



Nishida Kitarō and Friedrich Schleiermacher On the Romantic Spinozism in their Early Thought

Although the clarification of Nishida's reception of classical German philosophy has been particularly significant in Nishida studies, the influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher has long been underestimated due to the limited references to Schleiermacher in Nishida's writings. Challenging this tendency, Kobayashi Toshiaki has highlighted an undeniable affinity between them concerning their Romanticism. Based on this hypothesis, this essay aims to demonstrate that the affinity between Nishida and Schleiermacher can be elucidated through their shared Romantic Spinozism. First, both Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" and Nishida's "pure experience" denote the pre-reflective state of consciousness which implies a sense of unity with the divine reality. Second, they both criticize the anthropomorphic view of a personal God in favor of the impersonal God of Spinozism, and argue for religious immortality in which human individuality merges into the unity of the divine reality, akin to "a drop in the ocean." Moreover, this structural comparison is reinforced by Nishida's interpretation of Schleiermacher in the recently published manuscript of Nishida's "Lecture on Religious Studies."

KEYWORDS: Nishida Kitarō—Friedrich Schleiermacher—
Romanticism—Spinozism—Spinoza—Intercultural Philosophy

In the realm of Nishida studies, as well as in the broader scholarship of the Kyoto School, it has always been of particular importance to elucidate the impact of Classical German philosophy (German Idealism).¹ As is readily apparent, Nishida's writings contain numerous references to German philosophers such as Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling.² However, one notable name is conspicuously absent from this distinguished list: that of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a thinker who is regarded as a member of Classical German philosophy and a contemporary of the aforementioned philosophers. Although Schleiermacher's significance to post-Kantian philosophy of religion was long underestimated, recent scholarship has attempted to incorporate his contributions into the constellation of Classical German philosophy.³ In light of this new trend, it is now incumbent upon Nishida studies to adopt a broader perspective on his intellectual background.

The research history concerning Schleiermacher's influence on Nishida is marked by a certain degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, there is a paucity of studies investigating the relationship between these two thinkers, owing to the scant references to Schleiermacher in Nishida's *Complete Works*. In his "Lecture on Religious Studies," for instance, Nishida does broach the topic of Schleiermacher's thought, but these discussions are largely fragmentary,

1. Walter Jaeschke suggests that the name "German idealism" should be avoided, pointing out that it does not reflect its substantial reality: "German idealism may be German, but it is not a philosophical category. And it is not just idealism" (JAESCHKE 2000, 232). Instead, Jaeschke uses the term "classical German philosophy", which includes broader philosophical currents after Kant, such as Romanticism (JAESCHKE & ARNDT 2012).

2. In this respect, Shikaya gives a critical assessment of Nishida's reception of Classical German philosophy (SHIKAYA 1984).

3. For a broader perspective on Classical German philosophy, see JAESCHKE/ARNDT (Hg.) 2012.

grounded in a superficial understanding of Schleiermacher as a philosopher of feeling.⁴ In contrast to Seiichi Hatano, a contemporary of Nishida who viewed Schleiermacher as one of the most pivotal figures in his systematic philosophy of religion,⁵ it may initially appear unlikely that an investigation of the link between Nishida and Schleiermacher would yield fruitful results.

On the other hand, research has pointed out an intriguing connection between them. Kobayashi Toshiaki, in a biographical and sometimes psychoanalytical exploration of Nishida's philosophy, proposes that exploring the link between Nishida's philosophy of religion and German Romanticism, represented by Schleiermacher, is significant for Nishida studies.⁶ Despite admitting that references to Schleiermacher are scarce in Nishida's writings, Kobayashi argues that this research question is unavoidable due to the "unignorable affinities in their thought," such as Nishida's "pure experience" and Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" as a religious experience.⁷ Kobayashi explains this "affinity" as their common tendency towards Romantic thought, concluding that Nishida's philosophy cannot be fully comprehended without clarifying his Romanticism. However, while this argument appears relevant and significant at first glance, it seems, as Kobayashi himself partly admits, to reach a deadlock easily as Nishida never embarked on a comprehensive writing on Romanticism.

Based on Kobayashi's observation, this essay argues that the affinity between Nishida and Schleiermacher also needs to be explained by their "Spinozism," which is strongly characterized by Romanticism in their case. The Romantic intuition that the self is a part of the whole nature or universe has a high affinity with Spinozistic thought, which postulates that finite beings have their existence in the infinite substance. The thesis of this essay, therefore, is that the resonance of Nishida and Schleiermacher can be most persuasively explained by their "Romantic Spinozism." Since Kobayashi's study has already demonstrated their affinity for Romanticism, this essay will mainly concentrate on their Spinozistic aspects.

4. E.g., NKZ 15: 230.

5. In his *Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Religion*, Hatano treats Schleiermacher as an example of a successful philosopher of religion (HATANO 2012, 131–148).

6. KOBAYASHI 2003.

7. KOBAYASHI 2003, 94.

As later elucidated in detail, both Nishida and Schleiermacher are heavily influenced by Spinoza. On the one hand, in Nishida's early main work, *An Inquiry into the Good*, Spinoza is not only referred to in significant parts but his philosophical system is also essentially characterized by Spinozistic pantheism, such as the monistic understanding of reality or the impersonal view of God.⁸ On the other hand, Schleiermacher was also strongly influenced by Spinoza's philosophy in his youth, by studying through Jacobi's book, which played a pivotal role in the so-called Spinoza Renaissance in 18th century Germany.⁹ Schleiermacher's early main work, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, which can be considered as "the most significant manifesto of theology since the Reformation,"¹⁰ was also written under the tremendous influence of this Spinoza reception.¹¹ Although the Spinozistic motifs can be found throughout the entire development of their thought, the scope of this essay is limited to the analysis of their early works, where the convergence of Romanticism and Spinozism appears most distinctly.

Regarding the method of comparison, the affinity of Nishida and Schleiermacher will be explained at two levels. The first level is the "common history of Spinoza reception." The comparison between Nishida and Schleiermacher is not an arbitrary pairing without any historical connection, but they are comparable due to the common history of Spinoza reception by analyzing what they learned from the same source of Spinoza's philosophy and how they incorporated it into their own thoughts. Especially, their early thoughts are a remarkable example of the history of Spinoza reception in

8. Concerning the relationship between Nishida and Spinoza, KOSAKA (2011) presented the most comprehensive and methodical comparison. Additionally, TAKEUCHI (2002) composed a distinctive and discerning essay on Nishida's critique of Spinoza. For an English literature on the subject matter, refer to DILWORTH (1970).

9. For an overview of Spinoza Renaissance in 18th century Germany, see SCHÜRMAN/WAZEK/WEINREICH (Hg.) 2002.

10. JÜNGEL 2004, 906.

11. The impact of Spinoza on early Schleiermacher is a crucial topic in Schleiermacher scholarship. MECKENSTOCK (1988) is particularly focused on the reception of Spinoza and Kant in early Schleiermacher. LAMM (1996) traced Spinoza's influence across the entire development of Schleiermacher's theology. ELLSIEPEN (2006) sought to demonstrate that the fundamental concept of early Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion, "intuition and feeling," was derived from Spinoza's *scientia intuitiva*.

Eastern and Western thoughts. This comparison offers an optimal exemplification of the intercultural philosophy on the basis of Spinozism in the East and the West.¹²

Furthermore, at the second level of analysis, it is also argued that Schleiermacher had a direct influence on Nishida's early philosophical ideas, which can be traced to some extent through philological methods. The crux of this claim rests on Nishida's recently published manuscript of "Lecture on Religious Studies," included as an appendix to his complete works.¹³ Although the lecture notes on religious studies only contain fragmentary references to Schleiermacher,¹⁴ the newly published manuscript reveals Nishida's more nuanced and profounder comprehension of Schleiermacher, which is in agreement with the result of comparison based on the history of reception. Given Nishida's explicit citations of Schleiermacher in his manuscript, the comparison at the first level of analysis concerning the history of Spinoza reception is grounded in philological evidence. This dual-pronged argument convincingly demonstrates that the concurrence between Nishida and Schleiermacher's early ideas is accounted for by their shared Romantic Spinozism.¹⁵

12. For a pioneering project for the intercultural philosophy based on the thought of "one and many" (Alleinheitslehre), see HENRICH (Hg.) 1985.

13. NISHIDA 2020.

14. Compiled by Hisamatsu Shin'ichi in 1913; NKZ 15: 221–381.

15. Regarding Schleiermacher's essay *Speeches*, it is important to specify which edition is being used for analysis. *Speeches* exists in four editions: the 1st (1799), 2nd (1806), 3rd (1821), and 4th (1831), each of which underwent substantial revisions except for the 4th edition. As there is almost no significant difference between the 3rd and 4th editions, the latter is typically considered identical to the former. Regarding the development of *Speeches*, GRAF (1978) offers a solid analysis. In the field of Schleiermacher studies, scholars generally rely on the text of the 1st edition, which most clearly reveals the Romantic and Spinozistic tendencies of his youth.

When it comes to comparing Schleiermacher with Nishida, it is also necessary to consider which edition of *Speeches* Nishida himself read and studied. However, this is difficult to ascertain because Nishida quotes from different editions of *Speeches*. For example, the recently published manuscript of his "Lecture on Religious Studies" contains quotes from both the 1st and 2nd (or 3rd) editions (NISHIDA 2020, 265–7), causing confusion even for the editor (NISHIDA 2020, 281). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that Nishida was using a text that allowed for comparison and overview of different editions of *Speeches*, such as Pünjer's edition (SCHLEIERMACHER 1879). Correspondingly, this essay also draws from various editions (primarily the 1st and 3rd editions) to describe Schleiermacher's thought.

PRE-REFLECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND MONISTIC ONTOLOGY

The “Intuition and Feeling” of the Universe in Schleiermacher

In his early main work *Speeches*, Schleiermacher expounds on his theory of religion, which can be characterized as a form of Romantic Spinozism. The essence of his argument can be most readily discerned in the second speech, where the central problem of the work—the essence of religion—is discussed. Prior to defining this essence (i.e., what religion is), Schleiermacher employs negative arguments (i.e., what religion is not), which serve to eliminate misunderstandings and prejudices. On the one hand, religion is not synonymous with “thinking” in the sense of intellectual activity. While one may attempt to discern the nature of God through metaphysics, such an approach does not necessarily result in piety. Conversely, a simple person who has not received formal education may demonstrate a deep religiosity that is able to astonish even academic scholars. On the other hand, religion is not synonymous with “acting” in the sense of ethics or morality. While ethical behavior is often associated with religion, moral rectitude does not necessarily equate to a deep religiosity, as atheists too can be highly moral individuals. Here, the reverse is also true: the paradoxical truth of religion lies in the fact that the deepest core of religious truth can only be grasped by sinners. In this way, Schleiermacher argues that the essence of religion lies neither in “thinking” nor in “acting.”

After presenting this negative argument, Schleiermacher proceeds to develop his positive argument regarding the essence of religion. He contends that religion is essentially an “intuition and feeling” of the Universe (S1, 102). According to Schleiermacher, religion “wishes to intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe’s own manifestations and actions, and longs to be grasped and filled by the universe’s immediate influences in childlike passivity” (S1, 102). Religion is neither an intellectual activity seeking metaphysical truth nor a moral activity aimed at virtuous conduct. Rather, it involves receiving the divine manifestation of the universe in a passive manner that is essentially aesthetic in nature, as “religion is the sensibility and taste for the infinite” (S1, 103). Moreover, this “intuition and feeling” is often characterized as a sense of unity with the universe. As Schleiermacher explains, “if man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the derived [medi-

ated] consciousness, forever apart” (S3, 40). In this immediate intuition and feeling, one feels embraced by the Universe. Thus, Schleiermacher’s religion can be regarded as a sense of mystical union with the Universe.

This definition of religion needs further explanation and analysis. Firstly, it must be noted that Schleiermacher characterizes “intuition and feeling” as “immediate.” In his terminology, “immediate” consciousness refers to a self-contained state of subjectivity without intentional objects as its content, where feeling dominates one’s inner mind directly, as opposed to the content of “mediated” consciousness which is objective knowledge of a thing or fact (KGA I/13: 22). “Intuition and feeling” is not an objective recognition of being in unity with the Universe (as religion is not knowledge); rather, it is a dominating feeling as a phenomenological fact which has not yet been subjected to reflection or judgement. In this sense, the “immediacy” of intuition and feeling should be understood as a “pre-reflective” state of consciousness.¹⁶ Religion does not concern “knowing” or “acting” that arise from reflection, but rather the pure consciousness of unity which is not yet disturbed by reflection.

Secondly, the concept of “intuition and feeling” is viewed as a fleeting “moment” that arises suddenly and dissipates just as quickly, leaving behind a trace of joy. As any attempt to analyze or theorize this “moment” would inevitably distort the religious experience, Schleiermacher opts to describe it using vivid imagery: “It is as fleeting and transparent as the first scent with which the dew gently caresses the waking flowers, as modest and delicate as a maiden’s kiss, as holy and fruitful as a nuptial embrace....” (SI, 112–13). This moment of “intuition and feeling” is elucidated through the use of metaphors evocative of the luscious and romantic relationship between two people, such as a “kiss” or an “embrace.” The sensual nature of this moment also implies a sense of unity with the Universe in the religious experience:

I lie on the bosom of the infinite world. At this moment I am its soul, for I feel all its powers and its infinite life as my own: at this moment it is my body, for I penetrate its muscles and its limbs as my own, and its innermost nerves move according to my sense and my presentiment as my own. (SI, 43)

16. See also Ulrich Barth’s analysis on the “pre-predicative” character of Schleiermacher’s theory of religion (BARTH 2004, 275).

In the realm of religion, the experience of “intuition and feeling” allows one to bask in a harmonious moment, embraced in the unity with the Universe. Nevertheless, due to its fleeting nature, this religious experience does not endure but vanishes immediately: “The incoming of existence to us, by this immediate union, at once stops as soon as it reaches consciousness” (S3, 44). Once this immediate experience is reflected upon and brought into conscious awareness, it no longer remains as “intuition and feeling” but transforms into reflected “knowledge” of the experience.

Thirdly, it is worth noting that according to Schleiermacher, the moment of religious experience is the “original unity” of human subjectivity (S3, 42), from which “knowing,” “acting,” and “feeling” emerge and differentiate. Although religion was distinguished from “knowing” and “acting” as discussed earlier, this does not imply that religion is totally disconnected from them. Rather, Schleiermacher argues that religion is their foundation at a deeper level. To support this argument, he explains that the fundamental roots of “knowing” and “acting” are found in religion, as they both originate from “a desire to be identified with the Universe through an object” (S3, 44). “Knowing” arises when an object holds an overwhelming power over humans, such as the wonder of nature that attracts human curiosity. Conversely, “acting” occurs when humans possess an overwhelming power over an object and intend to exert influence and change it. Thus, in their deepest roots, “knowing” and “acting” are intrinsically linked with religion, i.e., the sense of unity with the Universe. As Schleiermacher notes, “they are not identical and yet are inseparable” (S3, 45). Therefore, the moment of intuition and feeling serves as the cradle of human subjectivity from which all the functions of the human mind originate.

As a backdrop to Schleiermacher’s theory of religion, it is important to note that his thought exhibits a certain Spinozism. Within his work *Speeches*, there are instances where God and the world seem to be treated almost equally, as evidenced by the use of the term “the Universe,” where the functions of the immanent world and the transcendent God are united.¹⁷ This tendency can also be seen in his characterization of religion as

17. Although the term “the Universe” played a significant role throughout the first edition, Schleiermacher later modified his usage of the term by removing or replacing it with other phrases, such as “the Whole” or “the Eternal,” in the third edition in response to criticisms of

“the immediate feeling” and “the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal” (s3, 36). Here, religiosity entails an immediate feeling and consciousness that all finite beings, including oneself, have their existence in and through the Infinite. God as the Infinite is not imagined as a transcendent entity separate from the world, but rather one that pervades and immerses into it. This image of mutual immersion between God and the world is further emphasized by the use of the expression “one and all” which was recognized as the slogan of pantheism: “[religion] is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all” (s3, 36).

Due to this Spinozistic tendency, Schleiermacher was criticized by his contemporaries, although he rejected the Spinozistic tone each time the text was revised for a new edition.¹⁸ In fact, Schleiermacher never identified himself as a Spinozist or pantheist, and it can be argued from his other works that he distinguished God and the world at least in their functions.¹⁹ However, because the original idea and scheme of *Speeches* were so deeply characterized by Spinozistic tendencies, his philosophy of religion in this work cannot be explained without considering his Spinozism.

Schleiermacher’s Spinozism can be traced back to the Spinoza Renaissance of eighteenth century Germany, which was catalyzed by the so-called “pantheism controversy.” In 1785 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) published *On the Teaching of Spinoza*, in which he vehemently condemned Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) as a Spinozist and disparaged Spinozistic philosophy. Although Lessing had already passed away by that time, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) defended his late friend’s beliefs and argued that he was not a pantheist in any sense. The “pantheism controversy” had a profound impact on many German intellectuals who went on to shape the Romanticism and Classical German philosophy movements

Spinozism. Nevertheless, traces of this term can still be observed in the preceding paragraph.

18. Immediately after the publication of *Speeches*, for example, Schleiermacher received a personal letter from his mentor, Fr. S. G. Sack who criticized Schleiermacher’s Spinozism (KGA v/5: 3–7; LAMM 1996, 90–1). It is also possible to see in the preface to the third edition of the *Speeches* that Schleiermacher paid attention to the criticism of Spinozism (KGA I/1: 12).

19. For Schleiermacher, the relationship of God and the world is not “identity” as in simple pantheism, but “correlation” (KGA II/10–1: 147–8).

in the following generation.²⁰ Despite “Spinozism” and “pantheism” being regarded as synonyms for atheism, German philosophers found significant inspiration and potential in Spinoza’s thought and utilized it to theorize their own philosophies.

As with other Classical German philosophers, Schleiermacher was also part of this generation of German Spinoza Renaissance. While a theology student at the University of Halle, Schleiermacher studied Spinoza’s works, especially Friedrich Jacobi’s book, which had a profound impact on him. Schleiermacher produced two manuscripts on Spinozism, namely “Spinozism” and “Brief Presentation of the Spinozistic System.”²¹ Although a detailed presentation of Schleiermacher’s Spinoza interpretation is beyond the scope of this discussion,²² it is noteworthy that he was deeply affected by Spinoza’s assertion that “there must be an Infinite, in which all finite things exist,” which he regarded as “Spinoza’s main thesis” (KGA I/1: 564). Given this historical and intellectual backdrop, it is difficult to comprehend Schleiermacher’s early philosophy of religion in *Speeches* without taking into account his Spinozism.

Pure experience and Monistic Reality in Nishida

Similar to Schleiermacher’s “intuition and feeling,” Nishida’s early philosophy in *An Inquiry into the Good* centers around the concept of “pure experience” which can be characterized as a pre-reflective state of immediate experience. Nishida contends that experience means “to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one’s own fabrications,” but it is typically contaminated by thoughts or judgments (IG, 3). For instance, when an individual sees a color and recognizes it as “red,” the experience is already tainted by the judgment of the color as “red,” which alters the experience from what it originally is. In this regard, Nishida endeavors to conceptualize “pure” experience, which is “without the least addition of deliberative discrimination” and “prior not only to the

20. For wide influence of the “pantheism controversy” and Spinoza Renaissance in 18th century Germany, see SCHÜRMAN et al. 2002.

21. Both presumably 1793 or 1794; KGA I/1: 511–58, 559–82.

22. Regarding the analysis of Schleiermacher’s Spinoza manuscripts, see MECKENSTOCK 1988; LAMM 1996, 13–56; ELLSIEPEN 2006, 140–271.

thought... but also to the judgment of what the color or sound might be” (IG, 3). Thus, pure experience is characterized by pre-reflexivity which does not yet extend to the realm of judgment.

To explain this concept of “pure experience,” Nishida frequently employs the phrase that there is neither a subject nor an object in this state of experience. Within the usual framework of epistemology, a distinction is made between the cognizing subject and the cognized object: for example, I, as a cognizing subject, see a cup of water as a cognized object. However, in the state of pure experience, there is no dualism of subject and object, but only unity in which the subject and object are not yet differentiated: “When one directly experiences one’s own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object are completely unified. This is the most refined type of experience” (IG, 3–4). To illustrate this pure experience, Nishida sometimes refers to the example of physicality, where the brain and the hand move in unity, without a subject-object relationship between the brain as the commanding subject and the hand as the employed object. Nishida’s description of this experience highlights its Romantic quality: “In the mutual forgetting of the self and the object, the object does not move the self and the self does not move the object. There is simply one world, one scene” (IG, 32). Therefore, the unity of subject and object is a typical characteristic of pure experience.

In the second part of *An Inquiry into the Good*, Nishida develops this concept of pure experience into a theory of ontological “reality” (實在). This transition from “experience” to “reality” can be interpreted as reversing the epistemological and ontological order. On the one hand, the notion of pure experience has an “epistemological” character in that it is presented as an experience: I experience that the split subject and object are “united” into one. On the other hand, it can be explained reversely from an “ontological” order that these split subject and object are nothing but “differentiations” of the original unity. The original unity, or in Nishida’s words, “reality” or “unified something” (統一的或者; IG, 7) which differentiates into all kinds of divisions such as “subject and object,” “thinking and will,” or “nature and spirit,” turns out to be the true reality behind what one typically understands as real.

The notion of reality is elaborated in greater detail as monistic reality that encompasses all divisions and schisms. To elucidate this configuration

of reality, two distinct principles are posited: “unity” (統一) and “contradiction” (矛盾; IG, 56). On the one hand, “contradiction” signifies that various constituents of reality are in conflict and thus distinguished from each other. For example, taking Nishida’s example of colors, red is distinct from other colors such as green or white. Because a color is distinguished by its unique quality and not conflated with others, it is said to be in “contradiction” against other colors. On the other hand, “unity” is a common foundation for these conflicting constituents.²³ To enable two things to oppose and act against one another, “there must be a third thing to join the first two and enable each to function with respect to the other” (IG, 56). Similarly, for red to be opposed to, compared with, or mixed with green or white, there must be the common foundation of “color” on which the opposition and interaction of individual colors can take place. Therefore, the two principles of “unity” and “contradiction” are indivisible components of reality: “The basic mode of reality is such that reality is one while it is many and many while it is one; in the midst of equality, it maintains distinctions, and in the midst of distinctions, it maintains equality” (IG, 56). The “many” elements of the world which appear to our eyes to be in chaotic conflict, are in fact encompassed by the “one” ultimate ground of reality.

This relationship between “unity” and “contradiction” is also viewed as a dynamic and dialectic movement. Concerning the progression of this reality, Nishida expresses the following:

Independent true reality complete unto itself is established in the same mode in all things: the whole first appears implicitly, and from it, the content develops through differentiation; when that development ends, the whole of the reality is actualized and completed—one entity has developed and completed itself. (IG, 52)

At the outset, there is one unity that does not fully manifest itself but only exists “implicitly.” From this unity, various “contradictions” arise as its differentiations, such as colors, subject and object, nature and mind, and so forth. Although this differentiation process appears to be a deviation from the unity of reality, it is a necessary alienation process for the perfection and

23. This thought of “unity” that embraces “contradictions” in itself is the prototype of the idea of “place” (場所), which plays the central role in Nishida’s philosophy. It can also be recognized by the fact that the example of colors is used in the explanation of “place” (NKZ 4: 218).

explicit manifestation of reality. After the differentiation and development of each part are completed, the dynamic development of the whole reality culminates in its clear manifestation. Therefore, this dialectic movement of unity and contradiction represents “the self-development of a single entity” (IG, 57).

From the above ontological structure of reality, Nishida’s early philosophy of pure experience can also be characterized as a type of Spinozism. A clear parallelism between Spinoza and Nishida can be observed in the monistic ontology: just as Spinoza explains that finite beings have their existence in the Infinite, i.e., monistic substance, Nishida says that finite beings in conflict and contradiction have their existence as part of the development of the monistic reality as its differentiation. Although Nishida does not explicitly refer to Spinoza in his argument of reality, the features of Nishida’s thought bear essential resemblances to Spinoza’s theory of monistic substance.²⁴

Comparison and Appendix from Nishida’s Manuscript I

As demonstrated, Schleiermacher’s concept of “intuition and feeling” and Nishida’s idea of “pure experience” share fundamentally similar structures. They both describe a pre-reflective experience of the human subject where the boundary between the self and other beings dissolves, and the self is enveloped by the Romantic sense of unity with the universe or reality. The epistemological dimension of this experience, as experienced by the self, corresponds to its ontological aspect of Spinozistic monism. Schleiermacher’s notion of “the Universe” undoubtedly draws from his studies of Spinoza in his youth. Similarly, Nishida’s ontological concept of the monistic reality displays unmistakable features of Spinozistic substance. In light of these points, it can be concluded that the shared philosophical ground between Schleiermacher and Nishida is rooted in their Romantic Spinozism.

Moreover, recent scholarship has unearthed a direct influence from Schleiermacher to Nishida in this regard, which is also philologically verifiable. In Nishida’s manuscript of “Lecture on Religious Studies,” which has recently been published as an appendix to his complete works, Schleierm-

24. For a systematic comparison between Nishida and Spinoza, see also KOSAKA 2011, 129–211.

acher's idea of "intuition and feeling" is referenced to explain "pure experience."

In this sense, God is the unity of experience. It is the ultimate unity of all pure experience. Schleiermacher says that the essence of religion is neither thinking nor acting but intuition and feeling, the intuition of the universe; it is to listen rapturously to the universe and to receive [what it gives us] in childlike passivity.²⁵

According to this passage, pure experience is not just a subjective experience of the self, but the ontological reality itself that is unified and grounded by God. In this context, this idea of pure experience is directly paraphrased by Schleiermacher's theory of religion: the essence of religion, which can be read as a paraphrase of pure experience, is neither an intellectual activity of metaphysics nor a moral activity of good behavior, but rather a pre-reflective "intuition and feeling" of the Universe that cannot be actively attained by one's own power but can only be passively received like a child.

From this passage, it can be argued that the similarity between Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" and Nishida's "pure experience" is not just a coincidental resemblance but stems from Nishida's conscious reference to Schleiermacher's philosophy. Although it is true that there are other canonical sources for Nishida's idea of pure experience, such as William James, it can also be said that Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" contributed to Nishida's idea of pure experience.

25. 「Gott [神]はこういふ意味に於いて Einheit d[er] Erfahrung [経験の統一]である。Letzte Einheit aller reinen Erfahrung [全純粋経験の最終統一]である。Schleiermacher [シュライアマハ]が宗教の Wesen は Denken でも Handeln でもない、Anschauung und Gefühl である、das Universum を直観するのである、das Universum の一挙一動をそのまに andächtig に belauschen し kindliche Passivität に於て受け取るのであるのとい」(NISHIDA 2020, 356).

Although this passage can be found also in "Lecture on Religious Studies" edited by Hisamatsu Shin'ichi (NKZ 15: 348), there is a significant difference between Nishida's own manuscript and Hisamatsu's edition. While God is, according to Hisamatsu's edition, "the ultimate unity of all our experience" (「我々の経験の最終統一」), Nishida's own manuscript clearly refers to the very key concept of his early philosophy by characterizing God as "the ultimate unity of all *pure* experience" (emphasis added). Thus, the newly published manuscript tells the clear connection between Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" and Nishida's "pure experience."

THE RELIGION OF AN IMPERSONAL GOD
AND SELF-NEGATING IMMORTALITY

Impersonal God and Immortality in Schleiermacher

After expounding on the theory of “intuition and feeling,” Schleiermacher proceeds to scrutinize conventional doctrines of Christian theology, including “revelation” and “inspiration” with a view to revising them from the standpoint of his theory of religion. In this regard, Schleiermacher’s Spinozistic inclinations are particularly evident in his account of the doctrines of “God” and “immortality.”

(1) At the core of Schleiermacher’s critique of the traditional doctrine of God is the contention that the notion of a personal God is an inadequate anthropomorphism: In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is usually conceived as a personal being who thinks, acts, and feels much like finite human beings. According to Schleiermacher, this portrayal of “God, thought of as too much like us, as a thinking and willing Person” constitutes a secondary, abstracted concept that is derived from the original experience of “intuition and feeling” (S3, 95). During his time, the personality of God was considered so essential to the Christian doctrine that its negation was regarded as a form of atheism, as was evident in the case of Fichte’s *Atheism Dispute*.²⁶ Similarly, Spinoza’s divine substance, which lacks personality, was also criticized as a typical form of atheism.²⁷ Despite this tenuous intellectual context, Schleiermacher nonetheless assails the notion that personality is intrinsic to God, and boldly and provocatively suggests that “one religion without God can be better than another with God” (S1, 137).

Prior to critiquing anthropomorphism, Schleiermacher introduces his “degree” theory of religion’s development, in which the forms of religion are related to the degree of development of human worldviews. In the first stage of a primitive human being, their sense is still “a dim instinct” (S1, 137). As the world is “a chaos uniform in its confusion, without division, order, and law,” humans arbitrarily cut off finite things such as stones or trees from nature and worship them as gods (S1, 137). In this animistic stage, religion

26. Fichte’s “*Atheism Dispute*” (1798–1800) also influenced the first edition of Schleiermacher’s *Speeches* (S1, 135). For this background, see SEYSEN 1999.

27. For a concise introduction and primary sources to the pantheism controversy, cf. SCHOLZ 1916.

is characterized by “an idol or a fetish” as objects of worship (S1, 137). In the second stage, religion takes the form of polytheism. Here, human sense and knowledge have developed, and the world is perceived as the entanglement of “heterogeneous elements and forces” (S1, 137). With the development of this multiplicity and diversity of the forces and elements of nature that constitute the world, they are personalized as divine beings, and “gods arise in infinite number” as in Greek and Roman myth (S1, 137). However, this second stage is not the highest development of religion, as long as the multiple forces and elements represented by polytheistic gods exist in parallel as chaos and are not seen as a unity. In the third and final stage, these forces and elements are unified “as totality, as unity in multiplicity, as system” (S1, 137). However, this stage of “one God” must not be identified simply with the monotheism of Christianity. Rather, Schleiermacher conceives that both monotheism and pantheism belong to this third stage, as they both capture the world as totality and unity of the whole being.²⁸ Thus, according to Schleiermacher’s theory, the highest stage of religion’s development encompasses both the monotheism of Christianity which holds a personal God, and pantheism which holds an impersonal God.

Now, it is necessary to question how these divergent views of God, namely the personal and impersonal God, arise from the same, highest stage of religion. Schleiermacher posits that this difference depends on “the direction of the imagination” (S3, 98). If one experiences for example the divine being’s omnipotence, this religious sense leads to two different attitudes towards the divine based on the direction of imagination. In the personalistic Christian imagination, “he cannot think of anything except under the one form given to us, that of consciousness or self-consciousness,” due to the “definiteness of thought” (S3, 98). Since individuals try to establish an analogy from their personal perspective as a finite being to construct the concept of divine omnipotence, their personalistic view is projected onto the divine being. In contrast, the pantheistic imagination avoids such projections or anthropomorphisms, and “one is willing, in the consciousness of their own weakness, to be lost in the mysterious obscurity” (S3, 98). Rather than projecting the finite way of being and speculating about God, the pantheistic imagination acknowledges its limited knowledge and accepts that the divine mystery is

28. Regarding Schleiermacher’s typology of religion, see also VON SCHELIHA 2018.

not entirely comprehensible. Thus, the difference between the Christian personal God and the pantheistic impersonal God arises from a distinct direction of the imagination that deals with the original religious experience.

From the preceding argument, it is evident that Schleiermacher favors the impersonal view of God over personalistic anthropomorphism: “The usual conception of God as one single being outside of the world and behind the world is not the beginning and the end of religion. It is only one manner of expressing God, seldom entirely pure and always inadequate” (S3, 101). Contrary to the prevailing Christian theology of his time which took faith in the personal God for granted, Schleiermacher attempted to propose an alternative religiosity based on his theory of “intuition and feeling” which does not presuppose the personal God.

(2) Schleiermacher’s second criticism of traditional Christian doctrine targets the concept of “immortality.” In the Western tradition, immortality has been conceived in two forms.²⁹ Firstly, Greek philosophy developed the idea of the immortality of the soul, where the imperishable soul is bound to the body as a prison, and liberation of the soul can only be achieved through the death of the body. Secondly, the Judeo-Christian view of immortality is characterized by the notion of resurrection, where the human being is raised from death and lives eternally under the reign of God. These two traditions share two presuppositions. First, “individuality” must be maintained both before and after acquiring immortality. If the liberated soul or the resurrected person is not the same as who they were before, the concept of immortality becomes meaningless. Second, immortality is attained “after” death. Irrespective of whether the soul is liberated from the body or the united soul and body is resurrected, the beginning of immortal life is triggered only by the end of this finite, wretched life on earth. In the Western conception of immortality, these two presuppositions are deemed necessary conditions without which the concept of immortality itself does not stand.

However, drawing on Spinozistic theory of religion, Schleiermacher criticizes these Greek and Judeo-Christian images of immortality as “irreligious” (S1, 139). With regards to the first condition of “individuality,” Schleiermacher acknowledges the human desire to carry their individuality beyond this mortal life, but he urges them to relinquish their individual-

29. LIVINGSTONE 2013, 277–8.

ity and merge with the Infinite, where personal boundaries dissolve, and the self ceases to exist: “But try to yield up your life out of love for the universe. Strive here already to annihilate your individuality and to live in the one and all; strive to be more than yourselves so that you lose little if you lose yourselves” (SI, 139). For Schleiermacher, religious immortality does not imply living an unending existence in heaven as the same person but rather entering the eternal unity with the divine where personal identity vanishes. Though Schleiermacher supports this view with a quote from the Bible, “Whoever loses his life for my sake, will find it, and whoever would save it will lose it” (SI, 139),³⁰ this thought of immortality demonstrates Schleiermacher’s Spinozism, Romanticism, and even his affinity with Eastern religiosity, where a finite self finds tranquility not in its limited soul but in union with the Infinite, just like a drop in the ocean.

Furthermore, Schleiermacher posits that death is not a prerequisite for achieving the union with the Infinite, which forms the basis of his second critique of the conventional notion of immortality. Immortality can be attained not only following the demise of this mortal existence but also during this fleeting life. This assertion can be comprehended by taking into account that Schleiermacher’s notions of “intuition and feeling” and his concept of immortality are essentially intertwined. As illustrated earlier, the fundamental essence of religion lies in “intuition and feeling,” through which the union between finite human beings and the infinite God is realized. According to Schleiermacher, this union is nothing but the religious immortality itself: “It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life.... In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion” (SI, 101). Hence, Schleiermacher perceives religious immortality not as an eternal life after death with an unchanging personal identity, but as the unity with the Infinite experienced through “intuition and feeling” during this mortal life.

Pantheism and Union with God in Nishida

Nishida’s early philosophy of pure experience treats the concepts of God and immortality similarly to Schleiermacher. In the final section of *An Inquiry*

30. Matthew 10.39. Cf. “Those who find their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it” (New Revised Standard Version: NRSV).

into the Good, Nishida discusses religious themes and criticizes the Christian doctrine of a personal God from the perspective of the impersonal God of pantheism, while explaining the ultimate salvation of religion as entering into unity with the Absolute.

(1) First, Nishida elaborates his theory of pure experience into a philosophy of religion concerning God. As discussed earlier, the epistemological aspect of pure experience as the unity of subject and object expands into the ontological framework of reality, i.e., the “unity” that differentiates into “contradictions.” The monistic reality that pure experience accesses is thus “an independent, self-fulfilled, infinite activity” consisting of endless “contradictions” and their “unity” (IG, 79). Here, Nishida introduces pantheism by identifying “God” as “the base of this infinite activity” (IG, 79), which is nothing but the unifying ground of reality itself. The relationship between God and the world in Nishida’s pantheism is a strong mutual interdependence: “Just as there is no world without God, there is no God without the world” (IG, 168). It is important to note that Nishida avoids the banal misunderstanding of pantheism that individual things in the world, such as a pen or book, are God himself. Rather, the relationship between God and the world is that of “a noumenon and a phenomenon” (本体と現象; IG, 158). As there is no phenomenon without noumenon, and the noumenon’s essence lies in self-revelation as a phenomenon, God and the world are interdependent.

Based on this pantheistic understanding, Nishida criticizes the Christian doctrine of a personal God. As typically described in the Old Testament, the Judeo-Christian transcendent God is imaged as having created the world and existing apart from it, yet exerting influence on it through supernatural power. Nishida challenges this image of a transcendent God, accusing it of being “extremely infantile” and criticizing it for several reasons (IG, 80). Firstly, it contradicts modern science, as supernatural occurrences that were believed to be transcendent interferences are now reduced to natural and immanent causes. In this worldview, a transcendent God that exists somewhere and yet exerts supernatural influence on the world is hardly believable, according to Nishida. Secondly, in terms of inner religiosity, the view of the Christian God falls short, for since the transcendent God exerts its power from outside of the world, human beings can only receive it externally and superficially. However, Nishida argues that there is no “intimate unity in our

hearts” which is essential to profound religiosity (IG, 80). For these critiques of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of a transcendent God, Nishida opts for the pantheistic view of God.³¹

An essential component of Nishida’s argument against the Christian conception of God is, akin to Schleiermacher, aimed at its anthropomorphic nature. Most significantly, Nishida refuses to accept that God, as the unifying foundation of the world, possesses human-like mental functions such as thought or will. Nishida contradicts the theory of Illingworth’s *Personality, Human and Divine*, which states that human personality comprises self-consciousness, free will, and love, and rejects each of these attributes as appropriate for God. Firstly, Nishida argues that God cannot have any form of self-consciousness since human self-consciousness is simply the unity of partial consciousness in each moment of time’s passing, and God, who transcends time, does not possess partial consciousness in this sense. Secondly, God cannot have the freedom of will in the way finite human beings do, as the freedom of will witnessed in human beings as arbitrariness is merely an indication of their incompleteness. Thirdly, the love of God is not like human beings’ “narrow-minded love” where certain groups are loved and others are hated and even destroyed as described in the Old Testament (IG, 163–4). Rather, God’s love should be understood as “equal and universal” for all beings, without any differentiation between good and evil (IG, 164). Therefore, Nishida rebuffs the anthropomorphic nature of the Judeo-Christian notion of God, arguing that the characteristics of personality are unsuitable for the divine being.

(2) Although Nishida rarely employs the term “immortality,” he conceives the ultimate aim of religion as the realization of a “drop in the ocean,” that is, the divine unity in which God and human beings merge into each other. Religion, to him, is nothing but “a demand in which the self, while perceiving its relativity and finitude, yearns to attain eternal, true life by uniting with an absolutely infinite power” (IG, 149). It is understandable, then, that Nishida refers to “the fundamental truth of Indian religion” that “Ātman and Brahman are identical” (IG, 80). In this sense, Nishida is also

31. For Nishida, confrontation against the Christian worldview was one of the most important subjects throughout his entire intellectual life. See also ASAMI 2000.

drawn to the affinity between Romantic Spinozism and Indian religion, as already observed fragmentarily in Schleiermacher's thought.

In his notion of immortality, Nishida also presupposes the self-negation of human beings as in Schleiermacher's thought: "Our taking refuge in God seems in a certain respect to be a loss of the self, but in another respect it is the way we find the self" (IG, 154). To support this argument, Nishida intriguingly cites the same verse from the Bible as Schleiermacher did: "Christ said, 'He who finds his life shall lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it,' and this is the purest form of religion" (IG, 154). As long as one strives to hold onto their own life, unity with God will remain unattainable. However, when one gives up oneself, the finite self is taken over by the divine unification. "An absolute unity is gained only by discarding the subjective unity and merging with an objective unity" (IG, 151).

This tendency of self-negation is also evident in how Nishida approaches the issue of "individuality." Arguing for the Spinozistic-pantheistic unity of God and the world, Nishida asks whether the individuality of human beings, as a mere appearance of God, is of no significance "like a bubble" (IG, 170). However, he maintains that this does not mean the underestimation of the value of individuality, because our individuality can be considered as a "part of God's development" (IG, 170). As previously explained, the development of the monistic reality undergoes three stages: the first implicit totality, its differentiation, and the higher unity of totality as the result of the unification of this differentiation. Since each of our individuality as differentiations of the reality takes part in this divine development, it is not just a fleeting "bubble," but it has meaning as a part of a whole. "In this sense, our individuality possesses an eternal life and constitutes an eternal development" (IG, 170). Thus, self-negation of individuality is a distinct feature of Nishida's early Spinozism.

In a similar vein, the combination of Spinozism and Nishida's theory of reality's self-development offers an explanation for the "problem of evil." Nishida posits that "absolute evil" is non-existent in the first stage of implicitly appearing totality (IG, 171). However, what is commonly referred to as "evil" emerges in the second stage of reality's differentiation. Nishida argues that evil is subjective because differentiated reality comprises conflicting standpoints or contradictions where what is considered evil from one perspective might be viewed as good from another, and vice versa. For instance,

“the evils of the flesh” might be seen as immoral, but from a biological perspective, it is necessary (IG, 171). In essence, reality itself is neither good nor evil; instead, different perspectives of differentiated reality judge each other. Consequently, this conflict of differentiated reality or “evil” is an integral part of reality’s development. When the conflict is resolved, a higher unity of reality emerges. Therefore, even evil is a prerequisite for reality’s development.

Comparison and Appendix from Nishida’s Manuscript II

The comparison above demonstrates the essential parallelism between Schleiermacher and Nishida in their thoughts on God and immortality. Firstly, Schleiermacher, as a Christian theologian, uses the heterodox notion of Spinoza’s impersonal God to criticize the anthropomorphism of the orthodox Christian doctrine, whereas Nishida, as a non-Christian, relies on the pantheistic framework and boldly critiques the Christian doctrine of a personal God as “extremely infantile.” Secondly, both Schleiermacher and Nishida argue that the final destination of religion is the eternal unity with the Infinite in the form of “a drop in the ocean.” They advocate giving up the smaller and finite self in exchange for a greater and eternal union with the Infinite. While Spinoza’s philosophy does not directly support this idea of self-negating union with the Infinite, it can be inferred from the contrast between temporal-finite beings and eternal-infinite substance. Thus, Schleiermacher and Nishida’s thoughts can be classified as Spinozism-like in this regard.

Despite the absence of philological evidence suggesting that Nishida was influenced by Schleiermacher on this point, Nishida’s manuscript of “Lecture on Religious Studies” reveals his fascinating reference to Schleiermacher. Here, Nishida explains the difference between the views of “sin” in Buddhism and Christianity.

The Idea of Sin.

Although the idea of moral sin is important for religion, this idea is based on a dualism of standard and deviation. When one knows that sin is actually grace, sin is no longer true sin. In this way of thinking, *maya* (delusion) as a form of sin is deeper than moral sin. In this respect, Buddhism is deeper than Christianity. The wrong view of things makes us fall away from God.

In the view of moral sin, we are still in the differentiated mode. It is not true dependence on God.

It is absolutely impossible for human beings to achieve moral perfection. We only realize that sin is grace. This realization—Schleiermacher’s intuition—is salvation. The sin against this true salvation is *maya*.³²

In the view of moral sin, Christianity regards sin as a deviation from norms and a dualism of right and wrong deeds based on certain standards. On the other hand, Buddhism considers the root of sin in another dimension, i.e. in “*maya*” (delusion): sin is not a deviation from norms but a wrong way of perceiving things, such as seeing “the self” as a substantial entity and harmful things as evil. As human beings cannot achieve moral perfection, they must realize their flawed way of perceiving things. Nishida contends that Buddhism’s teaching is more profound than that of Christianity in this respect.

Notably, Nishida refers to “Schleiermacher’s intuition” and places it alongside Buddhist teaching. While Schleiermacher himself never stated that “sin is grace,” Nishida seizes Schleiermacher’s pre-reflective “intuition and feeling” and associates it with his conception of salvation from sin and evil. Just as evil is the fall from the original unity, and the ultimate goal of religion is the reunification of the self with the Infinite, Nishida interprets Schleiermacher’s intuition of self-negating union with the Infinite as a form of salvation where the pursuit of moral perfection is suspended, and even the sinful self is welcomed into the unity as it is. This quotation suggests that despite the limited direct references to Schleiermacher in his early philosophy of pure experience, Nishida had Schleiermacher’s concepts and ideas in mind.

CONCLUSION

Based on Kobayashi’s hypothesis that there is a certain affinity between Nishida and Schleiermacher concerning their Romanticism, this essay has demonstrated that their Spinozistic background is crucial for a

32. 「【Sündeの考は】sitt Sündeの考は【reli】宗教上大切ではあるが、此考はNormとNormwidrigeのDualismusに本づく。Sünde即ちGnadeと知る時、Sündeは真のSündeにあらず。斯く考へればMayaがsittl Sündeよりtiefer Sündeとなる。於是仏教はChristentumよりtieferである。見方の誤りがGottより我々をabfallenせしむ。

Sittl Sündeの見方にては我々は尚差別相の上にある。真の絶対の他力ではない。

人間はsittl Vollkommenheitに達することは到底不可能である。我々はSünde即ちGnadeと知るのである。此知—SchleiermacherのAnschauung—が即ちErlösungである。True salvationに対するSündeはMajaである」(NISHIDA 2020, 379).

profound comprehension of this connection. Firstly, both the fundamental concepts of their early philosophy, namely Schleiermacher's "intuition and feeling" and Nishida's "pure experience," illustrate the pre-reflective unity of the self with the ultimate reality. In this regard, Nishida's newly published lecture manuscript reveals a direct reference to Schleiermacher by likening "pure experience" to "intuition and feeling." Secondly, their critique of the anthropomorphism of the Christian doctrine of God and their perspective on the religious immortality of the self-negating union with the Infinite are also founded on the Spinozistic-pantheistic notion of an impersonal God. On this point as well, Nishida's direct reference to Schleiermacher in his manuscript demonstrates his affinity for Schleiermacher's concept of intuition regarding the thought of sin and salvation. Based on these explicit references, it is reasonable to conclude that Schleiermacher contributed to the formation of Nishida's early philosophy of pure experience to some extent.

This study on the affinity between early Nishida and Schleiermacher leaves certain questions unanswered. Firstly, it is necessary to inquire how this motif of Romantic Spinozism evolves as their philosophy and theology develop in the later periods. Although Nishida's interest in Schleiermacher largely dissipates in his later thoughts, his monistic tendency remains a crucial element of his philosophy, for example, his thought on the Absolute in "The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview."³³ However, Nishida was always required to differentiate himself from Spinozism which allows no room for individuality as God's *modi*, especially after Tanabe's critique "Requesting the Guidance of Professor Nishida" in 1930.³⁴ Similarly, facing allegations of Spinozism, Schleiermacher also had to distance himself from Spinozistic thought for the construction of his theology, while some influences from Spinozism are still evident in his Christian dogmatics *The Christian Faith*.³⁵ Even without direct references to each

33. NISHIDA 1987. In his philosophy of religion, Nishida characterized his position as "pantheistic": "My idea is not pantheistic. Perhaps you will call it pantheistic" (NISHIDA 1987, 70). Including this distinction in his philosophical position, the development of Nishida's Spinozist thought needs to be traced in more detail.

34. TANABE 1963. Although Tanabe does not mention Spinoza, his critique can be interpreted as an attack on the static system of monistic ontology which has been construed as *The Self-Aware System of Universals*.

35. SCHLEIERMACHER 2016. Although Schleiermacher distances himself from Spinozism,

other, the development of Spinozism in Nishida and Schleiermacher is an enlightening case study of an intercultural philosophy of religion based on a shared history of Spinoza reception.

Secondly, as a methodological issue, it is imperative to incorporate the findings from the newly published lecture manuscripts in Nishida studies. As this study has demonstrated, Nishida's lecture manuscripts are invaluable for connecting his original *Selbstdenken* with his background in (primarily) Western intellectual history. Tracing the reception history of Western philosophy in Nishida and other thinkers in the Kyoto School would also help elucidate an essential aspect of "global philosophy," where Japanese philosophy has indispensable significance.³⁶ A detailed contextualization and intertextual analysis between Nishida's principal works and his lecture manuscripts may appear trivial at first glance, but a comprehensive scholarship of global philosophy can only be built on a solid foundation of rigorous textual analysis.

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- KGA Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1984–).
- NKZ 『西田幾多郎全集』 [*Collected Works of Nishida Kitarō*] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1978), 19 vols.
- S1 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- S3 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1893).

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certain influences of Spinozism are recognizable, for example, in the doctrine of creation and preservation (LAMM 1996, 95–197).

36. For the project of global philosophy, see ITŌ et al. 2020.

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