Book Symposium
John C. Maraldo, *Japanese Philosophy in the Making*


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**KEYWORDS:** Nishida Kitārō—Tanabe Hajime—Watsuji Tetsurō—Heidegger
What philosophy is, what it can and should do are questions as old as philosophy itself. In saying so, I do not wish to entertain the all-too-common complaints about the alleged uselessness of pure thinking for human affairs (the case of Thales arguably being the first in a long genealogy of such complaints)—after all, since these questions are philosophical questions, they should be attended to by philosophers; neither common sense nor the methods of positive and historical sciences are appropriate means for dealing with them. I rather argue that being in perpetual dissent with itself is what, in Hegel’s words, discriminates philosophy from the other sciences, and that the recent proposition of “world philosophy” is just another turn in this history of dissent, although in an historically inflected form that poses a philosophical challenge on its own. That is, the call for “world philosophy” arises against the backdrop of a narrative of Western philosophy that has come to the fore with Nietzsche’s attack on “Platonism” and its redaction in Heidegger’s deconstruction of so-called “metaphysical thinking”—all of which has been attentively noted by Kyoto School philosophers of the second generation and further on. Succinctly put, the call for “world philoso-

1. Hegel 1993, 2
3. Cf. the quote in the epigraph. I read Hegel’s “Nachteil” (disadvantage) as an ironical capitatio benevolentiae.
4. For a preliminary account of what is at stake here, see Liederbach 2017. My point is not the arguable affinity of Kyoto School philosophy to the genre of Nihonjinron, as Davis (2020,
phy“ coincides with the diagnosis of the “end of philosophy” (HGA 14, 67) and the longing for “the other beginning” (HGA 65, 176) to which Kyoto School philosophy is to contribute.5

Whether this narrative is convincing is not to be discussed here;6 however, trying to establish the significance of Kyoto School philosophy by putting it into relief against this historical backdrop reminds us of the historical character of philosophy itself. To be sure, this is not meant to suggest an historicization of philosophical positions; rather I argue that, for uncovering the rational structure of any philosophical claim, an understanding of the particular context, in the terminology of the early Heidegger: the “hermeneutical situation,”7 to which it was responding is indispensable. Philosophical problems are not perennial objects ready to be discovered at any possible time, but are accessible only under specific conditions. As Hans-Georg Gadamer confesses, the problem of “temporal distance” (Zeit- enabstand), the systematic centerpiece of his conception of effective history, could become “thinkable in its hermeneutical productivity” only after Hei-

5. One of the most influential of these contributions is arguably Nishitani Keiji’s 『宗教とは何か』(cf. NKC 10).

6. However, I am following Robert Pippin’s conclusion that it is not; cf. Pippin 1999; Liederbach 2019.

7. Cf. Heidegger 1989. As Heidegger holds, “the appropriation of history [means] to understand radically what a specific philosophical research of the past, in and for its situation, took as its fundamental concern; understanding does not mean to just take note of, but to originally retrieve what was understood in the sense of one’s ownmost situation and for this situation” (Heidegger 1989, 239; my translation).
degger’s existential interpretation of understanding and his subsequent temporal interpretation of *Dasein*.  

As this example suggests, the “history of philosophy in a non-doxographical, non-narratological sense is the place of sorting out what any philosophical activity has imposed on itself as a problem.” Moreover, the self-imposed problems arise from philosophical reflection on specific limitations inherent in existing positions that stimulated this reflection in the first place. For Gadamer, Heidegger’s notion of understanding was limited, since it did not allow for the concept of effective history; Heidegger was dissatisfied with Husserl’s notion of pure consciousness, since it did foreclose the question for the being of intentional acts; the concept of intentionality was meant to be one of Husserl’s answers to the *aporiai* of psychologism; this list could be continued.

As these examples evince, philosophical activity, if it brings to clarity for itself what it is doing, begins with taking into account the historical context of any philosophical claim or position, but it does not end there. In that philosophical activity also means to provide answers to problems posed by the limits of existing positions, it is more than mere historical reflection; the articulation of limits in historically existing positions goes hand in hand with the claim to some form of rationality that is capable of amending them. (As the examples given above indicate, there is more than one form of rationality at play, each of which was found appropriate for its respective hermeneutical situation.) The dialectical relation of existing knowledge and claim to rationality reveals the temporal character of any philosophizing that finds its concretion in its historical instantiations. In acknowledging its historicity, philosophy provides itself with its own legitimacy.

For grasping the motivation and scope inherent to the call for “world philosophy,” it is, therefore, important to note that it came to the fore after the “end of philosophy” had been proclaimed. The proponents of this call

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responded to their hermeneutical situation in a way that, for them, promised a solution to a problem they found already articulated but not resolved in Heidegger, that is the problem of intercultural philosophy.11 Similarly, the philosophical achievements of Nishida, Tanabe, Watsuji, et al., like any other philosophical position, have to be understood as responses to their respective hermeneutical situation, which, however, is not to be confused with the situation that gave rise to the call for “world philosophy.” Neither for Nishida nor for Watsuji or any other Kyoto School philosopher of the first generation, the “end of philosophy” posed a philosophical problem. They rather struggled with well-defined issues that had come to the fore in post-Kantian philosophy, like the structure of self-consciousness, ethical atomism vs. ethical holism, the philosophy of history, etc., to which they tried to respond by making use of those forms of rationality that deemed them appropriate. They certainly did not position themselves at some point after the end of Western philosophy but rather in continuity with it.12 The contributions of Nishida et al. are philosophically significant in that they articulate insights that resonate with anti-Cartesian positions in post-Kantian Western thought.13 Kyoto School critique of Cartesianism is not to be misread as a critique of Western philosophy as such, as Western phi-

11. Cf. Maraldo 2017, 27; Davis 2020, 24. Maraldo and Davis deserve credit for having reflected their hermeneutical situation; in research on Kyoto-School philosophy, that is far from being a matter of course. Historical assessments like Elberfeld 2017, albeit informative and useful in their own right, cannot substitute that kind of philosophical reflection.

12. Particularly Watsuji is explicit in this regard; cf. WTZ 9: 37–129. After having introduced the fundamental concepts of what would become his ethical theory as developed in the Ethics (WTZ 10 and 11), he takes the pains to juxtapose them with ethical positions from Aristotle to Marx. In doing so, Watsuji puts himself within this strand of philosophical investigation into what it means to be human (for him, clarifying this question is the task of “ethics”) and not beyond, after its alleged end.

13. Pippin’s loose, yet apt characterization of Cartesianism “as arguing that the possibility of any cognitive or even intelligible relation to the world resides in mental episodes occurring in individual minds” (Pippin 1997, 375) resonates with Watsuji’s objection against the “modern fallacy to treat the ethical as a problem of individual consciousness only.” (WTZ 10: 11) Similarly, Nishida’s lifelong struggle with spelling out the implications of “pure experience” (the central notion of his maiden work An Inquiry into the Good) is motivated by, and developed in response to, the conceptual framework of Cartesian dualism; cf. Fujita 2013, 16–18. And Tanabe’s Logic of Species is motivated by his dissent with modern social ontology originating in the contract theories of Locke and Hobbes; this point is forcefully made by Nakaoka 2018.
Philosophy cannot be subsumed under the header of any “-ism,” be it Platonism or Cartesianism. What is at stake here is not historical correctness, but the understanding of philosophical claims. As with Heidegger’s hermeneutical strategy of “Überhellen” (over-illuminating), which he applied to the appropriation of philosophical terms (mostly of ancient Greek origin), the will to meaning is not always doing justice to that which calls forth our humble faculties of understanding.

Raising these reservations is meant to bring the Kyoto School’s critique of Cartesianism into sharper focus and, thus, open the possibility for a discussion that is more nuanced than the post-metaphysically inflected readings would allow for. In this regard, John Maraldo’s philosophical perspectivism merits attention. His dissatisfactions with positions in Western philosophy are illuminating in that they reveal an anti-Cartesian potential of Japanese philosophy, particularly of the Kyoto School. The complexity of the constellation within which these dissatisfactions are articulated requires an equally complex level of understanding. For one thing, this constellation is informed by post-Heideggerian discourse; for another, it is shaped by Japanese philosophy, the interpretation of which is, at least in part, motivated by that very discourse. A reflection on Maraldo’s hermeneutical situation has, therefore, to clarify the circle-structure at work here.

In the first volume of his collected essays, John Maraldo has proposed to utilize “Japanese philosophy as a lens on Greco-European thought.” Since this image suggests a plurality of philosophical standpoints that can take account of each other, Western philosophy being only one of them, it aptly captures the task of a philosophy that, productively acknowledging the reality of an inter-permeability of philosophical traditions, redefines itself as “intercultural philosophy.” On this view, philosophy is to follow the examples of art history, literary and religious studies and the like, where the de-centering of academic discourses has begun more than half a century ago. In philosophy, the de-centering aims at deconstructing an “Eurocentric” notion of philosophy; it calls for the recognition of other, non-Western

traditions of philosophical thought. As Maraldo states, “[t]he inter in intercultural philosophy works... against the exclusion, against the notion of the outsider itself, insofar as it indicates a transgression of boundaries that allows philosophy to pursue its investigations from an area that challenges and sometimes erases boundaries.”

This is to say, intercultural philosophy has to disclose the middle ground between the allegedly fixed boundaries of seemingly stable traditions; its method is “trans-lation,” carried out in “a field of in-between,” the hyphenation in “trans-lation” designating “not only the transference of texts from one natural language to another, but also the transformation of textually embedded problems, methods and terminologies both across and within natural languages.”

Now, challenging boundaries is not the same as erasing them. Depending on which is emphasized, the character of Maraldo’s philosophical perspectivism will change significantly. While “trans-lations” in “betweenness” can bring about transformations as well as shifts of boundaries, one wonders what kind of philosophical activity corresponds to their erasure. The very notions “trans-lation” and “betweenness” presuppose the existence of different traditions, each of which has to be to some extent historically continuous so that a “betweenness” emerges within which they can be “trans-lated” into each other. These notions presuppose, in other words, some form of boundary, however fluid and permeable, that delineates the field of possible transgressions. We would not know where to begin or end our “trans-lating” activities without at least a minimal difference between self and other (the latter I take to be different from the “outsider” mentioned in the quote above). In contrast, erasing boundaries would lead to eliminating the difference between self and other and, consequently, coincide with the negation of any continuity that could be addressed as coherent tradition, which would, most importantly, entail the negation of any philosophical activity that comprehends itself as essentially historical.

Ultimately, the distinction between challenge and erasure forces us to admit two different styles of inter-cultural hermeneutics, one that emphasizes, to a certain degree, the continuity within a given tradition, and a

more radical one that puts the very idea of continuity into question. To me it seems obvious that Maraldo’s work is in line with the first style of this hermeneutics while it remains critical towards the second. As we will see below, this raises difficulties to situate his philosophical perspectivism within the context of “world philosophy.”

As Maraldo notes, philosophizing from the intercultural middle ground “transforms our understanding of the past,”20 a past which is first and foremost that of our own tradition. However, given the historical character of philosophical thought, transforming “our” past inevitably affects our understanding of the “other.” The “trans-lation,” Maraldo is arguing for, would bring about, and would have to maintain, a poly-centric space, constituted by a potentially infinite number of ways of doing philosophy (understood in a much broader and more inclusive sense than the hegemonic Western concept did allow for) that were free to enter into what would have to be called a “polylogue.”21 Again, this presupposes the existence of historically distinct traditions; it allows for boundaries being challenged but not erased. In fact, as far as Maraldo’s philosophical perspectivism wishes to contribute to an intercultural “polylogue,” it is continuous with the hermeneutical tradition of Herder, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. The suggestion that the notions of trans-lation and polylogue derive from the hermeneutical truth that philosophical thought is inextricably bound to a specific historical, cultural, and linguistic context is, therefore, not surprising. Recently, Charles Taylor has developed this Gadamerian insight towards a philosophically grounded theory of “understanding the other,”22 although he has not gone as far as to put into question the concept of philosophy as such. That is, his (and, as I suppose, Maraldo’s) hermeneutical movement stops short at erasing boundaries. But this is precisely what in the call for “world philosophy” often seems to be implied. While the dissent of philosophy with itself as invoked by Hegel rests on the assumption that there is some kind of hermeneutically retrievable continuity to this discipline (Hegel’s Phenom-

21. “Polylog” is also the title of an academic journal dedicated to the promotion of intercultural philosophy; cf. http://www.polylog.net/start/
22. Cf. Taylor 2002. In that Taylor applies Gadamer’s notion of “fusion of horizons” to the understanding of a plurality of historical traditions, he expands it beyond its original meaning, which remains within the “effective history” of one tradition only.
enology of Spirit, Gadamer’s notion of effective history, and even Heidegger’s conception of Seinskgeschichte are a cases in point) that has bearing on “world philosophy,” from a post-Heideggerian point of view, this assumption no longer holds. Only when it has shaken off the fetters of the once hegemonic but now declining Western metaphysical thinking, so the story goes, would “world philosophy” be free to make its path.23

The difficulty to define Maraldo’s position within the context of “world philosophy” derives in particular from the post-metaphysical implications of the latter. However, it is safe to say that his philosophical perspectivism is not to be confused with that of Ueda Shizuteru.24 While, for Ueda, the possibility of “world philosophy” depends on the “end of philosophy” and “another beginning” in Heidegger’s sense,25 Maraldo is careful to avoid such commitments. For him, the possibilities of Japanese philosophy are to be disclosed only in correspondence with Western philosophy. As his numerous interpretations of Nishida, Watsuji, Tanabe, Kuki, and other Kyoto School philosophers evince, the “lens on Greco-European thought” is pre-adjusted by Japanese interpretations of philosophical problems that had been raised and discussed in the Western tradition. It has an anti-Cartesian focal point which is directed at both Japanese and Western attempts to come to grips with the implications of Cartesianism for theoretical and practical philosophy and promises to offer new answers to long-standing problems.26

Albeit Maraldo searches for non-discursive modes of philosophizing, he

23. Cf. inter alia the contributions in Davis, Schroeder, & Wirth 2011 and Davis 2020. These examples are significant for they have decisively shaped the picture of Japanese philosophy within Western academia. It is noteworthy, however, that Heidegger’s own position with regard to so-called “post-metaphysical” thinking is more complex than the proponents of “world philosophy” would admit; cf. Figal 1997.


As to practical philosophy, Maraldo’s discussion of Watsuji is instructive. Through an analysis of Watsuji’s notion of betweenness (間柄), he explores the middle ground between post-modern deconstructions of the subject and the critique of subjectivity in traditional hermeneutics (Dilthey and Gadamer); cf. Maraldo 2019, 21–40, especially 30–2.
does so in a non-post-metaphysical register. He explores the boundaries of metaphysical thinking by “trans-lating” it from the hermeneutical middle ground he discloses by juxtaposing it with positions in Japanese thought. His hermeneutics puts emphasis on the continuity of Western philosophy while opening novel perspectives on this tradition. Since these perspectives have been developed by culturally and linguistically inflected readings of the Western tradition, they can add depth and breadth to it. The circular double-movement inherent to trans-lation possesses an historical continuity as does the hermeneutical middle ground it opens. Consequently, Maraldo’s definition of Japanese philosophy as “a form of inquiry which has its methods and themes that are Western in origin but that can be applied to pre-modern, pre-Westernized Japanese thinking,”27 implies the challenging of boundaries, not their erasure.

However, from the perspective of a more radical hermeneutics, this position lacks the relentlessness “world philosophy” would need to get started. It is, therefore, understandable that Davis’s dissatisfaction with Maraldo’s definition is motivated by the suspicion that it “devalues if not excludes potentialities”28 of pre-modern Japanese thought and the distinctive Japanese character of Japanese philosophy. As he states, “insofar as philosophy involves self-questioning rather than self-assertion, it must entail critically reflecting on the horizontal limits of one’s own cultural tradition rather than just rearticulating and venerating the contours of those limits.”29 Davis’s concern is, in short, that Maraldo’s definition shuts out the possibility for Western thought being challenged by the pre-modern and/or distinctly Japanese “other” in a way that would, eventually, lead to the erasure of its boundaries. What is at stake here is not really the challenging of philosophical problems, concepts, and methods within the boundaries of Western philosophy like, say, refining phenomenological techniques of description by drawing from Japanese sources;30 and rather than adding another voice to an already

27. Maraldo 2017, 7; see also Heisig, Kasulis, & Maraldo 2011, 20–1; Davis 2020, 43.


29. Davis 2020, 51.

30. This line of research has been pursued by Ogawa Tadashi and Nitta Yoshihiro; cf. Ogawa, Mazarin, & Rappe 1998; Nitta & Tani 2011; see also Tani 2017.
many-voiced choir of philosophical positions, Davis’s attempt at “dislodging philosophical Eurocentrism and Euromonopolism”31 is directed against “dominant modes[s] of argumentation in the Western tradition,” like “refutation,” “contentiousness,” or “combat,” which he juxtaposes with seemingly more benign modes like “relegation,” “cooperation,” or “play.”32 Established “Western” modes for generating philosophical knowledge are put into question by “non-Western” modes that nonetheless are to be taken as philosophical. Moreover, changing modes of inquiry will inevitably lead to different results, which, too, are claimed to be regarded as philosophical. A remark by Fujita Masakatsu on the significance of Japanese philosophy may serve as a complement to this view. As Fujita maintains, “there is a strong tendency in traditional Asian thought to not simply grasp things within a presupposed framework of “knowledge,” but rather, since “knowledge” itself is understood to be a certain kind of restriction, to return to its roots,” a view that, as he continues, “lives on” in the thinking of Nishida and Nishitani,33 who are the main sources for Davis’s project. In Fujita’s light, the philosophical import of Nishida and Nishitani goes beyond Japanese philosophy in the sense of “traditional and contemporary Japanese thought as brought to bear on present-day philosophizing,”34 since it questions “[o]ne of the predominant assumptions in current academic philosophy,” namely “that philosophical thinking should be restricted to forms of rationality European in origin but presumed universal in scope and applicability.”35 Against this backdrop, Davis’s concern for pre-modern Japanese thought to be acknowledged as philosophy entails the claim to go beyond the restrictions of knowledge as such. While this does not necessarily entail the refutation of philosophical claims to knowledge, it means to lead the concept of knowledge back to its “roots,” which, eventually will lead to a radical transformation of philosophy as such. Accordingly, for opening the arena of “world philosophy” and introducing pre-modern Japanese thought into that arena, readjusting exist-

32. Davis 2020, 15–6.
33. Fujita 2013, 5.
35. Heisig, Kasulis, & Maraldo 2011, 18. To be sure, the editors of the Sourcebook aim at challenging the boundaries of Western concepts of rationality, not at erasing them.
ing frameworks of knowledge and the related modes of inquiry will not suf-
fice; the very notions of “framework,” “knowledge,” and “inquiry” have to
be put into question, and this is precisely what, in Davis’s light, pre-modern
Japanese thought is supposed to do.

While Maraldo readily admits that hermeneutics is no one-way street,36 he
stresses the potential of Japanese philosophical positions to address prob-
lems in modern philosophy. It is, therefore, surprising that Maraldo opens
the section entitled “Pathways to Nishida” in his book with an investigation
into ancient Greek philosophy.37 Nevertheless, with this investigation he
has provided an example for how modern modes of philosophizing could be
challenged by pre-modern modes without drawing the radical consequences
we find in Davis. The purpose of his inquiry into ancient Greek philoso-
phy is not to transform modern modes of philosophizing by leading them
back to their “root,” but to unearth modes that have been marginalized or
forgotten since the advent of early modern philosophy. The marginalized
“other” is not utilized to dislodge the modern self-understanding of philoso-
phy but to point at its blind spots. In this inquiry, too, the hermeneutical
circle of deconstruction and (re-)construction is pertinent. Therefore, when
Maraldo aims at deconstructing an established definition of philosophy as
exclusively “logical reasoning,”38 he pursues two interrelated goals: recover-
ing a marginalized non-discursive strand of philosophical thinking in the
Western tradition, and shedding light on philosophical practices in the
Japanese tradition, the light of which is reflectively to further illuminate
and to complement its Western counterpart. While Maraldo relies heavily
on Pierre Hadot’s pioneering reconstructions of ancient Greek philoso-
phy as a “way of life,”39 he juxtaposes the French historiographer’s findings

38. Maraldo 2017, 24. It is not entirely clear what Maraldo exactly has in mind. As the con-
text suggests, the term “logical reasoning” covers such different modes of discourse as Sophist
eristics, Socratic dialogue, Platonic dialectics, and Aristotelian inquiry into principles (archai).
However, as it will become evident below, Maraldo’s discontent is directed against an under-
standing of philosophy as purely theoretical enterprise for its own sake, decoupled from every-
day-life. In contrast, he seeks for the possibility of non-discursive forms of philosophizing that
might lead to reframe philosophy as “a way of life.”
39. Cf. Hadot 1995, 2002. It should be noted, however, that Maraldo entirely focusses on
with positions in pre-modern Japanese philosophy, mainly of Buddhist and Confucian provenance. The inter-cultural betweenness that Maraldo’s hermeneutical circle paces out reveals possibilities that remain undiscovered in an intra-cultural perspective like that of Hadot.

This juxtaposition of pre-modern Japanese and ancient Greek philosophies reveals several commonalities that form the backdrop against which the differences stand out. While both ancient Greek and pre-modern Japanese philosophies are to be understood as “a way of life... of which it is both the expression and the means,” the decisive difference lies in the significance the body has for philosophical practice in each culture. In the West, the philosopher strives not only for “detachment from everyday life,” but also for “detachment from the body.” However, as Maraldo’s examples from a variety of sources, reaching from Kūkai to Edo-Confucianism, reveal, in Japan the philosopher situates himself within everyday life, which he seeks to transform by means of his philosophical practice which comprises the mind as much as the body. While both Western and Eastern forms of philosophy as a way of life serve the purpose of “spiritual progress,” in the East, philosophy as a way of life is a distinctly “embodied way of life.” Therefore, while Hadot opens the possibility for challenging an established view of philosophy as pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the Japanese lens further widens this critique. In this regard, Maraldo maintains that the findings in pre-modern Japanese philosophy can “serve as a basis to re-evaluate central concerns of Greek thought and the Western heritage... as a lens to bring the vision offered by Greek-derived Western philosophy into sharper focus.” Moreover, the embodied thinking is an indispensable prerequisite for the life-transforming function of pre-modern Japanese philosophy. For

42. Maraldo 2017, 34.
45. Maraldo 2017, 44.
46. Hadot 1995, 60: “Theory is never considered an end in itself; it is clearly and decidedly put in the service of practice.”
47. Maraldo 2017, 56.
instance, as Maraldo maintains, “Kūkai’s philosophy thus calls one to transform ordinary life rather than simply immerse oneself in it. The transformation, however, must begin within one’s ordinary state; “buddhahood in this very body” does not abandon bodily life in the world. In contrast, from the perspective of Kūkai’s philosophy, the seeker of wisdom in ancient Greek philosophy was called to detach from everyday life and liberate himself from the body.” And for Japanese Confucianism in the vein of Hayashi Razan, becoming aware of “the unchanging, integral relationship between humans and the cosmos” is tied not only to bodily practices of “quietly sitting in meditation,” but also entails a view of mind and body as “inseparable, interpenetrating aspects of human existence.”

By putting into focus the function of the body for philosophical practice, the Japanese lens on Greco-European thought reveals an aspect of philosophy that has been noticed in the West only recently. It is, therefore, no surprise that the concepts of space and body figure prominently in appropriations of Japanese ethics, especially Watsuji. No doubt that these discoveries will further enrich philosophical discourse. However, what, beyond the import of new, “Japanese” perspectives on “Western” philosophical problems, could it mean for current philosophizing to retrieve philosophy as a way of life? How does the claim that, in pre-modern times, the purpose of philosophy used to be spiritual progress relate to current philosophical discourse? The fact that something has been forgotten or marginalized does not per se warrant its philosophical significance; there might have been good reasons for breaking with the purpose of philosophy as spiritual progress.

These suspicions arise for in both traditions, the image of philosophy as a way of life entails some sort of dogmatism. That is most clearly expressed by Hadot, who claims that in ancient Greece, “to philosophize is to choose a school, convert to its way of life, and accept its dogmas [which] are not open to discussion.” Similarly, but in a different metaphysical register,

48. Maraldo 2017, 41–2
50. Maraldo 2017, 49.
51. Maraldo 2017, 52.
Roger Ames maintains that in ancient China, “[the sage sought] the art of effectively contextualizing the experience of the human being within the processes of nature in an effort to optimize the creative possibilities of the cosmos,” whereas in the West the philosopher engages himself in “some disinterested interrogation of nature.” In both examples, there is something that is not to be questioned: the dogmas of the school and the law of the cosmos that philosophical thought has to align with. Consequently, in this view, a philosophy that strives for decoupling its practice from any functional context and, therefore, becomes “uninterested” or “detached,” appears as “hubris.”

It is important to note that Maraldo is careful to not introduce pre-modern Japanese philosophy as a model that modern philosophy of any provenance is supposed to follow in order to overcome its “hubris.” While Hadot urges contemporary philosophy to return to the ancient Greek ideal of spiritual exercise, Maraldo contents himself with stressing the contrastive function of the pre-modern “other.” For instance, when he points out that the liberating practices in Buddhism “contrast sharply” with the philosophical practices in ancient Greece and even more with those of modern Western philosophy, he is careful to prevent them from being misunderstood as prescriptions. And yet, they can enrich philosophical discourse by challenging established boundaries and further enhancing boundary-challenging processes already underway within that discourse. Since Maraldo’s philosophical perspectivism does not rely on post-metaphysical presuppositions, he is free to acknowledge the boundaries of Western philosophical tradition and, at the same time, can draw from pre-modern and modern strands of Japanese philosophy to challenge them. Therefore, he provides a novel perspective on the history of Western thought that, although inspired by an anti-Cartesian discontent, does not lead to the extreme consequences which we have seen in the late Heidegger.

Instead, Maraldo’s anti-Cartesian appropriation of pre-modern Jap-

57. Maraldo 2017, 44.
anese thought obviously resonates with a genealogy of existentialist dissent with modern philosophy that originates in Kierkegaard’s famous dictum on Hegel, “the absolute professor had forgotten to exist”\(^59\) and leads from Jaspers’s notion of “ultimate situation” (\textit{Grenzsituation}) in his \textit{Psychologie der Weltanschauungen} (1919) and Heidegger’s existential ontology of \textit{Being and Time} (1927) to the critique of disengaged reason in the line of Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor.\(^60\) I suggest situating Maraldo’s philosophical perspectivism within this genealogy. Maraldo, as a hermeneutical thinker, refutes mentalist representationalism and argues for a historically and culturally inflected notion of philosophy. He shares with the anti-Cartesian line of thought the problem of giving an account of temporality and finitude of existence that must not rely on the method of mediation, “that is the dialectical reconciliation of even the most sharply opposed ideas,” which “takes from human existence the stringency of absolute decision, the unconditioned and irrevocable character of the choice that alone is appropriate to its temporality and finitude.”\(^61\) In a strong sense, however, the anti-Cartesian thinkers from Kierkegaard to Dreyfus and Taylor are still theorists. They develop arguments to show that mentalist representationalism does not hold; that is, they wish to amend the shortcomings of Cartesianism within the established framework of philosophy as theoretical discipline of “logical reasoning.” And so does Maraldo, although in an inter-cultural register; his “trans-lations” in betweenness are presenting themselves always as arguments for the productive potentials of “polylogue.”

Departing from, and further elaborating Maraldo’s findings, we would find ourselves eventually in a position to reframe Heidegger’s narrative of “forgetting of Being” in terms of “forgetting of the body,” and “forgetting of embeddedness.” However, in contrast to Heidegger’s narrative, the forgetting of both body and embeddedness are not absolute; the one-sidedness and factual biases of modern Western philosophy can be corrected without having to proclaim “the other beginning.” Although in many instances the challenge from outside might turn out to be productive for becoming aware of those biases, the task of amending them cannot be transferred to

\(^{59}\) Gadamer 1999, 111.

\(^{60}\) Cf. Dreyfus & Taylor 2015.

\(^{61}\) Gadamer, 1999, 111.
the challenging “other” but has to be taken on from within the history that
gave birth to them. In this respect, Heidegger was right to claim that a cure
for the metaphysical aporiai could emerge only from within the history of
Western metaphysics.62 This does not contradict his dictum about the “inev-
itable dialogue with the East Asian world;”63 it rather helps to structure the
“betweenness” wherein such a dialogue involves a challenge to boundaries
of established philosophical discourse, but still would have to be called phil-
osophical. Similarly, following Maraldo’s traces allows for acknowledging
the hermeneutically grounded path-dependence of philosophical thought
without having to assert its homogeneity. While “logical reasoning” is the
predominant mode of philosophical thinking in the West, its boundaries
can be challenged. Erasing them would be possible only by renouncing the
historicity of this, if not any, philosophical practice. Rather, as the appro-
priations of Western thought by Kyoto School philosophers have brought
about linguistically and culturally inflected variants of that thought, appro-
priations of modern and pre-modern Japanese philosophy in the West will
similarly lead to results revealing a particular betweenness as the place of
their origin.

Ultimately, Maraldo’s response to the call for transforming philosophy,
traditionally understood as a Greco-European accomplishment based on
“logical reasoning,” points toward a more comprehensive “world philoso-
phy” that encompasses not only strands from different (non-Western) tra-
ditions, but also opens up the very concept of philosophy towards other
practices like poetry, performative arts, and meditation.64 While, in Maral-
do’s view, these embodied practices are not meant to dislodge philosophy as
a discipline of pure thinking, his “trans-lations” in betweenness have con-
tributed to creating a productive uneasiness for this discipline in its estab-
lished self-understanding. Being aware of other possibilities of thought
while, at the same time, knowing that embracing them at the cost of “logical
reasoning” would be an act of self-deceit, might be the appropriate attitude
for philosophizing under inter-cultural conditions.

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Among the many North-American scholars of Kyoto-School philosophy, John C. Maraldo—who was educated in the U.S., in Germany, and in Japan—is probably the most versed not only in Far-Eastern traditions but also in the European continental philosophy on which the Kyoto School has so consistently nourished itself. This puts him in a particularly interesting position to evaluate this school’s relation to phenomenology in specific as well as to significant contemporary philosophers of the West in general. Maraldo has recently published a book on Nishida Kitarō in which the Japanese philosopher and Martin Heidegger are set against each other in mutual reflection. This volume is the first in a series of three wherein Maraldo collects major papers on the Kyoto School written over the past decades. Most of the texts have been slightly adjusted to give the book greater overall consistency, giving readers access to what is probably the most profound thinking on Nishida philosophy to appear in the English language.

Maraldo’s collection is thus not merely an excellent presentation of Nishida’s philosophy but also an introduction to the major discussions taking place in academia today.

To begin with, we may put the question: To what extent does the work of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945)—the most famous Japanese philosopher of the twentieth century—contribute to the momentum of philosophy and to its very definition? Is the discipline of philosophy to be defined solely by its Greek origin, by the meaning of the word we use to express it (philosophia: search for a knowledge freed of muthos), by its detachment from the bodily sphere, by its proximity to the sciences and to the critical investigation of complex questions? With the opening to non-Western traditions, whose thinking rivals that of Western philosophy, the definition of the latter may

need to be enlarged if that tradition is to engage in a true dialogue among world civilizations and not just confrontation with “the other.” To be sure, as a discipline, philosophy has been defined from the start in terms of the Aristotelian *organon*, but it can also be seen, in broader terms, as encompassing any type of fundamental thinking in any type of culture.

When the discipline of “philosophy” was introduced into Japan during the 1860s and 1870s, some local thinkers considered it a Western import, which they translated as 哲学, a term coined by Nishi Amane using Chinese characters and Confucian overtones, meaning literally “the study of wisdom.” Although generally limited to the study of Western texts, the word was later to be adopted by Korean and Chinese intellectuals, and is still widely in use in all three countries.

What, then, is “Japanese philosophy” (日本哲学)? It can refer to philosophy carried out by Japanese scholars in a European key (from Plato to Husserl) with methods similar to those of any Western academic institution engaged in “philosophy.” At the other extreme, Japanese philosophy can designate classical Japanese thinking on fundamental questions formulated prior to the introduction of the European discipline in Japan. In this case, its frame of reference is not Western but almost exclusively Oriental. (Such, for example, was the position of Inoue Tetsujirō, 1855–1944.) A third sense would propose a way of thinking which is European in its methods but which is applied to the study of traditional, premodern Japanese thinking. As such, it demonstrates that the writings of ancient Japanese thinkers like Dōgen and Kūkai contain elements that can be considered philosophical in the accepted sense of current Western academia. (One thinks here of Ōmori Shōzō, 1921–1997, revisiting the ancient theory of 言霊, the spirit of words; or Yuasa Yasuo, 1925–2005, revisiting the body-mind problem with Buddhist eyes). A fourth sense aims at clarifying the specific, unique qualities of Japanese thinking that distinguish it from non-Japanese thought, though mainly adopting Western terminology and methodology for its expression. This generally implies an attitude of collaboration of various cultures within a single global humanity, none of which dominate the others. This was the position of Nishida himself.

All this requires the art of “trans-lation.” By that I mean not just rendering words from one language into another but making readers understand a way of thinking or posing questions from a different cultural context. There
is more involved here than mere linguistic competence. It is much more a question of precise philosophic questioning, which includes an understanding of the entire historically creative cultural process behind the production of a philosophical text. Trans-lating Western thought into Japanese culture in the mid-nineteenth century Meiji era is probably one of the most impressive example of such a phenomenon. (In this regard, I would mention the remarkable endeavors of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), who encouraged the rise of a Japanese “Enlightenment,” 文明開化). Nishida’s philosophy may be seen as marking a watershed in this process of trans-lation. Numerous questions arise in this context. For example, what becomes of William James’s empirical “pure experience” in the Nishidian system of thought, where the spiritual experience of Zen (見性, “seeing into one’s own true nature”) retains its significance?

In the attempt to have not just Nishida, but the whole of Japanese traditional thinking accepted as “philosophy,” Maraldo pleads for a very broad sense of the term that goes beyond the narrow technical sense of the Western philosophical canon in order to include any type of profound thinking about important human or cosmic questions. In doing so he aims to enlarge the meaning of the Greek discipline with the help of modern commentators (like Pierre Hadot) to prove that even for the Greeks, philosophy was not as narrow as one may think. One could object to Maraldo that it would be more significant to go back to the Greek texts themselves that define philosophy rather than follow modern commentators who are simply interpreting the past to suit their own agenda. It could also be stressed that one of the major philosophers of our age (Martin Heidegger) proved convincingly that philosophy was indeed a Greek-rooted discipline and was pervaded by a specifically Greco-European onto-theo-logy (as well as by the grammatical structure of European languages, in particular, the subject-predicate logic and the plurivocity of the verb “to be”). For Heidegger, it was time to leave this behind and inaugurate proper thinking, free of those limits, and capable of dialoguing with other civilizations. This leads us to ask Maraldo: Why do we need to impose such a Eurocentric discipline on the rest of the planet, when other cultures already have their own means to do so within their own tradition of “thought” (a word that has equivalents in every language)? For example, is it fair to characterize the various types of Indian soteriological
systems as “philosophy”? Does it not risk betraying their significance, which is not limited to pure disinterested knowledge?

In any case, for Nishida and modern Japanese philosophy, matters are not so difficult. The conceptuality and methodology of the new discipline of *tetsugaku* (of essentially Western origin) created by Japanese intellectuals tackles questions that include specificities of the East. Presenting Nishida, however, is no easy task. Apart from the difficulty of translating Japanese into Western languages, the complexity of his way of thinking requires a considerable conceptual gear. How is Nishida to be defined? In what frame of reference is he to be placed? To mention but a few possibilities:

1. **He has been presented as the first modern Japanese philosopher.** Maraldo’s response is that he might not be the first, but he certainly is the foremost and the first to be put on a par with leading Western philosophers to such a degree.

2. **He has been described as a philosopher of the East.** Although he uses Western concepts, methods, and sources, he has endeavored to tackle so-called “Eastern” notions like nothingness or the coincidence of opposites.

3. **He has been labeled a “Zen” philosopher.** But given the contradictions between Zen practice and philosophical analysis, Nishida may be said to have developed his own system of thought only after becoming dissatisfied with Zen.

4. **He is seen as the founder of the Kyoto School and a philosopher of nothingness.** It is true that a number of philosophers gathered around him (from the 1920s to the 1940s), many of whom developed their own thinking, often in relation with one of his main topics: nothingness or “absolute nothingness” (絶対無).

5. **He has also been labeled a “nationalist ideologue.”** Here, Maraldo is clear in observing that even if Nishida was obviously not a Marxist (as some of his disciples were), neither was he a nationalist. Rather, he was a philosopher living under dictatorship and doing his best to act positively within such a regime without being crushed by it.

However one wishes to draw the frame of reference for evaluating Nishida, Maraldo opts to begin with Nishida’s thinking on religion (宗教, “the teaching of a sect”), perhaps his most constant preoccupation. This
is not immediately obvious to Western philosophers, who often consider religion as belonging to a different area of investigation and requiring a number of social or anthropological disciplines that are not specifically philosophical. As Maraldo notes, for Nishida “religion is an irreducible fact of the human heart” (p. 128). It is a given, not a philosophical construct. It is a matter of the interior life of the individual. It belongs to the historicity of individuals rising to consciousness of themselves, and this historicity is itself a self-determination of the Absolute in the contingencies of specific cultural circumstances. The Absolute is manifest in different cultural-historical expressions. In his attempt to define the foundations of conscious and physical phenomena philosophically, Nishida appeals to immediate experience and to “absolute free will” (both Fichtean and Schopenhauerian) as its basis and argues that these emerge within a religious symbolism that actually gives them life—that is, it is their very heart. In a sense, it draws us to a place beyond analytic intelligence, where the fundamental experience taking place cannot be properly named. At best, it can be referred to in paradoxical expressions like the kōan that lead to Zen kenshō, through enigmatic notions like the “self-identity of absolute contradictories” or certain Neo-Platonic or Eckhartian pronouncements that echo them. The heart of the one’s experience of religion, according to Nishida, resides in one’s own death, in the fact that each moment can be lived as the death of the preceding one; or perhaps better, that one can only fully experience the present by resolutely leaving behind what went before.

If Nishida had kept to such straightforward utterances, there would be little to fault in what he has to say about religion. But, as every reader of Nishida knows, certain aspects of his thoughts on religion were highly ambiguous. This was especially the case in the 1940s, when, contradicting his own insistence on religious individualism, he began to speak of a State based on religion and morality. Maraldo does not mince words here: “(Nishida’s) language ambivalently accommodates rationale for both politically absolutist policies and radically individualistic action” (p. 157).

Regarding State nationalism (国家主義), we have to ask: Why does such a shadow of doubt still today hang over Nishida’s ventures into political issues of national interest? Maraldo examines the reasons that Nishida philosophy, which was at first completely nonpolitical, at some point became politicized. We may single out three main reasons.
First, Nishida’s early philosophy was clearly limited to the field of consciousness to the exclusion of historical existence. He was preoccupied with cognitive, psychological, ethical, aesthetic, and religious questions. It was only in the 1930s, after he began to be criticized by some in his circle—notably Tanabe Hajime (a Hegelian philosopher of history and politics), Tosaka Jun (a convinced Marxist), and Miki Kiyoshi (a Marxist humanistic existentialist)—that he ventured to tackle problems clearly outside of his competence and principal frame of reference: history, society, the nation, the state, power, and, later on, international matters. It is precisely because he tried to respond to criticism and to correct his own inadequacies that he decided to integrate such historical topics into his philosophy.

Then came pressure from the state. By 1938 and later, state officials solicited his support to give more ideological substance to their propaganda. This is where he clumsily tried to take advantage of ambivalences in his own vocabulary mixed with equivocal elements of the official discourse to slow down the latter and bring it cautiously into some more reasonable ground. The failure was total: what he said led him to be criticized by rightist extremists during the war and by politically-correct pundits after the war.

A third reason is the inescapable comparison with Heidegger’s case. Since the 1980s, this has become a very explosive issue in both Europe and North America. Many commentators cannot help inserting the intentions of Heidegger (who freely entered the Nazi party) into the mind of Nishida (who, in a sense, was only trying to be civil to everybody, which, as often happens, had exactly the opposite effect).

Enactive-intuition (行為的直観) is one of Nishida’s most thought-provoking concepts. After having gone to great lengths to explain how nothingness underlies the separation between self and world, how it is the encompassing “place” out of which consciousness arises, Maraldo endeavors to clarify Nishida’s use of “intuition” and “enaction.” Nishida’s “enaction-intuition” seems to support the idea in recent cognitive science (one thinks here of Varela, among others), that cognition is embodied and specifically directed by structured interactions between brain, body, and world (a notion reaching back to Merleau-Ponty). Nishida wanted to express this kind of mutual interaction and tried to show how the engagement of the body with its environment brings about a meaningful world. The embodied self and the world actualize themselves mutually. When seeing is directly oriented to doing
or, conversely, when doing is aimed at seeing, we know through our acting bodies, through our interaction with things and our shaping of the world— which in return shapes us. (Artistic creation is paradigmatic here). After scrutinizing a variety of translations, Maraldo settles on the word “enactive-intuition” as best conveying the performative sense suggested by Nishida. Among the main advances of this notion over the older notion of “pure experience” are (1) that it avoid the psychologistic connotations of the former while retaining its sense of immediate contact prior to a subject-object split, and (2) that it opens the possibility of integrating the social, cultural and historical dimensions of human reality.

The notion of self-awareness (自覚), which straddles empirical self-perception, Cartesian self-consciousness, and Buddhist self-awakening, has a tendency to shift meanings. We may try to stabilize it by means a mathematical model. For example, Ueda refers to Josiah Royce’s idea of an infinitely detailed map (of England), that is, one that contains an image of itself. Whereas Royce includes the standpoint of the map-maker, Ueda focuses on the map depicting itself. In this structural self-representational and reflexive model, the whole is mirrored or imaged in a part of itself, giving greater unity to its diversity and generating an infinite system (Dedekind). Nishida’s notion was meant to give an altogether more reflexive, logical, and universal basis to his rather subjective and psychological notion of “pure experience.” In A Study of the Good, he also argued that infinity does not derive from time (as for Kant) but from the self-imaging quality of thinking. Finally, with the mirroring phenomenon, we arrive at a stage where there is seeing without one who sees. Phenomenology may bring greater clarity to all of this.

Indeed, Nishida’s philosophy has strong and intrinsic connections to classical (mainly Husserlian) phenomenology: the same interest in questions of consciousness, the same importance given to lived experience over scientific observation. Yet there are also marked differences. Not only does the phenomenological self seem to be replaced eventually by empty space, but the step-by-step Husserlian descriptions are often replaced by wide-ranging disputes with traditional philosophers on fundamental metaphysical questions. Nevertheless, the notion of self-awareness can profit from a fusion of Husserlian and Nishidian perspectives. Both stress that consciousness cannot be objectified or explained by the empirical sciences. For both, consciousness means more than just being awake rather than unconscious. It
means more than just feeling subjective states. Consciousness is that which allows things to appear and manifests themselves to us. (This is as true of Nishida as it is of Heidegger and Husserl). Yet, Nishida's understanding of awareness sharply diverges from Husserl's intentionality because he considers the latter to remain within the duality of subject and object: the duality of a conceiving consciousness and an observed object. Nishida aims at a more primal stage, a pre-reflexive stage from which consciousness emerges prior to self-reflection. Maraldo remarks astutely in this regard: “The point is that Husserl does account for what is prior to any objectified consciousness. Nishida did not see this because he did not heed, or perhaps did not read, Husserl's account in terms of retention and inner time consciousness” (p. 312). Perhaps the main difference is between a consciousness that remains an “I” (Husserl) and a consciousness that is prior to any type of subjectivity (Nishida). For Husserl there is a primal streaming and a primal “I” that experiences subjectivity; for Nishida, there is a streaming and some unchanging, transtemporal unity, irreducible to anything resembling an ego. Nishida's quest of the place and meaning of the “I” was long and arduous. Although he clearly always rejected any substantialization of the “I” (自我), he never denied the self outright, and indeed tended to speak of a “true self” (真の自己) rather than of a Buddhist “non-self” (無我). What he aimed at was some sort of acting self, “that which acts” (働くもの) while being “self-aware” (自覚的). By the same token, he understood the consciousness of self-awareness in terms of self-reflection, both as an of examining and as a mirroring, a play of words that works well in European languages. The point Nishida seems to be at pains to make is that in “awareness” the “self” is nothing more than a reflexive occasion (a place) for this awareness to occur, not some subject that is having some sort of experience. Where Nishida clearly parts from phenomenology is in his notion of “a greater whole that encompasses the reflected self tied to the reflected world” (p. 326). In this enveloping structure, a judgment about the world is enclosed within the “place” (場所) of consciousness, which is itself enclosed within the “place” of the general dynamic of becoming conscious, which Nishida calls nothingness (無). It is the nothing out of which acts of consciousness arise and make judgements or “reflect” objects (有, beings) in the world. When this occurs, there is no longer an “I” that knows the world, but, in self-forgetfulness, an awareness that becomes the world or a thing within the world.
Nishida and Heidegger

Nishida’s return to fundamental questions is somewhat comparable to Heidegger’s approach, not merely for the question of consciousness but also for questions of God and nothingness (“the gods” and “the nothing”) which was essential for both of them. Can nothing be considered greater than God? Is it the hidden truth of Being? While both Nishida and Heidegger see the emphasis on Being (有) as characteristic of the West, Nishida does not recognize the difference between Sein and Seiendes. And while Nishida sees the Nothing (無) as characteristic of the East, he seems not to take into account Eastern traditions that are not guided by nothingness or to recognize Western contributions to the concept of nothingness. Heidegger’s aim is to overcome ontotheology; Nishida, to contribute to a pluralistic world philosophy that would encompass all major civilizations. Despite their differences, they come together in reflections on nothingness or the Nothing: “It is the pivotal theme in Nishida’s work, and in Heidegger it is the ulterior side of Be-ing” (p. 357). Just as it may offer a way to overcome metaphysics (or traditional Western philosophy), it may also lead to a new conceptualization of “the Absolute.”

When Nishida speaks of God, it is clearly the God of Western philosophy, but he tries to invigorate its meaning with the aid of the Buddhist notion of an Absolute Nothing empty of form, beyond any substantial ground, overcoming oppositions and yet “absolutely self-contradictory.” For him, God (much like the Buddha of the Diamond Sutra) “is” God by not being God. The act of self-negation or self-emptying (kenosis) is what makes God God. Moreover, in a kind of “inverse correspondence,” the dying of the self is what enables one to make contact with God, much the same way that Heidegger sees the Angst of death open up Dasein to the Nothing of Being, a Nothing that is essentially the not-being of beings. Overcoming the historical (onto-theo-logical) negation of Being/Nothing parallels the obliteration of the ontological difference between Being and beings. Maraldo concludes with a question: Does not Heidegger always think of the Nothing in relation to Being? Could Nishida’s renewal of the idea of God offer a way to renew Heidegger’s questioning about the sacred (the gods, beyond the God)? Might this be possible along the lines that Jean-Luc Marion, among others,
suggests: a self-negating God who is a loving giving without a giver, a gift, or even a receiver?

On nature

Maraldo concludes his book with reflections on the thought of Nishida and Heidegger during the 1930s in the light of today’s environmental crisis. Reflecting on the notion of the “one world,” Maraldo wonders if the two philosophers might help us better understand the root causes of our current clash with an endangered environment whose perils exceed the obvious technological improvements at our disposal. Heidegger and Nishida may be able to help us understand the profound disrespect for human finitude and for the contingencies of existence that lie at the root of the environmental crisis. In contrast to the world of resources within our reach (or the world of being-in-the-world), Heidegger suggests that we contemplate the notion of the “earth” as a creative force beyond human reckoning. For his part, Nishida conceives of a source of creativity beyond self-centered human activity. In both cases we are led to shift our view of agency to something creative but larger than the strictly human and to seek an alternative to the empirical “naturalism” that is still the dominant philosophical position of our day (and which has, until now, sustained the advance of technology).

The commonplace expression “the world has changed” comes to mind whenever we think historically, but it also means more than the novelties of our age: our very view of the world has changed. Most people think of the world as culturally diverse and yet globally one. The unity is dynamically strengthening, both economically and legally. The usual view is that of a changing world set against an unchanging and universal totality. Nevertheless, there is a general tendency to see the natural order of things, clearly mirrored in the universal totality, as the fundamental reality from which everything else derives, including human behavior. It was against this naturalistic worldview that Nishida developed his notion of a “creative, historical world” and that Heidegger set up an opposition between world and earth. Nishida saw the natural world as a causal-deterministic system (more mechanistic in physics, more teleological in biology). But at the same time he argued that it is human beings in the historical world who produce that relative image of the cosmos and who can create a new rela-
tion to the natural world as well as to their own human world, stimulating interactions among people in ever unique ways. This is the heart of what he calls “action oriented intuition” (行為的直観), which can in turn become an active source of creative interaction among all nations in the construction of a single world. In a complementary way, Heidegger’s Beiträge has the world appearing as a fragile source for the emergence and configuration of all things. In this way he pursues the truth of Being, the disclosure and concealment of Being and the event (Ereignis) of allowing beings to emerge and come into their own.

This is the source of the discord and strife between world (opening, horizon) and earth (withdrawal, soil). In Beiträge, Dasein is no longer the sole source of the meaning of things. Rather it is is the “worlding of the world” that creates history and allows all things to take on a particular meaning. Dasein becomes the medium of this bestowal of meaning, its guardian rather than its creator, so that Sein itself seems to gain an active role. Since the world does not simply lie at our disposal, the environmental crisis cannot be resolved by human decision alone. It requires “an attunement of restraint, diffidence, even awe, at the power of Being to refuse disposition (Ve f ü g u n g) at the hands of humans” (p. 433). In a way, once nature is allowed to be itself, our role is to prepare for what is to come, not prevent it.

Questions

As noted above, one could object that Maraldo’s defining of a “universal” philosophy would make it more important to return to the Greek texts that define philosophy rather than merely follow the lead of modern commentators who interpret the past to suit their own agenda. We might also recall that it was Heidegger, one of the major philosophers of our age, who argued convincingly that philosophy was indeed a Greek-rooted discipline and was pervaded by a specifically Greco-European onto-theo-logy (This includes the grammatical structure of European languages, in particular the subject-predicate logic and the plurivocity of the verb “to be.”) In his view, it was time to leave that mindset behind and initiate our own mode of thought, freed of those limits and capable of dialoguing with other civilizations. And so, we would ask Maraldo: Why impose such a eurocentric discipline on the rest of the planet when those other cultures are already
occupied with dealing with their own tradition of “thought” (a word that has equivalents in every language)? Is it fair, for example, to characterize the various types of Indian soteriological systems as “philosophy”? Does it not risk betraying their significance by limiting them to pure disinterested knowledge?

When considering A Study of Good, might we not think in terms of a reactualization of neo-Confucian ethics (Zhu Xi) in a Western vocabulary?

* This text is a slightly modified version of an article published in Revue philosophique de Louvain 118/2 (2020–2021): 291–8.
Japanese Philosophy in the Making introduce a la filosofía japonesa no desde un estudio alejado de las cuestiones que reclaman nuestro mundo en crisis, sino arraigado en sus requerimientos más hondos: la exigencia del multiculturalismo, la exigencia de un pensamiento que abandone perspectivas sustancialistas, que afrente radicalmente el interjuego ciencia y vida cotidiana, el problema de la agencia, la crisis climática, la praxis social, entre otros. Además, este libro es el intento de pensar los temas más actuales de la filosofía contemporánea desde Nishida Kitarō, de ahí sus apartados «Pathways to Nishida» y «Pathways through Nishida», pues es a Nishida a quien en este volumen Maraldo dedica su atención la mayor parte, sin olvidar hacer una presentación magistral de la filosofía japonesa anterior. Por eso este libro de John Maraldo puede pensarse como una introducción a la filosofía contemporánea desde la filosofía japonesa, y a la vez una introducción a la filosofía japonesa desde la filosofía contemporánea. A través de sus páginas podemos constatar que nuestro autor tiene el ojo educado y paciente en los problemas filosóficos contemporáneos acompasado por los problemas urgentes de nuestra contemporaneidad. Cuando uno lee este libro uno está ya en el mundo contemporáneo del pensamiento y de sus problemáticas. Por eso considero que este libro no es solo un libro de filosofía japonesa, constituye todo un compendio de problemas estéticos, epistemológicos, filósofo-políticos y religiosos, que John Maraldo trata con maestría y nos va dejando con el paso de la lectura la sensación de que escribe desde el mundo y el mundo lo afecta a él profundamente. El tema de la acción performativa es algo que él mismo toma como su propia divisa, por lo que el lector tiene la garantía de tener un libro que lo toma y lo introduce de nuevo en el mundo de otra manera y que Maraldo hace filosofía en la acción de pensar en el mundo y con el mundo. Incluso en trabajos recientes de Maraldo uno puede palpar un trabajo fresco y flexible, interesado por la antropología, por las otras culturas, por la ciencia, por el mundo.

Japanese Philosophy in the Making encuentra accesos privilegiados al amplio espectro del pensamiento japonés. En esta tónica, Maraldo reconoce
que la filosofía en Japón puede entenderse como la «filosofía conducida por japoneses académicos en clave europea», también puede entenderse como «la filosofía japonesa clásica» 1, es decir, la filosofía no al encuentro con el pensamiento europeo, sino la filosofía premoderna japonesa anterior a la era Meiji, es decir, como encuentro con filósofos como Dōgen o Kūkai, a la luz de conceptos y métodos contemporáneos, la cual a la inversa, también puede iluminar desde aquellos pensadores conceptos del pensamiento occidental. Según Maraldo, también puede entenderse por filosofía en Japón, aquella que busca demostrar «el carácter distintivo de la originalidad de la cultura oriental» 2. Y, finalmente, encontramos que la filosofía japonesa propiamente dicha es aquella que se realiza fuera de Japón, por eso Maraldo señala que filosofía japonesa no es filosofía en Japón, como se ha señalado. La filosofía japonesa evita posturas etnocéntricas, considera todas las producciones filosóficas en Japón en todos los campos, pero según advierte el autor, debe tomarse en cuenta y reconocerse que este trabajo de filosofía japonesa va más allá de la traducción y la explicación de textos, de manera que por «filosofía japonesa puede designar[se] el trabajo en lenguas no-japonesas hecha por no japoneses, de la misma manera en que norteamericanos y británicos pueden practicar filosofía continental o filósofos europeos filosofía americana» 3. La obra de Maraldo nombra a algunos que desde su consideración hacen filosofía japonesa en los términos aquí planteados: Gereon Kopf, John Krummel, Matteo Cestari, Jan Gerrit Strala, Jacynthe Tremblay, Agustín Jacinto Zavala, entre otros. En este sentido, considero que el título de uno de los capítulos: «Nishida´s Philosophy in Europe and North America», dada la procedencia de Agustín Jacinto, podría titularse «Nishida´s Philosophy out of Japan», para incluir plenamente la tendencia creciente de interés por el pensamiento nacido en Japón en lugares como Latinoamérica y no sólo en Europa o Estados Unidos. Considero que la filosofía japonesa en el contexto latinoamericano cumple muchas funciones: ofrecer una ventana de aire al pensamiento encasillado por tradiciones anquiladas para poder seguir pensando, tras llegar al límite occidental puesto por las antinomias de la razón, la ontoteología, el sujeto, la metafísica de la presencia; ofrece una

2. Ibid., 8.
3. Ibid., 10.
suerte de deconstrucción del individualismo y otro concepto de entender lo político desde la aperturidad de la nada absoluta a que da lugar la inter-idad; devolver la dignidad a la vida diaria y pensar la naturaleza como expresiva. En suma, ofrece líneas de pensamiento para enfrentar un mundo en crisis desde múltiples pensadores que vamos descubriendo en cada uno de los cursos que abrimos. Sabemos de las intermediaciones textuales con las que trabajamos, traducciones al inglés, pero para nosotros es más importante trabajar con esas señas que permiten de cualquier modo leer el mundo de otra manera. Alguna vez un profesor alemán me dijo: a mi me interesa saber cómo leen ustedes a Heidegger y porqué lo leen. Esa consideración espero de mis colegas que trabajan filosofía en Japón o filosofía japonesa.

En la filosofía en el hacer y en proceso de John Maraldo se vuelve imprescindible el trabajo de la traducción, no solo de una forma de los vocablos, sino en el trabajo de elaboración de distintas traducciones de conceptos para así hacer ver distintos visos de los mismos. Este procedimiento en su versión más acabada lo encontramos en el texto dedicado a la acción-intuición koiteki chokkan («Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida’s Turn of Intuition into action»). Maraldo haciendo un gran esfuerzo por trascender la literalidad de las traducciones propuestas hasta ahora como “intuición actuante”, o “intuición activa” o “intuición acción”, las cuales, según el autor, no logran alcanzar «el sentido performativo de la intuición de Nishida» propone las traducciones de intuición orientada a la acción (action-oriented-intuition), intuición performativa (performative intuition) o bien, propone intuición-en-la-acción (inactive intuition), sin olvidar la de intuición dentro de la acción, (intuition into action) todas las cuales mantienen una cercanía con las ciencias cognitivas, particularmente, con su concepto de enaction que tiene el sentido de la acción en la interacción entre el cerebro, el cuerpo y el ambiente.

Sobre las relaciones entre filosofía y traducción, Maraldo afirma contundente: «Considero que la filosofía ha dependido de la multiplicidad de lenguas y de la traducción entre ellas». Y añade: «Filosofar es una práctica cultural que envuelve la transmisión y transmutación a través del tiempo y a través de múltiples lenguas»4. Con esto debemos de hacer notar que nuestro filósofo realiza una inmersión profunda en el lenguaje y en los len-

4. Ibid., 10.
guajes, hasta lograr otro decir, «para transformar el pensamiento y el lenguaje de los lectores» lo cual deja ver su profunda y larga formación en la fenomenología y en la hermenéutica. «Para decirlo más concisamente, el discurso filosófico ocurre por el camino de la trans-lation de textos, hablados y escritos» pero esto quiere decir no un mero vaciado o transferencia de textos, sino «también la transformación de problemas, métodos y terminologías textualmente inmersos al interior y a través de lenguajes naturales». Asimismo, esta filosofía en el hacer, y completamente reelaborada desde los conceptos de intuición-en-la-acción, filosofía que surge desde el pensar mismo y envuelta en el mundo, tiene entre sus principales caminos de producción/creación la filosofía comparativa, no en términos descriptivos, de información de datos y de diferencias entre dos posturas, sino en términos también como Heidegger entendió el encuentro con otro pensamiento, como una auténtica Auseinandersetzung o confrontación, como lo podemos ver en el texto sobre Heidegger y Nishida. El trabajo filosófico de Maraldo se decide en su carácter de filosofía del presente en debate con producciones de conocimiento procedentes del ámbito científico (como lo hace con Francisco Varela). De este modo, Maraldo no cae en la clausura de la filosofía en sí misma, sino que se cierne y se resuelve en el diálogo y debate con propuestas científicas del mundo contemporáneo, del mundo del arte y la cultura en general.

Maraldo entiende la filosofía -como ya lo señalaba- como un trabajo en marcha, en proceso y siempre sujeto a reformulaciones, de ahí el título de este trabajo fundamental Japanese Philosophy in the Making. El paladín de este trabajo de filosofía en el hacer es Nishida Kitaro. Él se movió entre lenguas orientales y lenguas occidentales, yendo continuamente de un lado a otro, siempre reformulando y repensando, el encuentro entre sujeto-objeto ya sea como experiencia pura, ya sea como voluntad libre absoluta, ya sea como intuición dentro de la acción y, en un sentido profundo, como basho. Algo ahí se mueve y reformula, y se renueva, partiendo de la reelaboración del concepto de experiencia pura, elaborado originariamente por él desde su experiencia y ayudado por William James.

En lo que sigue en diálogo con John Maraldo me detendré en el lugar que en Japanese Philosophy in the Making se da a los dichos Zen e incluso a

5. Ibid., 12.
los dichos del budismo Shin o del «cristianismo en los textos de Nishida. Maraldo dice que en Intuición y reflexión de la autoconsciencia: «El Zen como tradición literaria fue una fuente entre otras, y aún así fue una fuente no de temas y problemas sino de sus límites retóricos». Contrasta para Maraldo, las simples menciones a dichos zen, frente al tratamiento sistemático de Bergson, Fichte y el neokantismo. Maraldo considera que si es así es porque Nishida posee «una fuerte voluntad de ser entendido como un filósofo, un tetsugakusha en el estilo occidental». En otro momento, Maraldo considera que Nishida en su último ensayo, no sólo incluye dichos Zen sino textos de Budismo de la Tierra Pura, además de Leibniz, Cusa, y textos de los evangelios, particularmente de Pablo. Y concluye que: «El diseño de Nishida de citar en tándem no ocurre para encontrar las mismas enseñanzas básicas de formas de cristianismo y de budismo sino con el afán de dibujar expresiones concretas de sus tesis principales desde las escrituras». Maraldo argumenta que Nishida con respecto a esas fuentes no tiene una postura específica, ni una hermenéutica, ni una prevalencia, sin embargo, encuentro frente a esta posición de Maraldo que esos dichos Zen y afirmaciones del budismo Shin, le permiten a Nishida proponer un uso performativo del lenguaje religioso. De esta manera no es que solo la acción intuición produzca significado, sino que además los dichos Zen pueden producir intuición-en-la-acción: la autodeterminación del presente absoluto. Los dichos zen o afirmaciones del budismo Shin no son simples menciones en tándem, como Maraldo señala, sino menciones insistentes, no casuales, a los mismos dichos, porque los menciona interrogando por su posibilidad de determinar el presente absoluto, interrogoando por su posibilidad de configurar el mundo y la existencia histórica. En la versión en español de Agustín Jacinto Zavala, leemos a Nishida:

No hay mundo autoexpresivo que en algún sentido no sea autoformativo, y no hay un mundo autoformativo que en algún sentido no sea autoexpresivo. En un mundo histórico autoformativo la expresión es fuerza, dice posibilidad de acción formativa. No es algo como el simple «significado» del que hablan los fenomenólogos y hermenéuticos. Estos eruditos piensan la expresión abstrayéndola de su dirección formativa. [...] También el símbolo, en el mundo

6. Ibid., 143
7. Ibid., 144.
histórico, no es inexistente. Tiene que ser algo que, como autoexpresión del mundo, tenga fuerza de formación del mundo histórico. Lo que los hombres de religión denominan «palabra de Dios» tiene que ser aprehendida desde un punto de vista como este.8

Esto también permite señalar que Nishida observaba la posibilidad de configuración de la existencia en el mundo con las simples frases como «lo natural es el dharma», o «el significado del no significado», porque tienen la posibilidad de determinar la vida diaria y producir la intuición en la acción como base de la vida diaria:

Es la autoidentidad de lo contradictorio: razón y cosa, saber y hacer. También el conocimiento científico, en realidad, se constituye aquí [...]. Es el punto de vista de autodeterminación del mundo histórico. Además, es el punto de vista que como autodeterminación del presente absoluto es enteramente la base de la vida diaria.9

El horizonte de «la base de la vida diaria» es el horizonte propuesto por la filosofía de Nishida, y me parece, que es un horizonte, que trasciende lo individual, porque es el horizonte de constitución de la vida diaria, como el verdadero sitio de lo histórico verdaderamente tal, por lo que resulta difícil pensar que «Nishida coloca a la religión en el «corazón» del individuo»10. El valor de los dichos, e incluso de las historias mencionadas por Nishida como la de Makabe Heishiro es constituir la vida diaria. En el despliegue encomiable de la comprensión de la koiteki chokkan de John Maraldo, como veremos, se extraña al concepto «base de la vida diaria» que Nishida desarrolla en el último capítulo de su última obra, como piedra de toque no sólo del arte, de la ciencia, sino de la acción en general.

Esto conecta de inmediato con la manera en que Maraldo recoloca el lugar del Zen en el pensamiento de Nishida. Para Maraldo si Nishida recurrió al Zen no fue para sostener que Nishida creó una filosofía Zen, sino para dejar en claro que lo fundamental para su filosofía como para el Zen es atrapar la realidad, porque, la realización de la realidad como tal es la realización de la propia naturaleza, que según Nishida en el Zen es kenshō. Para

9. Ibid., 217.
Nishida, esta cuestión, según Maraldo fue fundamental para crear un pensamiento del «sistema del no-sistema» desde su primera tentativa filosófica. Para Maraldo, el abandono del zazen por parte de Nishida, se reflejó en decenas de volúmenes, y en la creación de una perspectiva filosófica que por completo buscó «atravesar todas las divisiones entre el yo y el otro o el sí mismo y el mundo». Para Maraldo de ninguna manera se puede decir que si no practicas zen por ti mismo no entenderás a Nishida. Puedo entender a Maraldo. Como filósofo Nishida trató de pensar esa unidad, y además desplegarla, es más a esa unidad, Nishida la convirtió en lugar tanto de la compasión como de la sabiduría, esa unidad fue pensada y repensada una y otra vez, sin embargo, para esta lectora una cierta inmersión en el Zen y en su historia y en sus historias, es indispensable y necesaria. Esa comprensión de la historia del Zen y de sus historias, y posteriormente el lugar que fue teniendo Shinran en su obra, y de las obras fundamentales del budismo, crean en el lector de Nishida, un comprender en tradiciones imprescindible, ya que podemos afirmar: conceptos sin tradiciones son vacíos. Casi, uno puede decir, que lo que hacemos para interpretar a Nishida, en primer lugar, es seguir los supuestos de tradición que encaminan su pensamiento. Pero además, quisiera arriesgar otra hipótesis heurística de cuño nishidiano: comprendemos desde una experiencia pura, desde una experiencia pura que ha sido seguida y desplegada en todas sus ramificaciones durante años. Uno puede entender, gracias a Indagación sobre el bien, que cierta experiencia en la vida de los filósofos, que lleva la marca de la no división sujeto y objeto, es la base de las filosofías. Esa experiencia zen en Nishida permeó su pensamiento total, al declarar a Nishitani como bien nos lo recuerda Maraldo: «Yo pienso que la vida del Zen consiste en atrapar la realidad. Esto ha sido mi deseo más preciado desde mis treinta: unir zen y filosofía, aun cuando eso es imposible». Lo cual, filosóficamente, se tradujo en ir antes de la división sujeto y objeto.

Quisiera hacer un reclamo a la especialización del pensamiento y a la desatención profunda que se ha dado en general al no prestar atención en simultaneidad a las dos obras fundamentales de la Escuela de Kioto de 1945, Topos de la nada y cosmovisión religiosa y Filosofía como metanoética. De esa

11. Ibid., 138.
12. Ibid., 139.
desatención procede la idea de que Tanabe era un crítico de Nishida, sin encuentros, ni matices, ni diálogo. Maraldo me permite ver que eso no es más que un prejuicio, Tanabe dialoga, conversa con Nishida, incluso con su última obra. Sólo un ejemplo. Cuando uno revisa la última obra de Nishida a la luz de *Filosofía como metanoética*, uno comprende que el dictum «Vivir como un muerto» no fue sólo importante para Tanabe, sino también para Nishida. Gracias al trabajo de *Japanese Philosophy in the Making* vemos a un Tanabe asombrosamente deudor de Nishida, al dar importancia, sin referirllo, a este importante dicho del maestro Zen Bunan (1602–1676) de «vivir como un muerto». El dicho recuperado maravillosamente por Tanabe dice:

Si uno puede morir por completo a sí mismo  
Mientras sigue vivo,  
Uno puede destacar  
En cualquier cosa que quisiera hacer.13

En la traducción de Agustín Jacinto Zavala de *Lógica del topos y cosmovisión religiosa* el dicho del maestro Zen Bunan aparece así: «El maestro Zen Bunan dice que «la práctica realizada tal como [lo pide] el corazón, mientras se vive como si [uno] estuviera enteramente muerto, es buena».14 Encontramos la interpretación de Maraldo de Nishida con respecto a la frase de Bunan muy tanabiana, pero ¿hasta qué grado? Para Maraldo en Nishida esta frase quiere decir que la muerte penetra la vida a cada momento, y es radicalizada en la negatización del yo a cada momento. El yo existe muriendo a cada momento. Y sólo muriendo a cada momento a sí mismo uno es verdaderamente un individuo. «Esta mutua negación y afirmación a cada momento permite que el yo mismo viva abiertamente, sin el impedimento de una identidad paralizada, para ser verdaderamente sí mismo, una y otra vez, ser verdaderamente individual».15 Sin embargo, no es esto todo lo que se quisiera decir, pues falta el componente de la actividad en el morir a sí mismo y vivir en el morir en Nishida. Pues «nuestro sí mismo es sí mismo al morir continuamente a sí mismo y deviniendo un nuevo sí mismo al actuar».16 Para Tanabe vivir muriendo no es intuición orientada a la acción,

como sugiere Maraldo, no es cada movimiento de la acción que constituye al sí mismo. Por el contrario, para Tanabe la nada absoluta afirma a los seres relativos, negando la inmediatez del propio poder, jiriki, no mediante la acción-intuición, sino a través de zange, es decir, a través de la vergüenza y el arrepentimiento. En Tanabe, este movimiento paradójico encierra la frase «Vivir como si fuera un muerto» o «actuar en la vida como alguien que ha muerto» 17. Para Tanabe, de lo que se trata al «Vivir como un muerto» es la transformación de un yo en un ni lo uno ni lo otro, este yo no «deviene lo que no es», sino que deviene en un medio de la nada. Se trata de la transformación de un yo que muere a sí mismo y fallece al devenir un medio de la nada, y a través de esa misma mediación es preservado en el ser y es regresado al mundo como «ser vacío». Tanabe no hablaría de una individualidad, sino de volverse una individualidad, sino de volverse un ser vacío. Así la continuidad de la muerte y resurrección en Nishida presenta rasgos de egoidad, porque vivir como un muerto en Tanabe significa, la muerte continua y paradójica del yo que aún así vive, a través de la metanoesis continua. Tanabe propone la práctica continuada del arrepentimiento o zange o del abandono continuo de sí mismo, y no la muerte continua del yo por mediación de la acción-intuición. Hemos tratado de este modo de esbozar la interpretación de vivir muriendo en Nishida y en Tanabe y sus grandes diferencias con la ayuda de Maraldo.

**Japanese Philosophy in the Making** muestra la decantación de un camino de pensamiento producto de un largo camino de trabajo filosófico, pero además podríamos decir que este libro de John Maraldo permite ver que el dolor de cabeza de este pensador estadounidense es el problema de la agencia, esto lo hemos visto no sólo en distintos congresos sino en este libro. Para Maraldo la agencia reside no en una mente individual o conciencia que responde a un estímulo exterior, sino más bien en una interacción compleja que abraza tanto al cuerpo que actúa en el mundo y el mundo que se produce y reconstituye el cuerpo actuante. De manera que la acción es «una cognición colocada no sólo en la mente, sino además en el mundo histórico, el mundo de lo concreto, en las interacciones cotidianas» 18. Es en este punto, donde podemos pensar que *koiteki chokkan*, en su más eminente sentido, es la base

17. **Tanabe 2014, 252.**
18. **Maraldo 2017, 207.**
de la vida diaria y que aquí Maraldo lo toma como mundo histórico, como poiesis del mundo.

Subraya Maraldo que gracias a la acción performativa podemos entender que el sí mismo y el mundo se encuentran en un lugar de interacción y no de diferenciación. Desde esta perspectiva el mundo no es algo pre-dado sino algo que es constituido desde la intuición en la acción. Ahora bien, para Maraldo, Nishida no disuelve la agencia, no la reduce al cuerpo, a no-conciencia, «el cuerpo es lo que ve como lo que actúa»: «el cuerpo individual viendo y actuando está en el mundo y al mismo tiempo trasciende al mundo». Podemos decir que en Nishida «el lugar de la agencia se despliega desde el cuerpo [...] al mundo mismo, con la condición de que la acción del cuerpo actuante y vidente sea incluida como un lugar a través del cual este mundo actúa y permite a las cosas ser vistas». No hay agencia sin las acciones corporales a través de las cuales vemos o entendemos; todo nuestro ver y entender es performativa. Las acciones en general incluyen pensamiento y comprensión. El artista para Nishida es el modelo de la acción performativa, el artista no preexiste a su trabajo, «sino [que es] alguien que intuye al mundo al transformarlo».

En el caso de la ciencia tenemos que el mundo no es independiente del conocedor, el mundo es transformado a través de la comprensión, a la vez que nos recrea. «La intuición performativa funciona como agente en la creación del mundo humano, de culturas y sociedades». Esta perspectiva se acerca a las ciencias cognitivas que sostienen «que el conocimiento es un logro que requiere de estructuras corporales que interactúan con el mundo exterior y que a cambio son remodeladas por este. Toda cognición está fundada en la acción, más precisamente en interacciones entre un organismo y su medio». A pesar de que las ciencias cognitivas permiten una lectura más profunda de la acción performativa o la intuición al interior de la acción, Maraldo piensa que Nishida reta a Varela en dos aspectos relativos a la agencia: por ser en las ciencias cognitivas el papel de la agencia ambiguo y por la noción de no yo de Francisco Varela.

Francisco Varela defiende que la acción es una acción sin agente, o reiere

19. Ibid., 208.
20. Ibid., 209.
21. Ibid., 212.
22. Ibid., 214.
que la agencia es una multitud de agentes operando al interior del cuerpo individual. Y que estos agentes en el curso de una acción compiten hasta que uno de ellos gana al lograr una acción coordinada, de lo cual surge un sentido de sí mismo en medio de numerosos procesos. Esto no satisface a John Maraldo. Para el autor de *Japanese Philosophy in the Making*, si en Varela la atención plena es la vía para acceder conscientemente a la naturaleza del yo, así sea de un yo ilusorio, inaccesible a la conciencia, entonces hay algo en las ciencias cognitivas inexplicado. Por lo cual pregunta Maraldo: ¿cómo un sentido del yo surge en tiempos diferentes y, además, recuerda lo que ha sido experimentado? ¿Cómo es posible que en ese proceso particular donde un yo surge vencedor, ese yo pueda crear una historia singular? Maraldo señala: «si uno es la acción no hay residuo del yo consciente que permanezca al observar la acción externamente. Cuando Nishida habla de la acción sin actor lo hace desde el punto de vista del sí mismo creativo y performativo que «a través de la práctica puede abandonar su voluntad y autoconciencia».

Para Nishida el sí mismo como cuerpo actuante, permite conocerse a sí mismo y «provee el fundamento de un único sí mismo». En Francisco Varela, la mayoría de las acciones, pensamientos son desconocidos e inconscientes, opacos a uno mismo. Por lo cual incluso Varela considera, que el viviente ético y habitual requiere de la conciencia de una actividad autodirigida y esto, piensa Maraldo, demanda conciencia. Pero ¿ofrece Maraldo finalmente en este primer volumen de sus obras completas salidas a semejante problema? Maraldo pensaría que el no-yo nishidiano es performativo, y esto es resultado del trabajo realizado por Nishida con el Budismo Zen: a través de prácticas meditativas que pueden dar lugar al despertar del no yo. La noción performativa del yo es un conocer sin conocer, un ver sin ver. ¿Será imposible reconciliar el yo performativo que tiene el hilo conductor del eterno presente con la identidad narrativa como pretende Maraldo? Tal vez podríamos pensar que el yo narrativo, el yo singular, no es el no-yo de la práctica, no es el punto de vista del yo-performativo que es conocer sin ver, una acción sin acción y es al que el zen busca despertar. En ese sentido habría varias agencias la del yo performativo y la del yo narrativo. ¿Podríamos decir que la misma agencia ha de resolverse en el intersticio de la intuición en la

23. Ibid., p. 221.
24. Ibid., 222.
acción, entendiéndose como algo que al encuentro con los otros y en consideración a los otros y en relación con el mundo, y en continua inter-relación con el ambiente hace posible justamente el encuentro entre sabiduría y compasión como algo que da vida amplitud y frescura al yo narrativo? ¿Habrá una dialéctica entre el yo performativo y el yo narrativo y singular? ¿Se requieren mutuamente? Maraldo no ceja en estas cuestiones. En el capítulo « What Phenomenologist Can Learn about Self-awareness?», Maraldo considera que Nishida tiene un punto en común con la fenomenología, esto es, entender la conciencia como develamiento, iluminación, aparición. Pero pregunta Maraldo volviendo al modo de ser fusionado con el objeto: «si tal autodespertar (autoconciencia) existe y es dada en cada actividad absorta (como la del escultor trabajando en una pieza de piedra), entonces cómo es posible adscribir tal actividad a alguien, a un sí mismo, y llamar eso un ejemplo de autodespertar (autoconciencia) como Nishida lo hace?» Momentáneamente, Maraldo señala, que si es posible tener conciencia, de sí mismo es sobre la base de que el artista «fue pre-reflexivamente autoconsciente». La necesidad de la agencia es prioritaria para Maraldo, al subrayar que si bien Nishida admite un actuar volviéndose cosa, no habla nunca de un actuar volviéndose el otro, porque la existencia del otro requiere la admisión al interior de mi mismo de otro que es absolutamente otro de mi, por lo tanto el reconocimiento de una nada absoluta en mi. Maraldo piensa, entonces, que el reconocimiento «es un modo de conciencia de sí que se mueve más allá de sí»25. Y esto sugiere algo muy diferente de una intersubjetividad y es una una experiencia compartida donde la conciencia primero surge de un ser-juntos-comunal que es anterior a la experiencia de cada persona. Maraldo sostiene que la experiencia de unificación que ha reflexionado una y otra vez Nishida, a pesar de la pérdida de foco en uno mismo, no disminuye la autoconciencia, más bien, ésta desplaza el centro de la conciencia de sí desde un yo autorreferencial al contexto más amplio del mundo el cual fundamenta la experiencia de radical diferencia con otros. Para Maraldo lo que ha sucedido es que Nishida se ha movido más allá de la fenomenología. «Nishida reemplaza -nos dice Maraldo- la noción de una conciencia fenoménica, por

25. Ibid., 332.

Acercarse a este libro desde una lectura atenta, requiere de un seminario, porque en *Japanese Philosophy in the Making I*, al recorrer los caminos de Maraldo a través de Nishida, se encuentran joyas de comprensión de los problemas que animan al pensamiento actual y a la filosofía japonesa. Las aportaciones críticas y metodológicas, el arsenal de preguntas planteadas por John Maraldo, rebasan cualquier espacio textual. *Japanese Philosophy In The Making I* muestra la necesidad de que existan traducciones en español no sólo de las obras fundamentales de los filósofos japoneses sino también de aquellos que la han desarrollado desde fuera de Japón.

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26. Ibid., 336.
Rebeca Maldonado una vez me dijo que la época de los grandes filósofos se había terminado. Que, a partir de ahora, la filosofía debía comprenderse como una labor colectiva, de constante diálogo. A partir de esta idea es que hemos dedicado estos años a tender redes de colaboración desde nuestro territorio a los márgenes del escenario occidental. Redes en que, desde nuestra singularidad, cada quien contribuye a construir juntos en un pensar-con. En estas redes nos encontramos con un espíritu afín en John Maraldo. Él es un pensador que siempre se ha tomado en serio el pensar del diálogo, del encuentro de los distintos mundos. Hemos tenido el placer de compartir la comida, las caminatas, los seminarios y las palabras tantas veces que ya lo sentimos como uno de nosotras y nosotros. Y, en ese contexto es que hemos considerado que la mejor forma de rendir homenaje a un pensador del diálogo es a través de nuestra palabra colectiva. Por ello hemos decidido hacer una reseña a dos voces mi profesora Rebeca Maldonado y yo. Para, al menos, emular aquellas charlas informales que hemos compartido con Maraldo, compartiendo interpretaciones y pensando en conjunto. Conocí a Rebeca Maldonado en 2010, mientras cursaba uno de sus tantos cursos en la licenciatura. En esos años ella había dado un importante giro en su pensar. Después de trabajar los tratados de la historia del ser de Heidegger, parecía faltar un trampolín para saltar más allá de los límites de la filosofía occidental moderna hacia el añorado «otro pensar». Este trampolín lo encontramos en Nishitani, en Ueda, en Tanabe y en Nishida. Rebeca Maldonado se atrevió a cuestionar los límites entre oriente y occidente impuestos por la academia, no sólo investigando, sino conduciendo clases y seminarios dedicados a la escuela de Kioto y la filosofía japonesa. En estos espacios, muchos estudiantes nos introdujimos a una forma muy peculiar de hacer filosofía y esto ha generado un ambiente efervescente peculiar. En el departamento de filosofía de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM cada vez se va desdibujando el halo de exotismo que rodea a los pensadores extremo —orientales y se les ve más como filósofos de pleno derecho. Me atrevería a decir que, después de más de una década de trabajo, para algunas de nuestras alumnas
y alumnos, Nishida y Nishitani son nombres tan familiares como Foucault o Deleuze.

En este camino, hemos ido conociendo aliados y tendiendo redes de afinidad con colegas que comparten nuestros intereses. En ese contexto, conocí al profesor John Maraldo. Corría el 2012 cuando hicimos uno de los primeros eventos internacionales sobre filosofía japonesa y china en México. Maraldo fue el primer especialista en escuela de Kioto que conocí en persona y me conmovió. Fue sorprendente encontrar a alguien que, en otras latitudes, había caminado nuestros mismos itinerarios por la fenomenología, el pensamiento de Heidegger y había encontrado un norte en la escuela de Kioto.

Y este encuentro no fue conmovedor sólo para nosotros. En pláticas informales después del evento, Maraldo le preguntó a Rebeca por qué las preguntas de las y los colegas mexicanos eran tan peculiares. Rebeca le contó sobre cómo llevábamos un seminario sobre escuela de Kioto y uno sobre Aportes a la filosofía de Heidegger de forma paralela. Fue una gran sorpresa cuando, un par de años después, Maraldo nos contactó para contarnos que había decidido seguir nuestro itinerario, se había dedicado a estudiar Aportes... y quería regresar a México para compartir impresiones. A partir de entonces, hemos mantenido una relación de diálogo constante y recibido visitas casi cada año de nuestro estimado profesor.

Algo que me parece crucial reconocer del profesor Maraldo, es su capacidad de tomar el diálogo intercultural con plena seriedad. Esto no sólo se ve cuando viajó a Munich a estudiar un posgrado o cuando partió a Japón a dar clases y traducir. A pesar de que uno de los temas fundamentales de la escuela de Kioto, desde Indagación del bien, es la interculturalidad y el reconocimiento de la diferencia como base del diálogo; en nuestros itinerarios pensantes nos hemos encontrado con muchos profesores que no tienen mucho deseo de dialogar seriamente con sus colegas de otras latitudes. Con mucho dolor, nos hemos encontrado más de una vez con profesores con evidentes actitudes coloniales, que vienen a México a dar conferencias y recibir todo tipo de atenciones pero sin ningún interés de escuchar al otro, a ese otro que se le ha abierto las puertas. La actitud del profesor Maraldo siempre ha sido la contraria. No sólo ha venido a México a dictar cátedra sino, sobre todo, a escuchar, a dialogar. Ésta es una de sus cualidades más admirables.

El mejor ejemplo de esto es el texto «Nishida's Ontology of History» que aparece en el primer tomo de Japanese Philosophy on the Making. Este
El primer tomo de *Japanese Philosophy in the Making* abre con dos textos que dan testimonio del encuentro entre dos mundos: el pensamiento japonés y el mundo occidental. «Japanese Philosophy as a lens on Greco-European Thought» y «How Meiji-Era Japan Appropriated Philosophy from Europe» cuentan la misma historia desde dos perspectivas. Se plantea cómo la filosofía occidental impactó el pensar japonés y cómo dicho pensar impuso a la filosofía un nuevo espejo para reconocerse.

En estos textos trasluce una pregunta que Maraldo ya había lanzado hace diez años en el prólogo a *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook*: ¿en qué sentido podemos hablar de una filosofía japonesa específica? Y, esta pregunta, pregunta en el fondo ¿qué entendemos por filosofía en general? Si la filosofía se entiende como una disciplina que nace en Grecia con Tales y que continúa con Platón, Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino, Descartes y Kant, desarrollándose a la par del mundo occidental; no tiene sentido hablar de filosofía más que si se habla en términos de los pensadores antes mencionados. Y aunque, en este sentido, se puede hacer filosofía en Japón, se hace a modo de la tradición occidental y el mote de «japonesa» le viene sobrando.

Ahora bien, si pensamos la filosofía como una indagación racional de las primeras causas y los primeros principios, la filosofía ha de ser tan universal como la razón. En este sentido, podemos reconocer, al menos *a posteriori*, a todo pensador racional como filósofo. Pero si la filosofía se entiende como una investigación racional, universal sin más, toda especificidad de la filosofía sale sobrando. Si se hace filosofía en Japón, en México, en los Andes...
o donde sea, no hace diferencia; pues se hace desde la misma disposición racional universal. Insistimos el mote de «japonesa» sale sobrando.

Podemos, en cambio, remontarnos a la forma en que Platón y Aristóteles entendieron la filosofía: como un furor, como una filia, como un deseo, como un impulso en sí mismo irracional inherente a la condición humana. Las filósofas y filósofos estaríamos movidos por un deseo, un deseo de saber, aunque dicho saber no sirva para nada.

Podría parecer que no hay mucha diferencia entre entender la filosofía en términos de una facultad universal y un furor universal, pero la diferencia no es trivial. Las facultades están codificadas, como muestra Kant, obedecen a ciertas reglas y, con ello, dependen de cierta «materia prima» para ofrecer un resultado determinado. Un deseo, en cambio, es una falta, un ir hacia algo que nunca se sacia plenamente. El deseo sólo se satisface temporalmente y encuentra sosiego en lo que puede acercarse.

Veamos esta distinción con un ejemplo. La digestión puede pensarse como una facultad, hasta cierto punto, universal. Depende de un cierto tipo de materia prima que es procesada de una forma determinada para obtener ciertos resultados. Es en este sentido que podemos digerir. Pero comer no es sólo la facultad de digerir, sino el deseo de saciar el hambre. Éste deseo, a la vez que es universal, se sacia de infinitas formas que responden a los medios específicos en que nos desarrollamos. No hablamos de digestión japonesa o mexicana pero sin duda hablamos de comida japonesa y comida mexicana, formas específicas de saciar un deseo universal.

Podemos finalmente pensar la filosofía como lo hizo Heidegger, en términos de la pregunta por el ser. Para él la filosofía es la forma en que occidente ha respondido a la pregunta por lo que es. Donde hay humanos acontece el ser, hay un modo de entrar en relación con lo otro de lo humano y desde este juego de relaciones se hace mundo. En otros términos, es humano preguntar «¿qué es el ente?» y en esta pregunta preguntar también quiénes somos nosotras y nosotros y qué lugar nos corresponde. Ya Aristóteles pensaba que la única pregunta que podía sosegar el furor de la filosofía era la pregunta por lo que es.

Para Heidegger el pensar que pregunta por lo que es, es algo propio del género humano. Pero la filosofía es una forma peculiar de responder a esta pregunta, la forma que configuró el mundo occidental. Para él todo pensar que se hace fuera de occidente no es filosofía, pero esto no lo demerita. Todo
lo contrario, el pensar que se hace más allá de occidente no está constreñido por los límites tradicionales de la filosofía y es capaz de otro pensar, de otros comienzos. Para Heidegger, lo que le viene sobrando a la filosofía japonesa es el mote de «filosofía» y las restricciones que éste trae.

Entonces, ¿hay o no hay filosofía japonesa? Podríamos responder afirmativamente rastreando rasgos análogos a los de la filosofía occidental en Japón, como son la filosofía como preparación para la muerte o la filosofía como modo de vida. Pero, a mi parecer, lo que nos da una pista crucial para responder a esta pregunta, justo remontándonos al nacimiento del nombre «filosofía» en Japón.

Maraldo reconstruye cómo Nishi Amane acuña el neologismo «tetsugaku» para referirse a la filosofía occidental. Al principio, Nishi pensaba que este término englobaba tanto a la filosofía en sentido occidental como a tradiciones orientales al estilo del confucianismo. Pero luego se inclinó por usar el término sólo para referirse a la tradición occidental. ¿Hay un tetsugaku japonés? Nishi nos propone una respuesta paradójica: sí y no.

Aquí hay que recurrir a una de las estrategias clásicas de la filosofía: reconocer que «filosofía», como vimos arriba, se dice en muchos sentidos. Si entendemos filosofía como una práctica universal, rescatamos el carácter de filosofía pero perdemos la especificidad japonesa. Si adoptamos el sentido restringido de «filosofía», como Nishi o Heidegger, podemos reconocer la especificidad de los modos en que las tradiciones extremo-orientales se abrieron al ser y dar razón de la singularidad japonesa pero perdemos su carácter de filosofía.

Tal vez la respuesta más fructífera es paradójica: sí y no, hay y no hay filosofía japonesa. Es crucial reconocer, como hace Maraldo, que pensadoras y pensadores japoneses, modernos y pre-modernos participaron del pensar al igual que Platón o Aristóteles y que pueden ser entendidos desde la misma disposición pensante. Pero es necesario reconocer también que su pensar se desarrolló en condiciones específicas y desde ellas tiró las distancias del mundo de forma distinta. Es filosofía, en sentido amplio, en tanto puede comprenderse desde la disposición del pensar. Pero no lo es, en sentido restringido, en tanto el pensar japonés no se encuentra completamente limitado por las fronteras occidentales de la pregunta por el ser. En este sentido, «filosofía japonesa» es una especie de oxímoron. Si es «filosofía», nada agrega decirle «japonésa» y si ha de ser «japonésa» no podemos llamarle...
filosofía. El pensar japonés es lo mismo diferente. Una misma disposición a pensar pero que se abre desde un horizonte de mundo específico. En pocas palabras, me parece tan importante reconocer que la filosofía japonesa es filosofía como que no lo es. Tal vez podemos aquí tomar una nota de Dogen y reconocer que la cuestión siempre ha sido la misma pero cada quien tiene una forma singular de ponerla.

Además, vale señalar el carácter subversivo que tiene reconocerle al pensar japonés su carácter de otredad. Es necesario reconocer que es un pensar que se hace desde otro lado, desde otra especificidad y que se atreve a tomar la voz en la tribuna del pensar occidental. Es una voz desde oriente, desde lo otro, desde fuera. No es de sorprenderse que en lugares como México, semejante pensar desde la otredad haga eco.

**El primer filósofo japonés moderno**

Siguiendo con el tema de la especificidad del pensar japonés, en su texto «Framing the Place and Significance of Nishida’s Philosophy in Europe and North America» Maraldo intenta responder a algunos prejuicios occidentales respecto a la figura de Nishida. Ya Rebeca Maldonado ha dado su opinión sobre la influencia del zen en el pensamiento de Nishida. Yo tengo un par de cosas que decir sobre el prejuicio de considerarlo el primer filósofo japonés moderno.

Maraldo cuestiona las implicaciones de llamar a Nishida el primer filósofo moderno de Japón. El adjetivo «moderno», piensa él, impone un cisma en el pensamiento japonés. Tomar a Nishida como el primer filósofo japonés moderno lo pone entre un antes y un después. Hace que todos los pensadores posteriores deban confrontarse de algún modo con el pensamiento de Nishida. Pero, sobre todo, lo confronta con el pasado. «El adjetivo calificativo moderno en este contexto sólo sirve para calificar el pensamiento japonés pre-moderno como un tipo de pensar completamente distinto»

Para Maraldo, describir a Nishida como el primer filósofo japonés moderno implica descalificar el valor filosófico del pensamiento pre-moderno. Negarse a esto es parte de su agenda de reivindicar el carácter filosófico del

pensamiento japonés. Pero, como vimos arriba, es una agenda con la que yo no me siento tan comprometido. ¿Por qué el temor a lo distinto del pensar japonés pre-moderno?

Ya expresé mi opinión sobre la importancia de reconocer la diferencia en el pensar japonés, moderno y pre-moderno. Hay que reconocer también de la distinción en cuestión no se sigue que los pensadores pre-modernos no sean filósofos, sólo que Nishida inaugura una nueva forma de hacer filosofía. Y esto no me parece ningún prejuicio. Me parece, en cambio, la condición para hacer una lectura justa de Nishida.

Llamar a Nishida el primer filósofo japonés moderno es reconocer que no es un pensador salido de un templo, como lo fueron Kukai, Dogen o Hakuin. Como Rebeca ha señalado, el pensamiento de Nishida está fuertemente influido por su práctica del zen pero esto no significa que Nishida sea un pensador zen en sentido tradicional. Por más que su pensar estuvo fuertemente influido por el zen, fue influido en la misma medida por la filosofía occidental y su institución: la universidad.

Esto suena a una obviedad pero coloca a Nishida en el cruce de dos mundos. Para los pensadores japoneses tradicionales, más cercanos a las instituciones pre-modernas, su pensar seguramente era percibido como demasiado occidental. En cambio, para sus colegas occidentales, era y sigue siendo visto con un cierto halo de exotismo. Nishida no es ni esto ni aquello, es un pensador formado en el vértice de dos mundos. Si algo es, es un hijo de la restauración Meiji, entre el pasado y el futuro, entre oriente y occidente. Esto vuelve su pensar tan poderoso, el hecho de que excede los límites de ambas tradiciones. Trae a la discusión tanto al amor y al pecado, típicos del cristianismo, como la no diferenciación y el no hacer de las tradiciones orientales.

Y este carácter de no ser ni esto ni aquello, a la vez, le permite ser una piedra roseta entre ambos mundos. Es una puerta de entrada para el pensador occidental a los temas de la tradición pre-moderna y una apertura de nuevos horizontes para el pensamiento japonés. A veces olvidamos que la escuela de Kioto no es simplemente una escuela de filosofía budista japonesa. Es una escuela de pensar que toma componentes tanto occidentales como orientales para hacer frente a problemas del mundo global moderno.

Tal vez no sea Nishida el primer filósofo moderno de Japón. Esto sería hacer una caricatura de la apertura de Japón, haciendo como si no hubiera habido ningún tipo de intercambio intelectual con occidente previo al siglo
Lo político del pensar de Nishida

La última cuestión que quiero tocar en este breve ensayo tiene que ver con las lecturas políticas de la obra de Nishida. Este tema no puede separarse de la controvertida discusión sobre las conexiones entre Nishida y el Militarismo. Hace ya casi 30 años Maraldo colaboró en traer este tema a discusión seriamente con el famoso simposio Rude Awakenings... y es claro que la cuestión nunca dejó de acompañar su pensar. En Japanese Philosophy in the Making I los temas de lo político y el nacionalismo en el pensar de Nishida salen a relucir más de una vez. Pero aquí, más que volver una vez más sobre la discusión del nacionalismo, quiero llamar la atención sobre una afirmación de Maraldo.

En «The Problem of World Culture» dice: «Nishida nunca pensó su trabajo como una filosofía política [...]». Y después de esto sostiene que lo político se impuso desde fuera a su pensar por las críticas de Tanabe, por presiones del gobierno en los años 40’s y por relecturas contemporáneas, particularmente aquellas hechas al calor de las acusaciones contra Heidegger. Remata diciendo: «Hasta 1930 Nishida desarrolló una filosofía de la conciencia que tenía poco que ver con el mundo social e histórico».

Semejante declaración me tomó por sorpresa porque, a mi parecer, el pensamiento de Nishida tiene una clara visión política desde Indagación del bien. Detrás de la experiencia pura hay una tensión entre unidad y diversidad. A la vez que la conciencia y la realidad tienden a una unidad absoluta, esta unidad sólo existe en tanto se expresa en actos singulares diferentes. Esta visión ontológica tiene una evidente consecuencia política.

La primera unidad de la conciencia humana se da entre la conciencia de ayer y la conciencia de hoy. Pero, en el mismo sentido en que estas conciencias están unidas en un sistema, se encuentra unida mi conciencia a la con-

1. Ibid., 164.
ciencia del otro. Estas unidades de conciencia colectivas van de la familia a la nación y, eventualmente, a una unidad social de toda la humanidad. Pero, como ya dijimos, estos niveles cada vez mayores de unidad nunca deben subsumir las expresiones singulares, ya que es sólo en virtud de éstas que dichas unidades mantienen su vitalidad.

Nishida incluso vislumbra un grado aún mayor de conciencia comunal que une a lo humano con lo no humano y todo lo que es; y que sólo se alcanza a través de la religión. Pero esta unidad sólo existe en virtud de cada hecho singular, de cada venir a la presencia instantáneo.

Aquí se conecta la filosofía de la conciencia de Nishida con una agenda claramente política, una agenda que intenta salvar tanto la unidad como la diversidad. Por un lado, Nishida cree que la conciencia tiende a la globalidad, a la creación de una esfera de todas las conciencias humanas y no humanas. Pero, a la vez, esta globalidad sólo se puede construir desde el reconocimiento y la defensa de las singularidades de cada nación, cada colectividad, cada individualidad. Es aquí donde, en sentido muy laxo, podemos decir que Nishida es un pensador nacionalista. Lo es en tanto da un lugar importante a la singularidad de las comunidades humanas y su cultura. Pero es todavía más una propuesta individualista en tanto que reivindica la centralidad de la expresión singular como principio vital de toda unidad. La propuesta de Nishida intenta balancear la ecología profunda y el cosmopolitismo con el nacionalismo y el individualismo (o más correctamente, el «singularismo»). Tal vez la mejor forma de describir su ideal político es tomando prestada la frase zapatista de «un mundo en el que queman muchos mundos».

Y este posicionamiento político no se quedó en lo abstracto. Por un lado, el pensar de Nishida que, como ya vimos, se posiciona más allá de los límites tanto de la tradición japonesa como de la occidental, es él mismo un paso hacia un pensar de la globalidad desde la singularidad nacional. Y más aún, el llamado «incidente Takigawa» de 1933 en que Nishida se enfrentó a las autoridades militaristas por la censura al profesor Takigawa Yukitoki por parte del Ministerio de Educación es un ejemplo de la defensa de la singularidad llevada a la práctica. Para una visión política que reivindica la singularidad como principio vivificante de la unidad absoluta, la censura es inaceptable. Una conciencia comunal que suprime un acto individual de expresión dentro de sí, aunque éste sea de disenso, está, en el acto, autodes-
truyéndose. En otras palabras, aunque Nishida apostaba por la unidad, esta unidad nunca podía lograrse suprimiendo las diferencias.

Claro que podemos ver en este texto de Nishida una reivindicación de la identidad nacional frente a la globalidad. Pero también hay una defensa del valor creativo del disenso singular como única posibilidad de una unidad orgánica real y no abstracta de la conciencia comunal. Es en el acto de disenso en que se expresa el individuo y, a la vez, se vuelve a dar forma a la unidad comunal de conciencia a la que pertenece.

En fin, por todo esto es que me sorprendió la afirmación de Maraldo de que, antes de los años 30 no hay un pensamiento de lo político en Nishida. A mi parecer, desde *Indagación del bien* de 1911, la agenda política de Nishida es bastante clara; y la intenta llevar a la práctica en los años posteriores con su oposición a todo intento de supresión de la singularidad. Pero claro, un crítico suspicaz podría contestar que peco de hacer una relectura politizada de Nishida al calor de los acontecimientos recientes. Pero a mí me gustaría cuestionar, en cambio, el énfasis en marcar una separación entre ontología y política.

Leyendo a Maraldo, da la sensación de que una cosa es hacer filosofía y otra tomar una posición política, pero yo no comparto esta dicotomía. Volviendo a lo dicho antes, si entendemos la filosofía como la pregunta por lo que es, este preguntar pregunta también por el ente que somos nosotros y nosotras y el lugar que ocupamos entre lo que no somos nosotros. Toda posición que tomamos sobre lo que es implica tomar postura sobre quiénes somos y cómo nos hemos de relacionar. En otros términos, no hay ontología que no sea, a la vez, política. Entendiendo, por supuesto, «política», más allá del juego de dirigentes y banderas de colores, como la ciencia del habitar, del estar-con las y los otros y con lo otro de lo que somos.

Poéticamente habitamos la tierra y Nishida nos propone una nueva forma de estar en el mundo y relacionarlos con el resto de la naturaleza desde la experiencia pura, desde el *topos* de la nada, desde la matriz de los vectores de la experiencia. Por ellos, su ontología no puede ni debe divorciarse de su política. Leer a Nishida nos invita a reivindicar el valor absoluto de la diversidad, de la singularidad, del disenso y, a la vez, recordar que todo vector singular se dibuja en la misma pizarra en que todas y todos y todo somos.
Unas últimas palabras

Cuando empecé a leer el texto de Maraldo estaba a la orilla del Mar Pacífico, en la costa de Acapulco donde, en 1614, arribó el barco de la primera misión japonesa a la Nueva España y Europa. Imaginé a aquellos marineros del galeón San Juan Bautista que cruzaron el océano y conocieron por primera vez las playas al otro lado de las costas del País del Sol Naciente. ¿Qué habrán pensado de la gente del puerto, de sus frutas, de sus tortillas, de su música y de sus fiestas? Noté que estaba recorriendo un itinerario parecido con el pensar. En el galeón del profesor Maraldo me aventuraba al encuentro de otras costas, donde alimentan su pensamiento con ingredientes locales, distintos a los de mi tierra. Con él aprendí a apreciar estos nuevos sabores y sobre todo, a integrarlos a mi mundo; a reconocer mi propia playa en el reflejo de la singularidad de aquella costa. Tan lejos y tan cerca, tan parecidos y tan diferentes. Y siempre en el diálogo.

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La démarche de cet ouvrage en trois volumes, dont seuls les deux premiers sont parus à ce jour, repose sur un présupposé qui de prime abord peut sembler évident : la philosophie se déploie dans des textes. Et dans la mesure où ces textes sont rédigés dans une langue donnée et que toute langue, à moins qu’un exemple vienne contrarier la règle, fléchit suivant l’usage qu’en font ceux qui l’emploient, ces textes et la philosophie qui s’y déploie sont toujours soumis à l’exercice d’une *tra-duction*, c’est-à-dire la transformation des problèmes enchâssés dans ces textes, y compris au-dedans d’une même langue. La philosophie se produit dans l’*interstice*, dans l’*écart* qu’il y a entre les problèmes originellement posés et les concepts mobilisés pour y répondre, d’une part, et les problèmes tels que reçus et réinterprétés à travers une telle *tra-duction*, d’autre part. L’écart est sans doute d’autant plus grand lorsque les problèmes sont posés dans une autre langue. La réception française de la phénoménologie, sans évoquer les débats soulevés par les traductions des *Méditations cartésiennes* par Levinas, de *L’origine de la géométrie* par Derrida ou encore d’*Être et Temps* par François Vezin, Alphonse de Waëlens, Rudolf Boehm et tous ceux qui ont traduit l’ouvrage avec eux, en est un bon exemple. Et si la philosophie prend place dans cet *écart*, alors la « philosophie japonaise », ce n’est pas un ensemble arrêté de textes qui appartiendrait au passé et qu’on étudierait aujourd’hui après coup, mais un champ de potentialités toujours ouvert, qu’il n’appartient pas exclusivement aux textes japonais de saisir, mais peut, et sans doute doit, être développé dans d’autres langues, moyennant les transformations méthodologiques, terminologiques et sémantiques nécessaires.

Certes, cette définition de la philosophie pourrait être mise à la question. Il en reste qu’elle a le mérite de ne pas réduire la « philosophie japonaise » à un simple objet d’étude qui viendrait satisfaire la demande et la recherche d’un exotisme en philosophie. En rassemblant dans ces deux volumes des articles, pour la plupart les textes remaniés de différentes conférences passées consacrées à certains représentants majeurs de la modernité japonaise,
tâchant de répondre d’une telle définition, de dialoguer avec ces auteurs et d’en prolonger le projet, l’auteur fait de ces philosophies des philosophies vivantes, pour notre présent, les sortant de la sclérose et de l’isolement dans lesquels elles sont toujours déjà placées lorsqu’on les caractérise d’ordinaire par leur origine comme japonaises, qu’on les met à distance comme des philosophies du passé et, pire encore, d’un passé qui, en tant que lecteurs occidentaux, ne nous appartiendrait pas.

Je ne peux que remercier Morisato Takeshi de m’avoir invité à en poursuivre la démarche en me proposant de donner ici un compte rendu, en français, de ma lecture du deuxième chapitre du deuxième volume, consacré à la « philosophie (de la) métanoétique de Tanabe Hajime ». Les attentes qu’il peut avoir pour mon rapport seront néanmoins, probablement, insatisfaites dans la mesure où, étant donné la longueur escomptée dudit rapport, je ne pus me résoudre à reprendre ici autre chose que les thèses et la démarche du premier des deux articles qui composent le chapitre, les accompagnant toutefois d’un commentaire critique qui, je le crois, s’appliquera aussi bien au second.

Dans l’introduction du chapitre, l’auteur rappelle que la « philosophie métanoétique » ou, s’il le veut, la « philosophie de la métanoétique », commence avec l’impossibilité pour Tanabe, tel qu’il le relate dans l’introduction désormais bien connue de la La philosophie comme métanoétique, de prendre position, en temps de guerre, et cela alors qu’on l’attendait de la part de l’un des intellectuels les plus influents de son temps et que l’urgence de la situation exigeait une réaction immédiate, pour l’une ou l’autre des alternatives suivantes : ou bien critiquer les dérives autoritaires d’un gouvernement oppressif, ou bien soutenir l’effort de guerre dans lequel la nation japonaise tout entière était engagée. Une critique ouverte de la politique en place, souligne Tanabe, n’aurait fait autre chose que diviser les rangs et exposer d’autant mieux les Japonais à leurs ennemis. Il en reste que son mutisme, appuyé par quelques textes maladroits de la fin des années 1930, fut alors volontiers entendu comme la preuve d’une adhésion tacite à cette politique, et motiva l’engagement funeste de nombre de ses étudiants dans le conflit mondial. De l’aveu du philosophe lui-même, du point de vue philosophique,

1. 『懺悔道としての哲学』, 1946.
2. Tanabe 1946.
le choix n’était pourtant pas difficile à prendre. Dans ce dilemme était mise en branle la confiance de Tanabe en la toute-puissance supposée de la raison, crise précipitée par la sensation, indique Maraldo, que ses tentatives de pourvoir l’existence nationale (国家的存在) – dont le timbre totalitaire résonnait avec de plus en plus de force à la fin des années 1930 – de fondements rationnels, s’étaient fourvoyées et avaient contribué à des souffrances inutiles. Pris par le remords, s’éveilla en lui le besoin d’une repentance et d’une libération de ce que la raison ne pouvait accomplir. Inspiré par son élève, Takeuchi Yoshinori, lequel avait publié en 1941 un livre intitulé *La philosophie du Kyōgyōshinshō*⁴, Tanabe trouva dans les enseignements du *Kyōgyōshinshō* de Shinran les éléments d’une résolution d’une telle crise de la raison. L’un de ces enseignements consiste à dire que le salut ne peut être atteint, après la mort, par les efforts propres de celui qui l’a poursuivi de son vivant mais, en vertu du dix-huitième vœu prononcé par le Bouddha Amida dans le *Grand Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra* (ou « sūtra de la vie infinie »), qu’il est rendu possible par la récitation du nom d’Amida sous la forme du nembutsu, de la formule « Namu Amida Butsu ». Suivant ce schéma, dans lequel l’aspirant au salut abandonne ses propres forces (自力) pour se reposer sur celles du Bouddha Amida, Tanabe abandonne toute prétention à bâtir une philosophie qui reposeraît sur sa propre raison, et s’en remet à une « autre force », qui n’est pas ici, toutefois, celle d’Amida – Tanabe ne fait subir aucun tournant mystique à sa pensée, et n’invite en aucun moyen à une conversion à une religion existante déterminée⁵ – mais celle du néant absolu, c’est-à-dire non seulement la négation du sujet qui « meurt » dans la repentance, car une telle négation ne serait jamais que relative, mais la force négatrice en vertu de laquelle cette négation relative nie, la force d’après laquelle le sujet est perpétuellement « ressuscité », converti et transformé en un autre⁶. La métanoétique (懺悔道), c’est ainsi la « philosophie-qui-n’est-pas-philosophie » (哲学ならぬ哲学) de Tanabe, ressuscitée depuis les cendres de sa philosophie antérieure, la « logique de l’espèce » (種の論理), à travers une métanoèse,

4. 『教行信証の哲学』, 1941.
5. Ibid., 9, 152–3.
le néologisme portant le double sens d’une *metanoia*, d’une conversion, et
d’une *meta-noesis*, d’un au-delà de la raison.

La crise de la raison tanabéenne est ainsi une crise personnelle. Ceci étant
dit, d’ordinaire discret vis-à-vis de toutes les affaires qui se rapportent à sa
vie personnelle, Tanabe n’aurait fait étalage de son intimité – plus encore :
d’une *telle* intimité – s’il n’en allait pas en réalité du destin de la philosophie
tout entière. Comme Maraldo le souligne, *La philosophie comme métanoé-
tique* est plus qu’un livre de confessions. 

Il y a chez Tanabe comme l’idée, jamais thématisée comme telle, et qui
par ailleurs ne lui appartient pas en propre, que les exigences philosophiques
d’une époque ne peuvent être satisfaites qu’au moyen d’une inflexion, d’un
tournant radical de la philosophie. Sans doute Maraldo ne voit-il pas dans
la métanoétique un tel tournant dans l’appréhension contemporaine de la
crise de la raison, car elle recèle certainement encore bien des imperfections,
mais il en entrevoit, du moins, la possibilité. C’est la raison pour laquelle,
à travers la *traduction*, il entend porter à notre attention, aujourd’hui, les
problèmes que Tanabe se posait au milieu des années 1940, en en clarifiant
le sens par la comparaison de la lecture tanabéenne de la crise de la raison
avec celles de différents auteurs, c’est-à-dire Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida,
Habermas, Apel et Rorty. Sans doute n’est-il pas nécessaire pour nous de
détailler individuellement chacune des positions mises à profit. Dans tous
les cas, la crise est historique. Elle est la crise de toute une époque et de toute
une humanité. Chez Husserl, elle se traduit par la perte de la foi en la pos-
sibilité d’une philosophie constituée comme science universelle, laquelle
perte se traduisant elle-même par le déclin d’une humanité européenne
devenue « étrangère à son propre sens rationnel de la vie ». Chez Haber-
mas, elle s’exprime dans « l’échec du projet de la modernité », celui de la
réalisation du progrès universel de la raison – idéal contredit par les faits à
l’heure où, en dépit de tous les progrès techniques et scientifiques, toutes les
conquêtes politiques, sociales et morales n’avaient jamais été si proches de
sombrer dans le néant. Le sortir de la crise ne pouvait être envisagé qu’au

7. Ibid., 157.
8. *THZ* 4: 37, 357.
moyen d’une critique radicale de la raison, laquelle devait cesser d’être com-
prise comme « centrée sur le sujet [isolé] », et se concevoir, plutôt, comme 
communicationnelle, fondée sur l’intercompréhension des sujets\textsuperscript{11}.

Toutes ces lectures de la crise de la raison et les critiques qui y ont suc-
cédé – non seulement celles de Husserl et de Habermas – corrèlent la vérité 
au sujet qui la construit ou la découvre ; pour aucune la raison est-elle déta-
chée du sujet. Lorsqu’elles appellent ainsi à une transformation du sujet, 
cette transformation provient toujours du sujet lui-même. Chez Tanabe, 
en revanche, la crise et la « mort » de la raison ne peuvent être voulues 
ou recherchées ; elles ne proviennent jamais du sujet, à travers ses propres 
forces, mais de l’autre-force, celle du néant absolu qui se manifeste précisé-
ment dans l’abandon de toute volonté de la part du sujet qui veut. Maraldo 
rappelle que les tendances philosophiques contemporaines – entre autres les 
terroirations sur le corps, l’Autre, les éthiques environnementales et ani-
males – tendent à réinvestir les problèmes philosophiques dans la vie même 
du sujet philosophant, prétendant que « les problèmes personnels les plus 
importants sont des problèmes philosophiques »\textsuperscript{12}. Seulement, la conver-
sion à l’œuvre dans la métanoèse implique un autre modèle de sujet :

Pour la voie du pouvoir-propre (自力), la résurrection dans la Terre Pure 
est le résultat de l’accumulation de nos mérites propres. [...] Pour la voie de 
l’autre-pouvoir, cependant, chaque action et pensée du soi est dirigée dans 
d’une nouvelle direction et devient l’activité du Bouddha Amida dirigée vers 
tous les êtres sensibles. Ce transfert devient alors l’objet de la foi authentique 
[...]. Le soi qui agit et pense est converti par la foi en un élément médiateur de 
l’autre-pouvoir transformatif\textsuperscript{13}.

Lors de sa mort et de sa résurrection, le sujet laisse ainsi, comme dit 
Maraldo, « la personne derrière ». Il renait comme un soi nouveau, qui 
n’aborde plus les problèmes depuis sa perspective propre, qui ne les endosse 
plus à titre personnel. Ce n’est par ailleurs plus « lui » qui les approche, 
mais l’autre-pouvoir dont il n’est que le médiateur, ou l’intermédiaire\textsuperscript{14}. La

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 371–2.
\textsuperscript{12} Maraldo 2019, 157.
\textsuperscript{13} Tanabe 1946, 210.
\textsuperscript{14} C’est pour cette raison que devient essentielle la question à laquelle tente de répondre le 
deuxième article du présent chapitre : comment, alors, si l’agir du sujet n’est plus son agir propre,
métanoétique entre, en ce sens, en contradiction avec, dirons-nous, l’air du temps – du nôtre, du moins. Pour autant, il faut insister sur le fait que ce n’est jamais de la mort du sujet en général, mais bien de ma mort dont il s’agit, de sorte qu’en cet autre sens, la métanoétique ne constitue autre chose qu’un pas en avant, que n’a encore franchi aucune autre philosophie jusqu’à aujourd’hui. D’autre part, quoique la métanoétique appelle à ma mort, la mort n’en est pas la destination finale. La négation du soi est suivie d’une « affirmation absolue de la Grande Compassion »15, qui n’est pas une compassion qu’on donnerait aux autres – puisqu’au terme de la métanoèse, si tant est qu’elle en ait un, nous reconnaissons que nous ne pouvons rien faire par nous-mêmes – mais qui nous est donnée, à nous qui souffrons, par cet Autre auquel nous nous abandonnons et grâce auquel nous sommes ressuscités et transformés. Et dans la mesure où cette « compassion » prend racine dans le néant, où elle ne repose donc en aucun être qui serait absolû – ni Dieu, ni Amida –, elle convient, dit Maraldo, à notre ère « nihiliste ».

Malgré toutes les tentatives – celles de Tanabe pour établir la métanoétique comme la seule possibilité du philosopher une fois que la raison a atteint ses limites, et celles de Maraldo d’en faire une philosophie pour notre présent –, cette philosophie risque cependant de demeurer à jamais incompréhensible, dans la mesure où, puisqu’elle est fondée sur la foi en un Autre qui est pure négativité, qui n’est, qui n’est donc ni Dieu ni même étant, elle ne fera sens ni pour ceux qui croient en un Dieu défini comme Être ou comme Amour, ni pour ceux qui ne croient en aucun Dieu, lesquels pourront considérer l’Autre comme « les autres hommes » – auquel cas, que l’Autre, absolu, soit médiatisé par des étants relatifs revêtira une tout autre signification16.

Qu’on en soit assuré, la reconnaissance de cet Autre n’est pas le fruit d’un choix arbitraire, mais s’impose d’elle-même lorsque la raison atteint ses limites. Pour Tanabe, comme l’indique Maraldo, la reconnaissance des limites de la raison ne suffit pas pour pouvoir poursuivre la tâche infinie de la philosophie une fois ces limites atteintes : « elle nous empêche de parler

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15. Maraldo 2019, 158.
16. Ibid., 159.
avec assurance à propos de problèmes cruciaux [...]. En laissant perpétuellement ouverts au débat des problèmes importants, [...] l’exercice auto-critique de la raison abandonne une immense aire de juridiction et diminue son rôle en tant qu’arbitre universel ». En définitive, ce n’est qu’en « laissant la raison mourir »17, ce n’est qu’en tant que métanoétique, que la philosophie peut poursuivre sa tâche et éviter à la fois l’écueil du relativisme et la régression à l’infini d’une raison qui, qu’importe les inflexions qu’on lui fait subir, rencontrera toujours des antinomies qui justifieront perpétuellement une critique par la raison de la raison.

L’une des originalités de cet article de John C. Maraldo, c’est de chercher à montrer que la métanoétique – quoiqu’elle sera toujours par nature religieuse, puisque fondée sur la foi, laquelle est définie comme « négation absolue de la raison18 » – peut, d’une part, emprunter son modèle à autre chose que la religion et doit, d’autre part, provenir d’ailleurs que soi. Maraldo évoque en ce sens le « flux » (ou la « zone ») que décrit Mihály Csíkszentmihályi à partir du milieu des années 1970. En psychologie du sport, ce flux est synonyme d’un état d’abandon de soi dans lequel l’athlète laisse en quelque sorte la performance avoir lieu sans qu’il interfère : « le pire ennemi [...] pour tout athlète, c’est l’intervention consciente19 ». Autre analogue, contre Tanabe lui-même, lequel considérait le Zen comme une voie fondée sur le pouvoir-propre, est la pratique de la méditation du bouddhisme Zen (zazen). Par essence, elle requiert l’abandon des pensées, des sensations et du sujet de ces pensées et sensations. Maraldo émet toutefois une réserve. La différence entre ces analogues et la métanoétique tanabéenne, c’est le rôle qu’y joue le corps. Il souligne que « le rôle du corps, dans la métanoétique, n’est pas spécifié20 », ce qui est étonnant, dans la mesure où, résumant, non sans arbitraire, la position de l’Occident à celle de Descartes, il souligne également le fait que, chez ce dernier, le corps est « tout ce qui peut être remarqué en nous qui répugne à notre raison21 » et que, par conséquent, ce

17. Ibid., 159–60.
18. TANABE 1946, 50.
20. MARALDO 2019, 163.
21. DESCARTES 1990, 70.
corps aurait eu un grand rôle à jouer dans la critique absolue de la raison. Ces analogies ne peuvent ainsi constituer une autre source de légitimation de la métanoétique, dans la mesure où la lecture qu’ils proposent de l’abandon de soi prend elle-même racine dans autre chose que la raison elle-même.

En outre, au-delà des critiques qui, sur ce sol, peuvent être déjà formulées, Maraldo relève deux paradoxes qui peuvent laisser penser que la métanoétique échoue essentiellement dans l’accomplissement de son projet.

D’une part, dans la mesure où la métanoétique est une philosophie poursuivie non par les facultés propres du sujet philosophant mais par l’autre-pouvoir dont ce sujet est le médiateur, Tanabe a défini la métanoétique, empruntant encore une fois sa terminologie et son modèle à l’enseignement de Shinran, lequel est dit être la « voie facile » (易行道) pour atteindre le salut puisque ce salut ne dépend pas des efforts et mérites personnels du sujet mais de la Compassion d’Amida, comme une philosophie pour « les pécheurs et les ignorants22 » – par opposition à la philosophie conduite de bout en bout par l’exercice des facultés propres de celui qui la conduit, laquelle serait la voie philosophique « des saints et des sages ». Pourtant, dans la mesure où, nous l’avons vu, son sens échappe d’ores et déjà, pour la plus grande part, aux philosophes contemporains, comment pourrait-il être accessible à l’ignorant ?

D’autre part, la métanoétique ne pourrait-elle aboutir à de fâcheuses dérives ? Le « tournant métanoétique » fut motivé par la passivité dont fit preuve Tanabe dans l’appréhension de la politique totalitaire menée par un gouvernement auquel il n’opposa aucune résistance intellectuelle. Dans la mesure où l’Absolu ne se manifeste jamais directement, mais toujours en quelque étant relatif, et dans la mesure où j’abandonne toute prétention rationelle et m’abandonne pleinement à l’Autre, n’y a-t-il aucun risque que je m’abandonne à des forces oppressives et destructrices ? Tant que cette question reste ouverte, la métanoétique ne saurait constituer une meilleure réponse que la logique de l’espèce à la crise qu’a connu Tanabe au milieu des années 1940.

Il y aurait beaucoup à dire concernant cet article comme le second, mais je me limiterai à une seule remarque, pour terminer. L’article souffre d’une lacune qu’il attribue pourtant lui-même à la métanoétique tanabéenne : le

rôle du corps y est laissé non-spécifié. Il est curieux, en effet, que la question du corps n’ait pas été abordée dans la *La philosophie comme métanoétique*, alors qu’elle était centrale dans les études qui ont précédé, jusqu’au moins 1931. En 1924, dans la toute première étude substantielle consacrée à la phénoménologie encore précoce de Heidegger23, « Le nouveau tournant en phénoménologie : La phénoménologie de la vie de Heidegger »24, Tanabe, toujours mu par la volonté qui était la sienne dans son article inaugural, « Du jugement thétique », c’est-à-dire la volonté d’unifier le réel et le ramener à sa pure manifestation, tel qu’il se donne, de manière concrète, dans l’expérience pure au cours de laquelle le sujet et l’objet ne sont pas encore distingués, fait état du besoin, pour la philosophie alors contemporaine, d’en finir avec la *Zweitweltentheorie* qui divise le monde en deux. La phénoménologie de Husserl, laquelle fonde la connaissance logique sur l’intuition sensible, semblait d’abord satisfaire aux exigences philosophiques de son temps. Seulement, dans la mesure où elle adoptait d’abord comme méthode la réduction eidétique, laquelle réduit les objets de l’expérience concrète à de pures objectités logiques, puis la réduction transcendantale qui abstrait le sujet de toute expérience concrète, elle ne pouvait s’imposer comme une telle philosophie. La phénoménologie herméneutique du jeune Heidegger, en ne recourant pas à de telles réductions et en se constituant comme analyse des modes d’après lesquels le sens est constitué par le sujet en fonction du commerce qu’il a avec le monde, se montrait à cet égard plus convaincante. Ceci dit, parce que l’étant n’est jamais, précisément, abstrait de la concretude dans laquelle il se donne, parce qu’il n’est jamais simplement approché comme un objet, mais toujours comme outil, le monde dans lequel il est est un monde essentiellement individuel : le jeune Heidegger néglige fondamentalement l’étant qui se refuse à la *Zuhandenheit*, à la disposabilité, qui se refuse à être saisi comme un outil, c’est-à-dire l’Autre, le *Tu* dans la dialectique avec lequel se constitue tout collectif. La raison pour laquelle Tanabe s’est détourné, au début des années 1930, de la phénoménologie, et notamment celle de Heidegger, qu’il a par la suite toujours cherché à dépasser25, c’est que la phénoménologie ne parvenait pas à rendre compte de la

24. 『現象学に於ける新しき転向：ハイデッガーの生の現象学』, 1924.

Ainsi, on eût apprécié qu’au-delà du constat que le rôle du corps au sein de la métanoétique est laissé non-spécifié soit posée distinctement la question « *Pourquoi ?* ». Il n’est pas certain que Tanabe eût accepté comme telle la distinction cartésienne entre l’esprit et le corps ; en fait, le rejet de l’idée, attribuée au jeune Heidegger, que le corps – le mien comme celui d’autrui – puisse être approché comme un outil le laisse déjà présager. *Je n’habite pas mon corps*. Tanabe dresse une distinction radicale entre le corps noématique (*物体*, *Körper*), qui est un non-moi, et le corps noétique, vivant, qu’on appelle aussi la *chair* (*身体*, *Leib*), inobjectivable. Tanabe ajoute : « La raison pour laquelle le corps est le véritable corps – en d’autres termes la corporéité – ne s’établit qu’au sein du corps noétique inobjectivable. Ce n’est qu’à partir de ce fond que le corps noématique peut lui aussi être distingué des autres corps ». Déjà en 1931, le corps définit le sujet comme un « moment oppositionnel » – en tant qu’individu corporellement fini, le sujet « tient son être du tout auquel il s’oppose28 ». Sans corps, il n’y aurait pas de distinction entre le *Je* et le tout – il n’y aurait pas de subjectivité *tout court*. *Je* est un *corps*. Autrement il n’y aurait aucun moyen pour que le relatif puisse jamais simplement constituer un médiateur pour l’Absolu.

27. Maraldo 2019, 147.
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The Gift of Philosophy’s Giveness

Mapping the Topos of Exclusion of Japanese Philosophy and Non-Philosophy

While Asian philosophy continues to work to gain legitimation in academia, the task of its scholars often involves not only elucidating and interpreting particular thinkers’ writings, but inevitably demands an effort to legitimate their thought as rightfully standing alongside the great intellectual traditions we refer to as philosophy. Certain features of Asian philosophies, those I focus on in the present essay—proximity to religion; embracing the ontologically negative; working outside the bounds of positive logic and language, apophatic tendencies—have led to a persistent exclusion from Western definitions of philosophy, exclusions from academic departments and curriculum, and relegation to the domain of the non-philosophical. Facing this form of exclusion, pressure to conform can take many shapes, one of which is a demand to articulate a definition of Asian philosophy as a pre-condition of inclusion. Yet, the methodological prioritization of definition has not been as prevalent with Asian philosophies as it has in many Western schools. While practical necessities might dictate compliance with such an approach, complicity in the logic of inclusion and exclusion of Western regimes of definition should be handled carefully, lest Asian philosophies undermine precisely what would constitute their most valuable contribution to an inclusive and intercultural definition of philosophy.

This is a delicate philosophical line to walk, one that few have undertaken with as much insight and care as Professor John Maraldo. A concern for precise and careful definition that does not undermine tenets of Japanese philosophy is at the very heart of the thirteen works collected in his *Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida*. As one of the leading voices in Nishida scholarship, Maraldo’s work, spanning over three decades and assembled in this brilliant collection of essays, charts an illu-
minative path not just of Nishida’s philosophy, but also the path of deep inquiry of one of his most incisive commentators.

Throughout the essays in this volume, Maraldo emphasizes how much truly depends on the project of developing a “world philosophy.” Making a place for Asian philosophies is essential not only for the sake of philosophical truth, he tells us, but for conventional reasons such as “career choice and livelihood” and “who gets hired.” Yet, our attempts to articulate a “lexical or generic definition” of Japanese philosophy can betray some of the fundamental principles of the discipline we seek to legitimate. Following Maraldo’s many lines of inquiry into Nishida’s philosophy allows us to meet this demand while resisting the imposition of a particular form of definition we should consider avoiding, while providing effective tools for challenging the logic and language of exclusion that goes along with modes of description that are more characteristic of Anglo-European scholarship.

In the present study, I assemble various arguments from within Maraldo’s Nishida studies to build a position for Japanese philosophy that does not simply seek to win a place within prevailing definitions of philosophy as a pre-requisite for inclusion; instead, in thinking beyond the binaries of inclusion and exclusion, and beyond binary logic and language in general, Maraldo’s commentary on Nishida offers the unique possibility of a different orientation for philosophers, a different methodological prioritization where one’s first gesture towards the culturally and philosophically other is not an us-and-them inclusion or exclusion, but an orientation taking its lead from a more basic and neglected aspect of philosophy, that is, its givenness.

**Defining something or nothing**

Throughout three decades of commentary, Maraldo has contemplated the question of how to “interrogate given definitions” of Nishida’s philosophy and, by extension, how to define Japanese philosophy as philosophy, from more angles and more insightfully than any other English-speaking Nishida scholar. This concern surfaces already in the Prologue to his Nishida volume where he proposes four common definitions associated with Japanese philosophy (日本哲学); including (1) philosophy done

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by Japanese scholars “in a European key”; (2) classical Japanese thinking before the term “philosophy” was introduced to Japan; (3) an approach that acknowledges that while methods and themes are mostly Western, nevertheless, they circulated in Japan before the introduction of Western philosophy; and lastly, (4) thought that exhibits a distinctive “Japanese originality.” While all four options sum up important ways Japan and its scholars have represented their own intellectual tradition, Maraldo is careful to avoid reducing Japanese philosophy exclusively to any one definition.

The concern for appropriate definition persists in his “Framing the Place and Significance of Nishida’s philosophy in Europe and North America,” where Maraldo continues to resist the demand to provide a single monolithic definition, and rather problematizes any simple understanding of Nishida’s thought, his status as a philosopher, or as the “originator” of the Kyoto School. He lays out five possible interpretive schemata for approaching Nishida’s philosophy, but instead of providing any heuristic that would easily classify or define his thought, Maraldo chooses to complicate all of the typical tropes that would enable such straightforward circumscription. Thus, we are disabused of including Nishida within the category of the “first philosopher” of Japan, as the “founder of the Kyoto School,” “philosopher of the East,” “philosopher of Zen,” or as a “nationalist ideologue.”

In his “How Meiji-Era Japan Appropriated Philosophy from Europe” Maraldo further complicates the common reduction of Japanese philosophy to Nishida’s philosophy. He considers several of the major precursors to Nishida’s thought, disclosing how earlier thinkers struggled with the philosophical world beyond Japan’s shores—as well as with their native tongue, their Confucian and Buddhist inheritance, the Chinese writing system, Dutch learning, and Western science—and in so doing forged an idiom later creating the context within which Nishida’s philosophy could emerge. One by one Maraldo challenges the propensity to include Nishida within any of the categories he is routinely relegated to, proposing an approach to his philosophy where the only way to describe Nishida avoids any one story while encompassing elements of all of these ways of defining his thought.

One might ask what we are left with in our attempt to define Nishida

2. Ibid., 6–10.
3. Ibid., 104–19.
as a philosopher after Maraldo has deconstructed most of the common handles we reach for. One might even claim that a positive definition is lacking; inclusion and exclusion are thus suspended in what amounts to a definition by way of a via negativa. This is dangerous territory since thinking beyond the positive, and embracing the ontologically negative has been a substantial impediment for intercultural dialogue and grounds for excluding Asian thought from the pantheon of philosophy. While holding back from positive definition has justified omission from the Western philosophical cannon, we must keep with Maraldo’s careful project and follow him in challenging and expanding the possibilities for a type of inclusion where Nishida’s philosophy, and by extension Japanese philosophy, contributes to that definition, gives to it, becomes part of philosophy’s givenness, rather than simply taking prevailing definitions that risk distorting precisely what it has to offer.

This is not a small problem and in looking back through the history of encounters between different thought traditions we do not find a great deal of viable solutions. One possible approach Maraldo develops in his “Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco-European Thought,” involves a thought experiment where he invites us to ponder how we might define Japanese philosophy if Greek thought were not the only standard against which claims for inclusion were appraised. This intercultural inversion points out inconsistencies in Western philosophy’s self-conception that arise when we turn the tables and evaluate the Western heritage based on Japanese definitions. Ultimately, Maraldo proposes a conception without any single standard, broad enough to encompass Eastern and Western philosophy, embracing the Greek tradition as well as the thought of Kūkai, Dōgen, Hōnen, and Shinran. This essay also includes an invaluable and detailed outline of the history of exclusion of non-Western thought from Western definitions of philosophy.

Religion: non-philosophy and the negative

A major incitement for excluding Asian thought from Western-construed definitions of philosophy comes in response to how an ontology of the negative brings philosophy in too close proximity to what it is heavily invested in relegating to the domain of the non-philosophical, that is, reli-
gion. In the Asian tradition there is no such strict demand to distinguish religion and philosophy. Buddhism, Daoism, and Shintoism have evolved for millennia without any significant need to fully circumscribe their doctrine or practices or in view of enforcing any strict inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries between philosophy and religion, nor any need to develop ontologies that prioritize the positive while downgrading the negative to an inferior or excluded status.

Nishida is no exception to his East-Asian tradition in this sense. For him, the question of religion is a question of the negative. “Religion exists,” Nishida writes, “where the self is absolutely negated, piercing through to its very source, in the self-realization of the self-contradiction of life.”

While this orientation might impede productive engagement with Western philosophy, Maraldo has rendered Nishida’s approach to the negative and to religion into a source of fruitful dialogue with Western philosophy. In his “Heidegger and Nishida: Nothingness, God, and Onto-Theology,” he considers the two thinkers in tandem regarding their notions of God and nothingness. For Nishida, defining god invokes the same problems of definition we will encounter here in our analysis: God cannot be defined in straightforward positive terms because his identity is self-contradictory: As God, God is not-God, and only thereupon can he be, or be open for encounter. Nishida invents new concepts, such as “inverse respondence” (逆対応) “predicate logic” (述語的論理), logic of “self-contradictory identity” (矛盾の自己同一), inverse determination (逆限定) to describe a bi-directional determination between God and humans. The identity of God is only possible as self-contradictory in a space where God and self are related through self-negation.

While Nishida and Heidegger can be considered in tandem based on these themes, Maraldo is careful to point out that Heidegger’s God does not involve self-negation: “God has disappeared in Heidegger’s meditation on Nothing,” Maraldo writes. Heidegger thinks of Nothing only as the other side of Being, and not as the ground where the two inter-determine through self-negation. Thus, even Heidegger’s “last gods,” Maraldo claims, are there “only to remind us of Be-ing and leave out the possibility of a God

4. NKZ 9: 145.
not bound to Be-ing.” What is crucial for Nishida—and for the present study—is that the self’s relation to God is a reciprocal and inter-determinative relation within a structure of mutual negation. My self is negated insofar as it is constituted by its relations to what is non-self, i.e. what I am not is part of what I am. God is one of those relations and while god is not my self, God is related to and thus constitutive of my self. Nishida sees this same form of negation from the other side of the relation: God is also defined by relations, also constituted by what is not-God: thus, God is related to and constituted by all individual selves.

While deific negation has a long history in Western negative theology (Deus Absconditus, Deus Otiosus) in its mystical or apophatic traditions, the essential point to bear in mind is that in Nishida’s philosophy there is a reciprocal determination between the self and God enabled by a mutual form of negation. Conversely, Western conceptions generally conceive of negation as uni-directional and decidedly non-reciprocal where negation only obtains on one end of the relation: God negates himself to allow the world and humans to be, but not vice versa. Humans remain contingent upon divine determination, but God is not determined by that which God determines. This theme arises again in Maraldo’s “The Problem of World Culture: Appropriating Nishida’s Philosophy of Nation and Culture,” where he invokes this important aspect of Nishida’s writings in an attempt to redeem intercultural encounter by construing it as obtaining according to the same reciprocal structure of negation underlying the I-thou relation. He further details how religion involves a negation of the self and God in his “How Nishida Individualized Religion,” this time in focusing on negation as death, not in the sense of an event at the end of life but, as Heidegger also understands it, as an event in the very present moment. While this rings of existential phenomenological approaches to death, Maraldo is careful to tease out the subtle differences between Nishida’s and Heidegger’s positions.

6. Ibid., 385.
Philosophy in the making: definition within a “continuity of act and act”

One of the dangers of accommodating strictures of definition that are characterically Western is that concessions might be made to define Japanese Philosophy in such a way that the negative must appear as positive. This is clearly not a project Japanese thought can be complicit with, yet the problem is perhaps deeper. Definition is crucial, but no definition has any efficacy without acts of executing and enforcing that definition as a philosophic act. It is the act of exclusion, the act of deploying, defending and enforcing a particular definition that I seek to challenge by way of Maraldo’s Nishida interpretations.

A key aspect of his scholarship is his insistence that Nishida’s thinking is a “philosophy in the making.” This is a fifth interpretation Maraldo proposes in his Prologue. As a philosophic act, the demand for a definition that excludes the negative also perpetuates several aspects of positivistic philosophy that Japanese philosophy clearly strives to avoid. What I take to be characteristic of a “positivist” approach are philosophies that ignore the ontologically negative (i.e., nothingness, 無; emptiness, 空) and in so doing tend to reinforce two assumptions: (1) that definition is meant to describe an object, one taken to be substantially autonomous/separate; and (2) that definition is an act of a subject, one thought to be an individual, self-contained self, subject, ego, i.e., not defined by what it is related to.

If philosophy were an object, it could be neatly circumscribed and delineated from what it is not, from what is non-philosophical. And, if as philosophers we were individual subjects not constituted by what is non-self, our philosophic actions of inclusion/exclusion could be exhaustively defined without risking that our own discipline partakes in anything that would contaminate the philosophic purity of its actions. Yet, philosophy is not an object. Philosophy is a set of actions. I would like to consider philosophy along these lines, but not merely as acts. More specifically, I would like to consider philosophy according to Nishida’s idea of an infinite “continuity of act and act” (作用と作用との直接の内面的結合). In this context, philosophy as a continuity of diverse acts is not a made object, but ever “in the

making”; ever provisional, evolving and eluding us as we and others seek to define it. What is crucial to recognize is that a regime of definition that demands exclusively positive descriptions assumes that strict delineations can be given between philosophic acts and non-philosophic acts. Such a regime treats philosophy according to what Nishida calls “object logic” (対象論理). Objects lend themselves to our thinking that they have clear distinguishing lines between each other that afford judgments of inclusion and exclusion: Domains of action, such as philosophy, do not. Thus, as Maraldo emphasizes, a philosophy in the making such as Nishida’s...

...remains work in progress, subject to reappraisal and reformation, to rethinking. Philosophy in the making particularly describes the way that Nishida Kitarō conceived the practice of philosophers of all traditions. I think it was also the way he understood what he himself was doing. One of his favorite refrains, “from the created to the creating”; easily applies to his own work—to the way he moved out of his sources, in both European and Asian languages, and ventured into original thought.8

The philosophic act of definition cannot be reduced to a relation between subject and object because there is a reciprocal creative dynamic between the philosopher and philosophy, best understood not as creating or giving a definition, but as the ambiguity of “created-creating.” Things understood as objects, on the other hand, can be straightforwardly created and defined. The object does not change or evolve in response to changes in how we define it. But, as a non-objective set of actions, philosophy is “in the making,” with an inter-determination that means we create philosophy as it creates us. Thus, no final positive definition is viable. As Maraldo writes, “Nishida never thought of his work as finished; it continually emerged as a philosophy in the making.” And, reflecting Nishida’s act of philosophizing as part of a continuity of acts where a reciprocal form of determination obtains, Maraldo writes that “our engagement” as readers of Nishida “continues to remake ‘Nishida philosophy’.”9 Understanding philosophy as an inter-determinative relation of act and act significantly problematizes any attempt at circumspective definition.

9. Ibid., 11.
Philosophy is perhaps distinct in that the act of defining the discipline is one of its most important preoccupations. If this were not the case, if the act of definition were extraneous to the discipline, then it might be possible to sum it up with a positive definition. But, philosophy defining itself is an act within philosophy. One act in a continuity of acts that evades circumscription. As that definition changes, evolves, is critiqued, philosophy expands and evolves. The act of definition is thus not an act outside of philosophy but within and constitutive of the discipline. The demand for a positive definition wrongly assumes that the act of defining does not change the thing defined. It treats philosophy as an object “made” not “in the making.” Yet, following Nishida, this crucial philosophic act must be considered as an act within a “continuity of acts” that is philosophy.

Attempting to define Nishida’s philosophy does not circumscribe it and constrain it within positive limits that allow for easy inclusion and exclusion the way an object is thought to be circumscribed and divided away from other objects. That very act of definition becomes part of an evolving definition, it gives to that definition, rather than simply receiving from. Thus, definitions are continually evolving, not amenable to the logic of the object, while so too does the self evolve as it attempts to define philosophy. To do so is not to pin down a static object but to give one’s acts to an evolving continuity of acts. Thus, defining philosophy is philosophy in the making, making philosophy while allowing philosophy’s giveness to give to the self as philosopher.

Since the philosophic act of defining philosophy has this reciprocal created-creating determination, the logic of the object along with inclusion/exclusion binaries can never properly capture what philosophy is, or what philosophers do; literally because philosophy is not an object capturable by a subject, it is, on the other hand, something that gives and receives our actions. This might complicate definition, but it perhaps nicely reflects the complexity of the philosophic act.

If phenomenal reality, including philosophy, is such a continuity of act and act, a field of acts intertwining in their positive and negative valences, then we might ask what the proper orientation to such a field might be, if it is not an orientation of a subject seeking to define an object. Let us now turn to Maraldo’s treatment of Nishida’s late field theory-inspired basho ontology
to further explore the possibilities for a type of definition of Japanese Philosophy that would not betray central tenets of Nishida’s thought.

**Basho: mapping the topos of philosophy**

Throughout many of his essays on Nishida, Maraldo has elucidated and elevated the intricacies of what is perhaps Nishida’s final and most fascinating scholarly period. In his last work “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” (「場所的論理と宗教的世界観」) we are lead beyond the “logic of object” or “logic of subject” towards a “logic of basho” or “logic of place.” Nishida conceives of basho (場所) as a field of relationality where beings and phenomena exist prior to their being included or excluded from one another. The concept basho, also referred to as “place,” “topos,” and sometimes “chōra” conceives of relationality not at the level of the encounter between subjects and objects, but on the prior field within which encounter and inter-determination is first possible. As Maraldo writes, “His aim was to explain more directly the nature of self and world that emerge out of this place that underlies distinctions.”

Thus, to focus on this field is not to deny the reality of any of the binaries that arise in our language, or the efficacy of the logic based thereupon, but to focus on the field that allows for such binaries to arise, thus Nishida’s basho theory pursues a “substratumless” (無基底的) philosophy of non-substantiality (無期底), an all-inclusive field of non-differentiation prior to subject-object opposition. At this level of phenomenal reality, definition is complicated, because as Maraldo writes:

> That ultimate space of placing is not anything that can be specified or named as a different reality. Nishida calls it “nothing” or “nothingness” (無). The ultimate “place of nothingness” functions as the dynamism of self-reflecting that underlies all differentiation.  

Here, signs of apophasis enter in response to the ontologically negative, which threaten to limit definition and present difficulties for intercultural dialogue, thus lessening the chances of Asian thought being included

10. Ibid., 200.
11. Ibid., 327.
within philosophy’s definition. Yet, Nishida’s use of the term *basho* invokes moments in Western philosophy that suggest otherwise. The ontology of *basho* is partly inspired by Plato’s notion of “*chōra*” (χώρα), a realm where elements have not yet differentiated themselves, do not yet have a determinate essence, where they neither *include* nor *exclude* the other elements determinatively. Intriguingly, in a rare occasion that hints however minimally towards a moment of apophasis in the West, Plato cautions regarding speaking of this prior originary realm of indeterminacy he calls a “receptacle,” to the extent that we cannot even distinguish *this* from *that*; that is, we cannot *include* or *exclude* one element from the definition of the other, thus rendering circumscriptive definition impossible at the choratic elemental level. Aristotel, however, does not follow such caution. Despite the first principles of science being “indemonstrable,” there is no caution that follows for constraining language in response, and classical logic as he formalized it is thus very comfortable with proceeding from this indemonstrability to ground logic in unambiguous exclusion and inclusion, where the “most secure” (*Metaphysics* iv) of science’s first principles, the law of non-contradiction, dictates that A necessarily excludes not-A.

Philosophic methodology based upon Aristotelian logic might be quite good at defining what it takes to be an object, yet quite constrained when it comes to describing acts with the reciprocal determination Nishida envisions on the level of *basho*, or for describing what Plato sees as the relation between elements in the receptacle. To capture this dynamic, Nishida develops an alternative logic where encounter between bodies and phenomena is not understood according to the exclusion/inclusion, A/not-A logic, but according to what Nishida refers to variously as the “logic of place” (場所の論理), the logic of nothingness (無の論理), or the “logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity” (絶対矛盾的自己同一の論理). Although each of these arise at different points in Nishida’s philosophy and have their own peculiarities, what they share (as derived from Mahāyāna *soku-hi* logic)

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13. Ibid., 49c7–50a4.
14. Nishida develops several other principles that deploy a similar contradictory logic, including his principle of “self-identity of opposites” (相反するものの自己同一), “affirmation of absolute negation” (絶対否定の肯定), and “absolute negation-qua-affirmation” (絶対の否定即肯定).
is that A is related to and thus constituted by not-A. This type of relation is only discernible if negativity is thought to be ontologically relevant. In such a case, the law of non-contradiction does not apply; being A (a self, a philosophy, a thing, or Being) does not need to exclude not-A (non-self, non-philosophy [religion], non-objects, Nothingness). Thus, according to this logic, you do not find selves in oppositions to what is not self, but a dynamic intertwining of self and non-self, where not-A is part of the definition of A.

To approach the question of philosophy’s definition at the level of basho, we must posit a prior and constitutive relation between the philosophical and non-philosophical, particularly between philosophy and religion. Yet, we must be vigilant not to fully collapse the difference between the two. There is no simple and straightforward continuity between acts of philosophy and acts of religion. On this point, we must follow Nishida beyond his earlier formulation of a “continuity of act and act” towards his later basho-related notion of “continuity of discontinuity” (非連続の連続). Of course, there will forever remain a discontinuity between philosophy and religion, but it is one that includes continuity. Thus, the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy cannot be reduced to terms of unambiguous inclusion or exclusion. We can certainly point to discontinuities between philosophy and religion, yet their relation on the field of basho also includes continuity. If philosophy is embedded in such a field of continuous-discontinuity then our efforts at definition are significantly more complex than the positivist regime of definition would have it.

Recalling that we are seeking to discuss not mere definition, but definition as a philosophic act, Maraldo’s Nishida interpretation can lead us further towards a viable path for bringing Japanese thought within philosophy without betraying its own principles. As Maraldo explains, while the earlier basho theory began with a concern for the “basho of propositions,” he writes, “[Nishida’s] thought evolves to a field of ‘pure dynamic activity.’” Thus, “basho is to serve as the foundation of both world and self as they interact, not simply as a foundation for framing judgments about the world.” How do we, then, in our philosophic acts of definition sustain a type of fidelity to the nature of the “pure dynamic activity” of basho? Let us continue follow-

16. Ibid., 121.
ing Maraldo and explore two acts he elaborates that keep with the structure of *basho*, those being mapping and mirroring.

**Mapping as philosophic act: the problem of exclusion**

If philosophical acts—such as defining what philosophy is—are acts within a continuously-discontinuous field of “act and act,” a field of mutually-negating phenomena, how do we orient our definitions to accord with what such a field demands? How do we say anything about philosophy, define it, know it, or compare it with other ways of thinking if definition is an act in such a field? One answer Maraldo considers at length is the act of mapping, which invokes intriguing moments in philosophy, literature, and art, East and West.

The theme of mapping often comes up in relation to the “map-territory” problem, which invokes the classical problem of the relation between an object and its representation. The example has re-emerged throughout intellectual history because of a persistent tendency of mistaking models of reality with reality itself. To overcome this problem of representation, and possibly to parody the attempt itself, several philosophers, artists, and literary figures have proposed creating a 1:1 map of some territory.\(^{17}\)

In his “Self-Mirroring and Self-Awareness: Dedekind, Royce and Nishida” Maraldo discusses Josiah Royce’s notion of such a “perfect map” to highlight some of the problems particular to philosophy in the attempt to map fields of reality. He highlights the impossibility of achieving an objective representation since in attempting to represent all of a territory—England in this case—point for point in perfect detail, the map can only be truly circumspective if it also represents the map itself, which is being drafted within the country’s borders. Furthermore, for the map to be complete,

\(^{17}\). Lewis Carrol’s *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded*, is perhaps most insightful in indicating the futility of such a project. When asked whether they used the 1:1 map much, Mein Herr responds that it “has never been spread out, yet,” and further, because of how cumbersome it is they now use the country itself as its own map, which suffices “nearly as well.” The metaphor re-emerges in Borges’s “On Exactitude in Science,” where he describes an empire whose science of cartography is so advanced that they produce a 1:1 map of its territory. Umberto Eco later invokes the theme in “On the Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale of 1 to 1.”
Maraldo relays, it must include a representation of the place from which the mapmaker draws the map. Here, the “problem of exclusion” arises, since if one desires to represent the position of the mapmaker, she would have to step out of the map’s territory and occupy a new, separate position from which to draw. Of course, that newly occupied locus of depiction would then need to be vacated in order to be depicted, and so on ad infinitum. As Maraldo points out, “this problem of exclusion reappears whatever the metaphor—be that of mapping or that of mirroring—and whatever the nature of the self that thinks.”

What Maraldo helps us to see is that there is a dynamic limitation to a form of panoptic representation (or definition) that seeks to be objective by including everything. Note that this limitation arises specifically because the map maker’s acts are included within the continuity of acts that is the territory. And further, that the mapping attempts, as they expand and change that territory, exhibit a reciprocal and bi-directional determination between map maker, territory, and map. These are precisely the dynamics that are ignored when treating the things we define as objects. The separation of object from subject gives us the idea that we can have a fully circumspective type of vision and representation of that which we seek to know or define. Yet, when one’s body is continuously-discontinuous (as an act) with that which it seeks to know, see, or map, exhaustive positive circumspection is forever elusive.

What the mapper wants—or the philosopher operating according to the metaphor—is an act that is external to the field of continuous acts. The positivist, objective mapper wants his acts to be fully discontinuous from the field. But, because according to Nishida’s basho logic, the mapper’s acts are always partly continuous within the acts that constitute the field, we see how there is a dynamic obstruction to defining things beyond their positive objectivity. Exhaustive representation aiming at unambiguous inclusion and exclusion is impossible. Something forever remains in the negative. The question is, How does one orient oneself to the elusive negative without turning it into the positive? This is key to the relation between the philosophical and non-philosophical and thus to bringing Japanese thought into a definition in a way that does not undermine its own principles and objective indefinability.

According to Maraldo’s interpretation of Royce’s metaphor, a position always remains, which hides itself because the mapmaker has no choice but to inhabit a determinate viewpoint and drawing point. Maraldo invokes Ueda Shizuteru’s attempt to overcome the problem of the unseeable position by positing a map without a mapmaker. Ueda entertains the possibility of England mapping itself. Maraldo’s rejoinder is that territory outside of England will still need to be excluded and therefore total representation/definition remains elusive.19

In addition to the impossibilities of exhaustively mapping any field in its full circumscriptive positivity, the metaphor of mapping has two further problems thwarting the attempt to define the field of philosophy according to the logic of inclusion/exclusion. The problem is that the act of mapping implies a one-way determinative and expressive relation. Conversely, as Maraldo explains “Nishida sees our individual, bodily selves as integral to the world we co-create, the world that in turn creates us. In a sense, each of us is a world-what Nishida called ‘a focal point of the world.’”20

To conceive of a map maker is to imagine an active subject over-against the mapped world, which is passively indifferent to its being mapped. The territory might inspire the map, but it does not change depending on how it is mapped. Philosophy is not this type of object, indifferent to the acts that seek to define it. With this kind of map conceived as objective representation, determination flows only in one direction, from mapper to map, and the finished product stands only in relation to the world as a copy. Such representation has no inverse determination directed back towards the person making the map.

19. Although I cannot pursue this line of thinking here, it is worth considering whether the multi-perspectivalism that Nishida posits as the ambiguity of “internal perception-qua-external perception” (内部知覚即外部知覚) might be applied to the inside-England/outside-England binary such that the mapmaker could actually achieve what Ueda proposes. Maraldo further explores how in knowing and judging there is an “incompleteness” that arises between knowing and the act of knowing, judgment and the act of judging. He suggests that Nishida is able to overcome this aspect, otherwise evident in Royce and Dedekind, through his basho theory, because in it self-awareness is not posited as the ultimate place, that is, of course, the status of basho. In his early work, the will is the more embracing place. Later, Nishida moves away from the idea of “places within places” and focuses more on the “self-contradictory identity” of relations between places, which allows for self-mirroring to obtain fully. See Stevens 2009 and Maraldo 2006.

This is far from the self-world determination Maraldo envisions in his proposal for Nishida’s philosophy as “in the making.” Our common notion of creation does not suffice, Nishida conceived of an inter-determination as a “dynamic if discontinuous working of the historical world as ‘from the created to the creating,’” writes Maraldo.21 Any self, especially one who seeks to augment their relation to the phenomenal world through philosophizing, is never in a one-way determinative or expressive relation to the world she seeks to define. The world is not simply passively waiting to be mapped. If we want to stick with the mapping metaphor and think along Nishida’s lines, we must turn things around: It is not only the self that maps the world, but the world also maps itself onto the self. We do not simply give to reality. Basho is, Maraldo writes, both “place-giving and place-receiving.”22

It is not merely that there is an infinitely elusive field that cannot be represented because the mapper always has to move out of that position in order to represent it. The problem is that the mapper’s body itself is part of what must be represented in order to truly map the world. And, each of the mapper’s actions is constantly contributing constitutive actions to the definition of the world that demand further depiction. The human body, like mountains, rivers, earthquakes, volcanoes and geysers, are ways the world expresses itself. The problem with representation is thus much deeper: when self and world are part of each other’s definition, not excluded from each other, then world-representation is partially self-representation, and this intertwining relation does not permit exhaustive mapping according to its positivity precisely because it is a type of relationality that obtains through negativity, through relation to what is not-self. Because the self includes what is non-self/world, and vice versa, there will forever be a dynamic blind-spot that evades any attempt of the self representing itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, the world representing itself through the actions of one of its expressions, i.e. the human body and consciousness. Thus, as Maraldo explains, “one’s very act of consciousness at any one time always eludes one’s own consciousness.”23

If we are to understand philosophical acts in the context of Nishida’s

21. Ibid., 367.
22. Ibid., 424.
23. Ibid., 195.
*basho* ontology as acts of mapping a field or territory, we must envision a two-way determinative and expressive relation. Not just a map maker who *gives* the world a map of a territory, but a world that expressively maps itself onto the body that is itself a *reception* of that giving. A world that gives us the body that in turn can give the world a map of itself.

**Mirroring as philosophic act: “enactive intuition”**

In Nishida’s later work he moves beyond his earlier concepts of “pure experience” to postulate a type of self-awareness constituted by a bi-directional self-world form of determination he describes as a “self-mirroring” (自己写像), where consciousness develops by a “reflexivity [that] is crucial to understanding the nature of *basho*.24

As a possible philosophic act to consider, which might lead us towards appropriate acts of definition, mirroring does suggest the reciprocal form of determination we find on the level of *basho*. Yet, as a metaphor we are testing in hopes of improving our means of defining Japanese philosophy, we must be careful since it can lend itself to two undesirable implications Nishida would like to avoid; those being that self-mirroring is (1) a passive reception of representations, where one simply intuits the world but does not act, and (2) that self-mirroring is a move to the interior of the self and away from the world.

Regarding the first implication, Maraldo’s re-translation of one of Nishida’s key concepts, 行為的直感, is particularly instructive. In “Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida’s Turn of Intuition into Action,” he places Nishida in dialogue with contemporary cognitive science, modifying what is commonly rendered as “acting” or “active intuition”—instead, in his formulation as “enactive intuition.” By invoking the term “enactive,” he draws on the neuro-biologist Francisco Varela’s theory, which construes consciousness as a body-world determinative loop, which more directly resonates with the reciprocal determination of Nishida’s “creating-created” dynamic. Maraldo considers both artistic and scientific practices as instances of this reciprocal form of determination, and he sides with the former as most exemplary, because “art making and world-making occur not so much in a

24. Ibid., 326.
causative, temporal process as in a dynamic and dialectical space.”25 Maraldo returns to Royce, who also proposes the idea of infinitely reflecting mirrors, in an attempt to further refine our metaphors for defining philosophy. It was following Royce that Nishida developed his understanding of conscious activity and self-awareness as a form of “self-mirroring.” What is key regarding the first implication listed above is that self-mirroring is not mere passive reception. Because the relation between self and world obtains according to the structure of “enactive intuition,” Maraldo writes that it obtains on a “place or basho (場所) wherein intuiting entails acting and acting entails intuiting.” Thus, he continues, we come “to know a world partially of [our] own making, and come to know [ourselves] as progressively made by that world.”26 Self-mirroring is not simply passive reception, but an enactive and reciprocal co-creation between self and world.

Regarding the second of the above implications, while self-mirroring could suggest a move to the interior of the self and away from the world, Nishida’s ambiguous the internal/external binary that would support that claim. In his “Self-Mirroring and Self-Awareness: Dedekind, Royce, and Nishida,” Maraldo emphasizes that Nishida’s concept of self-awareness as self-mirroring avoids the charges that his early work was a philosophy of the subject.27 Nishida’s concept explains reflection as an infinite system where the whole is mirrored in every part. Because the self is already part of the world, a move to reflect on the self is always a move ambiguously towards the world. Thus, “to say the self reflects the self itself is to say that the self absolutely goes outside the self itself.”28 To this effect, Maraldo explains:

In Nishida reflexivity implies that self-awareness inherently entails world, and world—as its greater context—reflects and shapes the self. Note that Nishida moves self-awareness beyond the self and places it “in” the world-not

25. Ibid., 209.
26. Ibid.
27. To avoid this fate, Nishida develops a logical grounding for self-awareness with the idea of a “self-representative system,” but needs a concept of infinity leading him to the German mathematician Richard Dedekind.
28. NISHIDA 1935, 83; NKZ 2: 133.
as an object in the world, but as intrinsic to a world that mirrors itself in us and becomes self-aware.\textsuperscript{29}

While Maraldo is careful to point out the persistent limitations of this or any metaphor for representing self-consciousness and the self-world relation that ensues, \textsuperscript{30} taken together, the notions of “enactive intuition” and self-mirroring offer improvements on the mapping metaphor for defining exactly what the act of philosophy is: An act where the self reflects on and is a reflection of the world.

While mirroring does improve upon the mapping metaphor when it comes to defining philosophy by capturing the bi-directional form of determination Nishida posits, it too has its limitations, which call for some caution in extending the metaphor too far. We must recall that in early encounters with the Asian world Western philosophy often mistranslated and misappropriated those systems precisely because of their inability to orient themselves to the “other” as anything but a mirror they held up to their own tradition. While the mirror metaphor certainly should call on us to recognize identity \textit{and} difference, many of our intercultural encounters could be construed as mirroring in only positive terms; a type of reflection that does not have the subtlety of Maraldo’s approach, which thus threatens to erase difference and reinforce only the identity of the one who believes that encounter is a one-way determinative/reflective relation. While Nishida’s notion of “self-reflection” clearly strives to avoid this fate, the metaphor for intercultural encounter is not immune from reinforcing the identity of the self against the other, the subject counter to the object. Furthermore, as a metaphor, mirroring might also suggest a type of determinacy, a positive visual domain that does not enable a viable orientation towards the negative.

How then can we define philosophy in such a way that we account for the bi-directional determination between self and world, beyond the logic of inclusion/exclusion, while also not forcing the negative to disappear or

\textsuperscript{29} Maraldo 2017, 328.

\textsuperscript{30} Despite pointing out the limits in the various metaphors, Maraldo does, nevertheless, consider a way out for Nishida. Exploring his unpublished lecture notes of 1926, he quotes Nishida as saying that in the ultimate “place” of “absolute nothingness” (無の場所), “there is nothing that mirrors.” Self-mirroring is, then, not inherent to that “place” but is a second-order determination thereof. Thus, in attaining this level, in attaining the absolute as no-self, there is “no seeing or knowing self” and one can thus achieve “seeing without a seer.”
clothe itself in the positive as a pre-condition of inclusion? Here, I propose considering a final line of Maraldo’s thought that teaches us to limit how we conceive of ourselves as the one who gives a definition, and instead take up the position of recipient allowing our orientation to definition to follow from the giveness of philosophy itself.

**The gift of philosophy: the demand of givenness**

There are several dangers attending complicity in the regime of definition imposed by Western philosophy as a condition of inclusion. Among these dangers, we actually find broad agreement between some branches of Eastern and Western philosophy. Particularly, we find a common concern regarding positive conceptions of subjectivity that conceive of the human as a self-grounding, self-identical being to which we overattribute individuality, identity, and autonomy. Maraldo’s interpretation of the notion of the gift, an analysis encompassing philosophy East and West, offers a viable intercultural approach for defining philosophy while avoiding this danger.

So far, the discussion has proceeded based on the question of how we define philosophy, how we give a definition of Nishida such that his thought can be included within the definition of philosophy without betraying the principles of his own writings by succumbing to the object logic he warns us against. Following Maraldo, we must recall that basho is both “place-giving and place-receiving.” Within this ambiguity of giving and taking, an alternate orientation to definition is discernible, which shows a way to be related to philosophy that Japanese thought can abide. If we conceive of ourselves not as the givers but as recipients, and particularly as recipients of philosophy’s givenness, including its gift-like qualities, a possibility arises for being philosophers alongside thinkers of differing traditions which does not rely on or reproduce the logic of inclusion and exclusion.

As part of a discussion of religion and negation in Maraldo’s “Nothing Gives: Marion and Nishida on Gift-giving and God,” Nishida is included alongside Derrida and Marion in a debate concerning the concept of the gift. All three attempt to construe the “giveness” of God in such a way that avoids Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology. Maraldo considers the Buddhist concept dāna as a correlate of the bi-directional determination of
Nishida’s basho. Dāna describes a type of gift-giving as a phenomenon that is simultaneously a giving and a receiving. What is crucial, is that the gift is not simply an object given, but represents the mutual co-arising of donor and recipient, thus according nicely with the mutual created-creating dynamic of Nishida’s philosophy. In this context Maraldo invokes Nishida’s idea of “inverse respondence” (逆対応) through self-negation (自己否定), which is based on a similar structure. He then contrasts Nishida’s two-way determination with Marion, who falls short, since for him God has no need for those for whom he negates, (thus, expression is not mutual) whereas for Nishida—just as donor and recipient co-arise in the act of giving—God is given the gift of being by individuals through inverse respondence. Contrary to Marion, for Nishida there can be no giver, given, or giving without mutual self-negation and reciprocal determination. As Maraldo claims, “nothing gives: nothingness allows the total self-negation that defines the kind of love we call God.” He finishes countering Marion with the decisive point for his analysis and for ours, that in Nishida’s conception, “nothing receives.”

Returning to Maraldo’s insistence of Nishida’s philosophy being “in the making,” we can expand this to encompass all philosophers and all thought traditions because they are more appropriately construed as continuous-discontinuities of acts, rather than as objects. Philosophy is “in the making” and while traditions might have fundamental doctrinal inconsistencies, what is true is that no one philosopher’s acts fully constitute philosophy’s givenness. For those who have a desire to seek philosophic understanding, the tradition one chooses comes to them with this givenness, with a dāna gift-like structure of giving and receiving. Philosophy is not available as an object that is made but as an inter-determinative givenness.

We can pursue many arguments about what philosophy is in our attempt to secure a definition, but whatever the parameters of that attempt, we

31. Marion also attempts to go beyond the ontology of “radically independent beings,” while Derrida remains tied to an account of God as gift not grounded in Being (to evade onto-theology) and an account of gift as a paradigm of “givenness” (to recuperate phenomenology). Maraldo explains that the French philosopher’s god as love (agape), as neither being nor not-being, is at once the giver, the giving, and the given.
33. Ibid.
should not ignore that on the prior field of non-dual encounter, this giving-receiving dynamic of philosophy can serve as a guide for encounter and an inclusive form of definition. Philosophy must first have been gifted to us, it must have a givenness prior to its being defined, compared, included or excluded. When we as philosophers decide to engage with any tradition, that tradition is encounterable with many important features that share in the logic of the gift as *dāna*. Thus, one way to work beyond a type of definition that centralizes the subject and isolates the object is to act in accordance with the bi-directional determination of *basho* and philosophy’s givenness understood according to a similar dynamics of the gift as *dāna*.

Of course, definition is a part of philosophy that neither Western nor Eastern philosophy will ever do away with. Following Maraldo’s interpretation of Nishida, we can, however, propose not to put an end to definition, but to consider deferring that particular act and taking our initial directive for our stance towards foreign traditions as we would conceive encounter in the realm of *basho*. If the first step towards meeting other thought traditions follows from the givenness of philosophy, from its *dāna* inter-determinative gift-like quality, then the otherwise immediate imposition of definition and comparison are fittingly complicated and delayed. Although in receiving a gift it might be challenging to hold off on making judgments of inclusion or exclusion, the logic of the gift as *dāna* may not demand the complete illimitation of such inclinations, but simply the prioritization of a different philosophical act: an act that comes before the question of inclusion or exclusion becomes an appropriate one. Gifts demand a different order of operations than mere objects do. With objects, we can be quick to compare and exclude, sort the good from the bad, include or exclude, divide what is mine or yours, valuable or not, and we are quick to make such judgments based on the implicit belief in a one-way determinative relation between myself as a subject and the things received as objects.

Yet, as Maraldo emphasizes, with a gift understood according to the concept of *dāna*, with a mutual co-arising of donor and recipient, while the need for definition can arise, the nature of the giving means that inclusion/exclusion should not be the first step towards the philosophically other. If the initial act of receiving a gift is to compare it with other gifts, that reception undermines the nature of the giver, their giving, and what is given. The reception will not accord with the nature of the gift. Otherwise, the gift is
reduced to an object. Yet, in following Maraldo’s Nishida interpretations, and his own thought regarding the givenness of philosophy and of the phenomenal world, we can avoid the same reduction in the philosophic domain and cultivate an orientation to various intellectual traditions that enables philosophic acts motivated by the recognition of a prior belonging in a continuous discontinuity of acts, one that enables an encounter in the moment before the question of inclusion or exclusion can sever those traditions into philosophy and non-philosophy.

References

Abbreviation


Maraldo, John

Nishida Kitarō
1973 *Art and Morality* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press).

Plato

Stevens, Bernard

本書は、翻訳を通じて哲学が生じるというマラルド氏の考えに貫かれている。マラルド氏は、translate（翻訳する）をしばしばtrans-lateと表記するが、それをあえて日本語で表せば「越えて（trans）- 運ぶ（late）」、すなわち「翻訳=越境」となる。マラルド氏自身による説明では、trans-lationは「複数の自然言語の間ないしその内部において、テキストに埋め込まれている問題、方法論そして語彙を変化させること」であるとされる（p.1）。

周知のように京都学派の哲学は西洋哲学、またインドや中国に由来する思想にも影響を受けているが、それらを改めて日本語において思考することを通して、既存の概念体系を問い直し、新たな概念・定義を生み出している。そしてマラルド氏は、京都学派の哲学を更に英語において分析することにおいて、彼自身の哲学を展開している。例えば、マラルド氏は「人間」といった和辻倫理学における重要概念を翻訳する中で、自身の言語がもつ限界に気が付くと述べており（p.37）、実際に氏は本書を通して、和辻らの日本語原典の精読にとどまらず、各単語の解釈的分析も行いながら、英語という言語のもつ限界の超越を試みている。

『作られゆく日本哲学2』は実に14の論文を含む大著であるが、本稿では特に和辻倫理学を主題とした論文4本について、その意義と著者への質問を述べる。その4本の表題は、「和辻はどのように倫理学を翻訳した=越境させた（trans-late）のか――解釈学的アプローチ」「文化間における信頼とまこと」「和辻倫理学の危険性：バランスのとれた批判の試み」「尊厳と尊敬：その関係性を再考する」であり、以下本稿では、これらの論文をそれぞれ第一〜第四論文と呼ぶ。

それではまず、マラルド氏の和辻解釈がもつ意義を僧越ながら数点述べたい。第

一に、マラルド氏は第一論文の冒頭において、単に「東洋的なもの」「日本的なもの」としてではなく、西洋哲学、特にディルタイやハイデガーらの解釈学とのつながりにおいて和辻倫理学を捉えることを目指すと述べているが（p. 22）、これは和辻倫理学の哲学的評価の前提として重要であると考えられる。しばしば和辻らの哲学はその日本的側面が強調されながら評価されてきたが、例えばマラルド氏も述べるように、和辻は彼の論じる「信頼」は日本に特有なものとしてではなく普遍的な現象であるとしており（p. 51）、それは彼の倫理学全般に通用することである。

また第三論文の副題にも明示されているように、マラルド氏が試みるのは偏りのない和辻批評である。和辻は戦後しばしば全体主義論者として批判されてきたが、氏は「和辻自身の批判のレンズを通して戦後の批評を読み、現在の批評のレンズを通して和辻を読む」（p. 79）のような批評が必要だとされている。氏は過去の和辻批判に対して、「二重の否定」を強調する和辻の言葉を見ると彼の哲学が全体への個人の吸収を提示するものとして読むことは難しいと和辻を擁護する（p. 83）。そして氏は、和辻における「全体性」が、国家をも、個人が社会的存在を達成した際の全体性をも意味し得るものであり、必ずしも彼の時代の反民主的・ファシズム的体制を指すものではないとしている（p. 84）。

しかし、全体的に見ると和辻倫理学に対する氏の評価は厳しい。4 本の論文を通して目立つのは、和辻倫理学の意義よりも、その欠陥に対する氏の指摘である。氏が評価する和辻倫理学の意義は、主に人間存在の関係的性質を示したことにある。特に本書では「間」（between, p. 23）、「人間」（interpersonal/interhuman, p. 27）への言及がなされている。だが筆者（犬塚）の視点からすれば、この関係的性質を説くために和辻が更に展開した行為論や時空間論、環境との関係などの分析も一層評価するに値すると考えられるが、本書ではそれらについてはあまり触れられていない。欲を言えば、馬鹿氏から見た和辻倫理学の意義についての解説が本書にもう少し含まれていた方が、和辻を未だよく知らない学部生・大学院生等にはより有意義ではないかとは思われた。

ただし、本書は和辻研究に既にある程度親しみの者にとっては、考察すべき和辻倫理学の課題が多く得られる重要な書物である。例えば、マラルド氏は、和辻倫理学において「他者」がいないと指摘している（p. 34）。そして、他性を認めないことは文化的・性的・政治的ヘゴモニーの形成につながってしまうのではと警告している。

2. 例えば、和辻倫理学における重要概念である「行為」の構造についての理解があって初めて、第二論文で問題とされていた「信頼」も単に感情的なものではないことが明らかになる。
（p. 35）。最近刊行された『和辻倫理学の人文学』（木村純二・吉田真樹編，ナカニシヤ出版，2021）において，板橋勇仁は和辻倫理学における「文化共同体」が「先取りしろうたいかなる共同性も否定されている仕方で，あるいはそうした共同性を否定し崩壊させる仕方で，「未知の者」と「友人」として出逢うこと」であると論じているが3，そのような評価とも比較しながら，和辻における他性はその限界について議論すべき重要な論点である。

また，マラルド氏は和辻倫理学における「全」と「個」に曖昧さがあると指摘している（p. 92）。この点は筆者も深く同意する。先述のように，和辻における全体性が国家をも，個人が社会的存在を達成した際の全体性をも意味し得るものであり，彼の立場は必ずしもファシズム的立場に至るものではないせよ，そのような解釈に至る文章も『倫理学』には見いだされる。マラルド氏は，人間存在が根本的に関係的で相互依存的であるという洞察に，和辻が設定したような階層的構造は不必要であると述べており（p. 86），この点も議論の余地がある。

さらにマラルド氏は，丸山真男の議論も引きながら，和辻倫理学において「である」（is）と「べき（ought）」との区別が不明瞭であることを指摘している（p. 88）。関係的存在「である」人間存在の本質を説き，さらに倫理学的原理としてそうある「べき」であるとする和辻の議論は，自然の秩序を理想化することで批判的規範の余地がなくなるという危険性をもつ（p. 89）。マラルド氏は和辻倫理学における戦争批判の論述に社会批判の可能性も見ているが，和辻の「信頼」概念が親密な共同体に閉じたものである以上，彼の理論に基づいた社会批判には限度があるとしている（p. 90）。筆者もこれまでに複数の場面で西田・三木らと比較しながら和辻における社会改革の原理の欠如を指摘してきたが，この点，すなわち和辻倫理学がもつ社会批判の可能性・限界については検討する必要があると考えられる。

4 本の論文の中で，特に興味深いのが尊厳と尊敬について論じた第四論文である4。この論文は特にマラルド氏自身の哲学が展開されているものであり，読者の知的興奮を喚起する。氏は，既存の尊厳論にはあるパラドックスが見いだされるという。一般に尊厳は個人に内在するものとして説かれ，そして尊厳は尊敬を受けるに「値する」ものとされる。しかし，尊厳はまた尊敬に依存し，よって他者との関係に依存す

3. 板橋勇仁『未知の者と友人として出逢う：『倫理学』の文化共同体論再考』木村純二・吉田真樹編『和辻倫理学の人文学』ナカニシヤ出版，2021，93–117頁，111頁。
4. この論文は，加藤泰史・小島毅編『尊厳と社会』（上）（法政大学出版局，2020）にも邦訳が『尊厳概念の再概念化：和辻哲郎の視点から』（髙畑祐人訳）として収録されている。
るものでもある。個人に内在するものとしての尊厳と、尊敬に依存するものとしての尊厳との間の緊張は多くの議論において明らかであり、この深刻な曖昧さはどうして生じるのかが問題となる（p. 99）。そしてマラルド氏が提案するのは、尊厳と尊敬は反射し合う概念（mirror concepts）だという考え方である（p. 108）。尊厳は人間関係においてのみ「生命力をもち」、他者との関係を通してのみ害され得る。そして、このような尊厳の再概念化に有効なものとしてマラルド氏によって位置づけられるのが、和辻倫理学である。関係性において人間を捉える和辻の立場は、関係性における尊厳概念を展開させるための出発点となると氏は述べる（p. 114）。

ただし、その応用は一筋縄では行かない。マラルド氏は、和辻を選択したことは恣意的で不十分であることが分かるとも述べている（p. 114）。彼が特に批判するのは、尊厳についての和辻自身の議論、また和辻倫理学における共同体の同質化・階層化である（p. 115）。後者について氏は、個人がより高次にある集団に従属しなければならないという点について和辻の立場が一定ではないということを踏まえつつ、人間が根本的に関係的であるという和辻の洞察にとってこの点は本質的ではないと述べる（p. 115）。

関係性において尊厳を捉えるため、マラルド氏は逆にそのような尊厳が毁損されている例を考察している。その例とは、ある者が拷問されている場合である。その者は苦痛を感じるが、その心理的苦痛の一部は、自身への同情・人間的配慮がないことによって経験されると考えられると氏は指摘する（p. 127）。よって拷問は、関係的な意味における尊厳を毀損することであるともいいえる。また尊厳が関係的に考えられることはそれほど多くないが、尊敬はほぼ常に関係的に考えられる（p. 129）。尊敬として定義される承認の形式——人格の尊厳が唱えられる際に重要となる承認の形式——は、常に他者との関係における人格の承認であると氏は提案する（p. 135）。このように氏は、尊厳はその現実化のために他者との関係における尊敬を要求するものであると論じるのである。

以上示したように、和辻をめぐる氏の論文は、和辻研究としても重要な論点を定義し、また現なる和辻論にはとどまらないものである。ここからは、特にマラルド氏の和辻解釈について、質問を4点ほど提示したい。

まず、和辻の「親切」をめぐる議論へのマラルド氏の批判についてである。氏はこの箇所において、和辻が彼自身批判していたはずの、人格はそれとは区別される身体をもっているという形而上学に陥ってしまっていると批判する（p. 119）。マラルド氏が問題とするのは、「親切」の行為の場面において人は他者を「目的」としてのみならず、同時に「手段」として扱うという和辻の議論である。和辻に対し、氏は自身が見知ら
ぬ人物に荷物を運んでもらった出来事を例として挙げ、その際「私はたとえ彼が行ったことを後に利用したとしても、彼を使ったのでは全くない」という（p. 119–120）。

親切や慈悲とはまさに、行為者が何も見返りに期待せず、相手を使役しないということである（p. 120）。逆に親切の行為とその受容は人を手段へと変えざるを得ないと考えることは、人々を客体化し、彼らの尊厳を奪うことになるように見えると氏は批判する（p. 120）。彼は、手段かつ目的としての我々という和辻の洞察は、人間関係性においてとらえる和辻倫理学の中心的洞見を裏切るものと考えられるという（p. 120）。

しかし、和辻倫理学においてこの目的と手段の二重性は本質的なものであり、また実際に「親切」の行為は我々の客体的主体を手段とすることなしに不可能だといえるのではないか。これがマラルド氏への筆者の第一の質問である。この二重性は、和辻倫理学における「主体」「客体」の理解、「行為的関関」としての人間存在の理解に根本的にかかわるものである。それは「倫理学」自体にも展開されているが、それ以前に書かれた論文「カントに於ける「人格」と「人間性」」（上）5により明らかであるため、まずこちらを取り上げたい。カントの Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten（1785、『道德形而上学原論』または「倫理の形而上学の基礎づけ」）に登場する「汝の人格に於ける、及びあらゆる他の者の人格に於ける人間性を、決して単に手段として取り扱ふることなく、いかなる時にも同時に目的として取扱ふやうに行為せよ」という命令の解釈を問題とすることから始まる当該論文において、和辻は人間存在が二重構造をもつことをカント哲学から読み取っている。その二重構造とは、「物」と「人格性」、いかければ「個」と「全」という二重性である。

カントが人格を単に手段としてのみ取り扱うことなく手段たるとともに目的たるものとして取り扱うべきことを言った時、人格の二重性はまさにその根拠に置かれているのである。手段としての存在を持つものは「物」であるがゆえに、人格もまた「物」として取り扱われる一面を決して失ってはいない。しかし人格は単に手段としてのみ取り扱うを許さない他の一面を持つがゆえにまさに人格なのである。…人格は「物」と「人格性」との二重構造を持つがゆえにまさに人格なのであり、従って差別的にして無差別、手段的にして自己目的、個なるとともに全である。我々はこれを人格性の物化と呼んでよいと思う。（wtz 9: 327–328*）

5. 和辻哲郎「カントに於ける「人格」と「人間性」」（上）『哲学研究』京都帝国大学文学部内京都哲学会、第16巻、第4冊、第181号、1931、1–26頁。和辻はこの論文と続く論文をまとめて「人格と人類性」（1938）として出版している。本書は和辻哲郎全集第9巻に収録されており、元の論文と多少の差異はあるが、本稿でもこの全集版から引用する。

和辻は、カントにおける「人格性」とは、対象としては無である「超越論的主体」との「超越論的人格性」であり、対象を対象としてなりたためる場面であるという（WTZ 9: 330–331）。そしてこれが客体・物の次元において「対象なる我れ」として現れる際に、人格となる。これが、単なる物体と人格との違いでもある。

我々はカントにおける「人格」が客体我を含める主観我、あるいは客体我によって内容的に充実されなければならない「われ思う」にはかなならぬといえると思う。これにより言えれば、客体を対象的に無なる「われ思う」が、（すなわち超越論的人格性が）、対象的なる我れとして現われたのである。単なる物体我は物であるが、この物が超越論的人格性においてある時、人格となるのである。（WTZ 9: 333）

人格が「単にただ手段としてのみ」取り扱われる社会は、和辻も「不道徳の行なわれている社会」と批判している（WTZ 9: 328）。しかし、現実の人格は依然として「物」であり、したがって目的と同時に手段としても扱われる。逆に言えば、「手段とする契機なしには親切をつくすることも受けることもできぬ」（WTZ 10: 150）である。我々が単に主体的存在であり、客体的・物的な側面を全く持たない存在であるとしたら、荷物を持つこともできず、親切の行為がこの現実に生じることもない。

先述の、和辻が人格と身体を異なるものとして考える形而上学に陥っているというマラルド氏の批判に対する、和辻における主体の「表現」としての客体という考えを見直すことが求められると考えられる。確かに和辻は「主観と自然との関係」から考える倫理学の立場を批判したが（WTZ 10: 11）、主体と客体との区別は和辻倫理学の理論的基礎としてある。和辻が彼の倫理学の構築においてディルタイを援用したことは周知のとおりであるが、和辻がディルタイから得たものの中で重要なので主体・客体の考え方である。直接には認識の対象とならない人間主体を扱う人文学の方法論として、主体の「表現」としての客体を通して主体を理解することを提唱したディルタイの「生／体験と表現と理解の連関」を和辻は高く評価し、またそれを利用して、我々の身体的行為や周囲の事物に「間柄」ないし「主体的な人間存在」が「表現」されているとした（c.f. WTZ 9: 174, 47）。カント論における主体的な「人格性」の「物化」との「人格」は、ディルタイの「表現」という考えを経て和辻倫理学に根付いたのである。いわば、我々の身体は人間（人と人との間）の「親切」を客体的に表現するものでもあるのだ。そしてこの客体的表現なしには、我々は親切な行為とはどのようなことかを知ることもできない。

また「人が人格として取り扱われない場合」ないし「人を牛馬と同じく道具として取り扱う場合」の例として奴隷制度を挙げ、奴隷は共同体の一員として認められていな
いことを論じた和辻に対して、「この考えは、十分であるとはとても言い難い。これは人間の共同的側面を持ち出しているが、奴隷は彼らの共同体を形成しつつ、同時に奴隷となりうる。和辻は、奴隷制度が家族を崩壊させ、共同体を分解するという点も考慮していない」（p. 122）とマルルド氏は批判している。しかし、氏も参照している下記の文章は、まさに征服者が既存の共同体を破壊しろうを述べているものではないだろうか。単純な事実確認とはなるが、これが氏への第二の質問である。

ところでその奴隷は、通例征服された民族や戦争の際の捕虜などから作られたのである。従って彼らがおのれ自身の共同体において充分な自由を有する人格として取り扱われていたこと、そこから自由を奪い人格として取り扱わないことにしたのは、彼らを征服した共同体にはかならず、従って彼らが奴隷であるのもこの勝利者の共同体の内部の取り扱いに過ぎぬということは明らかであろう。それは言いかえれば征服された異民族の成員を征服した民族の成員と認めないということにはかならぬのである。（wtz 10: 590）

そして、マルルド氏への第三の質問は、和辻における代替不可能な個についてである。マルルド氏は、「和辻は人の単独性（singularity）をよびうるもの、すなわち各々が代替不可能であり、同一の者ではないという事実を見落としているのではないだろうか」（p. 130）と批判する。氏は、柄谷行人の「単独性」と「特殊性」との区別を引きつつ、和辻における個人性は特殊性（particularity）であり、個人は人間の特殊な例として位置づけられているという（p. 131）。このような個人は代替の対象であり、尊厳の候補者ではない。和辻における個人の唯一性（uniqueness）とは、単にある人他者から区別するものであり、対して単独性（singularity）とはそのような比較以前のものである（p. 133）。和辻は人々を言語や国家といった関係性の中にとどまるものとして考えているようであるとマルルド氏は述べる（p. 133）。

だが、下記の和辻の文章には代替不可能な個人がその関係性において描かれている。これは和辻が人間存在の時間性・歴史性について説く中の一節であるが、その中で彼は一つの例として「一人の青年とその父母との関密な親子関係」を挙げている。

この親子の間柄には、今たくましい青年となっている子がかつて婴児として、そのころまだ若かった父と母とに慈しまれたこと、特に母親は幾千度となくこの婴児を抱き、愛撫し、あやしげ哺育したのであること、あるいは彼が幼児として、さらに少年として、日夜に父母の深い配慮を受けつつ、その健やかな成育やその愛らしい言動をもって父母の生を充たしていたこと、などの数え切れない過去が、現に
生きているのである。でなければ彼らはこの親でありこの子であることはできない。
…しかもその幼児にとっては他の女をもって代えることのできない母親、無限の信頼をもって一切の存在を委せ切っていた母親であるがゆえに、今や年老い力の弱まっている彼女が、このたくましい青年にとって依然として無限に優しい慈母であり、同様に体力において青年よりも弱くなっている父親が、依然として権威ある厳父である。（WTZ 11:6）

一つの親子関係にも多量な過去があり、「その過去は、現在の親子としての主体的連関をまさにこの親子の連関たらしめているその主体的限定にほかならない」（WTZ 11:7）。そしてこの過去は「主体的な広がり」をもったものとして、「環境的な表現」を含む（WTZ 11:7）。家、その庭、池、近隣の並木といった、これも多量の姿が、「この親子の間柄を特定のものとして限定している」のである（WTZ 11:7）。これは確かに関係性から独立した単独の個ではないが、関係性においても人は単なる「母親」ではなく、人はかけがえのない「この母親」になりうる。このように、和辻にも代替不可能な個の姿がその関係性において描かれているが、マルルド氏にとってはたしてこれは評価に値するものとされるだろうか。

また最後に第四の質問となるが、本書では和辻に関する論文4本への前書きにおいて、和辻倫理学が人間中心主義的であることへの批判、そして動物間の「信頼」や動物の「権利」「尊厳」への展開可能性について言及されているが（p. 19）、4本の論文の中ではこれらについて特に論じられていないようである。この点も、可能であればマルルド氏の考えを伺いたい。

以上、マルルド氏への質問を主に4点挙げた。英語から日本語への「翻訳=越境」を通じて、筆者が氏の議論を誤解した可能性も多々あり、氏の返答を待ちたい。本書には他にも議論のために取り上げたい点は数多くあるが、それらはまた別の機会に委ねることとする。「作られゆく日本哲学」は、第三巻の発刊が予定されている。その中では和辻哲学を踏まえた上での新たな「他性」についても論じられることが既に本書で予告されており（p. 94）、マルルド氏の哲学的考察の今後の展開が期待される。

7また、ここではその解釈について検証することはできないが、先の論考において板橋氏は、和辻の「文化共同体」は「個々の人間存在が、ある条件や能力に拠るのではなく、ただそれがその個別性・独自性をもってそのように存在してここにそのように現われることに拠って互いに端的に肯定しあうような、そうした「最も純粋な、最も端的な人間共同体」」であると述べている（109頁）。
As a Western scholar who arrives at Japanese philosophy from an alternative tradition, one is eventually confronted with two important issues: What are the grounds for valuing Japanese philosophy after satisfying one’s intellectual curiosity? Can a non-Japanese philosopher participate in and contribute to Japanese philosophy? In *Borderline Interrogations*, Professor John Maraldo offers a novel approach to philosophy which indirectly addresses these issues. For example, the use of “inter” as a space of difference, overcomes the false dichotomy of traditions. Rather than standing in one tradition and engaging with a foreign tradition, Maraldo proposes a field in-between, which avoids the arbitrary choice of East or West. Furthermore, through his conceptualization of trans-lation, Maraldo claims that Japanese philosophy can occur in other languages. In this regard, Maraldo proposes a way of doing philosophy which is not restricted to any particular cultural boundary. Whilst Maraldo addresses an impressive array of themes and theorists under the given framework, I will here humbly restrict my comments to his treatment of Watsuji Tetsurō. There are four main themes which I intend to address, relating to each of the essays on Watsuji: (1) Watsuji’s supposed anthropocentrism, (2) relation to Heidegger, (3) the role of virtues, and (4) the notion of dignity.

**Anthropocentricism?**

Within each of the four essays, Maraldo offers interesting and important contributions to Watsuji scholarship. One way in which he does so is by developing the concept of *fudo* and illustrating the connection between *fudo* and *aidagara*, which both overlap in terms of possessing twofold characteristics of spatial and temporal extendedness. However, in the opening discussion of how Watsuji trans-lated ethics, Maraldo suggests that Watsuji could be criticized for particularity on the grounds that he restricts his ethical enquiry to human beings. In Maraldo’s own words: “If Watsuji’s
*Ethics* is to be criticized for partiality, it would be for limiting ethical concerns to human beings and indulging in the same anthropocentrism as the European philosophers he severely criticizes on other grounds.” Maraldo may be referring to Watsuji’s claim that “The place of ethical problems is not in the consciousness of an isolated individual, but precisely in the *aidagara* between a person and a person. Therefore, ethics is the study of *ningen* [human beings].” However, I here disagree with Maraldo’s diagnosis. Whilst Watsuji may explicitly state that *aidagara* concerns the relation between person and person within *Ethics*, we should not take him at his word. In *Climate and Culture*, which preceded *Ethics*, Watsuji argues for the inter-relation between humans and their environment, and here illustrates that our environment is not separate from us in several regards. Firstly, he uses the example of the cold to demonstrate that our environment is not something we objectively experience, but something we discover ourselves in. As Watsuji himself puts it:

> When we feel the cold, we do not encounter an objective cold, which is apart from us. Rather, we find ourselves in the cold. The instant that the cold is discovered, we are already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is “present outside” is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we ourselves.

Secondly, he elucidates upon his concept of climate (*fūdo* 風土) by illustrating how it has led to regional traditions of architecture, clothing, and food. In Japan, for example, wooden structures were built to withstand humid summers and ice-cold winters, thin cotton yukatas were made for the heat and kimono of several thick layers for the cold, and because rice flourished from the heavy rain and oppressive heat, it became the staple diet. In this way, Watsuji presents an alternative way of thinking about our environment as a fundamental part of who we are.

Although one may be tempted to claim that Watsuji’s environmental thought is distinct from his ethics, we can also derive a similar relationship between humans and nature from within *Ethics*. In the discussion of double

2. Watsuji 1992b, 12.
negation, Watsuji states that the negation of both one’s individuality and community leads to the home ground of existence. Here, Watsuji makes explicit that this home ground is the ontological state of emptiness. In his own words, “its essence is negation, that is, emptiness.” This Buddhist concept not only entails that we do not possess an individual ego, but that we also exist in an interconnected web of relations alongside all other forms of life. Thus, whilst Watsuji’s focus is on human relations, his Buddhist ontology commits him to a position which also values non-human life as integral to who we are. It is precisely in this regard that Watsuji can be read to overcome anthropocentrism, and also provide an ecocentric theory which can be applied to environmental ethics.

Thus, although Watsuji states that ethics is the study of human beings (ningen), when understood in relation to his notion of home ground, it becomes evident that his approach goes beyond mere intersubjectivity, and as such, it cannot be criticised for being anthropocentric. In the final section of the book, Maraldo presents some ecological considerations, where he discusses how Japanese philosophy might cause us to rethink our relationship to the environment. Given that Watsuji can be read to present an ecocentric theory, it would be interesting for Maraldo to rethink the relationship of Watsuji’s ethical thought to the environment. Namely, how might this affect or contribute towards Maraldo’s environmental considerations in the final section?

Beyond heidegger

In English-language Watsuji scholarship, there is a tendency to place an unqualified emphasis upon the weight of Heidegger’s influence upon Watsuji. However, anyone with knowledge beyond the English translations of *Climate and Culture* and *Ethics* will be aware that Heidegger plays a relatively minor role. Indeed, Watsuji only mentions Heidegger in the preface to *Climate and Culture*, and fifty-three times in *Ethics*. Compare this with the influence of Kant, for example, who features one hundred and eighty-three times in *Ethics*, and to whom an entire chapter is dedicated in *Ethics as the Study of Ningen* (1934). Moreover, Watsuji also composed two
independent texts on Kant: Kant: Critique of Practical Reason (『カント: 実践理性批判』, 1935) and Personality and Humanity (『人格と人類性』, 1938). In this text, Maraldo certainly goes some way towards rectifying this excessive treatment of Heidegger by offering an in-depth discussion of Watsuji in relation to Kant.

Nevertheless, there are two points on which I seek to question Maraldo’s discussion of Heidegger in the first essay, “How Watsuji Translated Ethics: The Hermeneutical Approach,” and suggest that Watsuji goes beyond Heidegger in these regards. Firstly, Maraldo suggests that Watsuji’s reading of Heidegger inspired him to explicate the central notion of his Ethics. In Maraldo’s own words, “Watsuji has followed Heidegger’s hermeneutical practice of planting the seed of a whole theory in a single word; the Japanese ningen is the counterpart and rival to the German Dasein.”5 This may be true, but Watsuji already possessed the necessary philosophical tools to engage in such linguistic deconstruction. In his Attempt at an Autobiography, Watsuji recalls attending ethics lessons by Nitobe Inazō, who became the principal at Tokyo First Higher School. Watsuji notes that the etymological analysis of Nitobe’s inaugural speech left a deep impression upon him:

Nitobe-sensei raised three mottoes at this time: “Clear Head,” “Clean Heart,” and “Sociality.” If this is correct, then it seems that it was the same time when sensei mentioned the origin of the three characters of the word for boarding house (寄宿舎). The radical at the top of the first character (宀) is the shape of a roof covering a house. Thus, the first character (寄) shows there is “奇” under the roof. These strokes alone (奇) mean “superior, not mediocre” and also there is a case when it specifies youth over sixteen years old. That is to say, that everyone gathering here under this roof are superior people over the age of sixteen. Next, the second character (宿) shows there are a hundred people (人百) under a roof. That is, many people are together under the roof. As the last character (舎) means a house, the characters for boarding house (寄宿舎) depicts a house that has a lot of talented students gathered there and living in it. Making everyone laugh by bringing up the origin of these characters, from there I think the word “Clear Head” was derived. After summarizing how important it is to have a clear head for the advancement of Jap-

anese civilization, it was stated that there is something more important for human beings—which led on to the next motto: to have a “Clean Heart.”

The second point regards Watsuji’s concept of “authenticity.” Maraldo notes in passing that Watsuji only employs the concept of authenticity in relation to the thought of Heidegger. In his own words, “As we shall see, his notion of authenticity (a concept he uses only to criticize Heidegger) involves interactive negations of individual will and group will.” However, I contend that not only does Watsuji espouse his own theory of authenticity, but that his theory goes beyond the individual-communal dichotomy, and is foundational to his ethical thought. Watsuji criticizes Heidegger, rightly or wrongly, for advancing a position which emphasizes the individual in opposition to society. In Watsuji’s understanding, Heidegger’s notion of authenticity is inauthentic because it severs the dual structure which Watsuji takes to be indicative of human nature. In this regard, we could compare Watsuji’s account to Charles Taylor’s ethic of authenticity, which situates the individual within their cultural horizon. However, whilst Taylor takes an intersubjective approach, which is grounded in the theory of recognition, Watsuji goes one step further. Rather than presupposing two individual agents with the capacity for self-determination, Watsuji’s concept of authenticity (honraisei 本来性) focuses upon the betweenness (aidagara) of person and person. Moreover, his concept of authenticity is central to realizing the totality of one’s individuality and communality. As Watsuji states:

One can be whole only within honraisei; that is, within absolute wholeness. This wholeness reveals its basic unity in the movement that realizes the “identity” inherent in the nonduality between the self and other through the standpoint of the “difference” imminent in the opposition between them.

Thus, whilst Watsuji’s Heidegger situates identity within the individual, and Taylor derives it from our horizon of significance, for Watsuji, our identity is the relation between person and person. In this essay,

Maraldo also claims that “English, cannot serve as a neutral arbitrator and translator of Watsuji’s Japanese and Heidegger’s German; at best, this triangulation of languages serves to point out the assumptions in such English words as “person” and ‘human being.”\(^\text{10}\) However, by considering Watsuji to espouse a concept of authenticity, we might also consider some linguistic issues as conceptual rather than cultural. That is, rather than seeing problems arise from the use of English to mediate notions from various traditions, such as Heidegger’s \textit{Eigentlichkeit}, and Watsuji’s \textit{honraisei}, we might instead consider the problem to reside with the concepts themselves. Namely, that there is no single, static definition for some concepts, such as authenticity, and that they are “essentially contested” as proposed by W. B. Gallie.\(^\text{11}\) It is in this respect that one may say that Heidegger, Taylor, and Watsuji all espouse concepts of authenticity, despite all developing their notions within distinct cultural frameworks. However, it is uncertain whether this idea is compatible with Maraldo’s claim regarding the translation of philosophy.

\textbf{Trust and sincerity}

In the second essay, “Trust and Truthfulness Between Cultures,” Maraldo provides a comparative account of Watsuji’s notion of trust in relation to that developed by Anthony Steinbock. Maraldo does a great job of illustrating the continued relevance of Watsuji by placing him into dialogue with a contemporary thinker. However, there is another contemporary theorist who would also have been a fruitful interlocutor on this topic. In \textit{Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity}, Francis Fukuyama calls attention to the neglected role of civil society in shaping the terms of modern political and economic life.\(^\text{12}\) He argues that prosperous countries tend to be those where business relations between people can be conducted informally and flexibly on the basis of trust, such as Germany, Japan, and the United States. However, despite focusing on the notion of trust within Asian societies, Fukuyama fails to acknowledge the role

\(^{10}\) Maraldo 2019, 28–9.

\(^{11}\) See Gallie 1956.

\(^{12}\) See Fukuyama 1995.
that Watsuji plays in this discussion. Thus, when dealing with the notion of trust, it would have been interesting if Maraldo had also put Fukuyama and Watsuji into dialogue, or triadology with Steinbock, to reveal how Fukuyama might supplement or even challenge Watsuji’s theory. A more substantial comment concerns the discussion of makoto where Maraldo refers to

a cluster of sinographically and conceptually related concepts that includes 誠実 (fidelity), 信実 (truthfulness), 忠実 (faithfulness), 心術 and 言行の 純 (purity of mind, words and deeds), 真言 and 真事 (true words and true things), along with the antonyms 虚偽 and 虚妄 (falsehood and deceit).¹³

However, rather than a “cluster of sinographically and conceptually related concepts,” I contend that Watsuji espouses a form or virtue ethics which is based on the foundation of trust and truth.¹⁴ One might be tempted to claim that these are not virtues, but rather dispositions which arise from simply providing a phenomenology of society, as Hegel may be considered to be doing. Indeed, Watsuji was clearly influenced by Hegel’s social thought in the second volume of Ethics, where the structure of ethical organizations bear a great resemblance to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. There is concrete evidence of Hegel’s influence upon Watsuji in Ethics as the Study of Ningen (『人間の学としての倫理学』), where Watsuji has a chapter dedicated to Hegel’s study of ethical life. However, rather than Philosophy of Right, Watsuji here focuses on Hegel’s earliest surviving manuscript, The System of Ethical Life (System der Sittlichkeit), and the early essay “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” (“Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts”). Here, Watsuji claims that Hegel’s study of ethical life fundamentally deals with the structure of ningen sonzai in The System of Ethical Life, and the method of the study of absolute ethical life in “On the Scientific Ways.” In The System of Ethical Life, the virtues arise within ethical life. For Hegel, the character traits which are considered to be virtuous are courage, honesty and trust. Here, there is no independently existing individual who enters into social relations, but rather the virtues, and social identity, are realized

¹⁴. See Shuttleworth 2020.
as social capacities. This is also acknowledged in Watsuji’s treatment of this text, where he notes that virtue is the ethical life of individual people.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, “such virtue is the subject of moral philosophy” and “we should take the name Ethik for the description of the above-mentioned virtue.” Furthermore, “to live according to the custom of a nation is virtue.”\textsuperscript{16} On Watsuji’s reading, virtue is a phenomenon of ethical life for Hegel. However, whilst trust and honesty are central to Watsuji’s thought, there are also a number of other characteristics which enable one to achieve social harmony. In the second volume of Ethics, Watsuji depicts how trust and truthfulness develop within the various ethical organizations of family, local community, cultural community, and nation state. Each of these organizations have their own unique relationships of husband and wife, parent and child, friends, and ruler and subject. Here we can clearly see Watsuji’s ethical thought is influenced by Confucianism. In particular, Watsuji seems to be espousing a form of the five Confucian bonds (husband and wife, parent and child, oldest and youngest child, ruler and subject, and friend and friend), within which the cultivation of unique characteristics leads to the flourishing of one’s relationship. Since Confucianism is taken to be a form of virtue ethics, there are good grounds for arguing that Watsuji also develops a virtue based theory. As can be seen, the structure of Watsuji’s ethical originations may be Hegelian, but the relations are Confucian. As virtues are espoused in both of these theories, Maraldo should reconsider whether the “cluster of sino-graphically and conceptually related concepts” might better be conceptualized as “virtues” and how these relate to Watsuji’s notion of trust.

Dignity

In the final essay, “Dignity and Respect: Reconceptualizing their Relationship,” Maraldo advances Watsuji’s thought in an interesting and unforeseen direction. He conceptualizes dignity and human rights from the relation between us, and places Watsuji into dialogue with contemporary advocates of recognition theory. Maraldo seeks to demonstrate that a conception of dignity can be derived from Watsuji’s thought to overcome the

\textsuperscript{15} Watsuji 1992a, 73.
\textsuperscript{16} Watsuji 1992a, 81, 86.
singular conceptions in contemporary literature. His claim is that the key to a robust theory of dignity is its mirror in the notion of rights. By extending Watsuji ethical thought, Maraldo’s claim is that dignity comes from relationships. However, Maraldo’s attempt to reframe these concepts within a Watsujian framework might be questioned on the grounds that dignity is a distinctly modern concept which only exists outside of a rigid social hierarchy. According to Charles Taylor’s narrative, the concept of dignity emerged alongside recognition as a consequence of the breakdown of modern hierarchies. As Taylor claims, “We can distinguish two changes that have together made the modern preoccupation with identity and recognition inevitable. The first is the collapse of social hierarchies, which used to be the basis for honour.”

For Taylor, in pre-modern society only some people possessed honour. However, this came to be replaced by the notion of dignity, which was applied to everyone. As Taylor explicates,

As against this notion of honour, we have the modern notion of dignity, now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent “dignity of human beings,” or of citizen dignity. The underlying premise here is that everyone shares in this.

If Taylor is correct, and the concept of dignity is a modern construction which only exists outside of hierarchical societies, then can Watsuji truly be said to espouse a theory of dignity? That is, since Watsuji’s account of aidagara results in a hierarchical society, composed of relationships within the ethical organizations of family, local community, cultural community, and nation state, can the notion of dignity be said to be compatible with his theory? These questions lead us back to Watsuji’s Confucian and Hegelian commitments. Maraldo acknowledges that Watsuji’s relationships are drawn from a Confucian source, however, it could be claimed that these are incompatible with modern social values. Does a wife gain dignity from being an ideal homemaker, by preparing her husband’s dinner on time when he arrives home from work? Do

children gain dignity from fulfilling their filial obligations to their parents? Moreover, is dignity only extended to same-sex couples, and nuclear families? To what extent do Watsuji’s Confucian convictions extend? For Hegel, in *Philosophy of Right*, without a sense of honour the individual will focus on their own self-interest, rather than identifying with the universal freedom of their wider community. In the aforementioned essay, *System of Ethical Life*, which Watsuji appeals to in *Ethics as the Study of Ningen*, the notion of honour also figures prominently. Here, for the early Hegel, the feeling of honour reflects the understanding of the potential loss of personality, and one defends one’s honour in order to preserve one’s personality. Thus, for Hegel, the struggle for honour could be argued to represent the denial of rights in modernity. However, in order to provide a satisfactory analysis of Watsuji’s account of dignity, it would be necessary to determine the exact nature of his social structure, and the extent to which Hegel and the Confucian tradition exerts an influence upon Watsuji.

**Summary**

To summarize, there are four particular areas where elucidation would be desirable. Firstly, given that Watsuji can be read to present an eco-centric theory, how would this contribute towards Maraldo’s environmental considerations in the final section? Secondly, although Maraldo frames the issues of translating philosophy with a mediating language, might we not also consider these as conceptual issues rather than simple linguistic? The third and fourth questions are interlinked as they both require further elucidation upon Watsuji’s relation to Hegel and Confucianism: Rather than “a cluster of sinographically and conceptually related concepts,” might these be better conceptualized as “virtues” and how would these relate to Watsuji’s ethic of trust? And finally: Does the social structure of Watsuji’s ethics permit him to espouse a theory of dignity?

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A ny author would be honored to receive eight thoughtful responses, critical as well as appreciative, to two wide-ranging volumes of essays. It is with profound gratitude that I in turn offer some reflections on the probing responses of my colleagues. My aim is not so much to defend my views against criticisms as to see their points as pivots that can turn our sight in new directions and sometimes expand our vision. I will divide my comments here according to themes rather than respondents, since they often raise questions that intertwine and connect their concerns, even while they diverge in their answers and approaches. (For sake of clarity, when summarizing the points of a respondent, I will enclose my own interpolations in parentheses.)

**Borders Claimed, Challenged, or Erased?**

**The Question of “World Philosophy” and the Place of “Japanese Philosophy”**

To Hans Peter Liederbach and Bernard Stevens I am grateful for a step back that contextualizes my inquiries and makes their genealogy and their limits more conspicuous. Liederbach begins with a statement of his own philosophical commitments (which I share): to present philosophical claims or positions in their hermeneutical (historical and language-bound) context, but to move on and offer solutions beyond the positions defined by a time, a language, or a tradition. We together would explicitly expand Charles Taylor’s implicit application of Gadamer’s famous “fusion of horizons” to include traditions usually placed outside Greco-European philosophy. This starting point raises questions about borders, their confines, overlaps, transgressions and erasures. Stevens puts this very point of departure into question by asking, in effect, whether the name *philosophy* should serve as the proper place to situate such fusion.

Let me begin then with their references to “world philosophy” as the area that might arbitrate these disputes or encompass their positions. Several comments by my responders assume that I understand my inquiries as contributions to “world philosophy.” In fact, I use the expression “world
philosophy” only five times, and then only to mention what other writers have invoked, but never to advocate it myself.¹ I realize I am “bucking the trend” by avoiding that now politically correct expression. “World philosophy” does have the laudable aim of presenting philosophy pluralistically, and without the Eurocentric sense that is still implied in the qualifier “non-Western.” But “world philosophy” presumes a unified “world” whose meaning calls for closer examination. In the question of “philosophy,” too, the meanings of our “one world” may turn out to be multiple, as I illustrate in the final essay of the first volume. What is more, the designation “world philosophy” may invoke an undesirable split rather than encourage the desired pluralism. In current discussions, that expression is used most frequently as a contrast to “Western philosophy,” that is, philosophy of Greco-European heritage. “World philosophy” does challenge the assumption of academic institutions that take Greco-European philosophy to mean all the philosophy there really is.² But then “world philosophy” turns out to be a hodgepodge of competing intellectual traditions that are either sidelined in departments of philosophy or relegated to other departments that deal with the “history of ideas” and other categories for what is “not (really) philosophy.”³ The expressions “Western philosophy” and “non-Western philosophy” are leftovers from an era of European colonialism, invoked as if the discipline never underwent global development. Who would think to qualify physics or sociology or any other academic field in this manner? If for now the geographical qualifiers “Western” and “non-Western” are still expedient, ide-

¹. References to my two books will be given simply as “i” for Volume 1 and “ii” for Volume 2, followed by the page numbers. Five instances in Volume 1 mention “world philosophy”: Inoue Tetsujirō, in “A Bit of My Worldview,” “defined his own position as a part of world philosophy…” (i: 89). James Heisig writes “only by seeing [Nishida’s philosophy] as it is located in the wider basho of world philosophy…” (i: 107). “Self, World, and the Nothingness Underlying Distinctions” was first published in The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy v (i: 180).

“Whether [Nishida’s] adaptation [of Western terms] distorts the contribution the classical East can make to world philosophy remains an open question” (i: 365, n. 17). “In the summer of 2014, I was invited to speak there on the theme of ‘world philosophy’” (i: 413). No mention of “world philosophy” is made in Volume 2.


ally they will become superfluous and our institutions will refer simply to *philosophy*. I propose that “philosophy-in-the-making” undercuts these binaries and their overlaps. This still embryonic notion recognizes traditions defined by distinct languages, texts, methodologies and interests, but places them in effective histories (*Wirkungsgeschichten*) that cross and develop the traditions through the process of trans-lation. Insofar as we need to recognize historical-cultural differences and linguistic distinctions, and to put a name to relevant traditions, the proper contrast to Greco-European philosophy is a plurality: Indian philosophy and Chinese and Japanese and African and Latin American and perhaps Indigenous philosophies—not an indistinct “world philosophy.” We make a category mistake when we place “world philosophy” as the relevant contrast to Greco-European philosophy.

I situate the evolving meanings of “Japanese philosophy” within this plurality. At the same time, I recognize the specific heritage of the term *philosophy* and the historical biases that guided its incursions into Japanese intellectual life. Thus, I favored the third of my four definitions that views premodern (pre-incursion) Japanese sources through the perspective of imported “Western” philosophy (1: 9). In retrospect, I would clarify that this perspective is not the only viable one. We can also attempt to define the “distinctive Japanese character of Japanese philosophy,” or “the potentialities of premodern Japanese philosophy” in its own terms. I regard these attempts as uncompleted projects for us today, and would see any such potentialities as viable sources for our philosophizing—including the task of understanding anew what premodern Japanese discourse was about, by way of contrasts with contemporary discourses. Any attempt to delineate “premodern Japanese philosophy” will have its biases and interests (its *Vorurteile*, as Gadamer says), with which we read and translate texts. While it is also

4. Liederbach cites Bret Davis’s compunctions regarding my third definition, but Davis too seems to agree with my point: “I concur that...we can allow pre-Meiji discourses to modify our current understanding of philosophy, but we cannot label those discourses ‘philosophy’ without at least provisionally projecting upon them modern Western and modern Japanese understandings of what is meant by that term” (Davis 2020, 45, n. 152).

5. In our exchange, neither I nor my respondents question philosophy’s binding to texts: its textual-orientation and transmission via the trans-lation of texts, which elsewhere I called philosophy’s *textuality* (Maraldo 1995; see also 1: 12). Maraldo 2010 (to be reprinted in
possible for historians to reconstruct readings that texts received in their own times and in later periods, that exercise of the history of philosophy is similarly guided by contemporary interests and research. In my mind, the task of defining any “distinctive Japanese character” would serve to highlight contrasts with other traditions and define their temporary limits. This endeavor would clearly differ from the aims of \textit{nihonjinron}, which aspires to establish fixed borders rather than to challenge or to erase them. Insofar as Nishida displayed the specific distinctions of Japanese thinking, he did so in pursuit of the “collaboration of various cultures within one global humanity, none of them dominating the others,” as Bernard Stevens states.

At the other end of this spectrum, I now see a major overlap between my first definition and the actual practice of academic Japanese philosophers. The first definition took as its premise the view that philosophy is an exclusively Greco-European discipline in origin, and confined “Japanese philosophy” to the work conducted “in a European key” by post-Meiji Japanese thinkers. The much broader designation “philosophy in Japan,” on the other hand, is not necessarily exclusionary, and increasingly includes engagements with premodern and modern Japanese sources. And to complicate matters more, I have suggested that scholars who are not ethnically Japanese and do not write in the Japanese language can be said to do Japanese philosophy when they engage originally Japanese-language texts and perspectives. This should come as no big surprise, since it is commonplace to see people all over the globe as doing “continental” (that is, European) philosophy, for

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6. An example from readings of Greek philosophy is the current debate about the division of Platonic dialogues, the contested separation of Socrates’ and Plato’s voices, and the controversial development of Plato’s moral psychology.

7. The work I cite later by Itabashi Yūjin is an example. Another example is Sueki 2016. An eminent scholar of Buddhism, Sueki writes: “As my research [in ancient and medieval Japanese Buddhism] progressed, I found that there was a great deal that could not be properly understood within the framework of the Western-centered philosophy of earlier times. I became convinced that a new conception of philosophy is needed” (vii).
example, or some German philosophers as carrying on American pragmatism. Here we find it natural to cross traditionally perceived borders.

The metaphor of borders also evokes the symbol of bridging. I make use of that symbol to compare and contrast the beginnings of philosophical thinking in Greece and in Japan by invoking the idea of philosophy as a way of life. Pierre Hadot documents this idea in the Greek traditions, and his critic John M. Cooper advances the plural “ways of life” and emphasizes their practice of reasoned argumentation and rigorous analysis. Michel Foucault stresses the Greek “care of the soul” (1: 31 & 36). From these readings of the origins of Greek philosophy I draw a bridge to premodern Japanese traditions that may similarly count as articulated ways of life, for all their differences from the more detached, less embodied Greek ways.

Here Bernard Stevens, following Bret Davis, raises an important question: why should we follow modern commentators who reinterpret the past “to suit their own agenda,” rather than read the texts themselves (Greek or otherwise) and engage them in their own terms? Stevens’s point is all the more pronounced when we recall that the Japanese philosophers I discuss dealt directly with such texts themselves rather than with modern interpretations of them. I must acknowledge that Hadot’s “way of life” is only one possible reading that bridges philosophical traditions which otherwise display distinct differences. What is more, Stevens reminds us that Heidegger—someone who profoundly engaged “the texts themselves” and insisted on philosophy’s sole origins in Greece—advocates a “new beginning” that should no longer go by the name of philosophy (although many readers will consider Heidegger’s reading of the Greeks to be a good example of reinterpreting the past to suit one’s own agenda). Why then impose the Greek name *philosophia* on what is not of Greek origin? Certainly we are not reading texts outside the Greco-European sphere “in their own terms” if we simply assume they are “philosophical.” And so Stevens presses me on the question whether we should use the term *philosophy* at all for the other traditions of thought that have their own histories, terminologies, and interests. Particularly where systems of thought do not pursue Greek-inspired disinterested knowledge, it might well be a mis-appropriation to impose on them the name of a Eurocentric discipline. As an example, Stevens mentions the various Indian soteriological systems. This is a decisive question with practical implications. Academic institutions today often relegate
what many of us call Indian philosophy, or Chinese and other East Asian philosophies, to university departments and seminars outside the home of “philosophy,” which means these sources are treated in predominantly philological and cultural frameworks that bypass the habits of interrogation fostered in that home. It seems to me that the hegemonic decision to isolate philosophy proper is not at all concerned to preserve the native significance of non-Western traditions of thought. That decision is all the more reason to encourage a “true dialogue between civilizations” in Stevens’s terms, or a “polylogue” in Liederbach’s words, where traditions are not simply treated as “the other” to philosophy. In this regard, it may indeed be important to enlarge the sense of “Western philosophy”—precisely by examining the specific ways it, too, has traditionally developed via intercultural translation.8

These concerns can encourage us readers of Japanese traditions to engage in more specific studies comparing and contrasting premodern Japanese discourse with discourse in Greek and in other languages, whether or not we want to designate the discourse from the start as “philosophical.” One project would be further inquiry into the clusters of concepts that defined fundamental questions in premodern Japanese discourse, on the one hand, and Chinese conceptual clusters, on the other.9 Another project, given the crucial role of “logical reasoning” as a mark of philosophy, is continued investigation of cultural modes and translations of rationality or, more broadly, of the ways that fundamental questions were thought out and answered.10 A third project would be an investigation of the senses of wisdom, Sophia, and related terms that connote a way of life that may or may not include the pursuit of disinterested knowledge. Where the aim is to educate ourselves

9. One excellent start is the study of Ogyū Sorai’s philosophical lexicography in Tucker 2006.
10. Thomas Kasulis (in JPSB, 25–28) singles out four habits of reasoning commonly practiced in Japanese philosophical traditions. Maraldo 2019, 64–8, gives examples of styles of argumentation in premodern Japanese philosophy. Graham 1989 and Graham 1992 present modes and limits of rationality in classical Chinese thinkers. MacIntyre 1988 argues that rationality is inseparable from tradition, and examines four rival styles of reasoning within the Western tradition. More specifically, Graham Priest, Yasuo Deguchi and Jay Garfield examine the logic of dialetheism—the view that there can be true sentences that contradict each other—that seems more prevalent in East Asian than in Western philosophy.
about a way of life most worth living, there are no temporal or geographical boundaries to our pursuits. What counts as philosophy may indeed be an “academic” question, but it is by no way an impractical and disinterested matter for us whose livelihood depends upon the support of institutions and cultures—or for anyone who appreciates the ability to question what we take for granted. Practicing philosophy as an interrogative discipline paves a path to clearings that lighten the burden of our confusions.

“Japanese Philosophy” and Nishida’s Contribution in Light of an Other

The interrogations of Emiliano Castro Sanchez lead us to a space that redefines “Japanese philosophy” in terms of what is other both to it and to its usual contrast, “Western philosophy.” For me, his path through the question of Japanese philosophy broadens out into the seldom recognized place of Indigenous perspectives.

Castro begins in a distinctively Heideggerian key but soon applies a particular Buddhist modulation. If philosophy celebrates the universality of reason, Castro, following Heidegger, first questions that universality and also disputes as well the geographical/geopolitical globality of philosophy. (Recall that Heidegger, contrary to his teacher Husserl, disavowed the grand idea that reason alone provided a way to pursue the infinite task of humanization, as I mention in the context of Tanabe’s crisis of reason, II: 153.) Castro tells us that to emphasize the universality of reason is to sideline the specificities that give it its flesh, as it were. In effect, the “Japanese-ness” of “Japanese philosophy” is rendered superfluous (as perhaps it should be if we are to include it in our teaching curricula). But then, Castro reminds us, philosophy as a Greek-founded discipline was always more than rational discourse that could transform any raw material in the world into food for thought. For philosophy was also a child of our emotive side—the fury, the desires and impulses (the eros), that move all of us humans to want what we lack. (This aspect also seems to resonate with Hadot’s philosophy as a way of living.) And our incessant appetites produce multifarious, culturally flavored ways to satiate us for the time being. That, too, seems to be a universal trait, a universal need.

Let us extrapolate from Castro so far. If, as Heidegger specifies, philosophy means Greek-inspired rational discourse about what is (which in the meantime forgets is-ing, Be-ing), then there is no such thing as Japanese (or
East Asian, or non-Western) philosophy. But if philosophy is understood as a “disposition of thinking” (an emotive-cognitive Befindlichkeit), then something like philosophy has occurred in Japan as well as elsewhere in the world. Yet that prospect leaves the specificity of philosophy behind; in effect, it makes the nominal philosophy superfluous. Perhaps this expansion suggests what Heidegger calls thinking in lieu of philosophy, although we should not prematurely identify Heidegger’s meaning with any sense of Japanese “thought” (思想). Is it possible that Heidegger’s “new beginning” or “another beginning” in the form of thinking might just have occurred long ago in these other lands, perhaps concealed in the poetic forms that fascinated Heidegger? Does thinking invite a third option to “Greek-European” philosophy versus “non-Western philosophy”?

So far, then, Castro answers the question “is there Japanese philosophy?” with “both yes and no.” There is and there is not. Here Castro modulates the Heideggerian key of his inquiry by applying a refrain from classical Indian Buddhism and the Kyoto School. There indeed is such a thing as Japanese-originated philosophy where philosophy denotes a disposition to thinking. And there is no such thing as Japanese philosophy where philosophy is rational discourse about what is. (We will return to the Buddhist “is and is not” when considering the response of Adam Loughnane). If Castro’s approach still seems too Heidegger-bound, we need only recall the essay by Nishida that begins, “the West thinks of being (有) as the ground of reality, whereas the East think of the Nothing (無)” (i: 354). This statement, with its enormous sweep of traditions, apparently agrees with Heidegger’s restriction of philosophy to the question of being. But then Nishida wrote expansively of “the metaphysical standpoints” rather than the “philosophies” of West and East. We might also recall that the question “philosophy or not?” applies to Heidegger himself. Was he a philosopher? Rudolf Carnap and numerous others said “no way!” And perhaps Heidegger the thinker would agree—in his own terms, of course. (I read der Weise in Heidegger’s “Country Path Conversations” as representing Heidegger the thinker, distinguished from the Gelehrter or philosopher.)

Castro’s depiction of Nishida assigns his philosophy (西田哲学) a place of mediation. I can only agree: Nishida, exceeding the status of Japan’s “first modern philosopher,” stands at the crossroads of the modern and the pre-modern, “between past and future,” “at the vortex of two worlds,” and even at
times “a Rosetta stone” allowing a translation between classical Christianity and Buddhism (as we shall see shortly). How would this mediating place fit the pattern of “both is and is not”? Standing aside from the metaphysical standpoints of West and East to gain perspective on both rather than being exclusively a philosopher of nothingness, rooting his work in Zen practice (as Bernard Stevens suggests and Rebeca Maldonado insists) and not merely in the idea of pure experience, the person Nishida appears both as a philosopher in the traditional sense and as not the usual at all. Castro hints further at how Nishida is a political philosopher from the beginning (and I will return to this theme later, for it seems to negate Heidegger’s apolitical view of philosophy’s beginnings). If the “first” modern Japanese philosopher is not without precedents, “Western” as well as “Eastern,” he is both inheritor and innovator. He was, as I will repeat, a preeminently inter-cultural philosopher. Castro’s response takes this mediation a step further, or rather, a step back. He concludes his reflections by alluding to his own place—and the place of Latin American thinkers—in a third arena, an Other to both Japanese and Anglo-European intellectual traditions that have marginalized if not entirely forgotten other contributions. For me, this step back invites us to consider the vast areas of Indigenous philosophy (as the American Philosophical Association now calls it), the palabras de los otros in Castro’s terms. It may be that this source is better conceived as “neither philosophy nor not philosophy.” Be that as it may, we will recognize our own boundaries and preconceptions more clearly by learning, from oral traditions and unwritten languages, how peoples across the globe have thought to live. That is the challenge that most interests me these days.

For now, further clarification concerning the “intercultural” nature of philosophy is in order.

Once More: Intercultural Philosophy, Translation, Philosophy-in-the-Making

“Intercultural philosophy” (and its allied names “cross-cultural philosophy” and “comparative philosophy”) designates first of all a bridging approach to the activity of philosophizing, rather than an area or a group of traditions. While this approach often compares and contrasts “non-Western” and Greco-European (or “Western”) discourse, it applies equally well to studies that engage different traditions solely within the former complex. I contend
that such traditions are fluid, but not boundless, as they interact through translation. A tradition is defined by its languages and historical times as well as its shifting geographical domain; traditions too are inevitably “in-the-making.” Liederbach cites Bret Davis’s judicious statement that philosophy of whatever vintage involves self-questioning rather than self-assertion, and so “it must entail critically reflecting on the horizontal limits of one’s own cultural tradition rather than just rearticulating and venerating the contours of those limits.” Rather than a designated area such as “Japanese philosophy”—or a “world philosophy” that would erase borders—a germane venue for such self-questioning is the approach of intercultural philosophy.

A significant method for self-questioning is translation. (Nishitani Keiji’s elucidation of the phrase 自事究明 is itself an example of a translation of Greco-European self-questioning that finds its counterpart in the Zen tradition.) As I have proposed, translation does not simply transfer texts from one natural language to another; it transforms textually embedded problems, methods and terminologies both across and within natural languages. Stevens adds the insight that translation calls for “an understanding of the whole historically creative cultural process behind the production of a philosophical text.” Liederbach mentions my commitment to the “hermeneutical truth” that “philosophical thought is inextricably bound to a specific historical, cultural, and linguistic context,” so I can now add this “truth” as the very reason translation is essential to philosophy-in-the-making. Liederbach notes that translation transforms what was the Other. Indeed, it brings others into view and potentially into conversation. It suggests that the encounter with what is other—what functions as a foil, a contrary, or a disruption of “the same”—is a necessary part of self-questioning. Translation is an instance of the “fusion of horizons” that crosses traditions as well as historical times, and in doing so it displays fissures as well as continuities. The task of an intercultural fusion of horizons would seem to assume fission within and between traditions.

13. Aside from the fissures apparent between horizons, Davis (2019, 725–6) points out how both Heidegger and Derrida move beyond the enclosures of horizons: Heidegger in his thought of the Gegnet or “open-region” in his “Country Path Conversations,” and Derrida in his notion of “the event” made possible by “the absence of horizon.”
Liederbach implies such fission within a tradition when he writes that, from an anti-Cartesian, post-Heideggerian point of view, we can no longer assume “there is some kind of hermeneutically retrievable continuity to the discipline” known as philosophy. This is one reason that it is problematic to presume continuity within a tradition, however designated, as I seem to do. It seems to me, however, that we may be putting the cart before the horse here, or digging a hole that hides the actual problem. The challenge I see is not to attempt to retrieve a coherent tradition but to define a tradition retrospectively from a juncture in the present (1: 13), so as to display its relevance—the difference it makes—for us now. (A striking example is Michael Puett’s Harvard course on ancient Chinese philosophy that challenges the worldwide priority given to “STEM education.”14) The term “appropriation” to which I frequently appeal expresses this challenge. It would be reverse to first determine the definitive bounds of a tradition linguistically called philosophy and only then choose the texts to translate and investigate. I propose instead that whatever our choices, swayed as they are by our own education, the challenges of translation help determine the relevance of the texts for the scope of “philosophy” and any one of its traditions.

Particularly in the case of intercultural translation, one’s assumed horizon of understanding is, as it were, split, jarred, or even shattered by reading and trying to understand a text out of a “foreign” tradition. To the degree that translation succeeds, it does not erase differences but lets the foreign be seen in contrast to the familiar present. As Heidegger said, its purpose is not simply to bring what has been said closer, but to allow distance and strangeness to emerge.15

(Perhaps Nishida’s notion of a “continuum of discontinuities” [非連続の連続] might apply to this idea, or his “contradictions that define the self-


15. HEIDEGGER 1941, 96.
same” [矛盾的自己同一]—an identity that internally sustains difference from itself.) The distance that Heidegger would preserve received further elaboration in Gadamer’s *Zeitenabstand* (temporal distance) that, Liederbach reminds us, makes the whole notion of *Wirkungsgeschichte* (the history effected by texts and interpretations) productive. Thus, if translation is to transform textually embedded problems, methods and terminologies and yet preserve distance, it must avoid two misconceptions: on the one hand, the Romanticist hermeneutical hope of reliving an original author’s intentions to overcome the temporal distance of their writing, and on the other hand conceiving a text as a kind of atemporal object that refers to ideal meanings beyond the confines of psychological intention and immediate historical context. Liederbach puts it this way: “philosophical problems are not perennial objects ready to be discovered at any possible time, but are accessible only under specific conditions.”

I think of translation as a method that makes such conditions visible, and it does so by encountering and articulating fissures as well as communicating meanings. In the context of intercultural philosophy, it works by recognizing and then challenging traditional borders.

The conscientious translator and her readers are, in turn, challenged to recognize and to bridge borders between traditions from a space they create in-between, to speak metaphorically. A bridge not only connects but preserves a space between two areas, and this distance can open our eyes to the need to change. Outside the “hermeneutical tradition” of Herder, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer within which Liederbach places my efforts, Habermas has criticized the conservative bias in Gadamer that prioritizes tradition over critical change. I submit that translation does change us, can disrupt present assumptions and biases, can transform the present and reach into the future by “effecting history”—*Geschichte bewirken*. Of course traditions reach into the past. But traditions also work forward from junctures in a present time. In the shifting traditions we gather under the name of philosophy, this is another way that it remains philosophy-in-the-making.

Does the translation that facilitates such philosophy necessarily require an infinite, polycentric space, allowing a potentially “infinite number of ways of doing philosophy,” as Liederbach worries? While I would not want

16. Maraldo (2010: 104) explains Paul Ricoeur’s articulation of these two extremes.
a-priori to preclude any particular ways of philosophizing, I envision translation as much more bounded, as quite finite in fact. I would leave open the “hermeneutical middle ground” for inclusion of the texts that interest researchers. But their linguistic nature—the creative word plays as well as the grammatical strictures—that define a discourse as “Greek” or “German” or “Japanese” of whatever historical period constrain the medium and ensure that some translations are out of bounds or mistaken. What if anything, my respondents will want to know, is out of bounds for “philosophy”? Staking out the bounds of the practice we now call philosophizing is an endeavor that, for better or worse, seems to interest only those of us who are challenging traditional boundaries. If, as Hegel said in Liederbach’s opening quotation, it is perpetual dissent within itself that distinguishes philosophy (and this aptly describes the beginning of modern philosophy in Meiji Japan), then we might seek definition in breakthroughs that come to us from the outside. (Think of Ueda Shizuteru’s notion of silence as the outside of all discourse and all language—a silence into which we must enter and from which we must return to fully appropriate their power.)

And yet I do not see plausible definitions as merely a matter of perspective. My appeal to philosophizing amidst texts, translations, and fellow philosophers who challenge one another is meant as a guard against any “perspectivism” that simply finds all views equally illuminating and favors relativism over rigor and decision. If a “perspectivism” characterizes my investigations, I would want it to mean allowing perspectives to appear as such, to bring to awareness the slants (biases) of any one of them. Different perspectives have different powers of illumination. On the other hand, I do not pretend to offer a science of perspectives that evaluates them from above, yet is not itself just another perspective. Rather than at a transcendental vantage point, I find myself “on the ground,” conditioned and constrained by the very life experiences that enable encounters with others. These contingent encounters are what open a “middle ground” from which we can appropriate philosophies. It was this kind of meeting ground that inspired my confrontation with Kuki’s philosophy of contingency, my questioning of “the quest for a worldview for the twenty-first century,” and my question: “nature within us or without us?”

To elaborate further the hermeneutical theory that I sketch at the beginning of each volume would require more words than I can summon here.
Suffice it to say that the ideas of intercultural philosophy, of Japanese philosophy, indeed of all philosophy, as “in the making” struck me only after I had engaged in much more specific and concrete investigations. The “theory” developed out of reflection on a practice. The ideas arose as I was trying to understand what Nishida, Tanabe, Kuki, Watsuji and others were doing in their engagements with specific Anglo-European and East Asian texts and concepts. When they write in a Japanese already modified by imported European ideas, and write as fellow philosophers to engage these creatively (but not to construct an allegedly new “Japanese” philosophical tradition), they do transform the traditions they draw from. I regard these Japanese thinkers as intercultural philosophers who belong to continuing lines of philosophical traditions. It was evident that they were keenly aware of the historical and linguistic place of their work, and that awareness inspired me to move beyond specific texts and to take a broader view of differing contours within vast traditions. (But not a “view from nowhere” or “from above.”) That is what I attempted in essays like “Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco-European Thought,” which reverses the presumption that “philosophy” describes the latter and “thought” (思想) the former. (In 1: 28, I use double arrows between distinct historical traditions to indicate reciprocal ways to configure philosophical traditions.) More globally, such lines of tradition as they extend into the past are defined by connections that researchers factually establish, as they do in Rolf Elberfeld’s project of Histories of Philosophy in a Global Perspective.¹⁷

Appropriating Nishida To Define Philosophy and Discern Patterns of Reciprocity

Whereas Liederbach and Stevens engage with Volume 1 by modifying a transcendent critique to offer a view from farther back if not from above, Adam Loughnane appropriates my reflections on Nishida in an immanent critique that complements them. Many of his turns of phrase subtly turn my analyses in directions I had not foreseen and let me now see patterns and boundaries in new light. His response is easily read as a coherent analysis in itself. Let me here merely isolate some cross sections that allow us to discern four patterns of reciprocity within Nishida’s thought. These patterns, as I

sketch them here, not only connect one response to others but also high-
light for me unnoticed connections between themes and formulations in
my various essays. I hope that my replies can in some measure reciprocate
the contributions of all my respondents.

Loughnane shows how signature features of Nishida’s philosophy can
apply to the exercise of defining philosophy itself, and not only “Japanese
philosophy.” A first pattern displays the reciprocity of the very act of defin-
ing when the objects to be defined come to affect our modes of defining. In
the case of “philosophy,” the sources we now signify as “philosophical” come
to reshape the original sign. Loughnane points out that defining itself is a
philosophical act—an intercultural philosophical act, I would add, that con-
fronts the dual problems of extension and exclusion that we have discussed.
Only via intercultural trans-lation do we extend the name of philosophy to
sources outside the bounds of the tradition that first created that name, and
we exclude—for the time being at least—other possible resources. Approp-
riating one of Nishida’s formulations, Loughnane presents defining as con-
struing an internal connection within diverse acts (作用と作用の直接の内面
的結合), specifically, the mutually defining acts of us philosophers and the
enactive discourses we read. As he puts it, “philosophy is not a type of object
that is indifferent to the acts that seek to define it.” The discourses which
philosophers choose to read, like the world that they and all humans enact,
are not indifferent to our acts of questioning, interpreting, trans-lating. Phi-
losophizing itself is a mode of enactment, of action-oriented intuition and
intuition-oriented action (行為的直観).

And yet, once again, such enactment of philosophy has its bounds.
Loughnane refers to them as the “givenness of philosophy.” Philosophy is
not just anything we at this point in time want it to be; it is not simply “up
to us” now to determine its meaning. We today are not the only sources of
definition: we encounter what is there before us. Insofar as we inherit the
meanings of philosophy from history, and from historical languages that
may or may not originally use the term, we are constrained by traditional
definitions and discourses. Making an otherwise infinite task possible, the
historical world will restrain what we include as philosophical discourse.
But I envision this givenness, too, as a form of reciprocity. What we may
draw from given cultural traditions and texts—and their descriptions of the
world—has the potential to recast our own inheritance.
In Loughnane’s insightful view, defining also appears in the form of mapping. To define philosophy we may envision it as a territory with boundaries, outside of which lies whatever does not belong to “philosophy.” Mapping can involve a second pattern of reciprocity. As we know from Nishida’s grapple with Josiah Royce and his self-imaging map, mapping can be a reciprocal act; a perfect map would have to include a depiction of the map maker and her act, ad infinitum. Nishida and Royce managed this unwieldy infinity by adapting Richard Dedekind’s notion of infinite systems that are partially mirrored in each of their parts (see 1. 276–88). Rather than following the mathematical model, however, Loughnane suggests to me that we see here a precursor to Nishida’s later logic of place or basho. Assuming some familiarity with this logic, we may mention Nishida’s point that this exercise involves more than implacing or enwrapping. Placing something in its proper basho means not only mapping it within its proper domain but also displaying how it reflects or partially mirrors some features common to its domain while omitting (excluding) other features. A map’s scale and the features symbolized in its “legend” apply to every part of the map. Not every part displays all of its features, but every part contributes features that define the whole map. To recognize philosophy as a kind of mapping would mean to locate different texts and traditions within an overarching domain that, in turn, is defined by the texts and traditions and their differences. The basho of philosophy is defined bi-directionally and interactively.

The exercise becomes more interesting when we wish to include the activity of the philosopher or defining agent who seems necessarily to stand outside the map but, of course, is necessary for it to occur. That “outside” to all maps introduces into the picture the ultimate “basho of nothingness,” and brings up Ueda Shizuteru’s proposal of a map that draws itself (1: 286–7). This proposal may sound far-fetched until we recall that Nishida, in effect, moves agency from the self to the world. Granted, the world is not a map, but when we think of “the world” we often picture a kind of map, perhaps a three-dimensional map, and the world surely includes every map of it and even every act of mapping it. Loughnane aptly translates this idea: the world maps itself onto the self. Think of it this way: The world is not a self-subsistent agent but rather an active totality that “expresses itself” through individual agents that embody and display it. The world’s expressivity (表現性), then, names a power that is actualized in its particular instantiations. World
and aware selves are co-determining and co-fulfilling. If we philosophers are mappers of the world, we must see our own activity as something, some action, that the world enables. And we must realize that we inevitably leave out what we do not (yet) know about. However infinite the world might be, our activity is definitely finite.

The relation between world and self presents a third pattern of reciprocity that is explicit within Nishida’s thought. Near the end of his life, Nishida famously wrote:

> Our awareness of self—our mirroring the self within the self—advances and manifests the self-awareness of the world ....Philosophy...must proceed not from the self, but from the world....what we call the self, as something that acts, should be reflected on from the standpoint of the world. When the world becomes self-aware, the self becomes self-aware. And when our self becomes self-aware, the world becomes self-aware.18

As a focal point of the world, each self is a center of the whole. The world itself, and all statements we make about world and self, are dependent on the fact that the world not only appears to these centers but comes to be aware of itself through them. This, too, is what is meant by the “expressivity” of the world. “The self becomes a point at which the world expresses itself; the self becomes a true individual, the true self.”19

In my ecological essay at the end of Volume 2, I used a metaphor to make Nishida’s point: We are, as it were, the world’s eyes, and not only its eyes but ears and fingers and other sense organs. If one expression of the world is the human historical body, and the body is a chiasmic being that senses the crossover from being touched to touching, from seeing to being seen, then we can imagine a certain reciprocity between Nishida’s thought and Merleau-Ponty’s that Loughnane has explored elsewhere.20 I would like us to expand our focus farther and explore possible reciprocities beyond those we notice between world and human self or human body. I would like us to consider all sentient bodies as expressions of the world’s awareness. Such ways are accessible to us, if not via our direct experience with other sentient beings, then via the stories of ethologists and indigenous peoples and

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18. NKZ 10: 471, 557.
anthropologists who learn from them. Nishida himself seems somewhat
discriminating but still open to such expansion of selfhood. On the one
hand, he wrote of the instinctual life of animals as opposed to the freedom
of human actions, but on the other he said (nonhuman) animals are capable
of enactive intuition, and so he intimated that nonhuman animals are actors
who participate in creating the historical world. It seems a natural step to
include other sentient beings in the *basho* of the world’s self-awareness.

The relation of self and world brings us back to the classical definition
of philosophy as the first discipline that questions this relation. Our fourth
pattern of reciprocity surfaces in such defining when carried out along
Nishidan lines. Here we can catch sight of Nishida bridging two European
domains that modern European philosophy was wont to sever: reason-based
philosophy proper and what it negates: revelation-based religion—reason’s
*logos* versus God’s word. A classical way to define God in medieval Euro-
pean philosophy is via negation, the *via negativa*. This way also served to
transgress the bounds of time-worn, mundane conceptions. In the classical
Buddhist form appropriated by Nishida (and Nishitani), it trans-lates as a
way to define any entity: X is at the same time not-X, and therefore it is X.
I attempted to parse this apparently enigmatic understanding of entities in
terms of temporal activities: fire is a burning that does not burn (or trans-
form) itself and that is what makes it what it is. Could this approach apply
to the definition of something as amorphous as philosophy? Philosophy
would seem a different enterprise altogether. After all, philosophy, unlike
something like fire, seems to do to itself what it does to all else: examine,
elucidate, interrogate, dispute.

As a sidetrack: perhaps this is what differentiates philosophy cross-cul-
turally and interculturally: its perpetual self-questioning that is unlike the
exercise of other disciplines (although they, too, can have their philosophi-
cal moments of self-examination). Yet the practice of philosophy, like the
activity of fire, requires its fuel, its material other, to do what it does, and
this material comes under the scope of philosophy from nearly every other
expression of human experience—including the practices, discourses, and

21. In his essay of 1938, 「人間的存在」 (Human being), in *NKZ* 9: 31, 33; see also 308. I explore
this extension further in "Humans and Other Animals: A Nishidan Proposal for How ‘Nature
Thinks,’" forthcoming.
texts that originally did not self-identity as *philosophy*. Fortunately, these sources are finite and can enter into the activity of philosophizing gradually. Philosophy-in-the-making extends its transformative power to its sources in intervals. Its extension (to other possible “thought traditions”) is selective and its deferral (of some) is not permanent. If *via negativa* is an exercise in exclusion—not this, not that—philosophy-in-the-making is an exercise in inclusion: making what does not originally self-identity as *philosophy* something philosophical. The distinctness (exclusivity) of philosophy appears in its unusual applicability (extension) to so many other human endeavors.

Returning now to Nishida’s Buddhist *via negativa*, one application exemplifies the way that his philosophizing extends a traditionally Asian Buddhist conception to a traditionally European Christian one. Regarding the question of God, Loughnane takes up Nishida’s self-contradictory definition of God as not-God, and reminds us that Nishida’s neologisms describe “a bi-directional determination between God and humans... in a space where God and self are related through self-negation.” He notes that the negation is not straightforwardly reciprocal in this “inverse respondence” (逆対応), that is, the two sides are not on a par with one another. In Nishida’s final essay, humans remain contingent upon determination by the Absolute (God), but—and here I would amend Loughnane somewhat—God is co-determined by that which God determines. God as the pure act of love, for example, is fulfilled by the recipients of love who in turn love others. If elaborated in more detail, Nishida’s extension might bridge two theologies. Let me merely offer a pointer. “Process theology,” inspired by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, does see a creator God as undergoing determination by creation. For a necessarily existing God to know a contingent world, God must have contingent aspects. God’s actuality, the manner in which God exists, interacts with the contingencies of the world and thus is in process rather than necessarily fixed for all time or in eternity. The activity of God’s creatures continually changes God’s experience of them. On the other hand, for theologians who espouse “the Christian distinction,” the only contingency involved is God’s choice to create or not create; God is immutably and absolutely God whether or not God creates a world; creation is entirely gratuitous (II: 229 & 227). I read Nishida’s last essay as bridging process theology and standard Christian theology. Nishida implies that a free and totally gratuitous creation out of love, however uncondi-
tional divine love is, necessarily entails a freely given, responsive act of love on the part of creation—on the part of what is created in “God’s image and likeness.” The “nothingness of God,” God’s self-negation, names the way that God as love does not oppose any other but embraces all, even while all else differs from God (1: 409). Once again, Nishida’s turn on an excluding *via negativa* moves negation into the direction of inclusion. This consideration has opened Nishida’s thought to contemporary theologians who engage with Buddhism as a “true mirror” to their own tradition.

*Nishida Beyond Philosophy: Zen Beginnings and Ends*

Rebeca Maldonado sets us squarely back in the Buddhist beginnings of Nishida’s philosophy. There the question of the role of Zen practice and Zen philosophy in Nishida’s life looms large. Maldonado sees through my reluctance to identify him as a Zen philosopher and shows us a way to reconnect Nishida and Zen. Nishida’s experience with Zen finds expression far beyond the little he wrote about it, and when he did call on Zen more explicitly, Maldonado intimates, he did so not to base his concepts on some authority but to let Zen words evoke insights in his readers. On the one hand, “concepts outside of traditions are vacant,” she notes, and on the other, a certain experience that escapes the bounds of concepts and their traditions can provide the soil that grounds and nurtures one’s philosophy. The fact that Nishida’s philosophy grew out of and left behind the adopted concept of “pure experience” should not deter us from seeing its roots in a practice that both inspired and defied that concept. That Nishida’s life experience does not reduce to a singular moment, a momentary *kenshō* or awakening, only attests to the enduring power of the practice in which it occurred—a practice that, I venture, eventually inspired his concept of performative intuition—embodied seeing by way of doing. That concept was but one form that deployed Nishida’s Zen experience, or rather “pure experience,” over his lifetime; other forms were self-deprecatingly formulated as “seeing the form of the formless, hearing the voice of the voiceless.” We may take Nishida’s comment to his student Nishitani in this light: “Isn’t Zen really a life of catching reality?”22—said perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek, gently poking fun at his own efforts to hold in his hands the reality that enveloped him.

**22.**「禅というものは真に現実把握を生命とするものではないか」. NKZ 19: 225.
If we take Zen to be a focal point of Nishida’s grasp of the world—to be a window into his philosophy—we may in turn place it as an example of how the historical world overall expresses itself in and through specific traditions that, in turn, shape the historical body. Loughnane’s translation of world and self, specifically, of how world maps itself onto the self, inspires this interpretation. Reading Nishida’s philosophy retrospectively from the 1943–45 essays back in time (as he in his 1936 Preface to Inquiry Into the Good reads “pure experience” retrospectively), we may understand the relation between the one universal world and the many individual selves (historical bodies) not simply as an “identity of contradictories” but more precisely as an asymmetrical if bi-directional “inverse respondence” (逆対応). The more expansive basho, the world, reflects itself in each one of its parts in a unique and historically defined way, which in turn helps define the wider basho. The world maps itself onto each self—each historical body—that in turn re-focuses the world through first-person perspectives. Our embodied selves are historical by living out historical traditions. Zen is one of those, and its practice is one “form,” one specification, in which the world expresses itself. That the philosopher Nishida gained a window onto the world through a specific, historically-shaped practice of awareness called Zen is, then, a reverse image of a world that expresses itself, and makes itself aware, in a certain historical body called Nishida.

A more concrete way to make this rather high-minded point is to let Zen sayings make it. This, Maldonado intimates, is what Nishida was doing when he explicitly quoted earthy Zen expressions. That Nishida quoted Zen texts in tandem with texts from other religious traditions shows his awareness of the plurality of ways the world gets expressed historically. Maldonado reads Nishida’s quotations as deployments of performative intuition: they generate insight. (This pointer resonates with what I intended, in a different context, by quoting from Dōgen at the end of both volumes 1 and 2.) Religious sayings give insight into the way the world has expressive power. In Jacinto Zavala’s translation of one passage that Maldonado cites, Nishida writes “What people of religion call the ‘word of God’ has to be apprehended from such a point of view.” Religious symbols are self-expressions of the world and in turn have the power to form the historical world. The dimension that Maldonado points to here shows how religion, for Nishida, transcends the individual, contrary to what I emphasized in my essay, “How
Nishida Individualized Religion.” If religion resides in the human heart, as Nishida repeatedly says in his last work, that heart is not an entity unto itself but a shared resonance between the self and the Absolute. Making the same point differently, Bernard Stevens reads Nishida’s political pronouncements in that work, where he “speaks of a state-based religion and morality,” as “contradicting his religious individualism.” Aside from this entanglement, I wholeheartedly agree that Nishida selects his quotations from religious traditions particularly to induce a transformation of everyday life, which is a shared life in the historical world. (And, we may note, the focus on everyday life here recasts the role of the everyday in Nishida’s earlier exchanges with Tosaka Jun; 1: 234–5, 251).

*Reading late Nishida and Tanabe in tandem*

At the same time, relocating the place of the individual heart raises a question about the death of the self and the place of the individual. Just what is it that dies, according to Nishida’s late philosophy? Nishida wrote of death as “what defines me, my individuality, more than anything else,” or so I had proposed in my essay, and that view took the meaning of death beyond the usual sense of the end of me as this embodied individual and hence as the absolute limit of my experience. Instead, by paraphrasing Shidō Bunan (1603–1676) and saying that one lives by dying, Nishida implies that death penetrates life at each moment and is realized in the radical nihilation of the self at each moment. Nishida’s universal description defines the individual in terms of its self-negation (1: 152, 155), but in his final essay this death of the ego-self occurs primarily in face of the Absolute (1: 144), not vis-à-vis others who share the historical world.

I can’t help but wonder whether Nishida was contemplating his own bodily death and profoundly sensed his singular departure from the historical world, when he composed that essay in 1945. This commonplace sense of one’s death would for Nishida mean the final opportunity to live by dying.

Maldonado places Nishida’s “living by dying” alongside Tanabe’s interpretation of Bunan: “living as if one were dead.” With this paradoxical saying she opens a new way to read Nishida’s final essay and Tanabe’s metanoetics in tandem, where Tanabe appears as his older colleague’s complement rather than his critic. Nishida parses the self as that which acts (働くもの) via enactive intuition—even where such activity leaves every sense of self behind.
Yet insofar as this describes the way we become—are resurrected as—singular individuals, Maldonado finds there a trace of egoity that is removed in Tanabe’s alternative. In Tanabe’s metanoetics, she writes, living as a dead person “means the continuous and paradoxical death of the self that still lives, through continuous metanoesis. For Maldonado, Tanabe advocates the continued practice of repentance or zange, a continuous self-abandonment, rather than Nishida’s continuous death of the self through action-intuition. Tanabe would transform the self who dies into a mediator of nothingness that returns it to the world “as an empty being,” not as a singular individual. This reading leaves me with further questions. Nishida’s living by dying is clearly a continual possibility, indeed a practice. And Tanabe explicitly considers zange as a practice (II: 189, 194), implying that is continual. But in what sense can the self-abandonment exhorted by Tanabe be a self-initiated and repeated practice? There is a finality to Tanabe’s self-abandonment (II: 206) that seems to leave “the empty being” bereft of action on its own, and that may feed into the worry that self-surrender is easily misdirected to earthly powers like the nation-state that would like to be absolute (II, 205–6). I wish that Maldonado had been able to comment on my Tanabe essays in Volume 2. But her comments on the place of death in Nishida’s “Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview” vis-à-vis Tanabe’s Metanoetics are an exciting incentive to further readings of the two texts in tandem. We will encounter yet another set of contrasting texts, mid-career Tanabe and later Tanabe, in the response of Quentin Blaevoet.

Maldonado’s concluding questions about the nature of the enactive self return us to a theme that occupied us earlier: the relation between self and world. Recalling my comparison with Varela’s theory of enaction, she raises probing questions that focus on the puzzle of the self’s unity and differentiation from the world it is said to enact. In the essay, “Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida’s Turn of Intuition Into Action,” I pointed out—but left unresolved—ambiguities in Varela’s and Nishida’s accounts that come to light when we contrast them. Maldonado offers questions that point to a resolution. The ambiguity in Varela concerns the identity and unity of self. I saw an unclarified tension between Varela’s no-self, that is, self merely as a product of narration—the “I” as a story we sometimes tell ourselves—and an implied self that underlies the ethical imperative of self-directed, moment-to-moment awareness of our virtual nature (I: 222). The ambi-
guity in Nishida occurs in the conceptions of knowing by immersing oneself in things and losing oneself (as in the practice of no-self), on the one hand, and knowing by interacting (as in enaction theory) on the other. I do not think this is a matter of “different descriptive standpoints,” as another reviewer suggests—that is, of a first-person standpoint of immersion and a third-person perspective of interaction. For, phenomenologically, bodily interaction with others is first experienced internally and “subjectively,” even if non-self-consciously, before it is objectified from a third-person point of view. In the background of these theories of enaction lies a world that itself is active and a self that is more than reactive. In effect, in Nishida’s late philosophy, world is much more an agent than is the “world” as Varela seems to understand it. In Varela’s theory, the meaningful and emergent Umwelt undergoes change through the actions of its organisms and in turn changes them. As noted previously, for Nishida, the embodied self functions as a way the world actively expresses itself, and the world functions in turn as a space in which the embodied self creates itself. But how might we reconcile the ambivalent senses of self in their philosophies?

Maldonado seems to accept my contention that Nishida’s negation of self, and perhaps also Varela’s (no)self, refer to a practice rather than a fixed, metaphysical position (to indicate this, I will place the negation in parentheses). Building from there, Maldonado’s questions propose possibilities to resolve the ambiguities I saw by linking aspects of (no)self in action. She asks if Nishida’s performative (no)self that “completely becomes [one with] things” (ものとなりきる) also functions as the self that truly meets and interacts with others (合い働き)—by losing oneself in compassion and in the wisdom that realizes our interdependence. She implicitly asks further if this performative sense of (no)self in interaction gains identity as a “narrative self,” insofar as narrative identity, too, is a way that the eternal present is continually realized in the historical world, the “environment” of our

23. Park (2020, 2) makes this distinction in his review of Volume 1. The standpoint of Varela’s theory seems to shift between the two perspectives. Varela acknowledges first-person perspectives but, like Nishida, moves away from a self-conscious first-person account when he writes, for example, “When one is the action, no residue of self-consciousness remains to observe the action externally” (quoted in 1: 221 and also by Maldonado). But then who is it that, as Park suggests, observes and describes actions externally, “as causal and normative mechanisms of enactive intuition”? 
embodiments of compassion and wisdom. In a similar vein, Bernard Stevens re-phrases Nishida’s (no)self as what happens when “there is no [longer an] ‘I’ that knows the world, but rather, in self-forgetfulness, an awareness that ‘becomes’ the world or the worldly thing.” Perhaps, Maldonado suggests, we need a kind of dialectic to define the relation between the performative (no)self of singular acts, and the singular narrative self that is recognized in the historical world. I will leave the task of developing these fascinating possibilities to others. Ideally, they will clarify not only our interpretations of Nishida and of Zen, but also his relevance for recent theories of enaction and their potential for clarifying human cognition.

Interlude: Nishida as Political Philosopher from the Start

Many readers of An Inquiry Into the Good find its resonance with Zen Buddhism quite transparent, particularly in its opening section. While recognizing the affinities with Zen, Bernard Sevens invites us to inquire whether that work is also “a re-actualization of Neo-Confucian ethics in a Western vocabulary.” Similarly, in contrast with his teacher Rebeca Maldonado, Emiliano Castro reads Nishida’s text in a way that exceeds its definition as a Zen-inspired work. This possible reading finds support in Nishida’s text when, once again, we see how something universal requires specification to manifest itself. Castro writes that “behind pure experience there is a tension between unity and diversity. While consciousness and reality tend towards an absolute unity, this unity exists only insofar as it is expressed in different singular acts. This ontological view has obvious political consequences.”

One consequence, in Castro’s reading, is that the systemic unity of consciousness is not merely a universal but necessarily receives political specification in “collective unities of consciousness that range from the family to the nation and eventually to the social unity of all humanity.” Perhaps inspired by Maldonado’s dialogical reading of late Nishida and Tanabe, Castro’s reading here links early Nishida to mid-career Tanabe and his logic of species. We might inquire further whether Nishida’s universal system of consciousness so directly translates into the geo-political sphere specified by the “singularities of each nation.” The insistence on such singularities and their particular contributions to a global political world is for Castro the only sense in which Nishida is a nationalist thinker. For me, even if there is an apparent gap between the universal and the global, it makes
sense to probe the possible unity between the ontological and the political in Nishida. Christopher Goto-Jones began such investigations almost two decades ago, reading An Inquiry in his own way as a political philosophy. On the other hand, Richard Wollin’s interrogation of Heidegger’s Being and Time gives reason to exercise caution when reading politics into ontology.

A second consequence lies in seeing the religious dimension of the political as a specification of communal consciousness. Here, Castro says, “unity is realized only by virtue of each singular act, of each instant coming to presence.” While this insight at first seems to support the individualization of religion, Castro suggests that Nishida’s attempt to save both unity and diversity on a religious level is part of a political agenda, insofar as religion is a thoroughly social phenomenon. Taking that agenda as our starting point, we might then inquire why Nishida, in his last completed work, “The Logic of Place and The Religious Worldview,” severed the religious from the moral and from what we call the political. To be sure, he encouraged an “obedience to the nation” that “derived from the standpoint of true religion”—in other words, from the heart’s encounter with the Absolute, not from the nation-state (1: 157). What is missing, I noted, is the voice of religion as a critique of society and the political state, such as we find in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society of 1932. To give Nishida’s final politics a more charitable reading, we might understand his “obedience” as a criticism of both national and individual egoism.

A third consequence is the prospect that Nishida proposes “a world in which many worlds fit,” to use Castro’s Zapatista phrase. “World” here is unmistakeably a global political reality that, for Castro, encompasses the ecological along with the cosmopolitan and that, once again, requires diversity to uphold global unity. No universal without differences—this is the principle Castro finds in Nishida’s philosophy, and it is as political (since we inhabit the earth together) as it is ontological. This principle later finds expression in the philosophy of basho, a logic of both fitting within and reflecting outward. The clear political message is that suppression of dissent is self-destructive: a world (or a nation-state) that would exclude some constituents that differ from others only cuts itself in two.

In light of Castro’s response, I am tempted to apply the Buddhist logic he applies to other questions. Starting with the conference that gave rise to *Rude Awakenings*, I have encouraged Nishida’s proponents to grapple with the question of his nationalism, and implored his detractors to consider the ways he was a critic of nationalism. And yet, even assuming that the sense of “nationalist” remains consistent, I still find reason to say Nishida both was and was not a nationalist. I do not simply mean that at one time in his life he was not and later in life he was. At the end, he felt he had compromised his message to his country’s officials and was torn between tempering and promoting Japan’s singular place in the world. But early in his life, too, he wavered; as a young student it was between patriotic zeal and resistance to devotion to Japan’s emperor (a devotion he later was to profess). A certain disunity seems to have troubled him internally, in his heart, all along. In that he was no different from the rest of us.

*Tanabe’s body, social-bound and then released*

After offering some appreciative comments on my placing of “Japanese philosophy,” Quentin Blaevoet’s perceptive response focuses on one essay in the second volume, “Metanoetics and the Crisis of Reason: Tanabe, Nishida, and Contemporary Philosophy.” In response, let me focus on the issue that Blaevoet most acutely raises: what is the role of the body in Tanabe’s metanoetics? This crucial issue deserves much more attention than I gave it in that essay; indeed, the question of the body’s significance for Tanabe’s entire philosophy, and for Nishida and other Kyoto School philosophers, deserves more detailed analysis in Anglo-European secondary literature *tout court*. (We will have something to say about the role of the

26. The biography of Yusa Michiko shows that Nishida as a student of the Fourth Higher School resisted the nationalist spirit enforced by the new *Imperial Rescript on Education* while still exhibiting “a patriotic zeal” to contribute to “building a new constitutional nation” (*Yusa 2002*, 2.4–29). Nishida’s private letters often allude to his compunctions and vacillations. In 1943, he wrote that he had “compromised on [his] choice of words” in composing “The Principles for a New world Order.” Expressions that call for confidence also indicate its lack: “…Even if we lose the war in terms of military might, we must not lose our cultural and moral confidence in the historical universality of the Japanese *kokutai* in terms of the formation of the global world…” (*Yusa 2002*, 321 & 329). On Nishida’s support of the institution of the emperor (*皇室*), see i: 255–7.

27. Many Japanese philosophical treatises on the body, such as Yuasa Yasuo’s *『身体』* (1977)
body for Watsuji in the next section.) Here I can only hope to raise a few attendant questions, in the hopes that other scholars will investigate and perhaps reformulate them.

Blaevovet takes me to task for neglecting the role of the body in Tanabe’s critique of reason and advocacy of metanoetics. I do point out that Tanabe neglects the body in his metanoetics, but I too leave the role of the body unspecified. This is a fair criticism. I see several motivations (reasons?) for considering the place of the body in metanoetics. My essay briefly treats two of them while noting Tanabe’s lack of pursuing the parallels (11: 160–163). First, I note a possible parallel between metanoetic self-abandonment and the release from self that is enjoined by two distinct practices that engage (and disengage) the body: zazen practice and the practice of accomplished athletes, both of which involve ultimate release from conscious willing. Despite his appreciation of “the spirit of Zen,” Tanabe treats zazen (and conceivably any bodily meditation practice) as an example of self-power for the elite, antithetical to the metanoetic path of Other-Power for everyone. He has no reason to consider other bodily practices that may begin with self-exertion or self-attention but proceed to let these go. In effect, in this respect his critique conceals a dismissal of the body. Then again, when Tanabe criticizes Nietzsche, another evident parallel escapes his notice—that between his own “absolute critique” of reason and Nietzsche’s critique of Descartes, whose notion of the body was “everything opposed to reason” (indeed the entire rationalist tradition from Plato on seems to have disowned the body). Insofar as the body served as the antithesis of reason and antidote to rationality, its historical significance might have engaged Tanabe’s attention a lot more.

Yet another path via the body seems ignored in Tanabe’s turn to metanoetics: the way that his students and compatriots were bodily taken away to war and often to their deaths in the name of safeguarding the emperor and the nation. In his Preface of October 1945, Tanabe proclaims his profound sense of responsibility as a professor for his role in misleading them (this sense was the subject of my second essay on Tanabe). But he might have dwelled on the utter physicality of the war’s destruction and his students’ sacrifice, and its role in his sudden awakening to metanoetic

similarly neglect Tanabe’s contribution. ITABASHI 2021a is an example of several recent treaties on the significance of the body for Nishida.
To be sure, this physicality was not that of external physical objects; it must have been felt inwardly as the destruction of lived bodies and of dwellings that sustain life. I surmise that the absence and the destruction of bodies, personal and cultural, played a crucial role in Tanabe’s heartfelt turn to Other-Power. Tanabe mentions no such thing, and I too might have mentioned the significance of the body in my second essay, which considers the challenge that a sense of personal responsibility poses to metanoetics. Where I propose Eva Kor’s practice of forgiveness as the kind of saving relief and release that could embody Tanabe’s sense of Other-Power, a connection to the body is palpable. Eva Kor’s forgiveness was her eventual response to those who “experimented on” her body as a child and tortured her in Auschwitz during the same world war. I might also have connected her experience to the alienating torture of the body that I consider in my essay on dignity (ii: 127). In terms of responsibility, Eva Kor and Tanabe Hajime were on “opposite sides”—she beginning as victim and he as someone complicit in great harm. But if Eva Kor’s turn to forgiveness after decades of hate and anger is extraordinary, nearly unthinkable, so too is the change of heart and absolute critique that Tanabe proposes in the midst and in the aftermath of bombing and terror. An undercurrent in Tanabe’s turn is his ambivalence toward personal responsibility, tossing him back and forth between a sense of helplessness and a sense of culpability for the destruction he bodily witnessed all around him. Even from his Kita Karuizawa retreat where he completed his book, this Erlebnis (体験) would have had a powerful impact on his consciousness, his growing alienation from rational explanations, and his turn to metanoetics. Does metanoetics and its reliance on Other-Power call for a release not only from self-effort and self-will but from a fully embodied personal self? This is the question that Blaevoet’s reminder leaves me with.

Then again, what of the possible connections with Tanabe’s pre-war philosophy of the body, particularly in his logic of species, which he continues post-war in a transformed Dialectic of the Logic of Species (1947). The lived body (身体) plays a crucial role in the pre-war, pre-metanoetic works,
as Blaevoet points out. It plays a lesser role in the post-war work as a contrast to reason. But *Philosophy as Metanoetics* seems to leave the body behind.

To sharpen the question, we may jump immediately to Blaevoet’s concluding claim: “Without a body, there would be no distinction between the I and the whole—there would be no subjectivity at all. *I is a body.* Otherwise there would be no way that the relative could ever simply be a mediator for the Absolute.” If this were the case, a failure to account for the role of the body would undermine Tanabe’s entire philosophy (or non-philosophy) of metanoetics. It may be that Blaevoet is suggesting here a trenchant critique of Tanabe’s metanoetics and leaving evidence for his claim to another occasion (perhaps via Michel Henry’s philosophy of corporeality). His powerful claim reaches philosophies of subjectivity and selfhood in general by identifying the personal self as a body and seeing the body as the site of subjectivity. It also invites comparisons with Nishida’s late philosophy of the self’s encounter with the Absolute. These are immense topics that could easily serve as the subject matter of an entire dissertation. I address them here in all brevity.

I happen to agree that the lived body (*der Leib*, 身体) is the principal site of individual subjectivity. Whether Tanabe could agree is another matter, and there are reasons to think he could not, and would also not consider the body as the sole mediator of the Absolute. We might examine at least three thorny issues pertaining to his tacit philosophy of the body.

The sense of death is the first issue. On first sight, considering Tanabe’s (non-)philosophy of death in the *Metanoetics*, it appears that the body might indeed be the mediator. His talk of “becoming as one already dead while still alive” does not enjoin one to displace the body or separate the soul from it (as Socrates implied when defining philosophy as “the practice of dying”). Tanabe’s death of reason, “death of the self,” and “death to the self” is not the death of the body. Each of these formulations presumably leaves the person fully embodied if spiritually transformed. It might then seem that Tanabe would allow for a personal body which continues throughout, and which might be the site of mediation. Yet Tanabe makes it clear that the relative self who mediates the Absolute is a self who is utterly transformed.

29. For example, *THZ* 7: 338.
30. TANABE 1946, 51, 55.
through metanoesis and submission to Other-Power. It is not the pre-metanoetic, willful self. Do we then have two selves, as it were, each in its time living in (or as) the same body? Or, if “I” am transformed and yet “I” am “a body,” perhaps this body that I am is transformed? Nowhere in Tanabe do I see any hint of a bodily transformation, as we find for example in the analogue of submission in athletic prowess. (Blaevoot’s critical question about the risk of submission to forces that are “oppressive and destructive” is a topic addressed in my second essay on Tanabe’s metanoetics, ii: 205.)

These questions raise a related issue that concerns the body’s role in individuation and personal identity. To take up but a fraction of this complex issue, Blaevoet rightly points out that metanoetics calls for my death, not the death of the subject in general. What is it that makes the death in question specifically my death? If it were the death of my body, what then would be left to mediate the Absolute in difference to it? But rather than hinting at such questions, Tanabe takes another track. He dwells dialectically on the role of self-consciousness or self-awareness (自覚) — and the seemingly contradictory “self-awareness of death”—in terms remote from the body. The death that is my death and of which there is some sort of awareness, my awareness, must be present now in an intersection of the present with the eternal, Tanabe says. Rather than an anticipation of the future (which would be an anticipation of bodily death), metanoesis, like the “Great Death” of Zen, calls for a “personal choice to become in a positive sense the efficient cause of one’s own death.” There would be much more to say but, in short, it appears to me that for Tanabe, as for other Kyoto School philosophers and for transcendental phenomenologists as well, what individuates or personalizes me is a self-awareness not reducible to my body, to a body that I in some sense am. Blaevoet’s claim further places subjectivity solely in the body. Tanabe complicates the matter with the talk not of subjectivity, but rather of nothingness and a self-negating self-awareness (a negating of self). Assuming that self-awareness is basic to subjectivity, then Tanabe’s negated self-awareness is subjectivity negated and transformed. The role of such negation and restoration of subjectivity is to mediate absolute nothingness.

Blaevoot’s claim implies an either–or: either the body-self mediates the

31. Ibid., 61–2. It is clear that Tanabe is not referring to self-chosen suicide.
Absolute, or there is no difference between the I and the Absolute (the whole); the I dissolves in the Absolute (like an atman that dissolves into Brahman, or ceteris paribus, like a personal mind sublated by universal Reason). For Blaevoet, the body seems to serve as a buffer or even barrier between personal subjectivity and the Absolute. Whether dissolution is the only alternative to mediation is one question; whether (the notion of) an unmediated, utterly transcendent Absolute is the consequent of a pre-meta-noetic, willful personal self is another; and whether the Absolute is mediated as long as the body lives is a third. In essays on other philosophers, I dealt with related questions that could easily be applied to Tanabe as well. Nishida’s notion of the inverse respondence (逆対応) that obtains between the relative self and the Absolute ensures that the Absolute embraces the human self but the human never coincides or merges with God (Ⅰ: 412). But what exactly is the relation between “the Absolute” (絶対者) and “absolute nothingness”? And on what basis do Tanabe, and Nishida and Kuki as well, reject the personification of the Absolute (respectively, God or the Buddha Amida)? Blaevoet’s critique inspires yet other questions. For Nishida, given the role that the body plays in the enactive intuition (行為的直観) that defines selfhood, why does the body seem to drop out of consideration in the way the self encounters the Absolute in an inverse respondence (逆対応)? For Tanabe, what is the role of the body in the action of “action-faith-witness” (行信證) that negates self-initiated action?

Finally, to introduce a third issue, we might attempt to bypass this barrage of highly speculative questions and return to a more concrete matter. As noted, the lived body (身体) plays a crucial role in Tanabe’s pre-metanoetic philosophy. Might that role be marshalled to save Tanabe from the omission of the body in the metanoetics? Blaevoet cites a cryptic sentence in Tanabe’s 1931 essay, “The Standpoint of Anthropology,” that seems to support his concluding claim. In his understanding, Tanabe speaks of the body as “an oppositional moment,” more concretely, a “corporeally finite individual” that “holds its being from the whole to which it is opposed.” The body would then ground the individual’s distinction from the whole and comprise the subjectivity of this relative being that otherwise would merge with the Absolute. Indeed, in the passage in question, Tanabe has already proclaimed that the study of the human being must take into account the human being as a whole (全体人間), and not merely as one part or one aspect,
such as the spirit in contrast to the body. Tanabe also invokes the standard phenomenological distinction between the “noematic body” — the Körper or object-body — and the noetic or subject-body (der Leib) that defines his sense of corporeity (身体性). In my understanding, the passage that Blaevooet cites translates somewhat differently from his rendition:

Thus, my body, as it on the one hand is the determining ground for the I to exist as the I, on the other hand serves as the medium by which the I surpasses this determination and returns to the infinite, absolute whole. Corporeity is a contradictory unity, at once this determining ground of the I as well as the mediator of a reductive development towards the infinite I. The I is the single individual as the oppositional moment of this dialectical unity and at the same time possess beingness (存在性) as the whole that stands in opposition [to the singular]. It is made self-aware as the oppositional being that serves as the source of power rather than mere dissipation of power. This determination as a being derives from corporeity.32

The body is indeed a mediator, but between which two oppositional sides? I read Tanabe, in this stage of his thought, as opposing two aspects of the self or the I (我): the finite singular self and an infinite whole. But is this infinite, absolute whole somehow Reason writ large, in which case Tanabe’s body would serve as a back-and-forth (dialectical) embodiment of absolute reason? Or, more likely, is it rather a socio-historical whole, the world as a socio-historical space-time complex? In that case, our corporeity both grounds our “being-in-a-particular-social-species” and functions as the site of its renewal. In other words, the body socializes us as much as it individuates us as subjective singular selves.33 In any case, the crucial question for Blaevoet’s claim is this: is the “infinite I” or “absolute whole” mentioned in this passage equivalent to the Absolute of Tanabe’s later metanoetics, or does it rather refer to the totality of human be-ing?

Let us leave the whirlwind of Tanabe’s thought and development to

32. 「然るに我の身体は一方において我を我として存在せしめる限定の根拠であると共に、他方において我がこの限定を超えて無限の絶対的全体に帰入する媒介となるものである…この我の限定の根拠にして同時に無限の我への還元的発展の媒介であるという矛盾の統一が身体性なのである。我はかかる弁証法的統一の対立契機としての個体であると同時にその対立者たる全体としての存在性を有し、単に力の消長ならぬ力源としての对立的存在者としての自覚される。その存在者としての限定は身体性に由来するものである。」「人間学の立場」，THZ 4, 370–1.

33. This reading is suggested to me by Sugimura 2019, 122–3.
others better informed than I. What I gather from the various readings of Tanabe’s 1931 essay only sharpens Blaevvoet’s initial question: why did Tanabe leave the role of the body unspecified in his metanoetics? Was it because his pre-metanoetic philosophy led him to find in our corporeity a rational ground for the state as well as for human social existence—in effect because the body had situated a rationality that he later felt compelled to overturn? What we can agree upon here is the undoubtable relevance of the lived body for understanding Tanabe’s philosophy. For that we have Blaevvoet to thank.

Interrogating My Interpretations of Watsuji

Focusing on the chapters of Volume 2 that deal with Watsuji’s Ethics, Inutsuka Yū and Kyle Shuttleworth offer some pointed objections to my interrogations. Their efforts deserve detailed response that can open further exploration of Watsuji’s abiding significance. Evidently, Inutsuka’s primary concern is to keep us on track in representing Watsuji accurately. Shuttleworth’s concern apparently is to ensure fidelity to Watsuji’s philosophy, even when “we should not take him at his word.” An accurate presentation of Watsuji’s ideas is of great importance to me as well, but I regard accuracy only as the first step to appropriate his Ethics in dialogue with contemporary philosophy. I do not seek out flaws in Watsuji’s explanations to present a critique for its own sake, but rather to strengthen the case for the relevance of his philosophy and, in particular, to develop cogent applications of his insight into human relationality. This task often required staking out a middle ground between his detractors—the critics that find totalitarian tendencies in his philosophy (Sakai Naoki, Bernard Bernier, Chiara Brivio, etc.)—and his expositors who sidestep the challenges and difficulties. I think it essential to address the issues that trouble his political critics today, which is why I consider troubling aspects of his social hierarchies in a chapter on the perils of his ethics. Whether there can be a Watsuian ethics without hierarchy is a question we will address shortly.

The Use of Persons as a Means

Let me begin with a pivotal point in the middle of my treatment of Watsuji’s Ethics. Inutsuka and Shuttleworth both point out the relevance of Watsuji’s many writings on Kant in addition to his treatment in Ethics, and
I wholeheartedly agree that his Kant interpretations deserve more attention by scholars. In his *Ethics*, Watsuji critically discusses Kant’s sense of ethical obligation and the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how Kant implies but also misunderstands the fundamental relational nature of human actions. I critically discuss Watsuji’s reinterpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative because it is one of the few places Watsuji mentions the notion of dignity, central as that is to Kant’s ethical philosophy and to my project of developing a robust sense of relational dignity. I suggested that part of Watsuji’s interpretation is mistaken and unneeded, and another part is innovative and insightful (11: 117).

Watsuji argues that, for Kant to be consistent, we must recognize that a person (人格) is of an empirical as well as a noumenal or transcendental nature, and that therefore a person may, at times, ethically be treated solely as a means and not as an end. Otherwise, Watsuji says, it would not be possible to establish the fundamental interconnection among human beings. And Kant’s kingdom of ends “as the systematic connection of persons” would not be possible. Affiliation among humans is possible because of humans’ dual character—in Kant’s terms their empirical as well as noumenal character, and this is realized in their treatment as a means as well as an end. For example, benevolence and kindness toward others requires a movement between treating others and oneself as an end and as a means. Yet service rendered to others does not mean subservience or slavery: “While serving you, the dignity of my person [人格的尊厳] must also be upheld.” The point for Watsuji is that even Kant’s own “principle of humanity” requires recognition of a dynamic interaction between oneself and others, in which use as a means is a necessary negation of individual identity.

I argue that part of Watsuji’s claim about Kant is indeed perspicacious; Kant’s “kingdom of ends” is a tacit recognition of the “fundamental law of being human,” that is, the dynamic relation between individuality and sociality. But neither that “law” nor our interactions require that we sometimes use one another, or ourselves, solely as a means. In invoking Kant’s concept of dignity here only to avoid the extreme and unethical kind of use we call slavery, Watsuji seems to think that the concept is not sufficiently developed

34. Watsuji 1949, 140–1; see also 244–45, 252; WtZ 10: 150; also 257, 265–6.
35. Watsuji 1949, 142; WtZ 10: 150.
to function as relational dignity. I think he fails to realize one potential of his profound philosophy. Watsuji does not clarify, nor did I examine, why or how it is our “empirical” (versus “noumenal”) character that requires the use of persons as a means.

Kant did think that the human body is a condition of empirical knowledge, and sometimes wrote of our mind as spatially located within our bodies, but his consistent belief that human nature is unified would mean that, ethically, we may not ever split the self into empirical versus transcendental sides and treat ourselves or others solely as a means. Apparently, for Watsuji it is our empirical side that necessitates and justifies such instrumental treatment, insofar as it negates a person’s individual self and establishes our interconnection. This seems implausibly to imply that our transcendental side is not, as Kant held, what makes all humans the same—universally possessing rationality—but rather as what makes us independent individuals.

Aside from the difficulty of reading Watsuji’s mind regarding our empirical character, it surely would be worthwhile to interrogate further whether the use of persons solely as a means must be an essential way that individuals negate themselves, and whether such usage is necessarily entailed by Watsuji’s fundamental law. I focused instead on Watsuji’s example of actions of kindness, and asked whether my kindness toward others, or theirs toward me, is a matter of using one another as a means. To try to see what that might entail, I extrapolated a more detailed example and asked, “Is this to say that [the person who helped me] used his body...to do me a favor?” (11: 119). I then argued against the view that acting bodily is a matter of using one’s body as a means. More generally, I argued that one is never necessarily so using oneself or others in interacting with them.

Note that in Watsuji’s own terms, it is one’s personhood (Kant’s Persönlichkeit), not one’s body, that must sometimes be used solely as a means. Clearly Watsuji understands the body—being-a-body—as essential to human be-ing. But does that mean using the body as object is what we necessarily do when we act, and thus that we inevitably use others and ourselves solely if temporarily as a means?

Inutsuka offers an argument that one indeed uses one’s body as a means when showing kindness to others or accepting their kindness. Indeed, one

36. WATSUJI 1949, 142; WTZ I: 150.
could not act kindly toward others if one did not use their “object body.” Moreover, she notes that in an earlier essay on Kant, Watsuji reinterprets Kant’s dictum dynamically: a person should be treated as both a means and an end, both a “thing” and an (end-in-itself) “person” (one aspect at a time, I would clarify). Watsuji seems there to affirm what he calls this reification of the person (人格性の物化). I will leave it to others to investigate the cogency of Watsuji’s Kant interpretation in his earlier essay, “The Person and Humanity in Kant,” and its possible discrepancies with his reinterpretation in his *Ethics*. Suffice it to point out one passage in the *Ethics* that would seem to contradict Inutsuka’s contention. Explaining the actions of human beings (人間の行為), Watsuji states:

> Accordingly, as one detects a specific motion in the body of one’s counterpart, one puts one’s own body in motion in a specific way as well. In such cases, the human body is not dealt with as “matter” [物体], as in physiology. And the movement of the body during this interval of time is not merely physical relations nor biological ones. Instead, it involves as well the relationship between one subject and another, as distinct from the relation between a person and a thing, even though such movement uses physical expressions as its medium.

Watsuji goes on to emphasize the relationality of actions (their intersubjectivity, 主体対主体の関係), which is more significant than their conditioning as willed or desired or simply conscious, and more significant than their relation with “objective things” (客体な物). These latter factors are relatively “beside the point” (見当遠い) for defining human actions.³⁷

Indeed, I find Watsuji in the *Ethics* to be in basic agreement with phenomenologists and other contemporary philosophers who argue that it is misleading to think I use my body as an object or something other than myself. Here I find Watsuji also in alignment with Nishida, who—as Loughnane reminds us—regards the embodied self as an expression of the world itself. To conceive of this “I” as a mind that has a body, or as a subject-body that has and uses an object-body, does not account for how one acts (and interacts) in the world. This is not the place to offer a detailed analysis, but the basic idea is that I live my body; I live and act as a body. When my

counterpart lifts a bag of rocks for me—to use my example—he is not operating a machine like a forklift, but rather feeling the weight and adjusting his movements from the inside; he is acting as a unified whole that interacts with other persons and with things in the world. Watsuji in particular, in the passage quoted above, emphasizes interacting subjective bodies rather than some conscious mind directing a body-thing. Some philosophers even describe how we “use” hand tools by treating them as extensions of the body we live.

While it may be possible to imaginatively disembodify oneself and regard the body as an object detachable from oneself, in Watsuji’s standpoint this appears extraordinary. With regard to the bodies of others, to treat them solely as objects would undermine fundamental trust among human beings by de-subjectifying and de-personalizing them. (A contemporary example of using another’s body solely as a means are laws that treat a pregnant woman primarily as an incubator or vessel for a fetus.) Watsuji’s very word for the self as subject, shutai 主体, connects self, 主 and body, 体. In general, I read Watsuji as sharing with most transcendental philosophy the premise that objects “out there” in the world are constituted by human subjectivity and agency, which is primary. Dilthey too saw objective things as expressions of our involved subjectivity (ii: 29). From the very first page of his Ethics Watsuji was engaged in overcoming a subject-object duality. And in the Ethics, Watsuji also shares the conviction of other philosophers who insist on the active body as subject (Leib) rather than as a thing in the world (Körper). What distinguishes Watsuji’s contribution is his insistence on the primacy of intersubjectivity and ontological relationality as opposed to the basic autonomy of individual persons. Inutsuka is certainly right in saying that acts of kindness cannot occur without the body; nor for that matter can any actions, according to Watsuji.

Let us not lose sight of the context of this discussion. Watsuji’s point at the end is that, while temporarily using others or ourselves as a means, we can prevent unethical use by appealing to the dignity of the person. My point is that, beyond this privative sense of dignity, we can find in Watsuji the basis for a revolutionary conception of relational dignity that clarifies commonplace ambiguities and offers an alternative notion of human rights.

But Shuttleworth is skeptical of an attempt to use Watsuji to ground a conception of relational dignity.
On Dignity

Shuttleworth writes that my “attempt to reframe these concepts within a Watsujian framework might be questioned on the grounds that dignity is a distinctly modern concept which only exists outside of a rigid social hierarchy.” Two issues arise here: how modern is the concept of dignity, and how rooted in unmodern, hierarchical social structures is Watsuji’s ethics? The overriding question is whether Watsuji’s Ethics can provide a springboard for a robust notion of relational dignity that finds its mirror component in the notion of respect.

How modern, and how divorced from hierarchy, is the reigning concept of dignity? The word songen 尊厳 that Watsuji and others most often use to translate dignity (and its counterpart in European languages) may indeed be of modern provenance in Japan, although common premodern usage of its constituent sinographs indicate that the idea is not entirely foreign (ii: 115–16). In any case, it is clear that Watsuji makes positive use of the word, as I exemplify, and sometimes in contexts that challenge hierarchical relations (ii: 116, 122–23).38 What about the concept of dignity in European cultures? Giovanni Pico della Mirandola wrote his influential Oratio on the Dignity of Man in 1486. Pico lived as the son of nobility in a distinctly hierarchical Italian society, yet wrote of dignitas not as a matter of rank or status, as the Roman tradition had it, but as the capacity of all humans to be free and responsible. Humans, he said, can make themselves what they want to be (although he seems rather premodern in stressing that we should become selfless, disembodied angels).39 His dignitas is often considered a precursor of Kant’s notion of Würde. If Pico is on the way to modernity, Thomas Aquinas is an icon of medieval European philosophy, and he lived and worked in an obviously hierarchical Roman Catholic Church and Italian society. Yet he similarly conceptualized dignitas as a universal feature of personhood (akin to Kant’s Persönlichkeit); in fact, he coopted the earlier sense of dignity as honorable-in-rank to apply it to all persons as rational beings: “And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of a rational nature is called a person...” that is, every human being by virtue

of being of an intellectual nature in an individual substance has this ontological dignity. Here we have premodern examples of a concept of universal dignity that appeared in distinctly hierarchical milieus.

To be sure, these examples posit dignity inherently in the individual person and could therefore serve as a foil for my notion of relational dignity that ties it to respect—and that ties it to Watsuji’s conception of aidagara. I noted that Charles Taylor implies the relational requirement, and in Shuttleworth’s apposite summary so does Hegel when he invokes the notion of honor—clearly a relational concept—that saves the individual from excessive self-interest. Hegel’s honor also seems to hark back to the premodern sense of an honor, and a personhood, that potentially can be lost. The standard objection (not Shuttleworth’s) to a relational concept is that dignity so conceived could potentially be lost: dignity would depend upon our relations with others and would not be individually inherent and inviolable. I countered this objection by noting the actual practice of recognizing violations of one’s dignity and the widespread if implicit recourse to respect from others when invoking the notion of dignity. But Shuttleworth’s doubt raises a second issue: is dignity, whether relational or not, commensurable with Watsuji’s hierarchical structures? Within this issue lurk some distinct questions, all worthy of investigation.

**The Question of Hierarchy**

The most crucial question in this discussion concerns Watsuji’s investment in hierarchical social structures. Is Watsuji’s notion of relational human being conceivable and coherent outside a structural social hierarchy that moves up a ladder from family, local community and so on to cultural community and, finally, nation state? Shuttleworth implies that once we leave behind this hierarchical layering of ways in which people organize societies, we leave behind Watsuji’s notion of human relationality: “since Watsuji’s account of aidagara results in a hierarchical society...” Inutsuka also finds debatable my contention that hierarchies are not necessitated by the fundamental relationality and interdependence of human being, by our aidagara, in other words. My question to them would then be whether Watsuji’s Eth-

40. *Summa Theologiae* 1, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2. Thanks to James G. Hart for this reference and paraphrase.
imposes on human beings a recognition that the nation-state, as the most inclusive realized community and form of *aidagara*, ultimately deserves the submission of all other, lesser communities and, in effect, has the final say.

On the face of it, I see no reason that *aidagara* (betweenness or human relationality) need entail ranked stratification. At base, what *aidagara* designates is neither simply social relations nor a social scale based on relative precedence or importance. *Aidagara* first of all denotes a between. It designates interhuman relations but contextualizes them as constitutive of the very identity of people, rather than isolating them as relations between autonomous singular persons. And this “between” places people on a level playing field before it ranks groups according to degrees of relationship. We add a qualification to *aidagara* when we place it in the context of more or less inclusive.

Granted, Watsuji’s *Ethics* places a great deal of importance on socially organized, increasingly inclusive forms of *aidagara*. These “social wholes” progress in “communality” (共同性) and “publicness” (公そのもの) from the nuclear family to the nation-state. The implication of their increasing importance and precedence is crucial to the question of the status of the nation-state and whether members must ultimately submit to it. But I point out several ambiguities in Watsuji’s hierarchy of communities: do they progress in inclusivity and public domain, or increase in ethical (人倫的) value, or perhaps both? Does the community have priority over the individual members, or rather, is priority given to relationality itself? (11: 84 & 86). To complicate matters more, Watsuji himself, as Anton Sevilla documents, revised his second volume after the war and seemed to shift emphasis from the overarching totality to individuality (11: 86). The status of Watsuji’s hierarchical structures is itself in flux. Implicitly affirming my thesis that hierarchies are not required to appreciate the fundamental relationality and interdependence of human be-ing are several interpretations of Watsuji’s *aidagara* that do not refer to any hierarchy or ranked order among related groups.

The recent interpretation by Itabashi Yūjin, to which Inutsuka refers, places

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41. Sevilla 2017, 106 et passim.

42. For example, Krueger 2019 and Johnson 2019, 13, 84–5. Influenced by Watsuji, Kimura (1972, 86 et passim) adapts the concept of *aidagara* to describe Japanese interhuman relations in a non-hierarchical way.
a priority on the egalitarian relationship of friends as well as the mediating role of the “cultural community.” I will return to this topic later, but for now we may note that the cultural community potentially serves as mediator between individualities of a lower order (families, etc.) and the “most public” social structure that Watsuji conceives, the nation state (国家). Insofar as a cultural community puts people on the same level (面一化する), I would suggest that it seems temporarily to bypass hierarchies. Finally, recall that Watsuji himself, in his statement about the inviolable dignity of every national people, places nations on equal footing rather than in a hierarchy. He intimates there a non-hierarchical aidagara at work, similar to that between friends.

These considerations notwithstanding, let us suppose that hierarchy in some sense is required by Watsuji’s ethical philosophy. His appeal to the unifying function of social wholes seems to suggest such necessity when it tacitly ranks social wholes in terms of their populations: the more people included, the more the need for their unification, so the greater the need for the largest potential unifier—the nation-state. Even so, the basic insight of the nature of human be-ing (人間存在) as relational, rooted in aidagara 間柄, does not entail that relationships be structured hierarchically according to their potential of more encompassing unification. It seems possible that a relatively populous society can prioritize relations with others and pursue the common good and communal well-being precisely by being egalitarian in power if not in status. Whether or not there are unambiguous historical examples of such societies is an open question, but such an egalitarian society is no more ideal than is Watsuji’s vision of a harmonious hierarchy. To come to the point: even if the architecture of Watsuji’s Ethics collapses without the hierarchical structure of social wholes, the argument for aidagara and the extrapolated concept of relational dignity remain cogent.

Shuttleworth also reminds us of Watsuji’s investment in two contrasting philosophical traditions, Confucian and Hegelian, and we can add the Bud-
dhist tradition that he mentions in his section on anthropocentrism. Open questions do arise in view of these starkly contrasting influences and their entangled commitments in the *Ethics*, and it is surely of interest to investigate the extent to which Watsuji implies, amplifies, or straddles either a virtue ethics or a virtue-based theory, as Shuttleworth has begun to do in the illuminating journal article he references. But I do not deem this exercise essential to appropriating Watsuji’s notions of trust and truthfulness, much less developing a relational concept of dignity. For one thing, it is controversial whether Confucian ethics should be conceived as a virtue ethics, and whether Hegel’s theory of the state is a virtue-based theory. For another, however much Watsuji’s account of trust and truthfulness imply what we may call virtuous relationships, he does not invoke the concept of virtue in his discussions of these two concepts. Indeed, in light of the attention given to morality (道徳) and Watsuji’s propensity for “linguistic deconstruction,” it is surprising that 徳, as a translation of *virtue*, plays such little role in *Ethics*. Watsuji relegates a discussion of it to an appendix (徳の諸相).

Of course, philosophical theories of ethics inevitably choose to emphasize some concepts over others and to elaborate them in different if often shared ways. Central to Watsuji’s way is his articulation of the roots of Sino-Japanese words to elaborate his vision of ethics as the study of *ningen*. I contend that Watsuji followed Heidegger in planting the seed of a whole theory in a single word: *ningen* 人間 in Watsuji’s case and *Dasein* in Heidegger’s. Shuttleworth astutely reminds us that Watsuji’s articulations here owes something to his student-day training under Nitobe Inazō. In turn, I was inspired by Watsuji to apply a similar etymological analysis to 尊厳,

46. In the article, SHUTTLEWORTH (2020, 68) concludes that “...perhaps as a consequence of this philosophical-fusion [of Hegelian, Aristotelian, and Confucian conceptualities], Watsuji’s account cannot be categorized in terms of virtue ethics or virtue theory....but instead exists in the in-betweenness of these two theories.” In his response here, he contends “that Watsuji espouses a form of virtue ethics which is based on the foundation of trust and truth.” In either case, his appreciation of Hegel’s influence on Watsuji is a welcome amplification. I also look forward to Shuttleworth’s elucidation of Francis Fukuyama—or of Eric Uslaner or other political thinkers—in contrast to Watsuji regarding the role of trust in civil society.

47. On this controversy for Confucian ethics, see WONG 2021, section 2.1. On Hegel’s relatively undeveloped concept of virtue, despite its potential relevance for his theory of the state, see BUCHWALTER 2012, 135–80.

the word that translated *dignitas*, which is at best a secondary concept for Watsuji. For all that, such analysis only points to the fact that concepts are inseparable from natural languages and cannot be understood apart from them. This is the very reason that *ningen* and *Dasein* are usually left untranslated, and the reason that I wrote of the challenging task of triangulating languages to get a hold on what we isolate as a concept. (I use “human be-ing” for 人間 with qualification; II: 26–8). In some philosophical practice, it is commonplace to try to extract a single, essential concept from its linguistic moorings. But if we adapt a turn of phrase from Watsuji, we might say that natural languages act as a kind of *fūdo* or natural domain for concepts, giving them their root connotations and entangling them in various clusters of words.

One revealing example is the concept that would bridge the English *authenticity*, the German *Eigentlichkeit*, and the Japanese *honraisei* (本来性). I take it that Watsuji’s discussions of this prolific and polysemous concept is due to his engagement with Heidegger, although his Japanese inflects it differently and his appropriation (or *Aneignung*) differs from Heidegger’s. In another referenced and illuminating article, Shuttleworth has explained what remains inchoate in my mentions of Watsuji’s own *honraisei* as a nondual relation of self and other and an ambiguous “return to the whole” (II: 55; 84 n.14; 93). What strikes me now about Shuttleworth’s explication is that it lessens the importance of hierarchies in Watsuji, whether or not he intended that. If *honraisei* “focuses on the betweenness (*aidagara*) of person and person,” and if it is central to realizing one’s wholeness as “a totality of one’s individuality and communality,” as Shuttleworth states, then it deflects from a ranking of more public social wholes over less public ones.

*On Alterity and Jita* 自他

An issue related to Watsuji’s conception of *honraisei* is *alterity*, a concept-cluster that Watsuji does not explicitly invoke. Inutsuka judiciously takes me to task for underestimating the potential of *Ethics* for an alternative conception of alterity, and points to Itabashi Yūjin’s interpretation as a remedy. Focusing on Watsuji’s use of 自他, I stated that there is no significant Other to the individual human being; an individual’s other is not really another individual but the social whole to which he or she belongs (II: 34). This comment does not point out a flaw in Watsuji’s *Ethics*, but states a contrast
with standard theories of alterity and, implicitly, of the autonomy of individuals. It is no surprise that Watsuji’s thesis would entail a different sense of being other to one another, for his insight into humans as fundamentally relational implies a challenge to understanding people or their ethnic groups as individually autonomous. What is missing in my account is an elaboration of an alternative notion of relational alterity.\(^{49}\) In light of Inutsuka’s criticism and Itabashi’s interpretation, I now see my statement above as capturing only part of Watsuji’s view.

The missing part in my portrayal is what we may call the Other that is implied in strictly interpersonal relations between individual persons. Two contexts provide examples. First, our way of relating to one another in trust entails a recognition of difference between oneself and another person. Trust can occur only if we relate to another as an Other who has the potential to be “of different mind,” even to deceive or betray us. In an interpersonal relationship of trust, self 他 and Other 他 are related precisely as distinct and different, even if not autonomous and self-sufficient. Secondly, we humans qualify as persons because we have the capacity to become a friend, Watsuji says, and he relates friendship to the capacity to be a part of cultural communities. Friendship and membership in a cultural community are relationships between individual selves and others “of like mind.” I mentioned Watsuji’s unelaborated gloss of this dual capacity as “the dignity of a human” (人の品格, 121), but I did not emphasize its implied distinction between self and other—its divide between 自己 and 他者. Itabashi elaborates Watsuji’s view that a cultural community consists of individuals who are able to encounter others as friends—to accept as a friend not simply people within one’s usual circle of relatives and acquaintances but, more so, to encounter unknown persons from afar—strangers—as friends (未知の者と友人として出逢う).\(^{50}\) Here too the implication of alterity is clear: the stranger-become-friend is an other to oneself.

There are, however, three factors that mitigate this version of alterity.

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49. My forthcoming article, “Alternative Configurations of Alterity in Dialogue with Ueda Shizuteru,” depicts views of current critics and offers an alternative, although not in the context of Watsuji’s relationality or cultural communities. Maraldo 2012 presents an alternative conception of autonomy as fundamentally relational.

First, Watsuji’s authentic self, as mentioned, is rooted in the “nonduality of self and other” (自他不二). Do trust and friendship express this nonduality by overcoming, or by undermining, any alterity of self and other? Second, the cultural community that provides the time and space of personal interactions is virtually “a community that has no ‘others’ who are refused participation.” It operates by a principle of inclusivity “as a communality that ‘transcends all human qualifiers and treats people as fellow brothers and sisters.’” 51 In other words, the “qualifications” that distinguish people (人間のあらゆる資格) are disregarded in favor of the factors that bond people together. This is where I think my original statement is on the right track: Watsuji at times does see the relevant “other” to the individual person not as another individual but rather as the social whole to which he or she belongs. Itabashi frames this view as the connection between individual 個 and community 共同体, which supersedes any self-other (自己–他者) divide. I would presume that the alterity of individual and community—the possible divide between them—is assured to the degree that each side, on occasion, negates itself. But insofar as the cultural community incorporates and absorbs individuals, such alterity seems attenuated. What counts for current critics as genuine alterity—the difference that being-other makes for groups as well as individuals—is muted in favor of an equalizing community. Third, differences among cultural communities within a single nation-state are disregarded, perhaps because Watsuji envisioned Japan as a uni-cultural nation. As Itabashi notes, Watsuji’s critics have interpreted his nation-state (国家) as eliminating the diverse individuality and uniqueness of each private community and its members, and realizing uniformity through a totalistic or totalitarian “moment.” Itabashi’s charitable reading of Watsuji counters that criticism by envisioning a global humanity opened by “meeting distant strangers as friends.”

Such humanity practiced on a global scale would clearly eradicate the practice of slavery, as Watsuji’s Ethics ideally does. Yet Watsuji’s statement about what makes slavery unethical can be read to place the Other to individual persons solely in the community that ideally not only includes them

51. 「それは参与を拒まれる“他所者”を持ったない共同性である。」「この共同性は、本来“人間のあらゆる資格を超越して人を同胞的兄弟的に扱う”共同性として全ての人間存在に聞かれる。」
but also homogenizes them. In the quotation about slavery that Inutsuka cites, Watsuji is defining what it is to be a person (人格) in terms of communal membership instead of being an end-in-itself. Within an ethnic group or a people’s (民族) own community, member persons are treated “with sufficient freedom,” but when conquered and enslaved, they are not treated as persons precisely by not being recognized as members of the conquering people. Such lack of integration of individuals into a dominant culture may indeed be at the core of slavery, but other factors also define enslavement. Slavery disrupts families and attempts to completely dissolve native communities. The fact that enslaved peoples did form communities among themselves, despite all barriers, confirms Watsuji’s insight that human beings are fundamentally communal beings. (An example are the communities of singers in North America formed from culturally diverse, enslaved African peoples who gave rise to music later called “Negro Spirituals.”)

What I think needs to be expanded is a recognition of a diversity of non-hierarchical cultural communities. Even where slavery is abolished and hegemonic power relations are discouraged, the challenge that remains for interpreters of Watsuji is to specify how differences among individuals within a community would be negotiated, and how differences between cultural communities within a multicultural nation-state would be resolved (the current strife between Francophone and Anglophone communities in Canada is an example).

My response here only magnifies the need to develop an alternative sense of alterity—a relational alterity that recognizes dynamic relations between self and other on both an individual and a communal level, and that has the potential to overcome cultural, sexist, and political hegemonies.

The Question of Anthropocentrism

Shuttleworth raises the fascinating question of the anthropocentrism that I find at the heart of Watsuji’s Ethics as a partiality (not a flaw) that he shares with the individualistic ethics he criticizes. Shuttleworth suggests rather that Watsuji presents an “ecocentric theory,” based on his conception of fūdo (風土), and his “alternative way of thinking about our environment

52. 「…言いかえれば征服された異民族の成員を征服した民族の成員と認めないということにはかならぬのである。」WTZ 10: 590.
as a fundamental part of who we are.” This possibility is indeed relevant to current ecological debates, and it deserves far more discussion than I can offer here.

In one respect, it may be said that all ethics is anthropocentric, insofar as only humans are thought to act ethically toward one another or toward other beings. Even ethical theories that take other beings into consideration typically do not regard nonhuman animals, much less other life forms, as capable of doing good or evil, and do not hold them morally responsible. But Watsuji’s ethical theory is more specifically anthropocentric. For Watsuji, the “study of being human” (人間学) defines the discipline called rinrigaku (倫理学, ethics as a field of study). Aidagara 間柄 describes the specifically human way of being. His notion of jinrin 人倫 as the basis of morality specifies human beings (人間) as those who by nature interrelate, associate, affiliate; jinrin forms the natural basis of all normativity. (This point is not unclear in Watsuji’s Ethics; it is rather controversial whether the natural order of things provides an adequate ground for normative judgments, as I point out in ii: 88–9.) An example is our natural proclivity to trust one another, and violations of trust are for Watsuji the measure of what is morally wrong. Evidence of trust among primates and other nonhuman animals depends upon the human observers’ conception of trust, and to that extent such evidence is still anthropocentric.

Watsuji relates his notion of fūdo to his conception of ethics in a lengthy chapter roughly translated as “History and Natural Domain as Existential Structures of Human Be-ing.” It belongs to our very be-ing that we are inevitably situated in specific geographical, climatic, and cultural environments. But to back up a bit and consider his earlier work simply called Fūdo, we can already see him describing a domain between nature and culture as we commonly conceive them. One typical way today to distinguish these two is via human genetics: nature names what genetically determines us, and culture names what is learned rather than genetically predetermined. Epigenetics bridges these two; it studies how behavior and environment affect the ways that genes work. Watsuji’s fūdo (literally wind and earth) is similarly a bridging concept. It names the natural-cultural habitats of human communities that include the types and sources of their food, clothing, and shelter along with the climate and topography that affects these sources. Once again, Watsuji’s reliance on specifically Japanese nuances is the reason that fūdo is
often left untranslated. Milieu may be one possible approximation of fūdo; the Spanish terruño may be another; each has its own connotations that differ from the Japanese. Augustin Berque has urged the archaic word mesology to render Watsuji’s study of fūdo (風土学) and has translated the entire context called fūdosei (風土性) as mediance. True, fūdo mediates on several levels—not only more abstractly mediating nature and culture or climate and culture, but also more concretely a community and its environment, both its “man-made” environment and its “natural” environment as they are intertwined. But of what value is a translation if it itself is unintelligible without extensive explanation? Why not instead leave the term untranslated and provide an explanation of the original?

What is crucial to the point here is that Watsuji’s fūdo seems to be descriptive solely of the human world. Although we might expect nonhuman animals to be accorded their own respective fūdo, Watsuji restricts this concept to human life. A fūdo does not directly refer to surrounding animal life. Rather—as David Johnson has mentioned in Watsuji on Nature—“animals do not constitute part of a fūdo but, along with the plants that do, are a mediating entity between human existence and fūdo, since human beings produce particular kinds of food, clothing, and shelter in interactions with a particular plant and animal kingdom.”53

Perhaps Watsuji’s contextualization of human beings is more Confucian than Buddhist; certainly his fūdo seems more human-circumscribed than ecocentric. Shuttleworth’s phrasing itself indicates the implied link: “our environment is not separate from us”; the cold is not something outside us but “we ourselves”; “our environment is a fundamental part of who we are” (my emphasis). It is human subjectivity that is assumed in these descriptions. A contrast may serve to clarify Watsuji’s unsurprising partiality. Recently, anthropologists like Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Philippe Descola have described Amazonian peoples who experience nonhuman animals as equivalent in ontological value and as belonging to the same domain as themselves, often as being relatives. Other indigenous peoples similarly relate to what we, in English and in Japanese, call “animals.”54 In other words, these

communities place nonhuman animals within their *aidagara*. Along with ethologists like Carl Safina, Descola also gives evidence that many animal species exhibit *culture* or learned behavior, and create artifacts to interact with their environments. This would support the idea that they live in a *fūdo* as do humans. This contrast with Watsuji’s anthropocentrism places humans and other animals together (as *衆生界*, or *生間*, as it were) in one world (*世間*), one intermediating space (*間*). Many of us would welcome the extension of Watsuji’s concept of *fūdo* to elucidate the interactive living places of other sentient beings and to render *fūdo* more ecocentric.

Yet on one point I am inclined to agree with Watsuji and other philosophers who are partial to the status of (what we call) human beings. I feel cautious about ascribing anything like “civil rights” to (what we call) nonhuman animals. “Rights” (*人権*) function as a way to legalize and codify human behavior, including behavior toward nonhuman beings. In the widest sense of the word, all beings deserve our *respect*—this is what many indigenous peoples are talking about. Showing them respect is the way to give them dignity, and can be an impetus to protect them legally. But I would avoid starting with legalistic conceptions like rights to express the inter-relationality of all beings from a clearly ecocentric standpoint. When I suggest a notion of *human rights* based on a relational concept of dignity, my extension of Watsuji’s ethics is similarly anthropocentric (11: 19).

Be that as it may, for turning our attention to wider perspectives we can be grateful to Inutsuka and Shuttleworth, and to all my respondents in this conversation.

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