here in Hong Kong. I also thank Gregory S. Moss and Friedemann Barniske for helping me translate the poems by Schiller and Goethe. Finally, I thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on the first version of the manuscript.

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