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The Third Stage of Ontology

Translators' Introduction

Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), along with Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), is a co-founder of the Kyoto School. If Tanabe had not voiced doubts concerning the basic structure of Nishida's philosophy in the essay 「西田先生の教を仰ぐ」 [Requesting the guidance of Professor Nishida] (1930) and had not, from 1935 on, argued in constant dissent against him, then neither Nishida's philosophy nor the Kyoto School itself would have taken the shape by which it is known today. Such is the significance of Nishida and Tanabe's philosophical disputes for Japanese intellectual history. The standpoint from which Tanabe leveled his criticisms is what he called the "logic of Species." The manuscript translated here, "The Third Stage of Ontology," was written during the period from 1934–41 in which Tanabe was explicitly espousing this new "logic," and its purpose is to situate his proposal in the history of philosophy.

Tanabe's work now enjoys international attention. Nevertheless, interest has tended to concentrate on the later *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, with the logic of Species receiving only prefatory introduction and its foundational texts only partial translation.[1] For this reason, before presenting a basic summary of the present text and some notes on issues of translation, this introduction will first sketch the development of Tanabe's philosophy and its relation to Nishida's, in order to shed a broader swath of light on the significance of the logic of Species within Tanabe's thought and the Kyoto School.

Tanabe took his first steps as a philosopher with the essay, "On Thetic

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1. In English translation, see TANABE 2018, 2021B, and the entry on Tanabe in HEISIG et al. 2011.

Judgment" (1910),[2] a work that betrays the great influence of Nishida's *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911) and its thesis that pure experience is reality.[3] For the next two decades, Tanabe's intellectual journey would proceed following the wake of Nishida's own development from pure experience to absolute, free will and the place of absolute nothingness, a fact to which Tanabe testified both contemporaneously and after many years of philosophical disputation. Aboard a ship to Germany in 1923, he is reported to have said, "To render Nishida's philosophy precise—that is my charge."[4] And in 1954 he wrote, "the first half of my philosophical inquiry [that is, from 1910 to 1930] proceeded by way of following Professor Nishida."[5]

At the same time, Tanabe makes clear that "as the professor's philosophical system neared gradual completion and came to be bruited about as 'Nishida-philosophy,' I turned against him intellectually," to which he adds that, "during his lifetime and after, I have opposed the main points of Professor's philosophy and continue to do so to this day [i.e., 1954]." And so, he completes the thought cited in the previous paragraph with the claim that the "second half" of his philosophical inquiry "proceeded by way of opposing Professor."[6] In summary we could say that while Tanabe's thought was conceived in the womb of Nishida's system, the doubts formulated by the former toward the basic structure of the latter evinced the pangs of a separation that would grant Tanabe the clear berth (birth?) necessary to pursue his own philosophical system.

In this context, we can understand the commonality found in their philosophical principle of *absolute nothingness* and their standpoint of *dialectic*, but also keep in mind Tanabe's trenchant critiques, especially from 1935, that "Professor's" contemplative quietism was impotent before the actual world. For what he takes to be at issue is that their common ground was not adequately tilled by Nishida. It is Tanabe's claim that *his* standpoint properly carries out the logic of dialectic—namely, as "absolute dialectic"—and that

2. TANABE 2021A.

3. While *An Inquiry into the Good* was published in 1911, prominent ideas from this text were being circulated by 1906 in the form of 「西田氏実在論及倫理学」 [Mr. Nishida on reality and ethics]. See NISHIDA 1980, 749–750.

4. ISHIKAWA 1963, 3.

5. THZ 12: 333.

6. Ibid.

his philosophy is one that truly lives and works in the midst of the actual. Precisely these moments comprise the twin demands of Tanabe's thought: logical thoroughness and practical efficacy.

Following a five-year dystocia of the mind between 1927–1931, Tanabe constructed his theory of absolute dialectic, the fruit of which is 『ヘーゲル哲学と弁証法』 [Hegel's philosophy and dialectic] (1931). With absolute dialectic as his method, Tanabe then ventured to clarify the logical structure of actual society, with the social ontology thereby produced being the logic of Species. From 1934 to 1937, the logic of Species was assembled through four articles published in 『哲学研究』[Philosophical studies],[7] namely, 「社会存在の論理」 [The logic of social being] (1934–1935), 「種の論理と世界図式」[The logic of Species and the world schema] (1935), 「論理の社会存在論的構造」[The social-ontological structure of logic] (1936), and 「種の論理の意味を明にす」[Clarifying the meaning of the logic of Species] (1937). In this last essay, the basic structure of the logic of Species exhibits a provisional completion. Contemporaneous with the second article, "The Third Stage of Ontology" was published in *Risō*,[8] and, instead of treating the logical structure or practical significance of the logic of Species, the work takes a bird's eye view on the history of philosophy and places it in the tradition of thought stretching from the pre-Socratics to Martin Heidegger (and Nishida). This text thus offers not only a statement of how Tanabe understood the intellectual-historical significance of his own work, but also a glimpse at Tanabe exercising his muscles as an historian of philosophy, and so some valuable indications of how Tanabe perceived the major trends of that history.

The basic structure of the logic of Species, as exhibited in "Clarifying the Meaning of the Logic of Species," would endure as the framework of Tanabe's thought until his final work, 『マラルメ覚書』[Mallarmé memorandum] (1961). Therefore, while "the logic of Species" is generally taken

7. *Philosophical Studies* is a journal that began in 1916 at Kyoto Imperial University. A great number of the central works produced by the Kyoto School, such as Nishida Kitarō's 『自覚に於ける直観と反省』[Intuition and reflection in self-consciousness], were first presented on its pages.

8. *Risō* (『理想』) is a philosophical journal produced by the Tokyo-based publisher Risōsha. Since its inaugural issue in 1927, it has, alongside Iwanami Shoten's *Shisō* (『思想』), secured a crucial position in the history of philosophy in Japan.

to indicate Tanabe's standpoint between 1934–1941, as a matter of fact, it remains the essence of his philosophy throughout the "metanoetics" (1944–1953) and "philosophy of death" (1953–1962) that were to follow. Precisely as the logic of Species is Tanabe's philosophy marked off from Nishida's.

The basic structure of the logic of Species lies in Tanabe's distinctive interpretation of the relationships within the Aristotelian distinctions among genus, species, and individual. As Tanabe ventured not only to clarify the structures of logic and society, but also to render intelligible history, religion, and art, as well as to philosophically comprehend the theory of relativity and quantum physics, he did so on the basis of his reappropriation of this distinction (one whose idiosyncrasy, among other reasons, is why these terms appear capitalized when spoken in his idiom; but more on this below). In other words, Tanabe sought to grasp everything in terms of the interactions between the Genus, the Species, and the Individual, an interrelationship, he thought, wherein the Species plays the center role. For this reason, it is as a logic of Species that Tanabe's thought essentially works itself out.

This is not the place to attempt a reconstruction of the relationship between the Genus, Species, and Individual;[9] however, to pick up again on Tanabe's contrast with Nishida, it can be said by way of summary that by taking the Species as central, Tanabe situated himself in opposition to Nishida's "logic of place," in that his "logic of the copula" stands against "predicate logic" and his proposed "logic of the particular" challenges the "logic of the universal." The emphasis Tanabe lays on the Species, then, is meant to cast light on what he took to be the inadequacies of Nishida's thought. This is expressed by two students who received instruction from both Nishida and Tanabe. In 1936, Nishitani Keiji wrote, "this notion of the 'Species' should be acknowledged as something absent and not adequately developed within Nishida's philosophy."[10] Likewise, in 1953, several years after Nishida's passing, Kōyama Iwao wrote:

> While Nishida's philosophy came to speak of the Species as a result of [Tanabe's criticism], it should be said that there is at last no room to acknowledge the Species among its logical principles. This derives from

9. For details on this relationship and the polysemy of Tanabe's term "Species," see Urai 2022.

10. Nishitani 1987, 216.

a difference in the points from which depart the logic of place belonging to Nishida's philosophy and the logic of Species: for even if the Species is enfolded by place, the organization of [its] logic differs from the ground up.[11]

Noteworthy here is that students such as Nishitani and Kōyama, both highly estimated by Nishida and Tanabe and both authors of monographs on Nishida's philosophy, attest to the absence of the Species in Nishida's thought and to the fact that while Nishida had tried to meet Tanabe's critique, this concept remained incongruous to his philosophy. Of course, the validity of their philosophical claims demands careful examination; however, there should be no problem in drawing the following conclusions. Through the logic of Species, Tanabe parted ways with Nishida and, thereby leaving his philosophical cradle, successfully conveyed a unique standpoint. Moreover, through the criticisms he leveled from this standpoint, he led Nishida to reevaluate his own philosophical positions.

The contours of the essay

While exegesis is best left for another opportunity, some brief remarks on the contours of this essay are in order to give the reader some footing. By dividing ontology into three stages, Tanabe sets out to establish his own social ontology, naturally, at a summit in the history of philosophy. The three stages are (1) the "natural ontology" of ancient Greece; (2) the "personal ontology" that begins in the early modern period, to which Tanabe assigns not only Descartes, Kant, and Bergson, but also Nishida and Heidegger; and then (3) the "social ontology" initiated by Hegel and especially his *Rechtsphilosophie*. Tanabe coordinates these three stages along the axes of "substratum" (基体) and "subject" (主体). Thus coordinated, natural ontology (the first stage) is the ontology of the substratum, personal ontology (the second stage) is the ontology of the subject, and social ontology (the third stage) synthesizes these two, becoming, what he calls, the ontology of substratum-*sive*-subject (基体即主体). It is possible to get a handle on this scheme by focusing the discussion on Tanabe's concern with "society."

11. Kōyama 2007, 573.

When Tanabe speaks in this context of the "substratum" and the "subject," he is referring to *society* and the *individual person*. It is in this sense that Tanabe remarks:

> Where Greek natural ontology dissolved the subject into the substratum without recognizing the independence of the former from the latter, with Kant, early modern personal ontology dissolved the substratum into the subject.[12]

According to Tanabe, since, for the Greek natural ontologists, "the being of the human being obtained completion only within the state," and since "the individual and the state would not have seemed isolated from, and certainly not opposed to, one another," then it appears that in the natural ontology, society, specified as a phenomenon that opposes the individual person, "is not questioned with respect to its own being."[13] Likewise, against the personal ontologists, Tanabe levels the charge that, "the early modern civil state took the individual person as yardstick, and did so to such an extent that its establishment was attributed to a contract among individual people."[14] In other words, since natural ontology does not account for the individual person as an entity that is in some way independent of and opposed to society, the subject becomes merely a part of this social substratum. And since personal ontology conceives of society as the product of a contract forged between individual people, the social substratum's independence from the subject becomes inconceivable.

To ascend beyond these first two stages, Tanabe holds that social ontology must first acknowledge the mutual independence and opposition of the substratum and the subject, and then, only on the basis of this presupposition, seek to account for how harmony can take place between society and the individual. For this reason, Tanabe finds that the "recovery of the substratum is the point of prime importance to contemporary ontology"[15] and claims that carrying out such a recovery will facilitate the shift from personal ontology to social ontology. To bring us full circle, this ontology of the substratum-*sive*-subject is thus primed to discharge the task that Tanabe

12. THZ 6: 283.
13. THZ 6: 279.
14. THZ 6: 284.
15. THZ 6: 292.

believes is demanded by his logic of Species, the task he announces as follows at the beginning of "The Logic of Social Being":

> The investigation of the principles of society constitutes the core task of contemporary philosophy. From this perspective, ontologies of the being of the mere human being and anthropologies already belong to the past. The human being can first become concrete within society, the being of the human being only within social being. It is the philosophy of social being that must be the philosophy of today.[16]

Issues of Translation

To conclude we explain our basic practices and account for decisions made with respect to terms that pose particular difficulty.

Beginning with the former, we generally acknowledge the principle voiced by Fichte-translator Daniel Breazeale, namely, that, "it is not a virtue to produce a translation that is more 'readable' or 'natural sounding' than the original"[17]: for doing so is paraphrasing, which is best left to secondary sources. Tanabe's prose is infamous, but here he writes with relative accessibility; which is not to suggest that the text demands no "disciplinary preparedness."[18] Tanabe offers his perspective on the classics and expects his reader to possess sufficient familiarity with them to appreciate what he offers. Thus, to facilitate the fulfillment of this expectation, much of the technical terminology has been translated with reference to Norman Kemp Smith's standard translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, along with the other translations that appear in the footnotes.

With regard to syntax, a single sentence may be split into several or divided by introduced punctuation, such as colons, semicolons, and dashes. Implied subjects, as is common in Japanese prose, were handled as follows. When the implication would be reasonably obvious to an informed reader, we have supplied it. Alternatively, on occasion, such sentences may be joined with the previous sentence that bears the implied subject. Yet, when the

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16. THZ 6: 53.
17. Breazeale 1988, xiv.
18. Sakai 2008, 190.

implication is reasonably controversial, we maintain Tanabe's ambiguous phrasing.

Tanabe adds no notes to this text, so all footnotes are supplied by the translators. We have respected Tanabe's paragraphing, but introduce italics (Tanabe uses no emphasis in this text) and occasionally remove or alternatively express hook brackets, of course, in addition to making decisions about whether to use single or double quotation marks.

As for terminology, our golden rule has been consistency. A learner of Japanese as a second language should encounter little trouble using this translation as a guide to the original. We believe facilitating access to new researchers is well worth risking some inflexibility. This naturally introduces problems when several Japanese words have only a single, clear English equivalent. We have tried to clarify any such ambiguities without recourse to neologisms that would make Tanabe's prose more artificial than it is in the original, and so often supply footnotes. In this text, the most significant are:

1. 形相・形式 ("form" as in *eidos* vs. Kant's *Form*)
2. 普遍・一般 ("universal" vs. "in general," viz. *überhaupt*)
3. 主体・主観・主語 ("subject")
4. 対象・客観・客体 ("object")
5. 否定的・消極的 ("negative")
6. 積極的・実証的・有なる ("positive")

Regarding (1), we break with our golden rule: when context is clear, it is left as "form," otherwise it is specified through some modification of *eidos*, as in "eidetic ontology." Regarding (2–5), the first term generally goes unmarked, and footnotes will alert the reader to other cases. Some comment is required for (6), especially our decision about 有なる. The challenge is making sense of the claim that "absolute dialectic…. demands one to conceive of all affirmation [肯定] as mediated by negation [否定] and all positiveness [有] as having being [存在する] in nothingness [無]."[19] The issues that this introduces require much more expansive comment than can be provided here; however suffice it to say that at work, as we believe the context suggests, is Tanabe's attempt to mark the contrast we find in, for example, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, when Hegel distinguishes between

19. THZ 6: 296.

"the positive and its truth," on the one hand, and "what is lifelessly positive and completely at rest," on the other.[20] If *nothingness* is the principle of negative mediation, then *positiveness* is what is thereby mediately affirmed, as opposed to the statically positive that is immediately affirmed or "reified" (有化).[21]

For the reader unfamiliar with the prose of the Kyoto School, some mention of 即 (*sive*) is necessary. In this text, the term of art appears in three forms: as a noun 相即 ("mutual correspondence"), a verb 即して ("corresponding"), and, most famously, as a copulative between two terms, for example 否定即肯定 ("negation-*sive*-affirmation"). The first is explained fairly clearly by Tanabe himself, when he writes, "to be independent is not to be fragmented but is rather to comprise a unity of original, mutual presupposition."[22] This should be the basis for understanding the other two forms.[23] While it may be helpful to think of this as the relation between two sides of a coin, one must also keep in mind the dynamic and interactive tension between the two sides.[24] In other words, it marks a "dialectical state of affairs," a relationship which it is Tanabe's task in this essay to convince us has a "concreteness" that can only be understood at the third stage of ontology.

Finally, a word on the decision to capitalize Genus, Species, and Individual for 類・種・個. Issues begin with the variety of words Tanabe uses to describe just as many perspectives on the "individual," namely: 個物 ("individuum"), 個体 ("individual"), 個別 ("singular"), 個人 ("individual person'), and finally 個 ("Individual"). Next is Tanabe's strict distinction between his preferred "dialectic" and the "analytic logic" for which "the classification and arrangement of species and genera [種類]"[25] is primary. We note that 種類 most usually means "kinds," but Tanabe plays with this construction (for

20. Hegel 2018, §47.

21. THZ 6: 298; also, cf. Tanabe's discussion of "negative unification" as "dynamic unity," THZ 6: 294. We do not, however, wish to claim that all instances of 有 should be translated as "positiveness." Worth careful attention, is when 有 is used explicitly in the context of Hegel's logic, where it would naturally be rendered as Being.

22. THZ 6: 269.

23. See also the helpful entry in the glossary of *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, s.v. "*soku-hi* 即非" (Heisig et al. 2011, 1264).

24. As appears in *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, the "relation of tension of [a] not-one and not-two mutual correspondence" (THZ 9: 168; Tanabe 2016, 291; translation modified).

25. THZ 6: 279.

the Japanese word is a composite of the sinographs for species and genera) to emphasize the different treatments of these core notions: namely, the difference between arranging something static, or immediately affirmed (again, the "lifelessly positive"), and rendering intelligible something dynamic, indeed, living. On the basis of this distinction, Tanabe would have good reason to agree with Robert B. Pippin's comment on a sculpture by Anthony Carro, that "an abstraction can be concrete, even weighty."[26] And so, we have decided on manipulating the device of capitalization partially to resolve issues of translating similar expressions and partially to mark Tanabe's idiosyncratic usage, but also precisely to capture this "weightiness." It is our hope that with the present translation, the reader will find a new avenue to explore the life of these weighty abstractions with Tanabe.

26. Pippin 2019, viii.

Tanabe Hajime

The Third Stage of Ontology

Translated by Urai Satoshi and Sova P. K. Cerda

I

The ancient philosophy of the West is, to speak generally, an ontology of natural being. The Greeks, who felt a constant and subtle harmony in the movement of the heavenly bodies, sought to find constant laws within the changes of nature as a whole. Such principles of being, as was considered by the Greek academic spirit, were the universal forms[27] that are apprehended by the eye of reason. Representative is the Pythagorean school, which took the geometric shapes that express mathematical principles to be the eternal forms of nature. A necessary product of *homo rationalis* would seem to be that the ontology of natural being is an eidetic ontology. Yet in contrast to this, the tendency of the natural philosophy that begins with the Ionians was to seek the unchanging *archē* that remains constant through the generation and corruption of nature and identify this principle of nature with matter. The motley that is natural being emerges upon this self-same substratum through the oppositions and vicissitudes of its various determinations, and it is through its generation and corruption that changes within natural being arise. At first glance, this hylic ontology is in opposition to the eidetic. Nonetheless, both take nature as their model for being, and, in conformity with the Greek aptitude for contemplating artistically and sculpturally, they coincide by thinking that the totality of natural being is a result of the production[28] of manifold being through imparting various forms on a self-same matter. These two types of ontology are only tentatively distinguishable on the basis of whether one considers form, as the unchanging principle of formation, to be what makes natural being possible, or one considers the principle of nature to be matter, as the substratum that maintains its identity while undergoing various changes to its form. They are identical as the products of the demand to seek to find in nature, which

27. 形相, viz. *eidēi*.
28. 制作, viz. *poiesis*.

has its principle of change and movement within itself, this principle of being in something unchanging. Furthermore, pursuing the consequences of these types, it is not difficult to find even greater overlap. To begin, form signifies a constant configuration of being that remains unchanged through change, but when viewed logically, it indicates the opposition between particular and universal in the interrelation of forms. So just as unchanging and constant form has being in vertical[29] change, in horizontal[30] differentiation, it is acknowledged of a self-same universal that its more general form has being. [268] If it is a demand of reason that, with regard to changing being, the principle of this being is to be apprehended in unchanging form, then it is also a demand of reason that, for more particular forms, more universal forms are to be conceived. Necessarily, then, forms themselves are unified by more universal forms, and the most universal form becomes the principle of being for the particular forms. At the limit, reason cannot but seek to reach the single, highest, universal form. This is precisely analogous to matter, which, as the self-same substratum, unifies manifold being throughout its generation and corruption. Insofar as both thereby involve an indeterminacy that tolerates determination within itself, self-same matter, taken as the archē, and the highest, universal form coincide. For this reason, Aristotle takes "genus" to be matter in the broad sense. Conversely, to the extent that it is grasped as something, even matter receives determination from form and is thereby not merely undifferentiated, self-same matter. It is, precisely to that extent, something enformed. Indeed many of the natural philosophers found their archē in such an already enformed matter. Matter cannot have being on its own without containing any form. Hence, when Aristotle took prime matter to be completely without determination, he considered it to be but possible being. Characteristic of matter, then, is that while it is an indispensable principle of being, it cannot be considered a sufficient principle. Originally speaking, nature is moving and changing being. Movement occurs by going from one determination to the opposite determination, and this occurrence cannot be understood only by means of the self-same matter lying at its base. Consequently, even ancient natural philosophy tried to establish a principle of change other than this archē and, by that means, to

29. 縦, cf. "diachronic."
30. 横, cf. "synchronic."

consider this occurrence in light of some relationship of forms. After the early Milesian school's simple and rudimentary doctrine of archē, none would take matter alone to be the principle of nature. One can simply say there was a common tendency of natural philosophy to turn form into matter. It is, perchance, a necessary demand of lived experience to acknowledge that that which is taken and felt in hand, that which resists the power applied to move it, is a real thing outside of us that cannot be moved at our liberty. In virtue of its such obstinate reality, matter is taken to be the principle of being. By contrast, form signifies something that is originally seen. That which is apprehended by the eye of reason is form. [269] Being, then, was to be understood by means of the principles demanded by the two, mutually irreducible standpoints of lived experience and reason. Still, as touched on above, in their independence, they have their points of compatibility. Form, when the demand for its universal unification is carried through, reveals the undetermined generality of matter; matter, when it is to be the principle of being, must turn itself into form. Nevertheless, one cannot immediately change into the other: for as mutually irreducible and independent principles, this would be impermissible. Their compatibility is due precisely to the fact that to be independent is not to be fragmented but is rather to comprise a unity of original, mutual presupposition. While form and matter are, at first glance, dissimilar principles of being that are demanded by the different standpoints of life and reason, it is only in their mutual correspondence and oppositional unification that they are conceivable as principles of being. Accordingly, from beginning to end, Greek natural ontology finds its core problem to lie in how form and matter, as mutually opposing principles of being, are to be mediated by one another. To the extent that philosophy is originally the product of reason, it is hardly avoidable that it places the eidetic ontology in the prized position. Yet if it does not at the same time acknowledge matter to be the substratum, then the unity through which form has its stability will fall out of sight. If in order for matter to serve as a principle of ontology, it is not to be left merely to lived experience, but is to be conceptualized, then, it goes without saying, this must be effected by the mediation of form. Natural ontology is evidently not *either* an ontology of form *or* an ontology of matter, and, even if one principle is emphasized over the other, it is, in fact, the synthesis of both. There is no error, I believe,

in saying that Greek philosophy found a sustained problem in synthesizing these two types of ontologies.

The hylic ontology in natural philosophy reached the peak of its development in the atomic theory of Democritus, whose thinking would greatly influence the scientific thought of later generations. While he emphasized matter's character as substratum, he also thought that the principle responsible for shaping manifold being was the configuration of the arrangement of indivisible particles, a configuration that arose mechanically through a vortex. [270] One could say that he tried to incorporate the rational universality and necessity of form while standing firmly on a hylic ontology. Yet, to think that upon dividing a material of continuous extension, one will arrive at indivisible atoms must amount to a contradiction: for continuity signifies something infinitely divisible. That the atomic theory of today's physics considers, not macroscopic, but microscopic being, does not mean that it posits atomic particles as the limit[31] of the division of continuous being. Rather, it means that continua and atoms—for instance, waves and particles—are what shape the unity of an essential opposition. Hence, the void (space), the place where atoms move, must carry the significance of being both the negation and principle of being. Atomism divided, multiplied, and put into motion the originally singular and unmoved being of the Eleatic school. Negation must have been involved in the mediation of this thinking, but ruled as it was by analytic logic, it could not become self-aware of this dialectical state of affairs. Nay, as we are all familiar, the antinomy of atomic indivisibility would persist until the modern period. Although Democritus' atomic theory would pass through the philosophy and science of later generations and emerge as a pioneer of atomistic thinking, due to the prevailing abstractness of the day's logic and the feebleness of its positive[32] grounds, it completely failed to compare to the eidetic ontology's grandeur, a grandeur which, it goes without saying, is found in none other than Plato's philosophy. Having developed the rationalism of Socrates, Plato's doctrine of Ideas goes beyond the diversity and change of sensation and takes the principles of being to be the universal and constant forms contemplated

31. 極限, i.e. (in mathematics) the limit that is approached.
32. 実証的

by reason. As a praxis-guiding, idealistic[33] philosophy, this eidetic ontology thereby possesses great power, and yet when it comes to understanding actual being, there is no escaping its abstractness. If form does not include a hylic moment, then it cannot bear upon being. Hence, Plato's later ontology would proceed toward a *dialektikē* that conceives matter to be what mediates form as its negation. In thinking of matter as both the negation of form and the mediation indispensable for its realization, Plato's dialektikē was the highest ontology to attempt a synthesis of the two lines of Greek ontology. Negation is the mediation of affirmation. Affirmation can only be affirmation through the mediation of negation. Dialectic was thus first put on firm footing. [271] Plato understood non-being to mean something different from what is.[34] In this way, both he and Democritus thought space (place), as the negation of being, to be non-being. For space to be regarded as the principle of difference and transformation, as the principle that establishes opposition among that which is received within it and that sends these to their opposite poles,[35] is for both the unity and discriminative differentiation of form to be mediated by matter as the negation of form. With this, the cornerstone of a principally synthetic ontology was first laid: for this dynamic space that mediates the oppositionality of difference and differentiation is, following Aristotle's understanding, what Plato takes to be matter. Moreover, while Plato's matter is more concretely defined in terms of "the large and small" and the "indefinite dyad," understood to signify the polar dynamicity that oscillates between excess and deficiency, it is form that is eventually taught to be the principle of proportional equilibrium that unifies this oppositional oscillation into the balanced middle way[36]. It is no exaggeration to say that, in Plato, form and matter are reduced to the principle of number (which itself is eidetic) and concrete, eidetic ontology draws near to its completion. Even so, there is no silencing the eidetic keynote of Plato's ontology. While indeed being is said to be a mixture synthesized of matter and form, since the hylic moment of this opposition is balanced by form and is thought to have being just to the extent that the proportional

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33. 理想主義, i.e. a philosophy oriented by standards of perfection; cf. THZ 15, 3–34.

34. Cf. *Sophist* 257b; see WHITE 1997, 280.

35. Cf. *Timaeus* 50b–53c; see ZEYL 1997, 1253–6.

36. 中道, viz. *mesotēs*.

middle way is realized, matter is not recognized to signify the substratum in which this realization is made possible and which lends support before and after such realization. It is as though the being of a work of art were not in the hylic being of its materials but in the realizing form, where the form only has being in accordance with the acts by which it is poietically contemplated. Even supposing Plato's is a concrete ontology, one based on the synthesis of form and matter, it is hard to deny that it is, nevertheless, of the eidetic type and takes up the standpoint of artistic contemplation. The eidos is what reason perceives[37] as the constant and universal form[38] that goes beyond the change and diversity of sensation. Mediated by its negation, matter, it is realized suddenly and in an instant. Hence, its being always goes beyond actuality, but in the instant of actuality it is realized only transtemporally and discontinuously. [272] Matter, as continuous, cannot serve as the substratum that mediates the realization of such discontinuity. Even if a so-called "continuity of discontinuity" could be established, a concrete, mutual correspondence between continuity and discontinuity is lacking. As no more than the instantaneous realization of the transtemporally eternal, it is no actualization of a temporally enduring substratum. For this reason, not only is Plato's not an ontology of matter as substratum, but without placing sufficient emphasis on this hylic moment, it keeps to the tendency of parting with hylic being and transcending actuality.

Aristotle's dissatisfaction with Plato lies in the transcendent character of forms (the so-called "separateness" of the Ideas)[39] and in his neglect of the hylic substratum. Despite the harshness of his critique of Plato, today it must be said that it is an historically settled fact that the basic thinking of his philosophy springs up from Plato's. Yet, insofar as it is no exaggeration to say that, compared to Plato's eidetic ontology, he adopted a hylic ontology, there is no doubt that by emphasizing matter Aristotle puts himself within the lineage of natural philosophy. It could be said that, where Plato was always to be a philosopher of form, despite his making the synthesis of form and matter the central problem of his mature ontology, it is Aristotle who synthesized both types and brought Greek natural ontology to its culmina-

37. 観ずる
38. 形姿
39. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* M, 1078b30f. See ANNAS 1976, 97.

tion. In taking "first philosophy," as it is called, to be the science of being itself, Aristotle is naturally to be regarded as the founder of metaphysics as ontology. While it goes without saying that the model of being adopted by his ontology is natural being, there is a contrast with Plato, who, influenced by the Pythagorean school, considered geometry and astronomy to be the sciences that reveal the form of nature and regarded mathematical and physical[40] being to be the model-type of natural being. Characteristic of Aristotle's natural ontology is that he, well-versed in zoology and physiology, took living things to be representative of nature. Say that mathematical being is transtemporal being: then, the phenomenon that typically realizes this in the actual, natural world—namely, the movement of the celestial bodies—appears as so unchanging and cyclical that it may be called the image of the eternal in time. It would be natural for an ontology, which regards this sort of being as representative, to also emphasize the transtemporal, eternal forms. [273] Still, living things are not characterized by either being born or aging and dying simply as individuals, but rather by the fact that parents birth young, and the species[41] lasts beyond and independently of the individual's life and death. What is clear is that the temporal duration of a continuous substratum takes on great significance. While of course, like Plato, within Aristotle too, there is reverence for the eternal forms of the celestial bodies, at the same time, it is also undeniable that an emphasis on organic being is of seminal significance for him. It would be no grave error to trace to here the concept of the species substratum. For Plato, matter as space, was everywhere non-being, the negation of being. Aristotle, however, transformed this concept into something more positive[42]. While matter cannot have being in itself, it is not simply that which is merely in lack: it has the possibility to be. It is possible being, which participates in being through the capacity to receive the form that is to be realized within it. Aristotle thought, furthermore, that, when the possible becomes actual through the form, and when potentiality is turned over into actuality, that mediator in which the actuality of the form is made to be, is matter. Unlike place in Plato, Aristotle's matter has not been pulled apart from things, but is a moment that

40. 物理学的, i.e. having to do with "physics," the science of physical processes.
41. 種
42. 積極的

enters into the being of things and establishes them from within. It is the medium in which things realize their forms, the substratum upon which their generation, corruption, and change takes place. As the mediator in which things are, Plato's matter is the same as Aristotle's. Nevertheless, the latter's characteristically serves as a moment that participates in being through the capacity to receive the form that is to be realized, something altogether absent in the former's, to the extent that it remains as non-being. Since matter, as possible being, opposes the actual being of form, it must be that form affirms matter while negating it, and, thereby, sublates matter, taking it to be the mediator of its own realization. Hence, form is the activity[43] that sublates matter, and matter endures as substratum in virtue of its negation and preservation through sublation. For this reason, the activity and actuality[44] of form is the end-to-be-realized of change and movement, and, as such, it is what puts them into motion. As the completion of movement, it is within movement; as the discontinuous moment beyond movement, it makes movement take place. In contrast, matter is the substratum, whose continuity is what mediates this. Continuous movement thereby takes place in virtue of the synthesis of continuity and discontinuity as moments. How to understand change and movement through unchanging principles, the task of natural ontology, therein finds its resolution. [274] When, in each stage of change, that stage is the relative-*sive*-absolute completion of the end, unchanging form becomes the principle of activity that makes each stage serve as the driving force[45] of change. The consistency of the self-same end corresponds with the self-sameness of the substratum that allows change to arise within it, and, in this way, the duration of the latter, as the moment of continuity, is mediated by the discontinuity of the former, which serves as the completed unity that contains each stage of change and movement. For this reason, the continuity of matter, as the substratum of movement, and the discontinuity of form, as its end and driving force[46], are thus mediated, and their oppositional unity allows for changing, natural being to be possible. Both types of ontology are thereby concretely synthesized.

43. 活動
44. 活動現勢
45. 原動力
46. 動力

Nevertheless, this mediation and mutual correspondence of continuous movement and discontinuous form, as indicated by the negative opposition of the concepts of continuity and discontinuity, is the synthesis of mutually negating moments and, thereby, evinces a dialectical state of affairs. Each stage of movement is put into motion by the discontinuous form that is activity; to the extent that each stage is the relative-*sive*-absolute completion of a self-same end, it, as consistent activity, stretches across movement, and thus mediates movement through the duration of the continuous substratum. This state of affairs can only be understood dialectically. Aristotle, however, rejected the Platonic dialectic, taking it to be insufficient as a method for necessary knowledge[47], and regarded analytic logic, ruled by the law of contradiction, to be the sole, rigorous logic. Therefore, in Aristotle this dialectical state of affairs ultimately cannot be adequately thought through. When, for example, Aristotle describes movement (*kinesis*) and activity (*energeia*) sometimes as if they were two, sometimes as if they were one, this would seem to be due to the difficulty of expressing with analytic logic the oppositional unity of both. If one were, by contrast, to radicalize dialectical thinking, then, because form, which relies on the negative mediation of matter as the continuous substratum, is conceivable as a discontinuous unity only in the negation of its negation, and because activity can be a relative-*sive*-absolute completion as the negation-*sive*-affirmation of movement, there would be no activity apart from movement, no form apart from matter, and, therefore, a pure activity with no substratum would be impossible. Yet, because he did not accept the dialectical thinking of negation-*sive*-affirmation and relative-*sive*-absolute, if the form that serves as the end is, as pure form, to become pure activity, [275] then, because it contains none of matter's possible being, there is no other way to conceive of it besides as something beyond the change and movement of nature. This is what Aristotle thought to be God, the prime mover. Arriving here, even Aristotle's ontology, like Plato's, comes down to an eidetic ontology. It is no wonder that God, as pure activity, is the so-called "thinking of thinking," an activity that contemplates the harmony of the world as the form of itself. Yet, there is no way to understand how God, while transcending the world, can be immanent within nature, putting it in motion as its end: for there is no finding a dialec-

47. 認識

tic of immanence-*sive*-transcendence. For the same reason, Aristotle has the problem of, on the one hand, following the tradition of natural philosophy and recognizing matter to be the substratum, while, on the other, having to conceive of form, separate from matter, to be the substratum. The stumbling block of Aristotle's ontology—nay, for eidetic ontologies in general—is the being of individua. If, one were to radicalize this thought that has just been stated, that form is the negation-*sive*-affirmation of matter and is mediated by matter, then there need not be any difficulty in understanding the form of an individuum. If the individuum is originally indivisible, it cannot be conceived to be merely the limit of division, as was mentioned above in relation to Democritus. The individuum takes matter for itself by negating and sublating it, and dissolves the condition whereby it, bound to the continuous diversity of matter, is unavoidably divided from without; at the same time, it is conceived as a unity that divides itself from within and contains contradiction. Therefore, the form of the individuum is not what speciates the common[48] form of the Genus, which contains the specific difference within itself, and not what appears at the limit of the process of dividing continuity; instead, the form of the individual must be such that it realizes materiality in virtue of its negating-*sive*-affirming the species form, its sublating the hylic substratum that correlates with the Species, and its being a negative unity. The negative moment that is the Species is completely sublated such that it no longer has substrateness within itself; the Individual itself then stands in on behalf of it; and the whole is shaped by the oppositional unification of Individual and Individual that is due to their negative unity. Such is the essential structure of the Individual. Since matter's substrateness is negated and preserved, the form of the individual, thereby established by this complete sublation, would take pre-existing matter entirely as a moment in its negative-*sive*-affirmative self-determination. For this reason, Aristotle refers to the essence of the individuum as the "what it originally was."[49] [276] Yet, if the "what it originally was" merely signifies the final species[50] to determine pre-existing matter through its specific difference, then it turns out to

48. 一般的
49. 本来ありしそのもの, i.e. *to ti ēn einai*, the "what it was to be," generally translated as "essence."
50. 種

be completely incomprehensible, since there is a contradiction involved in there being a terminus to speciation and division. That one cannot arrive at indivisible form through so-called "conceptual division" is the cause of difficulty in interpreting Plato's theory of Ideal numbers. This can only be understood by dialectically radicalizing his dialektikē. Yet, as mentioned above, in Aristotle's reliance on analytic logic, he rejected even the Platonic dialectic. It must be evident that this leads to the problems belonging to the concept of *infirma species* and the indivisible forms of individua. As a result, in the Middle Ages, the issues with the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology concentrated on the essence and being of individua, causing fierce debates. As the final species[51], the individuum's indivisible form is inconceivable for analytic logic. The positive half to this negative[52] state of affairs thereby lies precisely in the fact that only that which negates the Species, breaks through the species form, and unifies contradiction and division within itself can be the essence of the individuum, that which truly sublates matter within itself. Where analytic logic thinks that necessary, universal form attains changing, actual being when determined by the mediation of matter, dialectic reverses this orientation and conceives necessary form to be an absolute, negative unity, one that holds within itself matter, the principle of self-contradictory change, while sublating contradiction and change. Only such a dialectic can comprehend the essence of the individuum. Expecting to achieve this, analytic logic is yet only able to conceive of species form to the extent that it can turn a contradictory opposition into a contrary opposition and change the real matter that opposes form into the ideal matter of the Genus, matter turned into form. That the species form is statically fixed prior to and apart from matter; that when matter is added to it, it is made dynamic and diverse; that, ultimately through this the form of the individuum is reached—this is impossible for thought. To think this way is for the very concept of the form of the individuum to be a contradiction. By contrast, inasmuch as dialectic conceives of form as only possible when it is universally[53] mediated by its negation, matter, dialectic is precisely that which can comprehend this very

51. 種
52. 積極的; 消極的
53. 一般に

contradiction in its unity. When it comes to the form of the individuum, this state of affairs can no longer be hidden. [277]

II

Aristotle rejected the separation of the Ideas against Plato, considered it an error to, as the latter did, accept universal form as true being, and placed emphasis on the essential being of individua. Aristotle, who esteemed the hylic ontology's right to validity against eidetic ontology and maintained fidelity to actual nature, thus bears the spirit of the natural philosophers. Still, accepting the above considerations, it becomes hard to deny that it is also there that the limits of the eidetic ontology are most noticeably exposed and the powerlessness, with respect to being, of the analytic logic ruling therein is most clearly made apparent. If the individuum is not matter's negative-*sive*-affirmative unity, then it cannot have form. This is not possible from the standpoint of the teleological view of nature on which Aristotle stood: for teleology acknowledges, not a self-contradictory, self-dividing, negative unity, but an immediate unity between the whole and the part, which amounts to precisely the immediate mode that is opposite of dialectical unity. If we define dialectical unity as the mediated mode, then the immediate mode is just that which is sublated by this as its negation. To go further, where teleology is a standpoint of contemplation, dialectic is practical mediation, and so the individuum's negative unity only takes place practically. The fact that this negative unity is a negation-*sive*-affirmation, that it is the relative-*sive*-absolute, is attributable to this as well. Therefore, individua are essentially realized, in fact, only for individuals as the subjects[54] of praxis. Even the object[55] that is for the subject can be an individuum only in practical unification. The individuum is for the individual and, in this way, the subject of praxis must be the individual in the superior sense. Thus, individua are only grasped subjectively. In praxis, the subject affirms-*sive*-negates its self-negating matter and realizes immanent-*sive*-transcendent form as the unity of discontinuity opposing the continuity of matter. When

54. 主体
55. 客体

the content is objectified[56] as what belongs to the substratum, the objective[57] individuum is established. Nature is immanent within the individuum as matter, but, in form, it is transcended. In the world of mere nature, there can be, in fact, no creative individuum. [278] This is ultimately unattainable for the things of nature that are formed by the bestowal of universal form on a self-same substratum or matter. Only the subject—which negates the substratum and affirms it by turning it into its own mediator—can, as individual, have creative essence and posit the individuum as the objectification of its content. Indeed, even universal form is form only as the reflective, negative side of the individual's form. For this reason, its content is subjectively made ever anew. Yet the substratum that is thereby subjectivized through the dialectical unity of negation-*sive*-affirmation is itself none other than a volatile mixture of contradictory opposites. It is Plato's matter, the Straying Cause,[58] and must be the true significance of Aristotle's prime matter. Form and matter thereby both have a dialectical structure. Greek ontology is the product of the endeavor to define such a concept, which is possible only in a dialectical structure, from the standpoint that understands natural being analytico-logically. When all is said and done, such efforts inevitably point to their own bankruptcy. That being said, the precision of its analyses and the clarity of its concepts would become an exemplar for future generations, such that any ontology must, at least once, return to it and from there make its new departure.

If, as we have seen, the individual is only possible as the subject of praxis, then there is also no denying that it has already surpassed natural ontology. Still, Greek ontology persistently tried to view the individual human from the standpoint of natural being. Accordingly, in both Plato and Aristotle, even the good is a way in which being is; yet this being is defined as the relative realization of pure form, which is impossible on the standpoint of the hylomorphic compound. For Plato, the being of the proportional, middle way is reason's enforming of pleasure, and is, thereby, the good. For Aristotle too, the middle is none other than the habit of rational intention[59] to enform

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56. 客観化
57. 客観的
58. Cf. *Timaeus* 48a; see Zeyl 1997, 1250; and thz 5: 292–3.
59. 理性的決意, viz. *boulēsis*.

excessive or deficient matter in accord with the proportional middle way. Happiness is thus realized in the activity that follows its nature, and precisely this is the good. Opposing Plato, who took philosophical wisdom to be directly the content of the moral good, Aristotle recognized that praxis has its own standpoint; however, he still thought that philosophical contemplation, as the relative realization of God's self-contemplation, was the highest good. Even if it is said that, insofar as good and evil are due to human intention, nature makes room for human deliberation and volition, the good must still be that which follows nature, that which views the form of nature and assimilates with it. [279] Morality is never given the significance of the negation of nature. It follows that the doctrine of the proportional middle way can neither bring out the full significance of dialectical negation, nor evade its own tendency to entail some halfway compromise. Aristotle thus, like Plato, believed that the being of the human being obtained completion only within the state, thereby intertwining ethics with politics, which, as is well known, is characteristic of Greek thought. The claim is that the human being obtains happiness only in the state. In general, for the tightly-knit Greeks who participated in governance as free citizens of the city-state, the individual and the state would not have seemed isolated from, and certainly not opposed to, one another. It would have thus appeared evident that the science of politics, just as much as the science of ethics, is to define the human way of being that, in following nature, is rational. Society, which opposes the individual person, is not questioned with respect to its own being, and so it is certainly not thought to have a form that goes beyond nature. Both the individual person and the state were thought of in terms of natural being and defined by its ontology. It was commonly held in Greek thought that nature (*physis*) was higher than artificial law (*nomos*). Nature has constant matter as its substratum, but, much more, it realizes divine reason through its eternal form. As with that of artistic production, the matter here does not oppose form with negation, but immediately coincides with it. Where form and matter are, not negatively mediated in praxis, but immediately in union, we have nature. For this reason, even the form can be considered to be a substratum. Even time, when conceived to be the enumeration of change and movement, can be made constant in the substratum,

and therefore be changed into a geometrical shape[60] through the mediation of the form's eternity. The logic of this being is the analytic logic ruled by the laws of identity and contradiction, and primary for it is the classification and arrangement of species and genera. This too is natural. The self-negating and contradictory form of the individual then becomes incomprehensible, and the demand to think, not that universal form is made manifold through matter, but that it is in the individual that matter serves as the negative mediator of form, becomes a challenge impossible to meet. Matter is not the substratum, taken to be an undifferentiated and transparent medium that does not negatively oppose form, but is the principle of contradiction and negation. [280] As the negation of this negation, form is absolute-negative unity and so is established only practically as the unity of the discontinuous subject, where matter, as the continuous moment of being, is its negative mediator. That this dialectical state of affairs lies between form and matter was to go unrecognized. Therein lies the limit of natural ontology.

In Greek life, the collapse of the state, conceived to be that wherein the individual person's happiness is made complete, would constitute for them the overturning of the human being's being from its ground. When they confronted this historical crisis, and thereby lost that on which they had been relying, they sought human freedom in inner repose and, from there, searched for the well-being of ecstasy in a unification with the One, whereby the opposition between form and matter would be extinguished. Nevertheless, this immediate fusion, even if raised from artistic contemplation to religious meditation, could still not acquire enough concreteness to compensate for all its increased difficulties. Instead, an entirely new ontology was prepared, one to replace the natural ontology by rejecting the value placed in contemplation, firmly establishing the practical subject, and overcoming nature. With its teaching of negative transformation, that he who gives up his life obtains eternal life, Christianity transmitted a new truth: the negation of nature is the recovery of spirit. Clearly, this is a negation of the pagan spirit that appeared in natural ontology. Now, a new cornerstone has been placed for an ontology of the human, spiritual being that goes beyond nature. Still, the human being, who is conceived to be incapable of saving itself in virtue of original sin, and who, only through faith, may be

60. 形象

granted grace by the Love that is God, has no being within itself. One could say that, while the subjective being of the individual remained as the last problem in Greek ontology, in Christianity, it was provisionally dissolved within God's absolute being. Opposing God and bound to matter as its flesh, human egoistic being is to be negated. Christianity thereby removed a stumbling block for Greek ontology, allowing it to occupy an extremely important, albeit subordinate, position for a period in Christian theology. Hence, there is the Aristotelian ontology within Scholastic philosophy. Statal being was thereby demanded by the being of the human being, and this position seemed to be suitably filled by the Catholic Church. [281] Nevertheless, this natural ontology, now supported by supernatural being, could not maintain any of its authority as the Church fell into ruin, following the growing demand for human liberation and the freedom of the individual person that accompanied changes to the social foundation. The goal of the Protestant Reformation was to liberate religion from the Roman Church and return to an early form of faith invested in the Bible. This was, at the same time, an overcoming of natural ontology. The demands for the recovery of humanity and reason's attainment of freedom were now sought, not in linking the supernatural to the natural, but in transcending nature on the standpoint of nature. In place of that faithed being that was dissolved into God's absolute being, there appeared the being of the subjective human, who with will and reason, acts[61]. When the human being is *homo faber*, as it is called, when it is that which rules nature through cognition, that which by obeying nature, indeed, overcomes nature, there is first indicated a negative-*sive*-affirmative beinghood. Nature is no longer eidetic being, no longer to be observed by the eye of reason, but is encountered in the immediate negotiations of life as something that resists sensuous impulse. If it is to be ruled and moved, one must cognize its laws. In place of Aristotle's natural philosophy, which never lost its feeling of piety for nature, there appeared a natural science that was motivated by a practicalism that aimed to utilize nature; and, in place of geometry, which treats independent and unmoved shapes[62], mathematical analysis was developed, which describes movement and traces change. Both are the results of *homo faber's* demands. The human being, who is thereby

61. 実践する
62. 形象

the epistemic subject[63] of such scientific cognition, is no longer mere natural being. The human being that rules nature through cognition cannot simply belong to nature. Even if the passive aspect of its being belongs to nature, the active aspect goes beyond nature. Such being is not, as nature is, cognized in sensuous experience, but becomes self-aware in the freedom of its rational activity. Such being is not, as was held to be so in the Middle Ages, dissolved in God's absolute being, but instead posits even the being of God through a postulate mediated by its own active being. It is self-sovereign being. The rational ego, self-aware of its own being as the subject of autonomous freedom, now replaces natural being. In place of Greek piety toward nature, there appeared respect for the person as free ego. The personal being of the early modern period replaced natural being, and, where natural ontology was ontology's first stage, personal ontology became established as its second. The central concepts of this ontology are, in Descartes the ego, in Kant the person, and in Heidegger existence. [282] It should go without further elaboration that the latter's philosophy of existence aims to occupy the position that belonged to Aristotle's metaphysics in ancient, natural ontology precisely by way of the fundamental ontology he himself advocates. Yet, in accordance with the above account, what requires attention is that, insofar as there are basic differences in the character of these as ontologies, there is the danger of falling into an intolerable confusion of standpoints if one were to recklessly interpret one kind by way of the other. For this reason, it would not be valid to interpret Aristotle's ontology with Heidegger's existential philosophy.

III

It is well known that Descartes established the being of the ego through the immediate evidence of self-awareness. The self-contradiction of doubt as method absolutely confirms the being of the ego as the subject of consciousness. This, it is said, is due to the fact that this subjective unity of negation-*sive*-affirmation is supported by the absolute being of God. Descartes would hold that the ego and God mutually correspond in the relation of the relatively absolute and the absolutely absolute. By contrast,

63. 主観

nature, as extension, is but the result of the demands of common sense being affirmed on the basis of a guarantee ensured by God's trustworthiness. For it is the demand of *homo faber* that the objects of scientific cognition have reality. It would be impermissible for experimental science, as a productive knowledge[64], that nature be merely an idea of the epistemic subject. While nature reveals itself through the artifice of this subject in experimentation, it must be a being that is independent of it. Nature is an object[65] independent of the subjective[66] ego; it is the substratum by which even the being of the ego is conditioned. Still, their dialectical unity cannot be conceived by mathematico-analytic logic. That Descartes himself oscillates between dualism and materialism is due to this difficulty. While this demand can only be solved dialectically, Spinoza tries to dissolve it into an immediate unity—an example that prominently displays the powerlessness of analytic logic's thinking vis-à-vis the negative opposition of nature and the ego. [283] In Spinoza, the substrateness of nature and the subjectivity of the ego cause the system's theoretical and practical demands to be completely torn asunder. There is no wonder that the notion of polarity would later emerge from this. This is, however, the hypostatization of dialectic, its organization through the logic of identity. For this reason, it is a model-type of so-called "dogmatism." In order to avoid this, Kant denied substrateness of nature and reduced it to the synthesis of the epistemic subject's consciousness. By his own testimony, it was the skeptical consequences of British empiricism that influenced him on this point. Where Greek natural ontology dissolved the subject into the substratum without recognizing the independence of the former from the latter, with Kant, early modern personal ontology dissolved the substratum into the subject. Kant's epistemology of nature aims for the transcendental grounding of physics, which, no longer constrained by the practical motive of *homo faber* seen at the beginning of the early modern period, tries to erect a system of unified laws based on purely theoretical aspirations. In this way, even the subsistence of matter as substratum is reduced to a time schema in which representations are lawfully synthesized under the category of substance. Transcendental logic, as Kant's metaphysi-

64. 工作的認識
65. 客体
66. 主体的

cal deduction shows, brings the thinking of analytic logic into mutual corre-
spondence with the synthetic structure of time. From the standpoint of the
logic of the law of identity, it tries to conceive of the structure of the objects
of analytic judgment in terms of particulars that are made necessary by uni-
versals, which are the transcendental rules that may be called propositional
developments of the categories. Transcendental logic is analytic logic syn-
thesized by the time schema. Originally, even analytic logic involves synthe-
sis as its other half. That analysis and synthesis constitute an inseparable and
opposing unity, is known from the fact that even the law of identity involves
the definition of synthesis. The synthetic half of analytic logic appears in
the synthesis of judgment. What Kant calls "experience" is understood as
the process whereby this is mediated by the schematic synthesis of time
effected by the power of imagination and is determined and realized in time
as a form[67] of intuition. The transcendental conditions presupposed in the
possibility[68] of experience are thereby secured by transcendental logic, and
the subsistence of substance is thought to be mediated by the subsistence
of time itself. The subsistence of substance is attributed, not to the being
of the thing in itself, but to the transcendental subject's[69] forms of cogni-
tion. Nature is now conceptualized all the way to its substance. The suprem-
acy of eidetic ontology over hylic ontology among the Greeks is here, one
may say, radicalized in transcendental idealism. It appears that the victory
of reason over life, of *homo rationalis* over *homo faber*, has been completely
attained. [284] Yet modern reason is not directly Greek reason. Dissolving
the substance of nature into itself, modern reason escapes from the binds of
nature, but at the same time, losing that which is to fulfill its own content, it
simply retains the capacity to set formal, universal laws. Though "theoreti-
cal reason," as it is called, may conserve a manifoldness in its transcendental
rules on account of the receptive moment of cognition, when we turn to the
unconditioned, free self-legislation of practical reason, it has only the moral
law, whose content is simply lawfulness. This morality is a completely con-
tentless, formal morality. The person, who is the subject[70] of this morality,

67. 形式
68. 成立
69. 主観
70. 主体

commands itself in accordance with universal law, as a self-legislating "I,"[71] and, at the same time, so as to respect all persons, who share such laws, as equally free subjects, it must be expected to treat both its own person and that of others ever as ends in themselves and not once as means. Yet lacking, besides this, any definition as social being, it does not take the state to be what mediates its completion. Even if there is mention of its being, this is nothing more than the completely substratum-less, autonomous self-determination[72] of the will. For this reason, the good is recognized nowhere except for in the good will. If this were compared to the Greek way of thinking, which, taking the good to pertain to the being of the human being, saw the latter as complete within the state, then it must be clear that modern reason and ancient reason have aspects that differ entirely in the content of what they mean. What transcendental philosophy calls "forms"[73] are nothing like the *eidē*[74] of ancient philosophy, which are viewed in concrete configurations,[75] but merely signify the universal[76] laws of the synthesis of abstract elements. It is ruled by so-called "atomistic thinking." To follow this way of thinking, the state is a grouping contractually organized by individual people, individuals who, hostile and isolated in virtue of their egoity, reflect on the fact that they will destroy themselves if left to their own self-regard and, restraining themselves, organize into law a general method for harmonious coexistence[77]. This is precisely the contractual theory of the state based on natural law. While in the Greek city-state, the state and the individual person shaped between themselves a melded unity that recognized no separation, the early modern civil state took the individual person as yardstick, and did so to such an extent that its establishment was attributed to a contract among individual people. Clearly, this cannot evade the tendency to be reduced to a kind of profit society[78] that neglects the natu-

71. 自我
72. 決定
73. 形式
74. 形相
75. 形姿
76. 一般
77. 共存
78. 利益社会, viz. *Gesellschaft*.

ral, communal society[79] of a nation.[80] The distinctive feature of the personal ontology is that it cannot recognize a substratum of the Species besides the subject as Individual. It then becomes necessary to try to explain the origin of the state in terms of a free contract between equal persons. [285]

While it could be said that Kant's transcendental philosophy is the culmination of early modern, personal ontology, the "personal being," as it is called, in fact does nothing more than lead to the abolishment of being. This is because the subject of a free will only has being to the extent that it practically wills the good, and, with spontaneous self-legislation as its principle, its personal beinghood is lost if it were, conditioned at all by something prior, to fall into a heteronomous unfreedom; it is the activity of the will that completely escapes the temporality of phenomenal being, that is liberated from empirical causality, and transtemporally initiates a so-called "causality from freedom." As a result of precisely Kant's doctrine of the person, Fichte takes the essence of the "I" to be a substratum-less, pure activity and holds that this activity does not emit from a subject that has being, but rather the activity itself allows for being to be established. Yet, as indeed Fichte himself acknowledged, a pure activity never reaches being without an obstacle to be overcome. To the extent that it has being, even the person must act[81] in time and, through the mediation of the enduring substratum that is to be negated, have being temporally. Even if this determination of the will is transtemporal, and it renews what is prior negatively-*sive*-affirmatively, it must itself still have being temporally through the mediation of the substratum of temporal being. If not, then as long as it remains a merely pure activity, it is not personal being. Kant did not dare draw this conclusion and instead went so far as to leave the substratum of the thing in itself as some residual on the side of the object[82]; however, it is hard to deny that this personal ontology harbors the tendency to negate being. In fact, even when it comes to the transtemporal activity of the will, this is only realized through the mediation of temporal being, and the result of this activity is, thereby, something that has duration in temporal being. While Kant claimed that

79. 共同社会, viz. *Gemeinschaft*.
80. 民族
81. はたらき
82. 客観

phenomenal being is based on the lawful synthesis effected by the transcendental forms of sensible intuition, and based the ontology of empirical being on epistemology as the theory of experience, he took the subject[83] of experience to be no more than the negative side of the subject[84] of the will, neglecting the positive[85] side that mediates the latter. The result was the so-called "two worlds" theory, a standpoint whose greatest difficulty appears in understanding historical being. History is certainly no mere phenomenon, like nature. Neither is it simply the content of a transtemporal will. [286] Properly, it is the result of the subject of the free will transforming itself into being, and it is that mediator whose negation-*sive*-affirmation is that by which the subject's activity is actual. Further, it is precisely being that has a substratum that subsists ever in time. The person has being through the mediation of historical being, but also goes beyond historical being, creating it ever anew. Since the negative side conceived to be opposed to persons and separate from their artifice is just nature, nature is thereby the negation and depersonalization of history. Nature thus too is subjectively reduced to history. It would then become clear why nature is not opposed to persons as another world, but must be mediated by them. Kant's two worlds theory unavoidably runs into unsurpassable difficulty in historical being. Heidegger's existential philosophy can be understood as precisely the attempt to salvage this. Likewise, however, it is hard to deny that his footing lies in the transcendence of personal being's free will, as in Kant and Fichte. According to Heidegger the being of the human being is defined as being-in-the-world, and its way of thereby negotiating with the things of the environmental world[86] through care is precisely what shapes temporality as the unity, in the present, of thrown pastness and projective futurity; he holds that, since all being takes place in the negotiations of this being of the human being, fundamental ontology is a self-aware ontology whose content is the self-interpretation of the being of the human being. With this, he himself believes that the tradition of Aristotle is revived, the tradition that places the problem of being itself at the center of philosophy. It is thought that, when self-aware

83. 主観
84. 主体
85. 積極的
86. 環境世界, viz. *Umwelt.*

being becomes aware that its immediate mode is being-in-the-world, it goes beyond the world; and when it ultimately, in the phenomenon of death, becomes aware of the finitude of temporal being, through the resolution[87] that is free for death, it goes beyond temporality. Hence, as concrete being, this is called existence. Stated positively, existence is to be the transtemporal being that serves as a moment in the establishment of time: for, structuring the horizon of time through its own ek-stases, existence establishes time through its mediation. Unlike in the case of Kant, where being is either completely conditioned by time as phenomenon, or transcends time as noumenon, existence is a transtemporal moment that enters into the structure of time itself and, thereby, becomes temporal being. For this reason, the existential philosophy is an ontology of time. It follows that existence does not, through its transtemporality, stand outside time, as Kant's person does, but instead becomes temporal being by way of its going beyond time. [287] This is precisely the structure demanded by historical being mentioned above. It appears that the temporal and transtemporal structure of history is thereby established by existence, which would give one reason to say that Kant's two worlds theory has been surpassed by Heidegger's existential philosophy.

Nevertheless, on further thought, even though Heidegger's temporal being is aware of itself as thrown in the world in its past moment of thrownness, what is omitted is that the world has a substratum that subsists from the past to the present. Existence, only in a self-awareness of the present, is aware of the thrown mode[88] as its own moment. The temporal structure of existence is not enough to understand why it has that world into which it is thrown as something opposed to itself. Inwardly aware of oneself in thrownness, one simply equates the latter with time's past, but has no acknowledgement of the state of affairs in which one is, outwardly, conditioned by past being in virtue of its duration. That is to say, this standpoint remains phenomenologically immanent and so makes no leave of transcendental idealism, broadly conceived. History does not remain as a moment of existence made self-aware in mere thrownness, but, as mediated[89] being, it is effected by a substratum that persists from the past. As past being, his-

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87. 覚悟を決すること
88. 様態
89. 媒存せられる

tory is that in which the subject recognizes the results of its activity; as substratal being, history is that which, mediated by the subject's negative-*sive*-affirmative activity, persists in opposition to this activity. The so-called "world" is what structures the beinghood of history. On the other side of the establishment of the discontinuous unity of time, is the world as what mediates the continuous substratum. That is to say, just as the subjective, discontinuous unity of time is established because the continuity of space is at the same time its enduring substratum, the dynamic-*sive*-static unity of space and time is the world. It follows that the unity of the world, in its absolute-negative mode, takes place transworldly. Heidegger, however, grasps the world that mediates the being of the human being in only two respects: as the world of equipment that the subject negotiates through care, and as the communal world communally negotiated; and thereby holds the world to be a moment subordinate to and imminent within individual subjects. Here he acknowledges no substratum that, opposing the subject as its negative mediator, conditions the subject and endures as independent being. [288] Completely neglected is the substratum as species society, which, through the traditional customs that serve as the origin of law, enfolds the subject from without; neglected, that is, with the exception of his teaching of the impersonal public[90] that, as its fallen mode, dissolves self-aware being into convention. Species society cannot take place without space as the continuous medium of simultaneous being. For a standpoint that takes only time to be being's fundamental structure, this substratum will, as a matter of course, go unacknowledged. Nay, pushing the thought further, in order for the opposition of the past to be mediated in the present by the free projection of the future, the establishment of time itself must already be mediated by the spatiality of simultaneous being-with[91]. The discontinuous unity of time can only take place through the mediation of the continuous being-with of space. Which is to say that the mutual correspondence of these is the world. If history is to be the temporal aspect of the world, then its spatial aspect must be society. Only mediated by the substratal being of society, does the activity of the subject establish history. Neglecting the spatial moment as the enduring substratum that mediates the pastness of time,

90. 世間, viz. *das Man.*
91. 共存

there is no world upon which history could take place. For Heidegger, the world is only to be negatively transcended, and so it is never acknowledged to be something that, in negation, is affirmed, something that, transcended, immanently mediates existence. This existential philosophy is incapable of being an ontology of historical being. Abstracting away the nation as substratum and the state as absolute, negative unity, is history still conceivable? History without substratum is no history. As a subject unmediated by the substratum, existence remains in line with Kant's personal being. Its so-called "transcendence" is simply transcendence from the world in a structural self-awareness of the time horizon; it has no practical transcendence toward the world. Yet, without transcendence toward the world in self-negation, concrete transcendence from the world is impossible. If transcendence is not always immanence-*sive*-transcendence it could not, in fact, be transcendence. There is no wonder that, interpreting the schematism of Kant's *Critique of Reason* as not epistemology, but ontology, Heidegger had to give up the transcendence demanded by epistemology. Yet an ontology separated from epistemology could not be what Kant demanded of transcendental philosophy: for it would not signify a critique of cognition. The unity of immanence-*sive*-transcendence, which truly holds epistemology and ontology together, must be, not a schematism of time, but a schematism of the world. [289] The world schema is precisely the schema of historical society. Now, the substrateness of society is based in the materiality[92] of nature. In order for the personal, rational being to be concrete, it must be mediated by the materiality of nature. Personal being is first raised to be a concrete moment of social being when it takes natural being to be its negative mediator. Personal ontology must thereby develop into social ontology. Ontologies that do not reach this, even one that criticizes Heidegger's philosophy of existence as an hermeneutically immanent standpoint and tries to go beyond it through a dialectic of immanence-*sive*-transcendence, still will not escape the standpoint of personal being, so long as they grasp being merely in temporality and understand history as the subject's determination that is in turn determined[93] by the mediation of an age. When the history of philosophy does no more than insert the mediation of an historical age into

92. 質料性
93. 被限定的限定

the individuum's determination within the place of nothingness, it continues to ignore the substratum of the Species and remains on the standpoint of the Individual. Not even the history of art could be a concrete history, if it were to ignore the substrateness of the nation and only describe what is characteristic to the style of that age. Needless to say, there would be no political history so long as one ignores the species substratum. The so-called "continuity of discontinuity" can have meaning as a concept that expresses the discontinuous, negative unity of the subject only when it presupposes the substratal mediation of continuity. Without the continuous mediation of the substratum, it would amount to no more than a vacuous idea. This standpoint has still not shed the shackles of transcendental idealism. Like Heidegger's existential philosophy, it is the world-avoiding philosophy of a transcendental ego. "Personal ontology," "temporal ontology," "logic of the Individual," "metaphysics of nothingness"—this list of definitions is no more than an emblem of their shared abstractness. They correspond in their opposition to the characteristic features of social ontology, world ontology, and the ontology of the substratum, as well as of the logic of Species and negative, absolute mediation. As ontologies, they do not reach the third stage, as defined by these latter characteristics, but belong to the second. As the ontology of substratum-*sive*-subject, which synthesizes the ancient, natural ontology and the early modern, personal ontology, this third stage radicalizes the logic of Species in its world schema, and, insofar as the above philosophies of existence and nothingness hold that the tasks of philosophy can be completely solved through the interpretation of expressions, it differs fundamentally from them in character. Such are the distinguishing features of contemporary ontology. Hence the third stage of ontology must be acknowledged therein. [290]

IV

The stumbling block for Greek natural ontology was the problem of the individual's form.[94] Early modern, personal ontology solved this problem with the concept of a self-negating, free subject, only to lose sight of the substratum, which served as the cornerstone of natural ontology, and

94. 形相

thereby endanger the very ground of ontology. For this reason, it reached the abstraction of an history without a substratum and thus its own impasse with the problem of historical being. The stumbling block for personal ontology is precisely the problem of history. It is said that the nineteenth century is the century of history. It is well known that from then until today, the philosophy of history has been recognized as the crown of philosophy and is at the center of contemporary philosophy's concern. Accordingly, it is inevitable that personal ontology will come to lose its value as a philosophy. Of course, not even the philosophy of personalism remains indifferent to this trend toward the philosophy of history. To the contrary, that there have been attempts to approach the problem of history from this standpoint is clearly observed by examining the tendencies of the representatives of contemporary, personal ontology discussed at the end of the last section. It is a remarkable fact that transcendental philosophy has discovered and made efforts to resolve problems never taken up as such by Kant, such as the grounding of the science of history and the methodology of the historical *Geisteswissenschaften*. Even for the so-called *Lebensphilosophie*, which, in its opposition to intellectualism, underlined the abstraction of *homo rationalis* and emphasized the superiority over reason of lived experience[95], the problem of history became an issue of primary concern among its prominent representatives. Be that as it may, in terms of the developmental stages of ontology, it must be said that even this philosophy remains at an intermediate stage between personal and social ontology. In essence, this standpoint asserts the originariness of life as what universally[96] mediates the individual[97] subjectivity of persons; however, despite the characteristic held in common by life and the continuous substratum of the Species, just as the pure activity that is the original source of the person, can, as the activity of a subject unmediated by the substratum, erect no beinghood, life, since it acknowledges no negative activity of the subject, cannot establish the being of the substratum, which has concrete beinghood only in its opposition to the subject. As a result of remaining on the standpoint of this unmediated, immediate mode, life is insufficient to be the principle of ontology. [291] As

95. 生体験
96. 一般
97. 個的

a philosophy, the *Lebensphilosophie* is thus unavoidably abstract. Its contributions to the philosophy of history lean toward epistemology and methodology and make little impact on historical ontology. Yet history is being before it is ever an object of cognition. The problem of history demands that it first be raised in reference to the beinghood of historical being. That this must thereby be the ontology of the substratum-*sive*-subject, which synthesizes the substratum at the center of ancient ontology and the subject at the center of modern ontology, should be clear from the above discussion. This is the way to arrive at historical society as the synthesis of nature and the person. Thereby established as the practical unification of these negatively opposed moments, historical society realizes the unity of the subject through the mediation of the substratum and, as such, must be poised to procure the solution to the problem of the form of the individual, precisely that difficulty that confronts ancient ontology, and synthesize what appeared as the two types of Greek ontology, namely, the hylic ontology and eidetic ontology. Now, along with the substratum being restored, the form is made concrete and the will of the personal subject serves as the content of reason. The so-called "rational will" is none other than the concrete content[98] of form. On this basis, even the person, as abstract, individual person, is made concrete as the subject of morals[99]. Thereby, it is said, as in Greek ontology, that the person completes its beinghood only in the state. Yet to that end, the nation-state, whose substratum is communal society, must be acknowledged as the truly concrete state, instead of the natural law, contract state of personal ontology. History is precisely the achievement of a subjective unification, one whose substratum is such a nation-state. Speaking in terms of schemata, this achievement is mediated not by the mere schema of time, but by the world schema. Space and time were dealt with as entirely separate by Newtonian physics; but their unification in the physics of the theory of relativity would seem to suggest the concreteness of the world schema. History could never take place merely by virtue of the temporal supplanting of ages. When the subsisting substratum that is society mediates the discontinuous, subjective unity of time and does so as the continuous substratum that corresponds to space, only then does history take place. To

98. 内実
99. 人倫, viz. *Sitten*.

speak of mathematics, when the arithmetization of modern analysis arrived at set theory, this was the culmination of the elemental perspective. At the same time, however, through set-theoretic antinomies this invited the so-called "foundational crisis" of mathematics and led to the acknowledgement of an intuitive medium, namely, that which mediates the series of elements in intuitionistic continuity theory. [292] We could say that through this, the element-set theory, which corresponds with the method of thinking belonging to individualistic, personal ontology, was replaced by a conception of mediation by substratal unification. In this way, the main tendency of modern mathematics, as seen in group theory, can be understood to lie in treating dynamic-*sive*-static systems that unify the order of arithmetic operations; it thereby stands on the standpoint of the unity of substratum-*sive*-subject. This operationalist mathematics serves as the method of quantum mechanics in physics, and, in the "world" of relativity theory, being comes to define the structure that arises as the unification of discontinuity mediated by continuity. The mutual correspondence of waves and particles in the new quantum theory also certifies that the negative unification of continuity and discontinuity is the basic structure of being and that ontology must be an ontology of substratum-*sive*-subject. By taking historical society as its model of being, the structure of substratum-*sive*-subject is now recognized as the concrete principle of ontology that runs through all realms of being. The reasons are thus clear for why the ontology of social being, as the third stage of ontology, is to be the ontology of today.

The basic principle of social ontology is, as just mentioned, the negative unification of the substratum and the subject. Since their negative-*sive*-affirmative unification is thereby only possible practically, it clearly differs from the standpoint of the subjectless substratum of natural ontology, but also differs from the standpoint of the substratum-less subject of personal ontology: for it is a practical ontology wherein praxis and theory are unified in the full sense. Earlier I mentioned resistance to human behavior[100] as a necessary condition of being, a condition that is based on lived experience. In praxis, the substratum society appears immediately as a resistance toward the subject's behavior. As the hylic substratum that envelops the Individual and allows for the Individual to arise within it, the substratum society is the

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100. 行動

immediate unification of the Species; it is what puts constraints on the Individual's self-sovereign behaviors and suppresses the separation and independence[101] it asserts through its egoity. To confirm this immediate mode's presence as the continuous substratum must be the first necessary condition of an ontology of substratum-*sive*-subject. To that extent, it implies returning the early modern personal ontology to the ancient natural ontology. The recovery of the substratum is the point of prime importance to contemporary ontology. That being said, in the ontology of social being, the species substratum is the negative moment of praxis. It does not signify something that has being as a so-called "substance" apart from mediation in praxis. Herein arises contemporary ontology's fundamental difference with ancient ontology. In ancient ontology, it is required that the substratum of nature is, not merely the mediator of being, but the final substratum. [293] As that which acts[102] negatively against the substratum, the subject is left unacknowledged. Even the subject belongs to the substratum as no more than a part. It follows that praxis is not recognized in an adequate sense, and the concept of the free person had no chance of being established. Yet because contemporary ontology is mediated by the early modern personal ontology, the subject is opposed to the substratum, and the substratum serves as a negative moment of the subject. The immediate, species substratum is, then, a moment that mediates praxis and, at the same time, is mediated by the subject. To even define it as "immediate" is to do no more than to define it as a moment in logical mediation. Since in the self-awareness of praxis, even the immediate mode of the substratum is a moment of mediation, it can be embraced by the logic of absolute mediation. For this reason, the *Lebensphilosophie* that goes no further than a negation-less immediate mode, that does no more than interpret this mode, and that does not acknowledge practical mediation as negation-*sive*-affirmation—this *Lebensphilosophie* seems to bring itself to a halt before erecting an ontology based on the logical mediation of substratum-*sive*-subject. Nevertheless, since, despite its negation by the subject, it is at the same time affirmed in negation and preserved in mediation, the substratum persists as the communal society (Species) that contains the subject (Individual), the communal society

101. 分立
102. はたらく

from which the Individual departs and to which it returns. Past tradition, as the content of history, is none other than as follows: the immediate mode, initially mediated by the negation-*sive*-affirmation of the Individual, loses its mediatedness and, through the self-estrangement of negative unity, once again turns into a not-yet-mediated, immediate mode; it thereby serves as the negative moment of mediation anew. Even the immediate mode is a moment of mediation; at the same time, the mediated mode also falls into an immediate mode, if its mediation is lost and becomes merely past. There is no fixed immediate mode; at the same time, neither is there a fixed mediated mode. Within absolute mediation, where all comprises a unity of negation-*sive*-affirmation, any unification is that of the dynamic-*sive*-static. It follows that the Individual too, as the subject of a praxis that negates-*sive*-affirms the Species, has being only in mutual correspondence with the substratum society; individuals persist neither independently, separate and isolated from this, nor alongside one another in the place of nothingness that lacks negative mediation. An unmediated[103] unification, such as that of the latter, does not leave the standpoint of personal ontology, just like the former. The Individual cannot have being without being mediated within a substratum that negatively opposes it. The mutual opposition of individuals does not amount to mediation; rather the opposition is itself mediated by the divisions of the Species that correspond with the negation and the affirmation of the species substratum. [294] For this reason, the subject that arises negatively-*sive*-affirmatively as the true Individual always mutually corresponds with the substratum that serves as its mediator; concretely speaking, it follows that the subjects are made equal as members of a state that sublates the mutual opposition of individuals and mediates communal society. The state correlates with the Genus, which is established in the subject's (the Individual's) negation-*sive*-affirmation of the substratum (Species); it is the mediated mode that arises when the species communal society is negatively unified with the Individual's freedom and self-sovereignty. As such a synthesized mode, the state is the most concrete unity, a unity within which the Species is sublated and retained; in a like manner, the Individual is opposed to this unity and yet, within it, concretely maintains its freedom and has self-sovereign being. Sublated by the state, the Species is mediated

103. 無媒介

by the equalization of individuals and, being equalized itself, it contributes to the particular-*sive*-universal unity of humankind, which, while uniform, includes the differentiation of Species. Separated from the state, the individual person would remain as abstract as the communal mode of the Species. As a moment negative to the Species, the Individual would signify nothing more than the separation and independence of egoity; it would not have existence. This is why the "Kingdom of Ends" of rational persons, which merely negates this egoity, is unavoidably abstract. The individual person only has existence in a state; at the same time, the state is only a state when mediated by the individual person's self-sovereignty and freedom. If this mediation were lost, it would be no more than a merely national communal mode, one whose substratum is merely natural and whose natural power of immediacy to unify individuals could never lead to an absolute society, whose sovereign right to govern is rationally acknowledged by individual subjects who are free and autonomous persons. Within the state, rule-by-other-*sive*-self-rule prevails. Since the nation is an immediate mode that lacks the mediation of self-ruling-*sive*-being-ruled that belongs to participation in state governance, it is strictly distinguished from the state. The being of the latter arises as the negation-*sive*-affirmation of the former and only in mutual correspondence with the Individual's subjective mediation. Since this unification is always a negative unification mediated by praxis, division always accompanies one side of it, as it demands unceasing synthesis. It must be, not a substratally subsisting, static and immediate unity like that of the nation, but a dynamic unity that, while mediated by the nation, is unceasingly renewed. For this reason, the state arises within history and yet carries the transcendent significance of relative-*sive*-absolute. Nevertheless, because this mode of unceasing mediation is in mutual correspondence with the subjective praxis of the Individual, if the freedom of the latter is deprived to an extreme, then the state collapses into the mere natural being of the nation. In such a case, the state inevitably indicates that it is in a condition close to losing its significance as an absolute society. [295] That being said, to whatever degree the state falls into this manner of self-estrangement, the possibility for practical mediation is maintained, and what gives confidence to Individual being is the hope that a new unification of the substratum and the subject will be brought about by this and that the state will thereby be renewed. The unity of actuality and reason must be conceived as including

this practical mediation and, thereby, as making the actual state rational. Since ancient Greece, the state has been a matter of great concern for philosophy. It is said that there was no change to this in early modernity, but in the present day, and accompanying the restoration of the substratum, it poses new problems. In fact, one could even say that the state is the touchstone of philosophy. One must say that there is no way to demand concreteness from an ontology if it cannot secure the beinghood of the state.

It now hardly requires specification that the cornerstone of the above social ontology was laid by Hegel. That the broad strokes of the above study were conducted under the guidance of Hegel is clear, I believe, from both the principles of its content and the methods of its thinking. It does not bear any detailed explanation that the third stage of ontology begins with Hegel's philosophy. It is due to him that the truly concrete philosophy of history was first established, that a philosophy of the state that corresponds with actuality came to be organized. If the ontology of historical society is to be the ontology of today, then it is precisely Hegel who is the founder of contemporary ontology. The dialectic of his logic is the core of this ontology, and, if one observes the evidence that this dialectic fulfills the task of absolute mediation, then I believe that it is beyond doubt that, putting Hegel aside, contemporary ontology would be inconceivable. The most characteristic part of his philosophy is the philosophy of objective spirit, and it must also be evident that its system, the *Elements of the Philosophy of Law*,[104] came to serve as the foundation of German sociology. Objective spirit is the relative-*sive*-absolute, dynamic being of other-*sive*-self spirit, such that, being mediated by the conditions of nature, it realizes infinite subjectivity[105] within finite objectivity.[106] Its immediate mode, the family, serves as the species communal mode that mediates the Individual and, as such, is the substratum that corresponds[107] to immediate nature; the civil society that opposes this correlates with the separation and independence of individuals; and with the state, the former two are sublated and synthesized. This coincides precisely with the logical structure of social being described above.

104. 『法律哲学綱要』, viz. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*.
105. 主観性
106. 客観性
107. 即せる

When Hegel takes it to be that the highest duty of the individual person is to be a member of the state,[108] this is a revival of the Greek philosophy of the state; and in that the individual person is by no means immediately fused with the substratum of the state, but, through the freedom of the subject,[109] is the so-called "rational will" that mediates the content of reason, his philosophy always includes Kant's personal philosophy as a moment. [296] The universality[110] of Hegel's philosophy, insofar as it is the synthesis of Greek and German philosophy, is especially vivid in this philosophy of objective spirit. History is none other than the process by which a finite-*sive*-infinite, negative unity of objective spirit is negated and replaced on account of its finitude, and is developed within different national spirits.[111] The substratal-*sive*-subjective[112] structure of historical society can be clearly recognized in this. Nevertheless, even Hegel's philosophy of spirit does not remain on a standpoint loyal to its logic and hold the absolute to be within the dynamic-*sive*-static unification of the relative-*sive*-absolute or think no positive[113] absolute has being beyond absolute, negative nothingness. Following Christian theism, his philosophy has not completely sublated the tendency to conceive of absolute spirit in terms of God as absolute being. In Hegel, instead of the three moments of universal, particular, and singular (Genus, Species, and Individual) relating to one another entirely through mediation and radicalizing the absolute mediation of logic, it is thought that the universal goes beyond mediation and coincides with God, who has being absolutely, giving the sense that the Individual's world of existence emanates from and is created by this through the mediation of the particular. This is a denial of absolute dialectic, which demands one to conceive of all affirmation as mediated by negation and all positiveness[114] as having being in nothingness. It is no more than an ideal dialectic, which, like mystical emanationism, holds that the world emanates from the universality of God as spirit through particularization. Just as Heidegger has judged, the struc-

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108. Hegel 1998, §258.

109. 主観

110. 一般性

111. 民族精神, viz. *Völkergeister*; cf. Hegel 1998, §341 and §352.

112. 主体的

113. 有なる

114. 有

ture whereby this absolute spirit thus determines itself as relative-*sive*-absolute objective spirit in history, the structure whereby spirit realizes itself in time, becomes a difficulty for Hegel's philosophy. Likewise, to think that the state is God's being on earth[115] is to replace the relative-*sive*-absolute state that arises in the mediation of the substratum-*sive*-subject with a state that, as absolute being, is the realization of divine will, which signifies an absolutism that does not tolerate the being-ruled-*sive*-self-ruling democratic moment. It is for this reason that it is criticized as an absolutism that entirely denies early modern liberalism. This emanationist tendency to ignore the subject as Individual thereby disregards the significance of the particular as what negatively mediates the universal and diminishes it as what merely specifies the universal from within. As a result, negative opposition is to be shorn of its dialectical character. This is also why nature's independent negative oppositionality to spirit is ignored, and why the result of spirit's self-estrangement being undertaken within spirit itself is expounded as nature. [297] When, in this, it is said that nature is external[116] to spirit, this does not mean that this externality, as a moment of absolute mediation, is something negative to immanence, but signifies an ideal externality on the inside of spirit. It is due to this that the "externality" of space expounded at the beginning of the philosophy of nature[117] is allowed to lose its unique significance, and nature is returned to an idea. Yet, if immanence and externality are not absolute-negatively unified in mutual correspondence, then, insofar as nature would thereby remain within immanence as an emanation of absolute spirit, nature could not in fact be a moment of mediation that serves as the substratum. To the contrary, absolute spirit itself becomes substratum and, without the negative mediation of substratum-*sive*-subject, brings about the identity of substratum and subject. In this way, the *Identitätsphilosophie* that Hegel rejects will appear as a consequence of the emanationist idealism. Correlative to this is the fact that Hegel's doctrine of judgment is one of the predicate and not that of the copula, which truly establishes the

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115. Cf. Hegel 1998, §258A: "The state is the spirit which is present in the world... The state consists in the march of God in the world."

116. 外在

117. Cf. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, §254; Hegel 2004, 28.

logic of absolute mediation. In contrast to Aristotle's logic of the substratum, which takes the shape of a doctrine of judgment of the grammatical subject[118], this doctrine of judgment of the predicate is what establishes the logic of the subject.[119] It belongs precisely to the idealist logic of personalism. That it does not reach the logic of substratum-*sive*-subject is evident. In this way, identity-philosophical emanationism leads to an idealism of the subject, which once again overlooks the substratum. That Marx attacked Hegel's idealism and opposed it with materialism has crucial significance as what, in place of Hegel, completes the ontological restoration of the substratum. The ontology of social being, for which Hegel had laid the foundation, arrives, by way of Stein,[120] at Marx, who undeniably carried out an unparalleled development. Dialectical materialism as social ontology contains a truth that must be honestly acknowledged. We can say that, with it, the substratum was completely restored, and nature sufficiently evinced its significance as such. Still, one must also say that it is an undeniable fact that as a result of this, the significance of the subject as what opposes the substratum was made abstract. Of course materialism also gives weight to the freedom of the person and, indeed, propounds that one aim for the recovery of the deprived subject and intend for the establishment of a free country; however, as a result of setting the sights of analysis on the divisive structure of the social substratum viewed solely from productive forces and relations of production, materialism takes the subject of praxis to be the class and cannot avoid the tendency to severely rarefy the initiative of individual people and disregard the authority of the rational will. By ignoring the eidetic ontology initiated in Greece and trying to recuperate the ancient ontology of the hylic substratum, there is an attendant tendency to forget the concrete form[121] that serves as the content of the substratum-*sive*-subject synthesis. [298] A result of this is that the ontology of the state leans one-sidedly toward actual classhood; and with the substratum as well, great emphasis is placed solely on the side of class division, thereby ignoring the side belonging to the primal unity of the nation. Just as in Hegel, where spirit does not remain as an

118. 主語
119. 主体
120. Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890).
121. 形相

absolute-negative mode, but signifies absolute being that is beyond mediation, the matter of materialism accordingly signifies absolute being, which is beyond absolute mediation, which, from the standpoint of the logic of absolute mediation, looks only partially carried through, and which, it must be said, constitutes a grave flaw for a philosophy. Dialectic must be neither materialistic nor idealistic, but absolute. To in any way admit of anything just as it is and without logical mediation, be it spirit or matter, to regard something immediate as "being" and reify[122] it with an affirmation that is immediate, without negation-*sive*-affirmation—absolute dialectic must vehemently expel this. Only an absolute dialectic, thereby radicalized, could adequately attain to being a logic of social ontology. It is also necessary that this is mediated by the world schematism, whereby space and time are negatively unified. In its concrete being as the state, even society, resembling the world of relativity theory in physics, takes place as the negative unification of the relative-*sive*-absolute. The state is dynamic being, unceasingly renewed, absolutely nothing and absolutely positive.[123] This is the highest configuration[124] within ontology. Likewise, within the state, the Individual that serves as its negative moment, becomes practical being, the mediator of substratum-*sive*-subject. The third stage of ontology must arise, in particular, as an ontology of the state, which, it may be said without objection, hereafter shall be the central problem of philosophy.

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Abbreviation

THZ 『田辺元全集』 [Complete works of Tanabe Hajime] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963–1964), 15 vols.

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122. 有化
123. 有なる
124. 形態; viz. *Gestalt*.

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