Steve Lofts
Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

The Logic of the Committee

A First Draft

Nakai Masakazu 中井正一

ORIGINAL TITLE:「委員会の論理」, in『世界文化』13 (1936): 2–17; 14: (1936): 16–33; 15 (1936): 12–25. Reprinted in 中井正一全集』[Complete Works of Nakai Masakazu] (Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, 1981), 1: 46–108.

KEYWORDS: Kyoto School—Cassirer—Heidegger—Marxism—logic—media—mediation—history—culture—technology—nothingness—critique—function—negation—negative judgment

Translator's Introduction

Nakai Masakazu (1900–1953) was a philosopher of aesthetics and media technology *avant la lettre* associated with the left wing of the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy, a critic and public intellectual, a social activist, an avant-garde filmmaker, and a librarian. In the late 1920s, he was the associate editor of the *Journal of Philosophical Studies* at Kyoto University. He co-founded two important interdisciplinary and even intercultural journals in the early 1930s: *Beauty and Criticism* (『美批評』), which was shut down by the authorities in 1934 for its antifascist positions, and *World Culture* (『世界文化』), which was shut down in 1936 for the same reason. Nakai also co-founded the populist newspaper *Doyōbi* (*Saturday,* 『土曜日』), which was shut down after only 44 issues in 1936 for the same reason. *Doyōbi* was modeled after the magazine *Vendredi* of the Front Populaire in France. However, whereas *Vendredi* was written by an intelligentsia to liberate the masses, *Doyōbi* was a "newspaper written by its readers" and "edited by committee"; in other words, it was a grassroots product of collective thinking and action. Nakai was critical of the intelligentsia and their esoteric and specialized language, which understood self-critique as a technical activity undertaken by specialists in the inaccessible corridors of the ivory tower world. Such technological specialization is an expression of the division of labor of capitalism. In such commodification of critical thinking, "*non-criticality* [無批判性] is branded into the *commodity nature* of the concept." Everyday people become uncritical consumers of critical thought rather than cooperative agents in self-critique. Nakai participated in the "Give the rice back" movement in 1932 and helped organize the student protests during the Takigawa Incident in 1933. As by the mid-1930s, public protests were all but impossible, Nakai and his friends began a "coffeeshop movement"—a mobile site

(場所) of resistance modeled after the European café scene. The original location of this movement was a coffee shop called François' Tearoom (フランソア喫茶室), opened by Shōichi Tateno 立野正一 in 1934 as a place for labor activists to meet and discuss politics. By 1936, it distributed the newspaper *Doyōbi* and functioned as a place for Nakai and his friends to screen their experimental movies, play jazz, and dance. Tateno was arrested in 1937, and François' Tearoom was closed under the Peace Preservation Law. Nakai's and Andō Shunzō's *Poem of the Sea* and *Ten-Minute Meditation* were the first colour films made in Japan, and *Poem of the Sea* was shown to Emperor Hirohito in 1932. In the same year, Nakai gave a paper at the *Kyoto Philosophical Society* titled "The Transformation of Beauty and its Challenges" that contained the core of his functionalist theory of beauty and art at which Nishida, Tanabe, Miki, Kuki, Watsuji, Tosaka, and Nishitani were present. Nakai was finally arrested in 1936, shortly after the publication of the "Logic of the Committee," for anti-fascist political activities under the Peace Preservation Law and sentenced to two years in prison but released in his first year.

After his arrest, Nakai lost his position at Kyoto University and eventually became the director of the Onomichi City Library in Hiroshima prefecture, where he taught art theory to ordinary people. After Hiroshima, Nakai began to give open talks on Kant's ethics to the general public. He also organized what was called a "summer university" that traveled from village to village in which Nakai brought intellectuals, farmers, laborers, and soldiers together to engage in what he called an "immanent self-critique" that sought not "knowledge" but a "revolution in consciousness"[1]—it was an attempt to understand the tragic history of Japan and their personal responsibility for that history, linking the everyday life of people to wider historical events during the period known as the Fifteen Years' War that led to the horrors committed by Japanese soldiers and ultimately to the destruction of Japan. The "summer university," which began with 700 students, transformed itself into the Hiroshima Prefecture Labor Cultural Association with 130,000 members.[2] After the war, Nakai co-founded the Hiroshima Culture Movement for Peace and Democracy in 1946. In 1948, with the

1. NMZ 4: 194.
2. NMZ 4: 196.

support of Hani Gorō, Nakai became the first vice director of the National Diet Library and, the next year, its second director. He died in 1952.

Be it the interdisciplinary journals *Beauty and Criticism* or *World Culture*, the weekly newspaper *Doyōbi*, the coffeeshop as a mobile site of resistance, the collective activity of producing films, his "summer university" project of collective "immanent self-critique," the Hiroshima Culture Movement for Peace and Democracy, the establishment of the library as a medium of democratic thinking, Nakai's philosophical focus was on the objective mechanisms/organizations[3] that create and mediate a "collective emboded subjectivity," and his social activism focused on the creation of new mechanisms of collective embodied subjectivity that would be cognisant of the mechanisms that conditioned their subjectivity while at the same time co-creating these very mechanisms in collaboration with others. Nakai examines how the nature of collective embodied subjectivity is transformed as the material mediation of thought historically shifts. In his 1932 essay, "The Continuity of Spring," Nakai provides a detailed analysis of the technique of montage in Mikhail Kaufman's film Spring and writes: "The history of language, which has been transformed into spoken words, written words, printed words, and telegraphic words, has now entered the realm of the language of sight, which does not require translation into any national language. It can be said that we now have a language without grammar and without endings."[4] Here, we find the beginnings of the critical treatment of the historical transition of logic that is the main focus of "The Logic of the Committee." Each material medium possesses its own logic that conditions the historical world opened up through it and the embodied subjectivity that inhabits this historical world. In his work on avant-garde films, Nakai examines this new medium from the perspective of the new logic of the image "without a copula" as the new *Kino Satz* (the language of cinema) and the new technique of montage that defined, for Nakai, the emerging art form of avant-garde film as an inherently anti-fascist and anti-capitalist medium.

Nakai wrote on European and Japanese aesthetics, focusing on the function of aesthetics in various mediums such as sports, architecture, machines,

3. Nakai plays on the double sense of the term 機構, which signifies at once mechanism, organization, system, structure, or framework.

4. NMZ 3: 150.

photography, film, and the library. For Nakai, the "everyday" is the site of a transformative socio-political praxis. It should be emphasized here that in Japanese culture, the borderlines between philosophy, religion, art, and the everyday are blurred; aesthetics is about a way of life as the art of living. Nakai's work on aesthetics must be approached with this in mind.

Nakai worked in various *mediums*: film, newspapers, the social spaces of cafés and parks, and language. His writings were published in academic journals and popular magazines such as *Kōga* (『光畫』), which was one of the main focal points of the New Photography (新興写真) movement in Japan in the early 1930s, which had been influenced by Germany's *Neue Sachlichkeit* and Surrealism.

In the early 1930s, Nakai was working on a theory of collective thinking and action as a collective resistance against the rise of Japanese fascism, on the one hand, and European-style capitalism, on the other. For Nakai, expression, perception, thinking, and action are displaced from a substantial notion of an autonomous individual consciousness and embodied in a collective structure that includes the body and nature but also group sports, committees, architectural spaces, the lens of the camera, and other machines as extensions of what he calls, following Kant and Cassirer, "the technology of nature" (*die Technik der Natur*).

Nakai completed his graduate studies in aesthetics with Fukada Yasukazu 深田康算 (1878–1928), who was at that time translating Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. In his 1927 article, "On the Preface to Kant's Third Critique,"[5] Nakai compares the two versions of the Preface to Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. In the first unpublished version, Kant situates "technology" as the medium between theory (the first critique, knowledge) and practice (the second critique, action). Technology is a dialectical moment, a reflective relation in the production of historical forms by the productive imagination that mediates theory and practice. As Cassirer writes: "There is a technology of nature (*eine Technik der Natur*)" that is the "expression of a creative formative will."[6] Nakai develops his understanding of "technology" as a philosophy of the mechanism that dialectically mediates nature and the human. In "The Logic of the Committee," Nakai writes:

5. NMZ 1: 277–304.

6. Cassirer 1981, 296.

> This human purposeful action sways all nothingness into being, all being into nothingness, in order to combine them into the human sequential order in the schematic axis of this natural sequence. The mediating moment that sways nothingness into being, being into nothingness, is the structure of the logic of technology.

Through the mediation of technical transformation, the human separates itself from the animal world and forms the human world.

> In this way, the human itself, as one of the powers of nature, confronts material nature. By means of the natural power in his body, as well as by means of the active force of intellectual work, the human works on nature and, in so doing, transforms nature, thereby simultaneously transforming his own nature at the same time.

Nakai's philosophy seeks to establish the aesthetic mechanism which mediates and embodies the collective will to see in the originary phenomena of the creative activity—art as *poiēsis* and *techné*—at work in the artwork that opens the world.

A full comparison of Nakai's view of technology with those of Miki and Nishida is beyond the scope of this introduction. Nishida and Miki developed their theories of technology as an embodied logic of mediation in the mid to late 1930s, and the similarities between their respective conceptions of mediation and technology have raised a debate about who influenced whom.[7] Like Nakai, Nishida and Miki maintain that we cannot separate *poiēsis* (making) and *physis* (nature) and argue that human creativity takes place through "the technology of nature" *(eine Technik der Natur*). Nishida wrote in 1936: "Technology is an activity of nature. Nature is an ingenious technician. Accordingly, we cannot accomplish anything unless it is thoroughly through the technology of nature (*eine Technik der Natur*)."[8] Miki wrote in 1936 that "the *Einbildungskraft* in art corresponds to the technology of nature (*die Technik der Natur*)."[9]

The move from individual consciousness to an embodied collective consciousness, from the modern "culture of individualism" to the arising "cul-

7. Krummel 2017, 265.
8. Nishida 2011, 119.
9. MKZ 8: 395.

ture of collectivism," had thrown aesthetics, which had long been founded on the creative genius of an individual author, into crisis.[10] Whereas many bemoaned the end of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, Nakai embraced the poetic force of technology and the beauty of the machine. Nakai's "Art and Its Tendencies in a Time of Intellectual Crisis" was published in 1932 and "The Logic of the Committee" and Walter Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" were published in 1936. Despite their differences, both understood human experience to be formed, configured, and organized by different historical forms of material, technical, and discursive mediation that are transformed through history *as* history. And for both, the work of art was the essential medium and means of worlding. As we have seen, Nakai understood technology as a poetic and dialectical mediation between the human and nature. Unsurprisingly, scholars often compare Benjamin and Nakai,[11] and Nakai has even been called "the Walter Benjamin of Japan."[12]

Nakai sets out his theory of mediation through a genealogy of the epistemes and technologies of the self, to speak with Foucault. For example, the rise of the technique of paper and printing, which was a response to the development of economic trade, gives rise to a modern subject that is free to interpret language according to their individual historical situatedness. This leads to a new understanding of the human as an autonomous individual and to the state of nature in which "the human being is a wolf to other human beings." "People accustomed to subservience within the feudal system must have had to cleanse themselves of something absorbed in their blood to convince themselves they were one person, one individual person, and could interpret words as they pleased." However, at the same time there is a form of alienation here, "because they were unable to recognize that the idea that 'the human being is a wolf to other human beings' is a mode of relation that arises from the terrifying structure of their own mechanism of industrial production, they had to tell themselves that human beings [人間] were this way by nature." Repeatedly we see that the source of alienation

10. Cf. MNZ 2: 44–7.

11. Cf. Takashima 2000; Nornes 2003; Kitada 2017; Yamamoto 2020; Lucken 2016.

12. Steinberg and Zahlten 2017, 22.

stems from the fact that we "are deeply involved in a mechanism [we] cannot understand."

In post-war Japan, Nakai greatly influenced a generation of young scholars such as Tsurumi Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔, Hariu Ichirō 針生一郎, Suzuki Tadashi 鈴木忠志, Tada Michitarō 多田道太郎, Imamura Taihei 今村太平, and Kurita Isamu 栗田勇. Hasumi Shigehiko maintains that Nakai is "the forerunner of all that is called in Japan contemporary thought."[13] And Tsurumi Shunsuke has qualified Nakai's "The Logic of the Committee" "as probably one of the greatest achievements in the history of Japanese philosophy."[14] There are chapters on Nakai in volumes of many of the classic works on Japanese cinematography.[15] After reading Nakai's "The Logic of the Committee," Hani formed the opinion that "he was unparalleled in terms of his level of understanding of modern systems of collective deliberation."[16] And when Miki left Kyoto to go to Tokyo and was asked who could replace him in Kyoto, Miki responded: "There aren't many of them, but there is one, and that is Nakai Masakazu."[17]

Nakai is just one of the many philosophers of the Kyoto School who has not yet received the attention he should. His works are not found in any of the anthologies of Japanese philosophy in English, and his name does not appear, even in a footnote, in the otherwise comprehensive *Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy*. Much of the literature on Nakai is found in media studies and film theory. One of the rare scholars in Japanese philosophy to speak of Nakai is Michiko Yusa in her seminal work *Zen and Philosophy*.[18] In 1995, *Rude Awakenings Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism* drew attention to the dark side of the Kyoto School. This work has sparked a great deal of debate about the level and nature of the complicity of the members of the Kyoto School with Japanese Nationalism during the war years. Given that after the war, Nakai was widely "regarded by many as one of the most respected wartime thinkers for his persistent resistance

13. Hasumi 1997, 256.
14. Tsurumi 1959, 32.
15. Cf. Nornes 2003; Kaffen 2011; Yamamoto 2020; Bernardi et al. 2021.
16. Hani 1981, 171.
17. Hani 1981, 19; cf. also 171.
18. Yusa 2002, 232–33.

to Japanese fascism,"[19] one wonders why Nakai is not mentioned at all in this work. However, in his "Revisiting Rude Awakenings," Maraldo (one of the editors of the original work) writes in a footnote: "One nearly forgotten example of early resistance is the case of the critic Nakai Masakazu."[20]

Nakai's philosophy has its roots in Kant, Hegel, Cassirer, Heidegger, Marx, Lenin, Nishida, Tanabe, and Pure Land Buddhism. In "The Aesthetics of *Neue Sachlichkeit*" (1932), Nakai explicitly situates his entire philosophical project between Cassirer's transcendental critique of symbolic forms and Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. Once substance concepts have been replaced with function concepts as Cassirer does in his 1910 work *Substance and Function*, two paths open to resolving the "opposition" between subjectivity and objectivity: the one taken by Cassirer "in the direction of mathematization"; the other, taken by Heidegger "in the direction of a vital concrete hermeneutic phenomenon." Although Nakai recognizes the diametrical and antithetical opposition between these two directions taken by Cassirer and Heidegger, he nevertheless not only argues that a "continuous curvature seems to flow between them" but also suggests that Cassirer and Heidegger were aware of this and sought to move closer to the "extreme opposite" of their own position. Thus, Cassirer, "beginning from numerical rigor, descends to concrete life," whereas Heidegger, "beginning from the self-illumination of concrete life itself, tried to ascend to the essential structure." Nakai's entire philosophical project can be understood, as he says, in finding the "Ariadne's thread" that connects the functionality of the transcendental form with the facticity of existence, between "the model (型) and the original existence": this, I would argue, is the ultimate significance of aesthetic function for Nakai in that it provides the "deep correspondence" between "functionality and actual existence."[21] One of the dominant themes of Nakai's thought is the problem of continuity and discontinuity. Following Cassirer and Cohen, Nakai argues that the symbolic function is a "dynamic 'meaning of continuous disconnection'"

19. Yamamoto 2020, 113.
20. Maraldo 2019, 9.
21. NMZ 2: 20–21.

(切断を連続する意味) and serves as the "medium" for a "mechanical continuity, that is, the disconnection of space-time, as an equivalent relation of time."[22]

Central to Nakai's work is his reading of Cassirer's *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (1910; *Substance and Function*). With Cassirer, Nakai sees the Aristotelian theory of concepts and concept formation as leading to the inherent dualism and abstractionism of rational metaphysics and traditional empiricism, and the substance concepts on which this theory of concept formation is based led to the "logic of blood" of German Romanticism and nationalistic fascism. Drawing from modern mathematics, Cassirer explains concept formation from the perspective of "function-concepts." The concept is a function that provides the rule of progression that transforms elements into the serial members of a unity. Cassirer generalizes Dedekind's function relation $\phi(x)$ into the relational logic of the symbolic function as the different modes of world-forming. The form of a function is nothing more than a mapping relation in which one thing reflects another thing. The symbolic function is a "peculiar kind of 'identity' that is attributed to altogether heterogeneous figures in virtue of their being transformable into one another by means of certain operations defining a group."[23] Cassirer calls this an "originary relationship (*Urverhältnis*) that can be expressed in different formulations as the relationship of 'form' to 'content,' as the relationship of 'universal' to 'individual,' as the relationship of 'validity' to 'being.'"[24] It is a "strictly unitary relation" of "opposing elements." As Nakai points out, an abstraction theory of concept formation can only provide us with a "set [集合] of individual representations" and not a group to which individuals belong as members. However, Nakai translates Cassirer's *Funktionsbegriff* into Japanese as 機能概念 rather than 関数概念 and distinguishes 機能 from 函数. 関数 and 函数 are used in mathematics to refer to "function equations," whereas 機能 refers to what something does or what it is for. The function (機能) of a window, what it does or what it is for, is to provide lighting, ventilation, and the view required in the house whose function meets the needs of a purposeful activity of human dwelling. At this level, the function-concept of the window is a concrete universal. In the move to

22. NMZ 2: 118–19.

23. Cassirer 1944, 25.

24. Cassirer 2009, 152ff.

abstraction, the "concept of the window" becomes a "functional complex" (函数的複合体) of three elements, but this is an abstraction from the existential concreteness of actual windows. In the first case, the concrete window function is "oriented" to the purposive action of the human; in the second case, it is an "unoriented" functionalization (函数化) in which the window is transformed back into an abstraction. Through this sleight of hand, Nakai establishes the continuous disconnection of logic and life as the mechanism of the historical world.

However, whereas Hegel understands life from the standpoint of logic, Nakai understands logic from the standpoint of life: "logic itself turns out to be a living ratio in the rupture, that is, it proves to be its own mediation. At each stage, rationality acquires new aspects that are unique to it, and at the same time, it retains all the rationality it previously possessed by transforming them into something else." The reason of History is not the history of Reason as an ahistorical Reason that works itself out as it moves to absolute knowledge, as in Hegel. Rather, reason itself is historically situated and conditioned; it is produced through purposeful creative action and the means for this purposeful creative action, but a creative purposeful action without end. And although actuality is an infinite actuality without end (that is, without limits), its dialectical realization constitutes its unity as history.

> This human purposeful action sways all nothingness into being, all being into nothingness, in order to combine them into the human sequential order in the schematic axis of this natural sequence. The mediating moment that sways nothingness into being, being into nothingness, is the structure of the *logic of technology*.

How we are to understand this "nothingness" is beyond the scope of this introduction. For Nakai, nothingness possesses a transformative function in the dialectic of history. The non-actuality of the balloon is transformed into an actuality. But as the non-actuality is made actual, actuality harbors within it new non-actualities: the historical process is never complete and the non-completeness of history is the product of a continuous repetition of negation. Nakai seeks to give logical expression to an incompleteness of endless progression of infinite actuality as a unified system (completeness). Quoting Lenin, he writes: "Human thought goes endlessly deeper from

phenomenon to essence, from the essence of the first order, as it were, to the essence of the second order, and thus proceeds *infinitely*." Each moment is defined by its schematizing the interdependence and wholeness of the world processes as part of that infinite process. The *logic of the committee* is the mechanism of history, "schematizing itself as a recursive process of infinite progress." The historical world is a dialectical process that schematizes itself as a process of infinite development while being one of regression. As the basis for making reality inevitable and complete, the whole always involves the principle of self-negation.

Given the historical context in which "The Logic of the Committee" was written, it is almost impossible not to associate the term "committee" with the "people committee" of an utopian socialism. Although Nakai draws from Lenin and Marx, it would be incorrect or certainly misleading to say he was a Leninist or Marxist. The committee is not the Leninist "central party committee" of the intelligentsia that would educate the masses about their alienation and mobilize them toward revolution. The committee is the collective unity of a creative group of individuals working together in a collective process of decision-making as the production of history. The logic of the committee is the logic by which a group makes collective judgments and collectively acts in creating a collective history. The production of the historical world, like the production of journals, newspapers, team sports, and films, is a collective process of historical individuals working within history *as* history and not the product of a single transhistorical ground.

"The Logic of the Committee" is a complex and subtle work that demands much of its reader. Much of this work builds upon ideas Nakai has been working on since the late 1920s as an academic philosopher and putting into praxis as a social activist. Nakai does not always make it clear with whom he is dialoguing, but one senses the presence of Nishida, Tanabe, and Miki. Finally, the subtitle of the work, "A First Draft," may be understood in many ways. It reflects the fact that the work had to be greatly edited to meet the page limits of the journal; it also refers to the fact that the schema expressed here can only be submitted as a proposal, which by definition is never complete as a conceptual schema and which awaits a critical response from its reader; however, in hindsight, it almost anticipates his imminent arrest which could not have come as a surprise to Nakai.

Nakai Masakazu

The Logic of the Committee
A First Draft

Translated by Steve Lofts

1

[46][1] Even though logic is a field of study that demands a certain rigor in language, the concept of logic itself is not entirely clear-cut. It would seem that many things that must be differentiated are conflated and included under the term "logic."

This is because the term "logic" has recently been rendered uniform by being taken up as something that transcends all phenomena and constitutes an exact and special world, even though its phenomenological forms have played various roles in various cultural transitions.

It seems to me that our attention should rather be directed toward the grounds for this idea that logic governs a transcendent and eternal world, the limits of its validity, and the cultural phenomena that make rationality truly rational.

[47] Simply put, in the Greek stage of logic, the rationality of the "spoken word," or, in other words, the rationality to make people submit to arguments, had largely permeated its form. It should be noted that, in conjunction with the collapse of the clan system and the mature stage of slavery, the agora served as a crucible where logic was generated. The fact that rhetoric had always been the arbiter in the history of Athenian politics and had been a significant force in moving the enslaved masses played a decisive role at that critical stage. Solon, Pisistratus, Cleisthenes, Themistocles, and Pericles were all men who influenced the masses with the power of rhetoric and led history on that basis.

Socrates, who was surrounded by members of the aristocracy, and Plato, who was himself an aristocrat and whose uncle Critias waged the final revo-

1. [Numbers in square brackets refer to the pagination in vol. 1 of Nakai's *Collected Works*.]

lution against commercial aristocratic democracy, were, above all, the ones who demanded order from the plethora of rhetoric.

If I were to name this early stage of logic to highlight it, I would call it the "logic of the spoken." In Greece, "the written word" was the work of barbarians, a sign of Phoenicians and thus an object of contempt. Plato undertook a fierce confrontation with "written words" in the *Phaedrus* (276A, 275D[2]) and the *Protagoras* (329A). The Greeks, who wanted to think only with spoken words, should be considered a people who possessed a spoken form of logic.

We can see in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* [48] that he regards rhetoric as the discipline that, in every case, would clarify the effective means of persuasion in the proof of a particular subject matter. Aristotle divided the discipline of rhetoric into two domains: the non-technical and the technical [means of persuasion]. The former is divided into three types: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic [means of persuasion], and the latter is divided into ethics, pathos, and logic, distinguishing between persuasion by means of an appeal to morality, emotion, and logic. He then divided the world of rhetoric into deductive and inductive reasoning, naming the former, that is, the one used for rhetorical syllogism (ἐνθύμημα), a syllogistic inference (συλλογισμός), and the latter, that is, the one used for rhetorical induction, a paradigm (παράδειγμα).[3] And every syllogism, whether general or particular, is presided over by dialectics. In this sense, a master of dialectic can also be a master of rhetoric.[4]

Thus, it should be noted that Aristotle's so-called syllogism as a means of persuasion is situated on a different level from the logic of science of Bacon's *New Organon* which was conceived in the context of the Elizabethan court.

It is interesting to keep this in mind when thinking in particular about the place of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι (exoteric discourses) in Aristotle's writings, a point that has sparked disputes among many scholars.

This term is used by Aristotle in several places in his writings [49] and has been disputed since Cicero. For Cicero and Bernays, this term is one of the two categories of his work that divides Aristotle's work into two parts—for

2. [27D in the Japanese.]
3. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1356b.
4. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1355a.

Burnett, it corresponds to Aristotle's lost work; for Zeller and others, however, this expression was used to refer to Aristotle's interpretation of debates or exchanges of questions and answers conducted by cultivated laymen, rather than to writings by Aristotle himself.[5]

In a very insightful description of Aristotle's examples in *Physics*, Grote observes that this expression sometimes refers to the questions and answers of a dialogue between cultivated people and, at other times, to the questions and answers that Aristotle has submitted to himself in the course of examining a problem: in any case, it is above all a method of showing all the possible ways of thinking about a problem before providing a demonstrative interpretation of that problem.[6]

Aristotle's ἔνδοξα [well-received opinion], as the potential state of pre-reflective thought, that is, of the wandering wilderness of thought in dialectic and rhetoric, is—as Rolfe has already remarked[7]—related to the place (τόπος [topos]; *sedes argumentorum* [the location of an argument]) where a reasoned defense of opposing ideas could take place, as it appears in the *Topics*.

In Aristotle's *Physics*, this topos originally designated the limit of the object that was surrounded and the object that was surrounding, or in terms of time, it was thought of as the limits of a segment of time; however, it seems that in the *Topics* it was considered as a possible mediating moment [50] in the disputed oppositions in a dialectical process.

This raises an important question concerning the dialectical logic and the possibility of τόπος as a mediating moment; it should be noted that the concept of *topos* by no means indicates only a two-dimensional plane[8] but also a three-dimensional moment of strife.

5. [This paragraph is indented in the original Japanese. However, it appears to be a continuation of Nakai's summary of the debates surrounding Aristotle's concept of exoteric discourses (ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγο) rather than a quote from any of the authors mentioned. This debate is set out in Grote's *Aristotle*, which Nakai quotes in the next paragraph. Cf. Grote 1880, 49.]

6. Grote 1880, 75.

7. Rolfes 1919, Introduction, iv–viii.

8. [平面的な場所, literally, a flat location.]

2

For Aristotle, in the realm of logic, this *topos* seems to play the role of a medium (*Mittel*) for the dialectic, as a core medium, or in other words, as a mediating moment of the "logic of the spoken." Thus, Aristotle's concept of a topological medium (*Medium*) distinguishes science from general dialectics, and he illustrates this by comparing a temple, a τέμενος, that is, a delimited place, to ordinary land. It seems to me that this term corresponds to it. The term τέμενος underwent a unique development in Rome. It has the same root as the Latin *templus* found in the *contemplativa* of the medieval *vita contemplativa*. This term does not yet possess, however, the contemporary sense of the term *Kontemplation* understood as an activity of thought; it does not imply the revelation (*gnōsis*) found in early Christianity, the ecstatic union of God and the human, that is to say, a mediating opposition, a mobile medium of homogeneity; it was a new form based upon a particular phenomenon within the individual psyche. In the turmoil of the collapse of the aristocracy and excessive slavery in Rome, [51] Neoplatonic elements were added to oratorical logic. Indian and Judaic elements were mixed into its logical character. Here, the concept of creation *ex nihilo* and emanation from nothingness arises. This conceptual symbol of creation as the expression of God's will is set apart from natural causality. Dilthey points out that this conceptual symbol of creation, this *Kontemplation*, is connected with the idea of a returning to God and finally becomes the "playground (*Tummelplatz*) of Scholastic conceptualism skilled in hair-splitting. Scholasticism, by its very nature, supported [*untergebaut*] a new non-actuality [*neues Nichtwirkliches*] based on a non-actuality [*dem Nichtwirklichen*]."[9]

The order of creation in this contemplation (*Kontemplation*) becomes, in a new stage, the ground of theological transcendental rationalism. The early Germanic peoples were passionate about Odin, opening the way to a perspective that would later become German pantheism. According to Oskar Walzel, this lineage links Plotinus to Jakob Böhme, Hamann, and Herder

9. Dilthey 1914, vol. 2: 4. [Nakai translates "*untergebaut*" as "build" [築いた], and while the German has the word *build* (*gebaut*) in it, the sense of the term is to *build-under*, that is, to support. Cf. Dilthey 1914, vol. 2: 4 for original quote: "[Zugleich] ward sie doch zum Tummelplatz haarspaltender Begriffsscholastik. Diese hat dem Nichtwirklichen nach ihrer Natur immer wieder neues Nichtwirkliches untergebaut."]

and even further to German Romanticism. The mystery of the sudden transition from Kant's logic to Fichte's must be understood to be hidden in their blood. What is hidden here is "a pantheism of method" (*ein Pantheismus der Methode*) that Windelband attacks as "a tendency that rational philosophy has been modeled upon from Descartes to recent times."[10]

Unlike the spoken word, which can be interpreted in different [52] ways by different people and thus can be subject to a confrontational dispute, the nature of writing on parchment requires a unilateral, univocal intentionality of meaning, and thus there arose a linguistic meaning and conceptual structure in which one word is oriented toward one meaning. It ends by demanding the equivalence of naming and existence. At this stage, the logical forms of nominalism and realism first become possible. However, the action of writing itself, in the process of establishing the mechanism of that expression, begins to bring about the division in the meaning of the *vita contemplativa,* as the feudal religious system becomes alienated from its human purposefulness, which follows the self-destruction of the slave system, that is, philosophy became, as is commonly said, the handmaiden of the church—a disjuncture occurs between the interpretative logic of Biblical and the epistemic logic of common sense. The essence of the legal and political Machiavellian logic of the Roman Empire can be said, rather, to be the center of gravity of Roman culture. This transformation toward the self-alienation of the "logic of the written" is what Wagner ridiculed as a double bookkeeping, that is, the idea of a double truth. Indeed, for them, there were always two truths. The idea of "double truth" from Averroes to Duns Scotus and then to Occam is nothing other than the duality of this logic. The enormous feudal system, the even larger religious organizations connected with it, the process of its disintegration, and what emerged from it was all for naught. As Bacon put it:

> For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for [53] the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.[11]

10. [Windelband 1911, 174.]
11. [Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, I, I.iv.5.]

Britain had at that time already taken control of an enormous trade route across the Atlantic; abandoning such scholastic speculation, it turned to devote itself to the more important empirical sciences.

As a result of the development of transportation and the sudden rise in commercial trade, the technique of paper and printing spread everywhere, which began to radically change the linguistic meaning of *Kontemplation*. The fact that the most patient observers [of the stars] began the scientific observation of things with a telescope as a weapon, in the word of *Kontemplation* we have created a skeptical, observant, lonely individual person in the universe, a *viewer*. It was during the sixteenth century, that is, during the Renaissance, that the meaning of *subjectum* changed from *something that lies at the foundation*, that is, as what denotes the embodied subject, *to something that observes*, that is, an [epistemological] subject.

Here, the "logic of the printed" has already arisen in opposition to the "logic of the spoken" and the "logic of the written." As Tarde has shown, the printing press gives birth to the public (*publicum*). Here, linguistic meaning can no longer be univocal; when words are handed over to the public in print, the public has the freedom to interpret these words according to the circumstances of the reader's surroundings, which are always different depending on the life experiences of the reader. Luther's words, who was the first to use the printing press effectively, were interpreted and assimilated differently by the princes than by the peasants as they pleased. Luther even had to massacre the peasants to get his words back from them. Moreover, this new form of the *interpretation of words* that was given by means of print created [54] a new type of public sphere, namely journalism. Hugo points out that the French Revolution would not have occurred without the newspaper.

This is where the typographical form of thought was emerging. It has already begun to form a new schema of the order of human relations that defines the phase of a mercantile civic society. A long time was needed before people accepted the idea "*Homo homini lupus,*" the idea that "the human being is a wolf to other human beings." People accustomed to subservience within the feudal system must have had to cleanse themselves of something absorbed in their blood to convince themselves they were one person, one individual person, and could interpret words as they pleased. Moreover, because they were unable to recognize that the idea that "the human being is

a wolf to other human beings" is a mode of relation that arises from the terrifying structure of their own mechanism of industrial production, they had to tell themselves that human beings were this way by nature. The linguistic form of the printed word became the cause and then the result of the proliferation of such a mode of cognition and its permeation in the human mind.

The loneliness of this new stage of human beings, where "the human being is a wolf to other human beings," and the rift in this new dimension of life were brought out by Shakespeare in his tragedies. Moreover, the new mechanism of organization that allowed human beings to become observers of the universe by sliding down into the rift in the universe, which is itself self-contradictory to humans, appeared in the name of free trade, in the form of a New World on the sea of their lives.

Francis Bacon was the discoverer of this world, the Columbus of conceptual thought. [55] Employing the new method of experience and observation, which he published in his *Novum Organum*, he radically overturned the logic of Aristotle.

> Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature. Beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything. [Furthermore, he says:] But the true method of experience… first lights the candle, and then by means of the candle shows the way; commencing as it does with experience duly ordered and digested, not bungling or erratic, and from it educing axioms, and from established axioms again new experiments; even as it was not without order and method that the divine word operated on the created mass.[12]

This language of observation and experimentation was taken up two hundred years later in Germany by Kant: just as the earth is no longer the center of the universe but moves among the stars, Kant's Copernican revolution of conceptual thought established the human being as the observer (*Zuschauer*) of the whole world.

Observation and experience are the two hallmarks of a new phase. Bacon's inductive method was to "put nature on the rack and compel her to bear witness"[13] and not just provide a "mere enumeration" [*enumeratio-*

12. [Bacon 2011, 47.]

13. [Cf. Bacon did not use the expression "put to the rack." It originates, perhaps, in Thomas

nem simplicem] of the examples serving as a demonstration. The reflection of the logic employed by Galileo in grounding his astronomy in observation, which permitted the dawn of the new mechanics opposed to Aristotelian physics, marked the emergence of a truly new domain of logic. This is why the *Encyclopedia* of the French [Revolutionary] was dedicated to him. And this is also why Kant dedicated the *Critique of Pure Reason* to him.

We have now considered the "logic of the spoken" (the logic of persuasion), [56] the "logic of the written" (the logic of contemplation), and the "logic of the printed" (the logic of experience). It should be noted that non-rationality is found within this third stage. That is, in contrast to the rationality of scholastic theodicy, the non-rationality of experience makes its appearance. The limits of inference are demarcated by the non-rationality of experience. This is where logic separates from epistemology. This is why Kant attempted to preserve the validity of his philosophy by setting limits to the unlimited logic of dogmatic metaphysics.

The fact that epistemology is separated from logic by this limit of experience is proof that the logic of this third stage is fundamentally different from the former two.

3

From Bacon to Kant, roughly speaking during the period between 1500 and 1800, each of the European nations was able to escape from the immense power of the Pope, and each nation became an ethnic nation with a distinctive system of its own, while the commercial system had already begun to dismantle the feudal mechanism and to transition to a financial system. More generally and concisely stated, it is an era in which every mechanism was commercialized. It is an era in which nature and its products, as well as humans and their labor, were commodified as objects of commerce. The entire logic of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* is a good example of this point.

Fowler (1878), who wrote that Bacon "insisted, both by example and precept, on the importance of experiment as well as observation. Nature like a witness, when put to the torture, would reveal her secrets." (Fowler 1878, 124). Cf. also Cassirer 1953, 47–8; Bacon 1911, vol. 2, chap. ii, *De augmentis*.]

The profound impact of this commodification on the science of logic and the theory of knowledge can be seen in that the universality of the concept of existence begins to be absorbed in a massive mechanism that cannot be supported by the mere synthesis of [57] the memory representations of the individual.

However, this transition did not progress at the same pace in England, France, and Germany. As a result of the center of commerce shifting from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, the conflicting economic conditions between the north and south of Germany, and due to a particular feudal system, Germany was excluded from the rapid economic progress of Europe and left behind from the 16th century onwards. England was about 150 years ahead of Germany, and France was about 50 years ahead of Germany. From around 1750, Germany made great strides to catch up, and from 1830 on, and especially after 1848 and 1870, it made rapid progress, and the five billion compensation for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 brought Germany to the economic stage of Europe. 1890 was the turning point when England, France, and Germany were neck and neck, and there was a tense silence from 1900 until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

What were the consequences on the world of conceptual thought of the specific economic situation that resulted in Germany initially lagging behind and then quickly catching up? What did it bring to the world of logic?

The 1755 Lisbon violent earthquake dampened the optimism of the Enlightenment. In many ways, this perplexed every serious thinker of the period. The following year, Kant also felt obliged to write three small works on the topic. And he was also forced to think about the nature of optimism. The earthquake, however, sent shock waves throughout the German system from all sides. Around the same time, Hume's "skepticism" was translated into German. The French *Encyclopédie* was published beginning in 1750[14] amidst great disorder in France, and the spirit of Voltaire enflamed the storm. [58] Germany became the battlefield of the Seven Year War. Thus, in 1772, the powerful guilds were forced to transform themselves.

What was spreading in Germany at the time in response to the arrival of

14. [*L'Encyclopédie* was originally published in 1751.]

these new foreign ideas claiming to be the empiricism of Bacon that took Hume and Voltaire as a model?

Oskar Walzel maintains that the period of German High Classicism was based on Plotinus's worldview. Although Plotinus struggled against Christianity and revitalized the ancient worldview, he was always in tune with early Christianity.

> The Germanic peoples, who lived in a harsher, more oppressive natural environment than the southern Europeans, found Neoplatonism quite in accord with their own feelings toward life. Christianity, with a mixture of Neoplatonism, seemed to them like the continuity of the conceptions of their ancient faith. This affinity was most evident in German mysticism during the Middle Ages.[15]

Medieval German mysticism secretly revitalized itself in Jacob Böhme and the entire Pietist movement, which was the outcome of the Thirty Years' War.

A new foundation of logic that discovers within the spontaneous *creation*, within the eruptive passion, a *subjectum lying at the root* of contemplation, is not simply the heritage of scholasticism; rather, it is a mixture of peasant and *Junkertum* elements rooted in the German soil. The fact that Luther translated the Bible into German and published it in print clearly indicates the true nature of the Reformation and Enlightenment spirit. [59]

In his study of *The Principle of Sufficient Reason*, Schopenhauer writes:

> But now the identity of the subject of willing with the cognizing subject, by means of which (and, indeed, necessarily), the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world and therefore inexplicable.... But whoever truly realizes the inexplicability of this identity will with me call it the miracle [*Wunder*] *par excellence*.[16]

This miracle (*Wunder*) was already a miracle (*Wunder*) in Kant during the 1760s. The Leibnizian and Wolffian elements in Kant refer to a German-like *non-rationalism* of an ambitious, practical willing, as opposed to the non-rationalism of experience in Hume and Voltaire, and while this epistemic experiential subjectivity and practical willing subjectivity are con-

15. [Walzel 1931, 5.]
16. [Schopenhauer 2012, 210.]

tradictions, there formed a societal contradiction that undeniably existed in Germany in the 1760s. In other words, because of Germany's economic backwardness, the essence of the British Industrial Revolution, which had been progressing for 200 years, flowed into Germany, where the remnants of the *Junkertum* were found and were being washed away by the tide of the subsequent industrial revolution in Germany; and because of this the non-rationalism of intellect and experience and the non-rationalism of practical-willing action coexisted in the form of a living strife.

However, these two non-rationalistic elements were similarly opposed to scholastic rationalism. Thus, Hamann's and Crusius' positions appeared as Kant's precursors.

The state of affairs becomes even clearer if we consider Kant's thing-in-itself from this angle. Within the Kantian system, the thing-in-itself is, in the *First Critique*, the material of experience [60], whereas in the *Second Critique*, it is the embodied subject of praxis. On the one hand, it is the object of knowledge and understanding, and on the other hand, it is the formal principle of will and reason. One is a prerequisite of spontaneous nature and phenomena, and the other is a prerequisite of freedom and ideas. Moreover, what is common to both is that they form a non-rational hole. Feeling is an intermediary, a mediator, and a continuum between the two.

When we examine the particular nature of this situation within the framework of a system based on the tripartition of intellect, emotion, and will [知情意], then Cassirer appears justified in locating the basis for the appearance of Kant's *Third Critique* in German pantheist historicism with Herder at the center. Rather, in short, the *coexistence of contradictions* is the meaning of critique, and the systematic organization of the *First Critique*, the *Second Critique*, and the *Third Critique* can be said to indicate the cultural forms of such contradictions.

Only after interpreting critique in this way is it possible to understand that Fichte's grounding of his science of logic in will and action derives its meaning from Kant's *Second Critique*.

It is not true that Kant is simply Humean or Voltairean. It is also not true that Kant is simply Leibnizian or Wolffian. Therefore, it must be questioned whether Fichte's choice of the *Second Critique* as his point of departure to succeed Kant conveys the truth of the Kantian tradition.

Fichte rather inherited an aspect of this willful-practical non-rationalism

and, along the lines of the reactionary and nationalist standpoint of the German nobility opposed to Napoleon, [61] should be seen as revitalizing the logic of the ancient blood of Germania, whose forests are home to Odin, the god of ancient Germany. The establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806 and Napoleon's Continental Blockade highlighted the powerlessness of the German *Junkertum* and the need for reform. What is more, this was a civil reform. Although the nobility believed in the possibility of restoring their power on their own, this was the process of a new transformation. Rather than saying that this came from Fichte's personality, this year appears to have been the moment that caused him to deviate from Kant. Even if a larger study would be necessary, we have already seen in Walzel an interesting development of the Plotinian logic of creation and emanation. Heine has also emphasized these points. As Schopenhauer pointed out earlier, in the German *Ich*, "self," there is always an echo of miracle (*Wunder*). This way of thinking is not found in England or France.

I believe that this logic of the I, which is specific to Germany or the Nordic countries if we include Søren Kierkegaard, has its foundation in the Germanic ethnicity of blood as opposed to Scholasticism; it is a particular form of logic that erupts when it finds the necessary rift in the economic stage of the profit mechanism and always plays a role of some kind. This mixture of the blood of Germania and the landed aristocracy of the *Junkertum* is an undeniable condition. Borrowing Fichte's concept of *Tat*, I would like to call it the "logic of action" or the "*logic of blood*." It should be noted that German Romantics lived more or less according to this logic. [62]

The fact that Kant developed the "logic of experience" in the *First Critique,* on the one hand, while he prepared the ground for the "logic of action" in the *Second Critique*, on the other hand, should be considered in relation to the particular economic situation in Germany. In this sense, the fact that the *Third Critique* was composed as a mediation between the contradiction of two moments in Germany in the 1700s should remind us of the magnitude of Kant's times and the strength of his character in not dismissing them as his own anguish.

From this perspective, Hegel's standpoint is the most complex of all. Undeniably, the young Hegel was situated in the lineage of this Romantic tradition. What distinguishes him from it is that in his phenomenology, he freed himself from the substantiality of emanation, from Plotinian creativ-

ity. The meaning of the embodied subjectivity (*Subjektivität*) is situated in the moment of its own division. Of course, if you turn it around, you can immediately smell the scent of Germanic blood in this gesture, but what separates Hegel's dialectical method from the irony of Friedrich Schlegel, Solger, and others and distinguishes him from Schelling's pantheism is that—in contrast to the concept of a substance that resembles a bullet which, once fired from a pistol, would continue its course eternally—the dialectical process of embodied subjectivity is a moment of negation, a process of division and development. It is not an element within a *medium* but rather a negative *mediation* that always possesses a *moment* of dividing itself into two.

With the Right Hegelians, the science of logic of Romanticism and German pantheism, [63] which transforms itself into something other than itself through its own mediation, returned to theology and combined with the "logic of action," while, among the Left Hegelians, it joined the English "logic of experience" and transformed into a "logic of production," as seen in Marxism. Germany had already undergone the hardships of 1848 and the transformation of the 1870s, when the injection of five billion in compensation stimulated speculation, on the one hand, and a period of severe unemployment after 1873, on the other hand, suddenly strengthened its industrial system. By being involved in the financial system, the *Junkertum* was in the stage of transforming into something else. From the 1870s to 1890s, the two figures Bismarck and Nietzsche found themselves marked by the same anguish. They are two faces of Germany powerlessly resisting the enormous contradiction of Germany becoming un-Germanic.

4

Sigwart's *Logic* appeared between 1873 and 1878; Lotze's *Logic* in 1873; Erdmann's *Axiom of Geometry* in 1877; Bergmann's *General Logic* in 1879; Cantor's *Foundations of a General Set Theory* in 1883; Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in 1891; Erdmann's *Logic* in 1892; Hilbert's *The Foundations of Geometry* in 1899; Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in 1900; Cohen's *Logic of Pure Cognition* in 1902; Cassirer's *The Problem of Knowledge* in 1906; Minkowski's *Space and Time* in 1909; Cassirer's *Substance-Concept and Function-Concept* in 1910; Natorp's *The Logical Foundation of the Exact*

Sciences in 1910; Lask's *Logic* in 1911; Husserl's *Ideas* in 1913; [64] Einstein's *Essay on the Principle of Relativity* in 1917.

When we look back in this way, we see, beginning with Sigwart's work in 1873 to the great European War, the tendency of each volume to use the title "logic,"[17] thus making a connection with Fichte's logic of the I without as much as a single word of explanation. The concept we now call the science of logic is the idea that logic is an eternal world separated from changing phenomena. The mathematization of logic has reached its climax with David Hilbert's and Wilhelm Ackermann's *Principles of Theoretical Logic* (1928) and Carnap's recent work. In the formation of logic, they turned their attention to the new and rapidly emerging mathematical developments, even if, in some cases, mere analogies, vague metaphors, or principles were employed to convince other people to accept them. In England, where the logic of the German blood was absent, we have Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic* in 1843; we also have Boole's *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic* in 1847, Darwin's *Theory of Evolution* in 1859, Spencer's *A System of Synthetic Philosophy* in 1862, and Jevons's *Theory of Pure Logic* in 1864; and in France we have Comte's *A General View of Positivism* which appeared in 1851. German philosophers after 1870 inherited all these works. And thus, after Cantor's "Set Theory" of 1873, they suddenly became deeply involved in their own mathematical rigor. It reached its peak in Hilbert, Ackermann, and Carnap. To put it simply, what took place was the functionalization of logic. [65]

It is "the logic of function" and "the logic of numbers." At this stage, the economic system, with the strengthening and intensification of the financial system, was moving toward the stage of imperialism, that is, toward the European War, and with this, there arose the demand for the use of advanced mathematics in every corner of life. However, this mechanism of heavy industrial production led both its products and the people involved in it to something far different from the starting point. In the world of concepts, logic moved away from the synthesis of memory representations and was transformed into a complex structure of functional elements.

17. [The term Nakai employs here (論理学) is the "science of logic" and not simply "logic." In the Japanese titles of the works cited by Nakai, one finds the terms 論理学, 論理, 論, or 理. However, these terms do not appear in the German and English titles of these works, and so the allusion is lost in translation.]

What took place here was the separation of logic from the general public. In Greece, Socrates's logic was the logic of the general public. However, the language of the science of logic has become specialized and divided into highly specialized logics and general syllogisms. This problem arises not only in the methodology of the science of logic but is present in concepts as well. Accordingly, it is only the specialized expertise of engineers who possess the general function-concept that determines the general sense of the things manufactured by advanced technological science, whereas because the general public only possesses memory representations, universality in the strict sense of the word has come to possess a structure from which the general public is alienated. In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger considered the disclosure of the being of tools based on the referential nature of the tools, but these tools have also been differentiated in society, and the referential nature of the generality of concepts has also emerged. Whereas a committee of specialized engineers possesses the general concept of the 1936 Ford Model T, the general public only possess a set of its sensory memory representations. In other words, the masses are alienated from the general concept of their products and are left to their own devices in a state of contradiction [66] in which they have only representations of the product. Hilbert's and Carnap's logic cannot be dismissed because they are technically functionalized, and this is because of the poverty of the present situation where logic itself exposes its unoriented functionalization of logic itself. However, in what phenomenal form does actuality maintain its rationality? Or, in other words, what form of rationality is behind its fall?

5

As the reader will have already noticed, we have finally reached the logic of the committee I have in mind. Moreover, the consideration of all these stages of transformation and progress was by no means a detour but rather the foundational work for the logic of the committee. This is because the positive and negative aspects of all these logics still subsist in all the commonplace linguistic forms employed today for rationality. And thus, the meaning of "negation" at each stage of logic constitutes, in a structural way, the framework of the logical mechanism of the committee. We can illustrate this now in Schema 1.



Schema 1

[67] Thus, if each stage of the mechanism of logic is transformed on its own accord into another, it becomes the foundation of the "logic of the committee," and each type of negativity expresses a significant dialectical negation. What kind of representative and deliberative functions does the committee mechanism have according to the logical mechanism of the concept? That is to say, what functions of voting, execution, delegation, debate, or making resolutions can be carried out within the limits of the rationality of the concept? I would like to consider the general structural form of the concept operating within the committee in the form of a profit-making mechanism and its limits. If a continuity in the cognition of logic is concretely possible, then I would like to consider how the limits of the generality of the concept reflect the dialectical discontinuity of the negativity of logic.

6

In the previous section, I attempted, albeit very hastily, to characterize the species character of rationality taken up as logic in each cultural stage. I then reflected on the possibility that the rationality of the committee is constructed by the transformation of the character left behind by each culture. This can be further illustrated by Schema 2.

[68] As can be seen in this schema, logic always plays a peculiar role in the crisis that ensues in the collapse of one system and the reorganization by something else; that is, we see that logic itself turns out to be a living *ratio* in the rupture, that is, it proves to be its own mediation. At each stage,



Schema 2

rationality acquires new aspects that are unique to it, and at the same time, it retains all the rationalities it previously possessed by transforming them into something else.

The current stage of rationality also has all the previous forms in the mode of the *für sich*. I will now attempt to analyze these forms of rationality.

7

[69] To begin with, we should take up the mechanism that constitutes two types of logic: the logic of *thought* and the logic of *debate*.

In general, logic is too often considered without distinguishing between the logic of a single thought within the I and the logic of investigation in a debate. So long as logic is presented in any form, it seeks the approval of others.

This seeking the approval from the *other* takes place on a different logical dimension than that of personal conviction. Reinach distinguishes *conviction* (*Überzeugung*: true belief) and assertion (*Behauptung*), two kinds [of judgment] that he analyzes in detail.[18]

We shall now clearly see that these *two are distinct* from each other. However, for it to be two things, we must further see that they are two things at one moment.

Let us first show that they are two things.

Reinach treats the clear distinction he draws between conviction and

18. Reinach 1989, 56–8.

assertion in *The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law*. He divides lived experience into two categories: the relational lived experience of the same [epistemological] subject, that is, of the I, and the relational lived experiences of a different [epistemological] subject, that is, the lived experience of other persons. Conviction can be had within the I, which is the same referential [epistemological] subject. However, when it comes to the lived experience of others, conviction becomes an assertion. This assertion, however, continues to be internal. It becomes a social and legal relation only when it is shifted to a *Mitteilung* [memorandum] of agreement with the other. For Reinach, "yes" (*ja*), "to agree" (*ja sagen* [to say yes]) is the foundation of sociality.[19]

[70] Reinach maintains that two things are confused in what Windelband and Brentano designate as *affirmation* (*Billigung* [approval], *Anerkennung* [approval/acceptence]): namely, *affirmation by consent* (*Zustimmungsanerkennung* [assenting acceptance]) and *affirmation by judgment* (*Urteilende Anerkennung* [judging acceptance]). Consensual approval is an endorsement of judgemental approval. Judgmental approval is limited to the sphere of *conviction*. However, consensual approval is necessary for the *assertion* of a judgemental approval.

This seems to be an important issue that we must pay attention to. The two must be clearly and carefully distinguished. I think the *structure of lies* plays an imporatnt role in detecting this parsing.

In any case, it constitutes a lie whether you seek approval by disavowing by means of an external assertion something that you have, in fact, approved by internal conviction or whether you seek approval by affirming in an external assertion something that you have disavowed by internal conviction. However, strictly speaking, it must be said that everyday life and public life are full of lies, to the extent that it is hard to say whether or not these words are lies. Giordano Bruno died in flames because he refused to keep silent about his scientific truth. Galileo escaped death because he tolerated his silence and only muttered, "Nevertheless, it moves." Kant, too, kept his position by refraining from asserting his theory of religion for a period of time. In any case, when turning the conviction of a new truth into an assertion, one should bear the burden of imprisonment, physical violence, or the death penalty. More or less like Socrates, [71] they could only speak out

19. Reinach 1989, 110, 205.

when the poisoned cup was before them. In each case, only those who were truly gripped by the truth dared to make an assertion, while others buried, corrupted, and erased the truth that people most urgently needed in unconscious or conscious lies.

Moreover, what is the source of the solemnity of judgment that still requires statements like Giordano Bruno's, even to the point of crossing the threshold of death? Why cannot the truth remain a certainty? Why does it take the dangerous step towards assertion?

Here, we find one of the most striking signs that these two—conviction and assertion—are two different things, as well as evidence that they are two manifestations of a single source.

As Reinach points out, in the meaning structure of a judgment, a *conviction* does not first enter the domain of judgemental approval. Rather, the *assertion* is the approval of judgemental approval. In the latter, the *consensual approval*, the *approval of approval*, should not be *qualitatively* different from the judgemental approval. However, there is a *quantitative* transformation in the meaning of what is called approval of approval. The assertion demands a *quantitative* expansion of judgemental approval to all other people. In other words, if judgemental approval has a *qualitative* structure of meaning, then consensual approval is a transformation into a quantitative structure of meaning. Here, I will consider the fact that we have two axes of transformation in the mechanism of judgment: the *qualitative orientation of meaning* and the *quantitative orientation of meaning*. Finally, I would like to consider the mechanism of this *orientational axis* of transformation [72] as a regulative model for the two types of affirmation: conviction and assertion.

When the transformation is abstracted and formalized, for example, when evaluating an examination as we do today, the *response* to the exam question is a sort of judicial affirmation of conviction. The evaluation is, however, a concordant validation carried out by one or more people, and this is converted into a quantitative percentage, that is to say, into a score. In other words, without a quantitative transformation, it would be impossible for several people to make a homogeneous evaluation. A homogeneous evaluation of the candidates would also be impossible. With regard to job placement, this mechanism generates many conscious and unconscious lies. The same is true for the mechanism of voting. The quantitative transformation of affirmative approval given to an assertion of conviction appears in

the form of voting. In the current mechanism of economic profit, the activity of conceptual thought in publishing manifests itself in the form of book *purchases*, which is a mass distinguishing mark of the quantity of affirmative approval. Each of these provides sufficient space for lying.

I believe I have shown tentative proof here that the quantitative orientation and qualitative orientation of meaning, conviction, and assertion are two different things. What should be noted here is that if we consider the fundamental structure from which the *phenomenon of lies* used to detect these bidirectional axes arises, it shows the economic foundations of the *mediation of lies*. What causes people to lie? Why can they not remain in the comforts of life without lying? Furthermore, does this bring about the distortion of error even in the realm of conviction without realizing it? This characterizes the mediating historical nature of these two orientational axes of meaning. [73] How many lies have been required by the systems of serfdom, feudalism, and capitalism, and the crisis brought about by the transition of these systems? And how did the emergence of the divide between these two orientational axes of meaning create new dynamic tensions between them? Answering these questions will provide rich material for new problems. This can, for example, be explained in terms of the classic difference between Greek tragedy and the tragedies of Shakespeare. The different nature of the tension between these two axes is not something that can be summed up in terms of "the tragedy of fate" and "tragedy of character," but rather, it is always a discovery of a new space within human life and within the structure of society, and the concrete reflection of this is expressed in the structure of tragedy. The human has discovered a new division, that is, a new dimension.

The discovery that human beings are individual persons is also sensed by them as a new sensation of spatial loneliness. Wölfflin sensitively noticed the differences in the intuition of spatial division between Egyptian and Greek sculptures. The Greek tragedy, which was created in the context of the crisis that saw the emergence of slavery from the collapse of the clan, is the creation of a linguistic space that reflects the emergence of a new human space. Shakespeare correctly captured the new spatial division emerging from the feudal system's collapse and capitalism's rise. Within the terrifying and perplexing abyss, people were bewildered by its dazzling force. While we must not overlook the deep horror at the foundational structure of this

division, at the same time, we must not close our eyes to the *inevitability* of these *forms*.

8

[74] In the previous section, we determined that conviction and assertion were two different things. We saw that they develop into two branches of lies, as the bi-directional axis of dialectical transformation of the dimensional rift of the *living space* that reflects the constantly novel division in the infrastructure. This was the first consideration that should be made in the analysis of the two things, thought and debate, which are the two elements of the committee mechanism.

We now must consider how conviction and assertion are two manifestations of one thing. The first consideration of this discovery we should turn to is the mechanism of negative judgment.

Even though Kant had already provided the catalyst for the movement to go beyond Aristotle's formalism, Kant did not succeed in his attempt to overcome Aristotle's formalism using *a priori* logic for two reasons: the first is that he took Aristotle's formalism as the "guide" for the project of an *a priori* analysis; and the second was his application of a table of categories, classified rather according to grammatical points of view, as a so-called logic. Modern logic used these two points as the springboards for a leap forward. Much of the controversy surrounding *negative judgments* in the early modern period centered on a critique of *negative judgments* in this context. Today, this remains the principal starting point for the treatment of this problem.[20]

The metaphysical negation of the *logic of blood* in the 1800s, which began with Fichte's *Foundations of the Science of Knowledge*, was an urgent revision to escape these two blind spots of Kant. They sought to ground negation in [75] the separation (*Trennung*) from the substance. It is as if by doing so, you could invoke logic to return once again to the ground from which it had emerged. (However, this separation is a problem we must return to from another angle.) Fortlage's *System of Psychology* (1855) and Brentano's *Psychol-*

20. See, Windelband 1884, 167–8.

ogy from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) also treat negative judgments as an *impulse of the will*.[21]

On the other hand, as we see in Sigwart and Lotze, the mainstream approach that emerged during the 1870s understood the negation to be a secondary judgment in the sense that it is the refutation of an affirmative judgment.[22] This involves, in other words, a double judgment. Similar to this, but a little different, we find in Windelband and Rickert the idea that negative judgment is not simply a refutation of the judgment but the evaluative answer to a *question*. "Every negation is an answer."[23] For example, the representational conjunction of the judgment, "This rose [is] white," can be affirmed without any preceding question. By contrast, when we say, "This rose [is] not red," the addition of the representation red to the perception [of the rose] gives rise to the question, "Don't you think this rose [is] red?"[24] which is then evaluated and denied. In other words, it is a secondary evaluative response. The remarkable characteristic of modern logic, which goes beyond Aristotle's formal logic, lies in the fact that this negative judgment is an evaluation of a secondary answer. It is no longer a static category but the appearance of a dynamic *logos* that divides itself from itself. When this judgment is turned to the negative side and [76] becomes an evaluation rather than a mere judgment, the sign of evaluation is again fulfilled by reexamining the phenomenon. It is a remarkable feature of modern logic that when a positive judgment turns into a negative judgment, there is once again a return to actuality. When this is permitted, all positive judgments are not merely affirmations that remain within the bounds of static coordinate *categories* but affirmations that stand amid the *reexamination into infinite actuality*. When we grasp the phenomenal expression of an essence through a law or model, this type of examination finds itself endlessly confronted

21. Fortlage 1885, 2: 91; Brentano 1924, 125.

22. Sigwart 1873, 162.

23. Sigwart 1873, 177.

24. [The copula has been bracketed because it does not appear in the Japanese but is necessary for the English. The literal translations would be: "As for (は) this rose (この薔薇), white (白い)" and "As for (は) this rose (この薔薇), not red (赤くない)." In the arising question, "Don't you think this rose [is] red?" (この薔薇は赤くないだろうか) Nakai uses the expression "だろうか," which not only indicates a question but also demands confirmation and approval from the person spoken to.]

with the question as to whether or not it can withstand the examination of other phenomenal aspects of the appearance of the essence. Thus, while being shattered by this examination, the model approaches essence eternally. "Human thought goes endlessly deeper from phenomenon to essence, from the essence of the first order, as it were, to the essence of the second order, and thus proceeds *infinitely*."[25] It should be noted here that this one law, this one model, is "*one stage* in the human cognition of unity and connection, the interdependence and wholeness of the world processes."[26]

Although logic itself arranges inferential rationality, it must be noted that its integration already has a step in the place where it is already established. Thus, all that affirmation of the copula, "to be," as a whole has been returned to the pale heaven of the negative possibility of the bottomless bottom. And again, by descending to the level of the phenomena, the inference itself is established.

Thus, the actual existence of inference, while throwing itself into the infinite wilderness of possibility of the plane of affirmation, on the one hand, always crosses the wall of negation by returning to the plane of actuality, on the other hand. An inference [77] that also encompasses even negation must no longer be an inference but a questioning of the actuality of reality. If the essence being questioned has a social dimension, then the thinker must exist as a moment of action that causes the phenomenal manifestation of the essence being questioned. In other words, the thinker's own thought-action exists as a phenomenon of the essence being questioned. Thus, when a law or model is constructed and examined regarding a phenomenon, the *answering evaluation*, that is, negative judgment, must be based on practical social evaluation. The evaluation must be handed over to the concrete structure of society itself. By being entrusted to the *criticism of social organization*, which is similar to but surpasses the reflection of thought, the question itself can finally return to the objectivity of the essence of the self.

Even if the problem itself is not social in nature, as long as this experi-

25. [Lenin 1949, 1578.]

26. [Lenin 1914, 148. The full quote reads: "But there is a vital thought, evidently: the concept of law is one of the stages of cognition by man of unity and connection, of the reciprocal dependence and totality of the world process. The 'treatment' and 'twisting' of words and concepts to which Hegel devotes himself here is a struggle against making the concept of law absolute, against simplifying it, against making a fetish of it. NB for modem physics."]

ment in actuality is delimited by technology, it cannot be freed from it. Thus, even judgment in the domain of *thought* is continuous with the *debate* inasmuch as it mediates the duality of the negative judgment as responsive evaluation. In other words, whether a judgment simply remains a *conviction* or turns into a negative judgment, it contains a discontinuity in the evaluative response in both cases. This is equivalent to an assertion having a discontinuity toward the *affirmative affirmation* of others. In the sense that it is a question of the phenomenal aspect of actuality, it has the same fundamental basis.

Windelband makes an interesting remark about the gradual increase in the intensity of the certainty of a judgment. [78]

> As we move away from the two extremes of complete certainty (affirmation and negation) and gradually weaken the degree of certainty, the intensity approaches a *point of indifference* at which neither affirmation nor negation is present. This zero point on the scale of logical judgments is of great significance for the theory of judgments, for it is also not unambiguous either. The *indifference* between affirmation and negation can be either absolute or critical. Total indifference exists where no judgment has yet been made at all, but critical indifference exists when, after a complete debate, both affirmation and negation are equally suspended. This absolute indifference only appears in the case of a question. In a question, the conjunction is not only in a state of trial but is also complete. Then, the interconnection of the representations is connected to the evaluation of truth value, but this evaluation is the only thing that has not yet been completed.[27]

He calls this clear suspension of evaluation a "problematic judgment" (*problematische Urtheil*).[28]

This point of critical indifference, which is the origin of negation within the realm of *thought*, corresponds to the zero point as the point of continuity, where the affirmative judgment transitions to a second affirmative judgment or a negative judgment. The *question* that mediates the emergence of this negative judgment—that is, the suspension of the judgment where only the evaluation of the truth value is lacking even though the representational

27. [Windelband, 1884, 187. The German term "Erwägung" (consideration) has been translated in Japanese by "debate" (討論).]

28. Windelband 1884, 190.

connection has been completed—awaits approval in the debate. It serves as the mechanism that establishes a position of those whose approval is sought in a debate. The standpoint at which a certain representational combination that has become a conviction following thought is transformed into an *assertion* after having been questioned in thought several times, that is, [79] after an *internal evaluation*, this place is where the judgment is once again returned to the mechanism of questioning. This is because, once again, at the level of debate, anyone who listens to the content of the representational combination simply reduces it back to the completion of the representational combination and withholds its evaluation. This is the fundamental nature of critique. Thus, at the level of external evaluation, the judgment once again takes on the character of a problematic judgment. As long as we are talking about the evaluation of a judgment, in other words, about the two-level structure of the completion of a representational combination and the completion of its evaluation, the two have a homogeneous basis. The standpoint of one person examining their own conviction once it has been established and the standpoint of another person listening to the assertion of that conviction are homogeneous at the level of the evaluation of judgment.

If we change our point of view, we can say that we are not sure of any of these convictions. This is especially true when conviction turns into an assertion. Is it not the case that *every assertion is a question*? It would seem that there is an inner dialectical quality to affirmation. It is not only for fundamental psychological reasons that one cannot help but express oneself as logic presses forward to the truth; rather, logic enforces its own negativity, and the tension that aims at the rigor of affirmation and denial becomes a larger question. There is a tension, a process of pursuing confident objectivity, that dispels the skeptical paradox of formal logic.

Thus, I earlier employed the structure of the lie in the analysis of thought and debate in order to demonstrate that conviction and assertion are two different things. Then, I employed the structure of negative judgment to demonstrate that it is two manifestations of the one and the same thing and that they correspond, through the problematic [80] judgment, to a stage of tension and development. This can be illustrated as in Schemata 3 and 4.



Schema 3



Schema 4

9

In the previous section, I attempted to distinguish between the *logic of thought* and the *logic of debate* and to analyze their continuity. We now need to consider the two forms of *logic*: the *logic of technology* and the *logic of production*. After this has been done, we must examine the logic of *praxis* in relation to the thought and discussion of these two logics. There, for the first time, we will discover a negation in the former two, and then we will discover a negation of a higher order, that is, a negation of separation in a higher sense. [81]

First, let me turn to my considerations of the logic of *technology*.

Aristotle's logic is a reflection of his metaphysics, which means that the concept precedes the judgment. Cassirer argues that the opposite is true for modern logic. Thus, he attempts to situate the theory of judgment ahead of the theory of concepts. However, to speak with Cassirer, this shift begins by means of a reconsideration of the old *concept of the class concept* (*Gattungsbegriff*), and in this case, the predominance of the concept is maintained.

What follows is the world in which this kind of concept falls. The common properties are abstracted from the attributes of objects, which, as individuals, have innumerable independent properties. These common

properties are combined to form one class. In this way, the concept is formed. As the inclusion of the concept decreases, its extension expands. Thus, a *pyramid of concepts* is created that ultimately reaches a certain *something* (*Etwas*). This something is the pinnacle of abstraction. What is more, what we discover at the limits of concept is an even more meaningless individual—which in no way refers to any individual but is itself merely a class—and when transformed into a concept, it plays the role of the molecule that forms the cornerstone of all thought.

At this point, doubts arise. The concept has finally become something empty. In the first place, a concept requires, in terms of its prescription of things, an unequivocal determination that can be pointed to in this case but not in others; indeterminacy and ambiguous polysemy should be the enemies of concepts. Nevertheless, this pyramidal structure of such indeterminate and the ambiguous polysemy of *things* must be questioned. For example, [82], as Lotze says, if we group cherry and beef together under the concept of being red, watery, edible foods, we have not established a valid logical concept of them. This is just a meaningless combination of words. What is needed is another method. This notion [of concept formation] could only be valid for the concept of living beings because living beings produce and develop in themselves, within determined generic concepts, their own relational and final [purposeful] concepts. This is never an indication of the triumph of abstraction but rather to the contrary. When this notion [of concept formation] is extended to the general concepts of the science of nature, the representation of intuition, that is, memory, comes into play. For Mill, a "round square" is a contradiction because the impression of a square cannot be found in the impression of a circle. This is further systematized in the *reproduction* of this representation. This is similar to James's idea that general representations resemble the blurred total-image that appears when multiple photographic plates are overlapped.

We can question this way of thinking by way of an example. Is it possible to have a representation of a line without width? A geometric line is the product of conditional relationships, not a collection of representations. Moreover, such a representation is impossible and cannot be retrieved from any memory representation.

Even if it is possible to synthesize a comprehensive representation of a collection of memory representations, it would not be possible to create a gen-

eral concept without the heavenly grace of psychological oblivion. [83] *The abstract substance-concept is a logic that relies solely on oblivion*.[29]

The function-concept was the new concept that emerged in response to this abstract concept of class. Its first beginning is found in Lotze. For example, to create the concept of metal from gold, silver, steel, or lead, it is not enough to simply eliminate the red, the green, the liquid, the gas, etc., from the substance. It is necessary to demonstrate the whole of the composition with its concrete characteristics. It must, however, be represented by an array of univocal relationships.

It should be noted that from this new standpoint, the idea of using "equivalence" (*Gleichheit*) in the conceptual composition as a clear and certain psychological intuition to mark various elements as equivalent or not the same assumes, on deeper analysis, a viewpoint (*Hinsicht*) by which to compare. The identity of this viewpoint, that is, the identity of the observation point (*Gesichtspunkt*), has a completely new structure. Here, the serial form of a thing appears. The relation of elements configured in a serial form is now the new mechanism of logic.

The reason we now separate logic from memory representations is to be more vigilant against their abstraction, for no other reason than to undertake a more rational analysis within the concrete relational mechanism. However, for Cassirer, this separation from the concept of memory was a departure point for the Hilbertian functionalization of judgment, as his observation point penetrated too deeply into the mathematical observation point, to the point of being enclosed within the function-concept, ultimately making the Hilbert-like judgment into a functionalization. It is transformed again into [84] an abstraction.

For us, however, the key question here is what we can take away from this tendency of logic.

The domain of logic that most contributes to our understanding of this tendency of the function-concept is that of the logic of technology. This is what we will consider below.

The proposition that human beings are "subordinate to nature" as con-

29. [In "The Contribution of the Functional Concept to Aesthetics," Nakai attributes this to Cassirer: "Cassirer says with a touch of irony: that 'the blessed fact of oblivion is the basis of the conceptual construct'" (NMZ1: 163–4). Cf. Cassirer 1923, 18.]

cerns their proper *purpose* and have "the power to rule external nature" only by means of their *tools* has in itself a dialectical structure. This signifies a fundamental reduction to the point where nature reaches its own *rationality* through the medium of nature itself. This is nothing else than the process by which the human separates itself from the animal world to form the human world. First by labor, then by language, which brought forth tools and plans respectively. In this way, the human itself, as one of the powers of nature, confronts material nature. By means of the natural power in his body, as well as by means of the active force of intellectual work, the human works on nature [自然] and, in so doing, transforms nature, thereby simultaneously transforming his own nature [性質] at the same time.

Such purposeful movement is labor itself. The structure of human productivity is composed of three elements: the *labor power*, the object on which the labor power works, and *the means* by which it works.

Among the three elements of this productivity, the labor power [85] and the means of labor, which are related to the human's active attitude toward nature, are correlated within a specific structure. This specific structure is the mechanism of technology. Thus, while productivity and technology form an inseparable structure, there are differences in terms of their mechanisms.

Let us analyze the concept of tools here. Let us return now to the proposition that the human is "subordinate to nature" for its own *purpose* and only acquires its "power to govern external nature" from its *tools*. Of course, we must not reify nature here. However, we must recognize in the tool that there is a separation and identity of the domain where the human undertakes a *Transformation* [transformation] or *Abbildung* [picturing/mapping] to a new *human order* with respect to progression of the sequential order of nature.

The fall of water is a natural sequential order. It is a natural principle of causality. For the sequential order of this fall to be transformed into a human sequential order, that is, transformed into the motion of an electric machine, an infinite sequential conversion is required; strictly speaking, *there is a combining of elements of the natural sequential elements with human sequential elements that marks the genesis of the new order of necessity of natural progression and the technical object.*

The rationality of these two series is different from that of the other. The sense of technology as mediation lies in the new point of view that results

from the combination of the serial forms of these two different points of view.

It can be said that the rift from which all religions have arisen is found in this chaos where this natural sequential order and human lineage is manifested as different from each other. For us, the unforeseen order is always chaos, [86] always a rift. The human order is nothing other than that which can be expected. In the end, freedom is nothing more than this. And if we don't mind defacing even God, then the mystery of why God created this world and why this world had to be banished into sin must also rest on this strife and division in which the human order is greater than the natural world, and where the natural order may also be greater than the human order. A sense of history is to be found in this strife. It also depends on the bare secret of being alive. Different worldviews determine the *model* of origin depending on how these two orders are understood in the originary phenomenon of the world.

I would now like to consider technology as the mediating moment in the dividing of these two orders.

What mechanism does this technology bring to the realm of logic? To begin with, we must first consider the logic of the natural progression in combining the progression of the natural sequential order with human sequential order. In general, judgment is divided into three domains within a generic conceptual way of thinking: (1) conceptuality—the relationship between the concept and the sign; (2) rationality—the relationship between reason and consequences; (3) wholeness—the relationship between the whole and part. Going further, if we advance to the configuration of the function-concept, we advance to the *symbolic formation* of judgment, as seen in Hilbert-Ackermann or Carnap. And if equality, expressed by =, is used to indicate the *transformation* (*Transformation*), then inequality, expressed by ≠, indicates inequality, which means that it is just a symbol of a mathematical formula. Either way, the problem is how to *transform* (*transformieren*) unidirectionally or depict (*abbilden*) the natural sequential progression [87] onto logical diagrammatic axes of the various committees of actuality and non-actuality, the possible and the impossible, the accidental and the inevitable.

However, there will be significant changes in all of the axes of actuality and non-actuality, the possible and the impossible, the accidental and the inevitable, as soon as we add the problem of technology here. Suppose we

quickly model this here, from actuality to non-actuality, non-actuality to actuality, from possible to impossible, impossible to possible, from accidental to inevitability, inevitable to accidental, with each reciprocal conversion. In that case, there appears a new mechanism for transformation and mapping, an inter-exchange structure, so to speak.

For example, the concept of an air balloon was once used in every logic book to illustrate an empty concept. It was a concept of a non-actuality. But now the Zeppelin has become a concept of actuality and has circled the world. There is a tension in the direction when this concept of non-actuality is transformed into a concept of actuality. The concept of the non-actuality of a navigating balloon is transformed into a concept of actuality because the navigating balloon is in a relationship of tension, as a rational order, with the human sequential order. This human purposeful action sways all nothingness into being, all being into nothingness, in order to combine them into the human sequential order in the schematic axis of this natural sequence. The mediating moment that sways nothingness into being, being into nothingness, is the structure of the *logic of technology*. If the logic of nature is unilateral and direct, then the logic of technology is reciprocal and alternating and involves reciprocal transformations. The technological orientation of medicine will reach its end in the *immortal human* being, a negative nothingness that cannot exist. In this way, *purpose* is something that approaches such nothingness. However, it must [88] be remembered that it is always possible to approach and stand before nothingness only as long as we remain in the rational order. The logic of action followed by all Romanticism is this limitless overflowing of rationality and non-rationality. "Elevating the contingency of the immediate present into the possibility" only occurs from this technical angle. At this moment, there is a synthesis of the logic of function and the logic of action in technology.

And, through the whole mechanism of the contingent and necessary, the possible and the impossible, the temporality of technology must pass through the activity of *experimentation* in order to transform the unreal things into actuality and the real things into non-actuality. Although it is said that time is a continuous occurrence, within the experimental mechanism of this technology, it is not connected horizontally by mere necessity or contingency. Whether it is by necessity or contingency, everything is twisted and rearranged as soon as we are confronted with the sequential

order of an intentional, purposeful human activity. Here, successive time is twisted and distorted.

In contrast to natural time, which simply flows linearly, technical time has an *original productive present*, such that every moment is an emanation point. Only in this present can the infinite future and the infinite past intersect recursively. It is in this sense that the line of purpose exerts a twist on time so that it acquires a new two-dimensionality of active positivity and passive negativity.

However, all of this is only a modeled reproduction. Let us return once more to the logic of technology as the form of phenomena. Here, I will now discuss the concept of a *window*.

According to the previous way of thinking of substance-concepts, the concept of a window, for example [89], is formed by abstraction; in other words, the conception is established from the mental representation constituting that form, if only minimally, its starting point; thus, the vague representation, the abstraction through elimination—which is in one sense an abstraction through forgetting—comes from the superposition of memory representations of many windows. What kind of generalization can be made there? Ultimately, it is only a set of individual representations. By contrast, if we consider this from the perspective of function-concepts, from the perspective of the purposeful activity called human dwelling, from the perspective of the requirements of the sequential order of tools, the window is the lighting, the ventilation, and the view required in the house; it is, in the mathematical sense, a functional complex of three elements. Whether it is round or rectangular is no longer a characteristic. In the moment that tempered glass was developed in the domain of technology, lighting, ventilation, and view were transformed into a higher order. When the ventilation is left to the systematic organization of the whole building, the whole wall is made of glass and also functions as a pillar; the wall, pillar, and window are combined into a single function. In other words, the concept is effaced into something larger, in this case, into the fundamental mechanism of architecture. Moreover, regardless of the form, each element of the function-concept that constitutes a window objectively retains the generality of all windows.

It is precisely here that the generality of the concept and the mobility of purpose that underlies its function, that is, *transformability*, is recognized.

Without this, how could we grasp the general concept of a technological tool that is constantly evolving? The characteristics that form the look of a warship during the Meiji era and that of a modern warship are very different, and ships of all types contain a myriad of different characteristics. If we employed a generic concept that eliminated all particular characteristics and said that a warship is a navigable vehicle used in battle, what concrete distinguishing mark [90] would we obtain? However, when it is considered as a functional complex of the four elements—attack, defense, transport, and habitability—we can determine the type of battleship by increasing the percentage of the attack and defense elements, and we can determine a cruiser class warship by increasing the percentage of the transport element. Moreover, each element conflicts with each of the others. The battleship is a living and moving concept: confronted with the trial and error of experiment, standards progressing yearly, the new standards appearing on the horizon the very instance of their new birth, hidden in the shadow of its technological purpose. It is an actuality that loses its very existence by existing, negates itself, and immediately becomes a medium to indicate its technological purpose.

Thus, the function-concept plays a fully active role in the domain of such technology-concepts. However, as Heidegger has pointed out, it is just a framework and has no orientation. It is also the strength of the technology-concept that it gives orientation to this function-concept. However, the technology-concept has its own limitations. It is a part of production and gains its legitimate position based on the correct understanding of the transformation into production.

This combination of the logic of *technology* with the logic of *production* and their connection to the two logics of *thought* and *debate* culminates in the logic of *praxis*, which completes the basic model of the *logic of the committee*. [91]

10

I previously established that at each cultural stage, in its collapse and reorganization, logic becomes a living *ratio* in its own rift. This is illustrated in Schema 5.

We have now retrospectively seen that each of these logics, by transform-



Schema 5

ing itself into something else, has formed the configured possibility of the logic of the committee.

Thus, the two logics of debate and thought are different: the first is a *quantitative* configuration of sense, and the latter is a *qualitative* configuration of sense. And finally, they are to be considered as two manifestations of one and the same thing. The *structure of the lie* had the role of detecting the separation, and the mechanism of problematic judgment contained in *negative judgment* proved to be the mediation of the continuity of the two manifestations of one thing. [92]

Advancing further and developing the essence of the *logic of technology*, I first attempted a *functional analysis of the concept*, re-examined the cultural heritage of the logic of function, and finally, contrasting the order of human purpose with the order of natural progression and recognizing that these orders were in opposition to each other, I considered the unique cultural heritage of the *logic of action* as an intermediary connection between these two orders.

The *logic of technology* exists as the sublation of these two logics. However, this logic of technology completes its true configuration by being further incorporated into the logic of production. At that moment, however, it had already transformed itself into a branch of the logic of production. I will consider this below. And when this logic of techno-production is combined with the logic of thought-debate, the logic of practice as the final composite is established as the final synthesis. Only then can these five moments have their own original place that constitutes the *logic of the committee* (see Schema 5).

II

In opposition to the logic of nature, which generally aims to determine the diverse existential opposition between possibility and impossibility, contingency and necessity, actuality and non-actuality, the logic of technology is a conceptual composition that blends the one into the other, the other into the one, in the direction of human purpose, such that the existence of "nothingness" in the logic of nature is strained toward "being," and the existence of "being" is strained toward "nothingness"; it is a logic with an orientation that [93] bends the natural movement of cause and effect into a human order. Thus, the genesis of the new necessary order of natural progression and the technical object is the meaning of the tension between the natural sequential order and the human sequential order and the logicality of technology as a dynamic mediator, and not the other way around.

The logic of technology itself, however, is only a mediating moment between nature and the human and does not involve the self-alienation of the concept, whereby the process of strife and division between the natural sequential order and the human sequential order becomes something other than human purposefulness. When this concept relates to something other than the process of transforming from the direction of technical genesis, we have entered into the *logic of production*.

In the previous section, I examined three elements of the structure of human *productivity*: the *labor power* as a purposeful movement of human activity; the *object* on which the labor power works, and the *means* used by labor power to work on something. I then examined the mechanism of technology vis-à-vis the particular structural connection between the means of labor and labor power in relation to the human's *active* attitude in terms of these three elements and, based on this, analyzed the logic of technology.

The concept of production transcends technology in its relation to its negative aspect, nature, that is, the *object* of labor, as well as in the fact that labor power itself is consumed and maintained only as *reproduction*; that is, to begin to structure *history* as a *process*. Logic begins from here to immerse itself in the flow of history. *Labor power* is the ability of a living individual. It presupposes a living individual. Thus, we need a certain quantity of subsistence to maintain this individual's survival. Therefore, labor power, as

an element of production [94], is already something that comes into being through the consumption of production. Thus, the production of this labor power is nothing other than the *reproduction* of the individual by the individual of himself/herself.

The quantity of the means of subsistence for the maintenance of this individual must be sufficient for the circulation of labor power. The natural desires for food, clothing, and shelter required here differ according to the climate and other natural characteristics. And this range of desires, as well as the mode of their fulfillment, becomes history itself and forms its cultural stage. In other words, what is referred to as simply a human purposeful order in the *logic of technology* has its purpose concretely expanded and transformed and eventually brings itself to its own self-alienated modality. The *logic of production* comes about at the moment that the rationality of this process is articulated. It is a logic that examines how concepts can be self-alienated from their essential orientation and nevertheless allows us to consider how that possibility is realized.

We should never think of this *separation* as a fanciful primitive state, such as a primitive society, for example. Such original states do not explain anything.

> It simply pushes the question into the grey and nebulous distance. It assumes as facts and events what it is supposed to deduce, namely the necessary relationship between two things, between, for example, the division of labor and exchange. Similarly, theology explains the origin of evil by the fall of man, i.e., it assumes what it should explain as a fact in the form of history.[30]

[95] Conversely, [we might ask,] how did slavery emerge from the clan system, and how did slavery progress to its self-destruction? And by what process did the concept alienate itself? Such an examination is the territory-specific *ratio* of this logic. Furthermore, by what process did the feudal system transform into the system of capitalism? In what way does the system of capitalism reveal the crisis that awaits it? How did the relations of production become irrelevant to the producers themselves in this process? How did this separation lead to alienation of the generality of the concept?

30. [Marx 2005, 323.]

12

I would like to consider now what aspects the generality of the concept possesses at this stage and whether everybody is able to truly cognize it.

We can consider two particular *characteristics of concept configuration* at this stage. The first is a striking trait of the domain of tools, namely that the production of existence has a *commercial nature*. The other is that the means of production are at each moment subject to the divisions of labor brought about by economic necessity, and this is inevitable even in the territory of intellectual technology, and that one arrives at a *specialization* in all relevant fields of study.

These two particular characteristics of concept formation at the present stage constitute the *"mass" character* of the concept. [96] This character of the concept forms the self-alienation of the concept itself.

13

First, let us consider the particular characteristics of *marketability*. We tend to think that the phenomenon of *buying and selling* is just an economic phenomenon and has no relation to logic and its generality, but if we observe the situation closely, this is not the case. For example, let us suppose we are selling *cement* here. If we observe closely, the fact that we are selling something like cement is a response to human demand. That is, within the limits of this mechanism of economic profit, if there is something that does not fit, even a little bit, the function to which cement is entrusted, people will not buy it, and it will be removed from the regions of real existence (*Existenz*) as praxis. At this stage, what does not sell does not exist, which means non-existence. The *possible* existence of "it is" is a continuation of the *actual existence* of "there is." Here, there is the logic of praxis. Thus, the price of a certain existence signifies the *boundary* at a certain moment, whereby the praxis of human activity makes it a real existence. Of course, this is so when the existence in question is a product. Still, even all-natural existence, be it mountains or rivers, all living things or animals, or ultimately even human beings, is for sale. And when it loses its trading value, it is subject to a strong deformation that plunges it into non-existence. The various factors

that determine the price of cement and cause the stock price of the company that produces it to fluctuate in the stock market are the principal [97] conditions in the determination of the concept of cement as a concrete product. Indeed, it is the increase or not of the share of cement X or cement Y in the activity of human society that is the phenomenal form of cement as a product, and it is the analysis that we make of it that conditions the determined standard of cement at the current moment.

The critique of the functional configuration of cement, that is, its value for human purposes, is tested in the experimental and scientific elucidation of as many human activities as possible. It is only in this way that the technology-concept of cement develops in line with its purpose. At the moment conceptual configuration in the logic of technology exists, its performance has always already been systematically critiqued and negated, and it negates itself as a mediating moment that designates a more general concept of cement, and negating itself with regard to possible existence. In the *logic of technology*, every Dasein is stretched towards its own technical purpose; every existence must have been twisted and distorted.

At the present stage of monopoly capitalism, however, this existentiality within the trading mechanism is already beginning to escape the critique by the masses. This is because when demand is not supported by money, it has fallen to the level of a mere symbol and been transformed into something unrealistic and invalid. This *demand*, which forms the foundation of technology, is divided into the demand of those with money and the demand of those without money. Where I have a demand based on money, I have an *actual object*; but where I do not have it, that is, if my demand is based on my desires, passions, hopes, etc., it becomes invalid, [98] it is but a relation between existence and thought, a mere representation in me.

Because of the intensification of commodification that occurs, human demand itself is caught up in a stage of hierarchical organization, separated from the human purpose and ends up becoming something other; what is more, the existential concept disappears for the members of the mass so that the only thing people retain when confronted with a concept is a mere representation. The human masses have been alienated from the *collaboration* in the configuration of the instrumental concept, in other words, detached from the concrete cooperation in the cognition of the generality of the

concept, and always only granted the representation of the given product, always forced to repeat everyday life.

Is there anyone who is conscious of cooperating in the formation of the generality of the concept, that is, of cooperating or submitting to the technical purpose of cement? At this present stage, everyone perceives cement as a *greyish-white powder*, that is, as a mere representation. The logic of everyone has already been detached from technical generality. Does anyone recognize, or even try to recognize, the generality of the 1936 Ford Model T? Our cognition has already been reduced to a distorted representation of a car. For all that we buy and sell, is there any existence that we grasp or are trying to grasp in general? The cars we drive, the synthetic silks we wear,... everything is received without any consideration to the generality that is possessed by the *secret committee* of factories.

In other words, it means that the existentiality of the concept is separated from the *critique* of human [99] purpose. Thus, *non-criticality* is branded into the *commodity nature* of the concept.

14

In the previous section, we saw that the tension of the concept vis-à-vis human purpose, which we had analyzed in the *logic of technology* as it is found at the present stage of the production mechanism, possesses its own history that brings about a form of self-alienation insofar as *reproduction* is a moment within production; the generality of the concept, in particular at this present stage, has taken on the *character of commodity*; it departs from its intended orientation and declines into a mere representation as ineffective demand. Finally, I considered the lack of critique, that is, the character of *non-criticality* vis-à-vis the orientation of human purpose.

I would like now to consider here the conceptual mechanism that results from *specialization* in the domain of intellectual technology that is brought about by the profound division of labor within the means of production at this present stage.

The specialization of each person's functions born from the fragmentation and differentiation of technical fields, as well as the habit of focusing attention and endlessly repeating identical and circumscribed gestures, are

the consequences of the *division of labor* which makes it possible to achieve the goal of efficiency with a minimum of effort.

However, the mutual independence of these exclusive functions presupposes that they are unified within the same organizational cooperation.

The division of labor in intellectual labor has also progressed along this path. The productive creation of a practical entity, as well as the planned generality of the concept of its existence [100], within the limits of commerciality, are largely entrusted to the company's in-house technical committee. Analytical research of other general objective beings is referred to the teachers at schools or other research institutes, and the investigation of these general concepts is referred to their respective academic worlds and academic research committees.

Of these *two phenomena of referral*, the *former*, that is, the company's exclusive technical committee, is, in a remarkable way, a kind of secret committee; that is, it plays a crucial role in non-criticality and in the fall into the representation of the commodity character, that is, the disengagement of the generality of the concept in the commodity character from the masses. The *latter*, that is, the pedagogical research committee, is different. The freedom of research is more or less allowed, within limits, at various levels. This means, then, that whereas the *former*, that is, the technical committee dedicated to the company, is a department within the large industrial organization, the *latter* has, to a certain extent, some capacity for personal competition, even for researchers to gather around; we find here an atmosphere of fortuity, rather than a mechanism of economic necessity; they correspond to a guild-like handicraft organization; however, it is true that schools are now gradually being transformed into semi-industrial workshops, where principals and general supervisors are becoming the institutions of graduate employment. What does this guild-like freedom mean? It is a feeling of personal self-reliance on one's own strength or effort and the insecurity of life that accompanies it. This mechanism of semi-free competition is a significant moment to form the structure of the fractions of [101] the academic world at this present stage.

The jealousy between individuals, rivalries, conscious or unconscious machinations, palace intrigues, suspicions, and all that suggests that "the human being is a wolf to other human beings" has long belonged to this milieu and has generated the characteristic cult logic of academic research.

There is a conflict of contradiction here: namely, the *specialization* of the division of labor is a phenomenon that parallels technical differentiation but whose *preserved form* belongs to a stage of organization that is lagging far behind: it can be said that this division between the two constitutes a source of anxiety for the worldview of the so-called academic *intelligentsia*.

The research that arises from this unbalanced system is characterized by the fact that its specialization is separated from collaborative unity. Originally, there must have been organizational cooperativity as a precondition of the division of labor. Here, however, only the specialized division of labor emerges; the organizational cooperativity has been dropped, and having been omitted, it moves on.

While the study of conceptual generalities requires the mutual collaborative research of all humans, it has been hidden away here in secret research driven by personal goals and ambition. The secretive feudal and hereditary form is reproduced here in a serious manner. As for the relation of the general public to a representation, the *non-cooperation* in grasping the generality of the concept once again in a mechanical way brings about their alienation, an inability to go beyond representations, and even an inability to elaborate any presentation. This does not mean that they do not have generality, but that they are deeply involved in a mechanism they cannot understand. [102]

15

Thus, at this present stage, the *commodity character* of the concept has led to a state of *non-criticality* and to the alienation of the masses from generality who only possess *mere representations*; furthermore, the nature of its specialization has today led to a state of *uncooperativity* that again alienates the masses from the generality of the concept who only concern themselves with *mere representations*.

Or rather inversely, it can be said that it is due to the mechanism that the current stage of *the masses* has become what it is. In other words, this means that the current Dasein of human beings, in being alienated from its own concept, has been alienated from its own existence in the process of production. Nature is alienated from humans, their own active functions are alienated from them, and their *species* is alienated from them. If the product is

alienated from me, if it opposes me as the power of the other, then to whom does it belong? As a means of of this mysterious other existence, species life is also alienated from itself. Thus, the concept is not just a *representation*; it acts as a *shackle*.

How can we restore the generality of the concept and break free from the committee's shackles?

From this new problem, the *logic of practice* appears for the first time.

[103] In order to save the concept from *non-criticality* and *non-cooperativity*, that is, the two forms of the representation of the concept that results from its commodification and specialization, we must prepare two things. In terms of the *non-criticality*, it is necessary to ensure organizational deliberation. And for *non-cooperativity*, we must establish the organizational representativeness .

This *deliberative* nature is the central pillar through which the logic of *thought-debate* are synthesized, and the *representativeness* is the other, the synthesis of the *logic of technology* and the *logic of production*.

And the practical nature that is by necessity a part of *deliberation* and *representativeness* is the mechanism of *the logic of praxis*, and the general functions assembled herein are nothing more than the full picture of *the logic of the committee*.

16

First of all, the starting point of *deliberation* is generally based on a *proposal* that is a reflection of actuality. The direct scarcity and mediated alienation in phenomena seek expression in some form as a public potential power. This proposal is nothing other than the expression of this potency in language. Cognitively speaking, in the transformation from the potentiality to the actuality, which is how this proposal appears, it is, in terms of cognition, already possible to *distort* the originary reflection *qua* reflection. The state of actuality is the fundamental ground of the potential power of the masses, but even if the situation necessitates a heightening of this potential power, if this potential power is expressed in the form of indifference, then surely this potency must have been distorted in another direction and diffused as an actual force, [104] and this is because it lacks a legitimate and basic means of projection. In this sense, a *proposal* must

presuppose an accurate orthographic projection of the phenomenon, that is, it is a reproduction.

I would like to call the *proposal qua reflection*, *the objectivization of the first embodied subjective condition*.

This *proposal* passes through multiple *questions*, *explanations*, and *debates* to arrive at a *resolution*. During this procedure, the many distortions of the perception of the current situation in the proposal should be corrected, the lies and falsehoods should be filtered out, and an endeavor should be made to construct an orthographic projection—In real life, however, committees are often quite the opposite. There are limits to and divisions within the committee.—As soon as a *resolution*, as an expression of the situation, is made, it is removed from the extremely secret deliberations and, according to the abilities and character of the various participants, follows according to its section the lines of the organization, and the linguistic meaning once again is embodied in human activity. That is, the referentiality of meaning is taken up in the organization-function of actuality. That is, here, it has the meaning of a *delegation*. The actualization of this received referentiality is its *implementation*.

The moment when we move from *proposal* and *deliberation*, that is, from *collective* assessment to *entrustment* and *implementation*, that is, to *delegation*—I leave here the organizational theory of representativeness for a separate article—this is the *plan*. I would like to call this *plan* the objective *conditioning of the second embodied subject*. This plan, in other words, is *schematic*. It is a *projected plan* (*Entwurf*) or model (*Model*).

As it is implemented, this plan becomes the *projection* (*Geworfenes*) of the result; that is, a *report*. But it still has a certain *schematic character*. [105]

In the transition from this *plan* to the *report* or from the projected plan to the graphical projection, there is a *process* in which the project changes while remaining itself.

To be precise, when it comes to the construction of a project, the projected plan and the graphical projection should be the same. The *plan* and *report* should be identical.

What differentiates these two things is that there is a severing, which is the *implementation* between them, which is what transformed them into a *process*.

It should be noted here that the *implementational construction* aimed at

by the plan will, by actually being built, or in other words, because it is the *object* of a *report*, become a *mediation* that will give birth to a *higher* plan that will concretely give birth to more embodied subjective conditions. It is a mediating moment that self-negates its own actuality.

Errors appear when the first *plan*, which acts as a mediator for denying one's own actuality, is transformed into a *report*—these *errors* are the propellers of historical progress—the correction of these errors through the re-examination of the ground of actuality, and the transformation into a higher-order *plan*, this turning back is the meaning of *critique* [批判].

If I call this *report* the *embodied subjectivization of the third objective condition*, this *critique* is *the embodied subjective conditioning of the fourth objective condition*.

And through this *critique*, embodied subjectivity truly descends to its very roots—*sub-ject*[31]—opening to a new fifth *proposal*; that is, it becomes once again the basis for the objectification of the embodied subjective condition. [106]

The meaning of embodied subjectivity lies in the return from the first proposal to the fifth proposal. And this process in which the embodied subject moves through the mediation of the object toward the realization of its own foundation is also the ultimate fulfillment of the *logic of practice*. Thus, is the *logic of the committee* not schematizing itself as a recursive process of infinite progress?

Following the *logic of this committee*, the *schema* expressed here is also submitted as a *proposal*, such that this *schema* is never completed as a conceptual schema; but by positioning itself in practice itself, I wonder if it has a self-expressive continuation above actuality itself. Let us illustrate this in Schema 6.

[107] This is also a model, and how it will withstand the examination of the phenomenon is a problem that should be considered by the reader. Thus, this, too, is a *schema*. However, it is also a *projected plan* that ought to be transformed into a *graphical projection*. The fact that this schema can transform itself into something else has important implications for the *logic of practice*.

Thus, each of the five modes of logos—the logic of *dialectics*, the logic of

31. [In German in the original.]



Schema 6

contemplation, the logic of *experience*, the logic of *action* and *function*, and the logic of *production*—by playing a role in the transition of cultural stages and by transforming itself into something else, it became the logic of *practice* which, as the constitutive moment of the *logic of the committee*, and as *thought* and *debate*, *technology* and *production*, and furthermore as their synthesis, became the *logic of practice*. (See Schema 5.)

This logic of *practice*, as a reflection of the actuality of the situation or, in other words, as an objectification of the embodied subject, implies a *proposal*, and this proposal is followed by a *plan* and a *report*, then a *criticism* from the field of actuality, and finally, after these four moments, there is, once again, a return to the proposal. This deepening through a return from one embodied subjective condition to another embodied subjective condition is the meaning of true embodied subjectivity and the dialectical nature of transforming oneself into a medium.

Does the division of the self within embodied subjectivity, as a process

and as history, not have a sense of development, and might this not also have the sense of the *dia-logos* that always divides in two?

And we must not forget that the division between these two is always the proper reflection of the potentiality of the *ground of actuality*. It should be noted here that pantheistic dialectic is, in fact, not free from the ground of the actuality of the situation. That this logic bears some kinship with [108] the metaphysics of the 1800s is nothing more than a sign that this is a holdover from the logic of the blood of the German *Junkertum* against which we have already warned: It is with this repeated warning that I would like to end this little manuscript on the *logic of the committee*.

Aware that many points could not be developed sufficiently due, in particular, to a limited number of pages, I count once again on the reader's forgiveness.

* The translator would like to thank Tani Yū for her insightful comments and corrections to a draft of this translation.

References

Abbreviations

MKZ 『三木清全集』[*Complete Works of Miki Kiyoshi*] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966–1968), 20 vols.

NMZ 『中井正一全集』[*Complete Works of Nakai Masakazu*] (Tokyo: Iwanami Bijutsu Shuppansha, 1981), 4 vols.

Other references

Bacon, Francis

2011 *The Works of Francis Bacon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bernardi, J. and S. Ogawa, eds.

2021 *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Cinema* (London: Routledge).

Brentano, Franz

1924 *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig: Meiner).

Cassirer, Ernst

1923 *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity* (Chicago: Open Court; reprint , New York: Dover, 1953).

1944 "The Concept of Group and the Theory of Perception," trans. by A. Gurwitsch, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 5/1: 1–35.

1953 *The Platonic Renaissance in England*, trans. by James P. Pettegrove (Austin: University of Texas Press).

1981 *Kant's Life and Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

2009 "Erkenntnistheorie nebst den Grenzfragen der Logik und Denkpsychologie," in *Ernst Cassirer Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg: Meiner), 17: 13–81.

DILTHEY, Wilhelm

1914 *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation: Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Religion*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol, 2 (Leipzig: Teubner).

FORTLAGE, Karl

1885 *System der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Brockhaus).

FOWLER, Thomas

1878 *Bacon's Novum Organum* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

GROTE, George

1880 *Aristotle* (London: John Murry, Albemarle Steet).

HANI Gorō 羽仁五郎

1981 『図書館の論理：羽仁五郎の発言』[Library Logic: Remarks] (Tokyo: Isetan Shoten).

HASUMI Shigehiko 蓮實重彦

1997 "'Taisho-like' Discourse and Criticism," in *Criticism in Modern Japan*, Karatani Kōjin, ed. (Tokyo: Kōdansha), vol. 1.

KITADA Akihiro 北田暁大

2017 "An Assault on 'Meaning': On Nakai Masakazu's Concept of 'Mediation,'" trans. by A. Zahlten, *Media Theory in Japan* (Duke University Press), 285–304.

KRUMMEL, John

2017 "Creative Imagination, Sensus Communis, and the Social Imaginary: Miki Kiyoshi and Nakamura Yūjirō in Dialogue with Contemporary Western Philosophy," in Y. Michiko, ed., *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy* (London: Bloomsbury), 255–84.

LENIN, Vladimir

1914 *Collected Works*, Volume 38 (Russia: Progress Publishers): {https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch02.htm}

1949 "Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks: Outline of Hegel's Science of Logic," trans. by Raya Dunayevskaya. Manuscript 1949 in the Dunayevskaya Collection (Detroit: Wayne State University Archives Microfilms, 1981–1989), 1492–1584. {http://rayadunayevskaya.org/ArchivePDFs/1492.pdf}

LUCKEN Michael

2016 "The Logic of Reflection in Nakai Masakazu," in *Imitation and Creativity in Japanese Arts* (New York: Columbia University Press), 61–72.

Maraldo, John
2019 "Revisiting Rude Awakenings," *European Journal of Japanese Philosophy* 4: 5–43.

Marx, Karl
2005 "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited), 88–105.

Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎
2011 "Logic and Life," in *Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitaro*, trans. by John Krummel(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 103–74.

Nornes, Abé Mark
2003 *Japanese Documentary Film: The Meiji Era Through Hiroshima* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Reinach, Adolf
1989 *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit Kommentar* (München: Philosophia Verlag).

Rolfes, Eugen
1919 *Aristoteles, Topik* (Leipzig: Meiner).

Schopenhauer, Arthur
2012 *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sigwart, Christoph von
1873 *Logik. Die Lehre vom Urtheil, vom Begriff und vom Schluss* (Tübingen: Laupp).

Steinberg, Marc and Alexander Zahlten, eds.
2017 *Media Theory in Japan* (Durham: Duke University Press).

Takashima Naoyuki 高島直之
2000 『中井正とその時代 』[Nakai Masakazu and his Age] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha).

Walzel, Oskar
1931 *German Romanticism*, trans. by Alma Elise Lussky (New York: Frederick Ungar).

Windelband, Wilhelm
1884 "Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urtheil," in *Straßburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie. Eduard Zeller zu seinem siebenzigsten Geburtstage* (Tübingen: Mohr).
1911 *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie: Erster Band: Von der Renaissance bis Kant* (Germany: Outlook Verlag).

Yamamoto, Naoki
2020 *Dialectics without Synthesis: Japanese Film Theory and Realism in a Global Frame* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

YUSA Michiko 遊佐道子
2002 *Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).