Dennis Stromback
Independent scholar

Miki Kiyoshi and the Overcoming of German and Japanese Philosophy

In the many intellectual twists and turns of Miki Kiyoshi's life, we see a relentless search for cultivating a philosophical standpoint that unites the interiority of subjectivity and the objective materials of the external world into a dialectical logic. The culmination of Miki's quest is articulated in his magnum opus, *The Logic of Imagination*, where a dialectical unity of *logos* and *pathos* is born within the creative imagination. The idea behind Miki's dialectical unity is granting subjectivity its own independent existence while having it forge material relationships against the horizon of creating a new "human being" for the social world. This article discusses Miki's mélange of anthropological humanism and Marxism in an attempt to correct Hegel's, Marx's, and Nishida's dialectics by centring on the creative imagination as the basis for social history. It goes on to argue that this dialectical standpoint ends up smuggling in a quasi-idealist account of subjective reality, which in turns lends itself to a legitimization of Japanese nationalism.

KEYWORDS: Dialectics—*Logos* and *Pathos*—creative imagination—logic of nothing—German Idealism—Marxism—cooperativism

Within Miki Kiyoshi's many attempts to capture a logic of social history lies a deeper quest to develop a logic of creative existence not bound to the limitations of German thought and Nishida philosophy. The culmination of Miki's search for this logic of the creative subject materializes in the *Logic of Imagination* (『構想力の論理』)[1] wherein he attempts to unveil how historical forms are produced through the creative power of imagination (構想力).[2] Here, Miki argues that there is a unity of *logos* (language and reason) and *pathos* (affect, emotion, or disposition) at the base of the imagination, which is the fuel for creating the world out of nothing and making it into a meaningful place. While this may seem like a radical departure from his humanist and Marxist phases, this is not the case. Previously, Miki had argued that for a new "human being" to emerge, the "basic experience" (基礎経験)[3] of a given historical period would have to negotiate

1. The essays making up the first part of this text were initially published in the journal『思想』[*Thought*] in 1937 and 1938.

2. The translation of *kōsōryoku* 構想力 poses a challenge for Miki scholars since there is already a word for "imagination" in the Japanese language (*sōzō* 想像) that closely resembles the English word. In fact, Miki himself stated that *kōsōryoku*, which he related to the German term *Logik der Einbildungskraft*, can also be called *sōzō*, which he calls the *Logik der Phantasie* (the logic of fantasy, in English). But the consensus among Miki scholars in the Euroamerican world is to translate *kōsōryoku* as "imagination," because it carries a nuanced meaning of a "power to conceptualize" or "the ability to conceptualize." I propose we translate the term along the lines of "creative imagination" or "productive imagination."

3. There is difficulty in translating the Japanese term 基礎経験, in particular, the first two glyphs. 基礎 refers to that which is the basis of something, but Miki scholars often translate the phrase as either "fundamental experience" or "foundational experience," while Townsend (2007) renders it "basic experience." None of these translations seem to fit Miki's intention to capture the raw hermeneutic framework of *logos* at work in everyday experience. I have decided on "basic experience" because it does not give the false impression of a non-discursive experience (as in the case of "foundational experience") or of a central experience at play in socio-

with *logos* to reveal the demands of the era. There is an "ideal" for the direction of humanity in this viewpoint, but it cannot arise from a transcendent law derived from objective rationality since the "ideal" itself must be continuously located in the basic experience of the proletariat that is reflected in *logos*. Apart from the obvious Marxist overtone of this standpoint, Miki's humanistic philosophy is still evident in that the original nature of human beings cannot be realized unless it takes ownership of the world to realize a unity with it.

As Miki matured, his triadic structure of basic experience, anthropology, and ideology was transformed into a dialectical unity of *pathos* and *logos* that seeks to clarify how the development of human individuality is expressed as self-awareness and revelatory action in the creation of historical forms. In the earlier Miki, humans are thought to be trapped in anxiety and loneliness, such that there was already a philosophical need to reconfigure a view of the human dialectically uniting basic experience, anthropology, and ideology. The the later Miki would revise the content of this dialectical structure, arguing for how a unity within the subjective imagination actualizes the capacity for creative projects within society. What Miki was aiming at in this triadic structure could be attained through a logic of creative imagination.

What is more, Miki was able to argue that without a unity of *logos* and *pathos*, the interiority of subjectivity might drive humanity to institutional madness. For instance, he suggests that without a good dose of *logos*, *pathos* will energize human life to move toward the irrational (as in the case of nationalism and totalitarianism); and that without *pathos*, an overflow of *logos* will lead to an excess of universal rationalization (as in the case of capitalism, individualism, and liberalism).[4] But if humans transform the world through a unity of *logos* and *pathos*, then subjectivity can realize its specific mode of being in a system of egalitarian cooperatives (*kyōdōshugi* 共同主義) in which the one is the many and the many is the one, while allowing each to

historical reality (as in the case of "fundamental experience"). The content of basic experience cannot be essentialized as a substance, because it is always changing in accord with historical developments, as reflected in anthropology, and then mediated and revealed through an ideology within the actual world of that historical moment.

4. See MKZ 17: 519.

preserve its own particularity. Communism is not the goal for Miki, because it reflects an abstract rationality of Western modernity that smacks of *logos*. Rather, what solves the problem of class and human existence is the principle of *kyōdōshugi*, which dialectically sublates all other competing economic and political ideologies.[5] Nonetheless, we see encased in Miki's dialectics a historical vision that aims to address the limitations of Hegel's, Nishida's, and Marx's dialectics. That is to say, for Miki, Hegel's dialectics reduces the movements of historical reality to objective rationality; Nishida's dialectics reduces the logic of historical creativity to an asocial active self; and Marx's dialectics reduces subjectivity to the objective quadrant of material production. Surprisingly, Miki's internal call for a dialectics to unite German thought and Nishida philosophy resurrects a quasi-idealist account of subjectivity as the basis of social history. By centralizing the creative imagination, Miki sets up the possibility for ideal forms to be reified in history. The controversy that surrounds Miki's wartime legacy can perhaps be understood from this perspective. In other words, rooted within his quasi-idealist account of reality is the tacit support for a colonial order led by the Japanese state.

The leftist shadow of the early kyoto school: nishida and miki's dialectics

Miki's ongoing dialogue with the efforts of Nishida, Hegel, and Marx to formulate a logic of history is present throughout his oeuvre. After all, Miki was not only a student of Nishida, he also participated in a program established during the Meiji period for students to study in Europe under leading scholars of the time. For instance, Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941) studied with Rickert, Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, and Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) studied with Edmund Husserl. Nishitani Keiji, the most prominent successor of the Kyoto School after Nishida and Tanabe, studied under Heidegger. Similarly, from 1922 to 1925, Miki would study with Rickert and eventually with Heidegger.[6] At the same time, Nishida's impact on Miki is undeniable.[7] He attended Kyoto Imperial University in 1917 to

5. MKZ 17: 522–3.

6. Yusa 1998, 45–7.

7. Miki acknowledged this explicitly in his introduction to the *Logic of Imagination*: "in my

study with Nishida after having read *A Study of the Good* during his third year of high school.[8] The book opened Miki to thinkers like Bergson, Rickert, and Cohen. There are other examples of how Nishida's thought left its stamp on Miki's philosophical standpoint. In particular, for all the various hats Miki wore in his philosophical pursuits, one sees an enduring focus on the contemporary world and its orientation to the new, as well as a concern for articulating a logic of historical creativity. Hegel and Marx had some role in steering this vision, but Nishida's view of historical time and his championing of the present is visible throughout Miki's view of the historical world as something created out of nothing that makes possible the self-determination of the present.

There is another and more fundamental way in which Miki's attempt to formulate a logic of historical creativity was under the spell of Nishida philosophy, namely, the desire to build a dialectic that would transcend the logical standpoints of Eastern and Western philosophy by means of a logic of *soku-hi* (即非).[9] Miki agreed with Nishida that Japan needed a philosophical standpoint of its own,[10] one that could stand in contradistinction to that of the West but also embrace it into a deeper logical standpoint. To achieve this, Miki would have to rethink the subject-object distinction assumed to lie at the base of reality.

The subject-object basis of historical reality

Miki's view of the subject-object basis of history is reminiscent of Nishida's dialectical universal (弁証法的一般者). For Nishida, since subjectivity is always "implaced" in history, one cannot think of subjectivity, let alone human life, as lying outside of history. In fact, Nishida rejected any standpoint that began from either a subjectivist or objectivist point of view. If we are to understand the logical structure of historical actuality, we must depart from a standpoint that encompasses subjectivity and objectivity as co-constitutive forces. As Nishida writes:

---

research, I have been continually guided, consciously or unconsciously, by Nishida's philosophy" (MKZ 8: 6).

8. Akamatsu 2018, 65.

9. MKZ 17: 507–10.

10. Krummel 2019b, 3.

> Neither can the world of subjectivity be contained by mere objectivism, nor the true objective world by mere subjectivism. I think that we must take our point of departure, when discussing the world of true reality which includes the world of subjectivity and objectivity, from logic. This must be the case as long as we are discussing the worlds of objectivity or subjectivity as well.[11]

This view of the epistemological subject *qua* actor within history stands opposed to the position of philosophizing or theorizing about facts from outside the occurrences of history. As early as 1911, Nishida had begun to formulate the core of this position: "I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists because there is experience."[12] The broader implication of this position is that if experience is more fundamental than the construction of the "I," then the epistemological subject must not only begin but also end in the unity of its own primordial experience and the objective world. Later Nishida would expand this view and argue that there is no other way than to realize oneself as an historical actor accumulating knowledge of oneself in the world. Miki would adopt this subject-object stance and reconfigure it to make it more compatible with German thought by arguing that subjectivity is indivisible from historical actuality,[13] and that in order to direct the course of history, subjectivity must also engage in self-transformation toward an ideal form suited to social history.

Miki's project of overcoming the subject-object duality was inherited from the Neo-Kantian school that was widely popular in both Japan and Germany at the time, but it was the approaches of Hegel and Nishida that set the stage for his critique. In the Hegelian world, the overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy occurs through an examination of the mutual constitution of subjectivities in the *Weltgeist* of history. The mind reflects on what it does and what it knows, which then becomes expressed as the various objects and institutions manifested in the world. By being each other's content, subjectivities build the historical world around themselves. Like a good Hegelian, Nishida understood this point well, as exemplified in his attempt to see the idea of subjectivities reflecting themselves as part and

11. NKZ 7: 218; Nishida 1970, 113.

12. NKZ 1: 4; Nishida 1990, xxx.

13. Miki recognizes this fundamental position in Nishida's philosophy. See MKZ 10: 420.

parcel of the concept of *basho* (場所) central to his middle period. Unlike Hegel, however, Nishida posited a prior unity, a pre-reflective consciousness that exists between subject and object: "pure experience" (純粋経験).[14] This is where Miki directs his critique.

Beginning with his preface to *A Study of Man in Pascal* (『パスカルに於ける人間の研究』), Miki began to develop a concept of experience not unlike Nishida's. But what Miki called "basic experience"[15] is more of an everyday experience, one that is pre-theoretical or pre-scientific, similar to Antonio Gramsci's concept of "common sense" or Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "doxa." This is not the experience of human nature as such, inasmuch as basic experience needs to be continuously conditioned, revealed, and negotiated by a theoretical model or ideal-type (e.g., ideology *qua logos*). Furthermore, Miki's notion of basic experience is less self-sufficient than Nishida's notion of pure experience, which is the beginning and the end of the dialectic itself. Basic experience is rather more like a category of logic that has the power to "spin" the movement of the dialectic in the sense that it needs a *logos* in the form of ideology to organize and structure its existence. Only then can the dialectic realize what history has to teach it about the demands of the age. In other words, ideology must grasp basic experience and turn it into a guiding principle.[16] While basic experience can be thought of as distinct from reason and equipped with a power to produce *logos* on its own, in the end it does not lead naturally to a *logos* that can reflect and direct the creative possibilities of human existence towards resolving the problems of social history.

Nishida and Miki diverge dramatically in the deployment of their concepts. While Nishida advances pure experience *qua* the prior unity of subject and object as a religious category,[17] Miki advances basic experience as not only an existential but also as a sociohistorical category that enters into a relationship with the physical world. Here we see that Miki's basic experience is not without content, something essential like Nishida's concept of

14. NKZ 1: 9–17.

15. According to Tosaka Jun, Miki's concept of *kiso keiken* was a term borrowed from Wilhem Dilthey. See TJZ 5: 106.

16. MKZ 3: 40.

17. Although the concept of pure experience was initially a religious category, his writings on the historical world, as Nishida would later admit, were an attempt to reformulate the concept of pure experience.

pure experience, but rather a concept that attempts to articulate how experience is socially, economically, and politically structured in history. In the modern period, Miki argued, this is the experience of the proletariat.[18] In his words, "what fundamentally regulates the structure of the basic proletarian experience is manual labor."[19]

Therefore, unlike Nishida's pure experience, which is an unmediated experience of a historically thrown and embodied form, Miki's basic experience is always a linguistically mediated experience that emerges within historical forms as a historical form. In this sense, as Christopher Goto-Jones tells us, Miki's basic experience is an emphasis on historical reconstruction and "clearly represents a Marxist influenced re-interpretation of Nishida's idealism of the 1920s" because it re-envisions "foundational reality from the quasi-mystical 'place of nothing'" by "pinning it quite firmly to the pragmatic demands of the present."[20]

To one degree or another, Miki's Marxist impulses ended up pushing him further and further away from Nishida. He agreed with Nishida that the unity of subject and object must be achieved within a standpoint of historical actuality. But contrary to Nishida's privileging of the historically active self, Miki argued that when one independent subject opposes another independent subject in the historical world, what is thereby assumed in terms of historical necessity is a dialectic of historical forms predicated upon a concept of sociality.[21] In fact, from early on—even in his Pascalian days—Miki rejected views of social existence that assumed an aggregate of atomized subjects (as in the case of Western individualism), a viewpoint common to the Kyoto School in general. "Man is not an isolated existence," Miki wrote, "but shares his existence together with human beings."[22]

The later Miki would expand on this position to insist that society is not an object that stands opposed to subjectivity but "something that embraces acting human beings within itself, as an expression of itself."[23] This concept

18. Miki calls the basic experience of Japan during the twentieth century "the basic proletarian experience" (無産者的基礎経験).

19.「さて無産者的基礎經驗の構造を根源的に規定するものは勞働である。」 MKZ 3: 45.

20. Goto-Jones 2004, 11.

21. MKZ 7: 14–15; MKZ 10: 434.

22. MKZ 1: 26; Miki 1998, 305.

23. MKZ 18: 171; Miki 2011, 704–5.

of sociality as the basis of the subject-object relationship as it relates to historical form marks a brief defense of Hegel and Marx against Nishida's view of history. Both Hegel and Marx maintained that the development of historical forms resulted from a dialectic movement articulated within intersubjectivity. Similarly, Miki attacked Nishida for only formulating a logic of existence, the implication being that it was insufficient for clarifying a true dialectic of historical forms. Miki claimed that merely identifying individual existence as the most concrete form of reality, Nishida's dialectics was unable to handle a concept of social history that would take into account the relative dimension of historical forms that has bearing on the temporal practicality of human life. Nishida's concept of the "eternal present," he insisted, was too abstract and empty,[24] devoid of the inherent sociality that can clarify how historical change occurs.[25]

To understand how history moves from one period to the next, one must look at how institutions are created and shaped. As a response to Nishida's general neglect of institutions as an object of determination, Miki develops a view of institutions (制度) linked to the interiority of subjectivity. His aim was to demonstrate that "creation is conceivable only from the imagination, wherein the elements of *logos* and *pathos* are one."[26] Here, Miki is drawing on Kant and Bergson to make sense of how the creative imagination can produce forms. Bergson's discussion of creative intuition, and his concept of the image in particular, is reinterpreted to bridge mind and matter, to show how forms are never static but continuously evolving through the technical activities of human expression.[27] This implies that Bergson's thought is not truly dialectical and is therefore limited to the creative formations of natural matter to the exclusion of the historical matter that culminates in the transformation of the world through the concerns of subjectivity. To this end, Miki argues that since historical forms (歴史的な形) are produced by the imagination, institutions—e.g., the customs, traditions, languages, morality,

24. In fact, Miki describes Nishida's dialectics as weakened by this. MKZ 10: 433–4.

25. CURLEY 2018, 448.

26. MKZ 8: 109; the quotation is taken from John Krummel's unpublished translation of *Logic of Imagination*.

27. Miki agrees with Bergson's idea that the imagination has creative power to enact forms, but then points to the latter's inability to unite intellect and instinct in a dialectical logic or to link instinct to collective habits. See MKZ 8: 109–11.

politics, all of which we describe as "cultural practices"—can be thought of as inventions or fictions for providing meaning to human life. In this sense, institutions can be thought of as real.

On the other hand, institutions are always adapted to and shaped in accordance with an ever-changing environment and thus cannot be conceptualized as fixed social conventions. Wherever humans create new environments, either institutions will die out or new institutions will form, but above all, institutions are historical forms that are continuously created and re-created by human action. But the broader point Miki is making is that humans have a creative relationship with institutions in social history. Whether institutions take the form of myth or tradition, subjectivity is nevertheless in a dialectical relationship with them. This implies the historical necessity of producing and reproducing institutions suited to the present, of a sort that will move subjectivity toward what Miki calls a creative society (創造的社会).[28] While Miki cites anthropologists and sociologists to legitimize the function of institutions in social history, he also kept an eye on Marxist critiques of historical forms as expressions of technical production. The term "historical forms" was all-inclusive for him and that included the relations of production as Miki understood them from Marxist literature.

The spiritual dominion of Nishida's thought in Miki's dialectics

For some reason or another, Miki never fully abandons Nishida. In fact, to the contrary, Miki's logic of *poiesis* echoes Nishida's logic of *poiesis*, a fact Miki himself even acknowledges. In the essay "Human Being" (「人間的存在」, 1938), Nishida argued that what materialists call "historical production" is actually the expressive activity of historical actuality.[29] As a response to the growing popularity of Marxist thought among his students, Nishida himself would eventually engage Marx in the effort to formulate a view of ontology as historical production and historical production as ontology.[30] The world of production, he claimed, can be captured in a logic of *poiesis* in which the process of creativity is seen as a circular flow that moves from the maker to the made and then back again to the maker. Where Marx speaks of material

28. MKZ 8: 183–4; MKZ 14: 307–17; see also MIKI 1998, 316–20.

29. See NKZ 9: 9–68.

30. HAVER 2012, 11.

production, Nishida speaks of a historical creativity that includes all material production from within the standpoint of an active self. Miki's logic of *poiesis* in the *Logic of Imagination* advances similar claims about the creativity of the historical agent, albeit reformulated in light of Hegel (as well as Kant and Bergson) in order to stress that the source of historical forms is the power of the imagination that unites *logos* and *pathos*.[31]

Prior to his *Logic of Imagination*, Miki was already moving towards a Nishidian dialectics that took the logic of nothing as the basis for an anthropology of self-awareness. We see this in his *Philosophical Anthropology* (『哲学的人間学』, 1933), which invokes the spirit of Nishida (along with Helmuth Plessner and Karl Jaspers) to clarify how the heart of creativity within human existence can be understood as a "creation from nothing."[32] In this unfinished project, Miki began by framing human existence as conditioned by affect (*pathos*) involving the power to galvanize self-expression into action, with a view to framing subjectivity as a transition from a passive state of existence to praxis when faced with the nothing (*mu* 無) deep within its being. In the shift to investigating the nothing within consciousness, Miki maintained that in the contemplation of *mu*, the world opened itself up to subjectivity.[33] Here it is the nothing that lies at the base of *pathos*. Creation is always out of nothing, but *pathos* is what determines the activity that is expressed outwardly. Miki cites Plessner frequently here, but his concept of nothing extends beyond the former's merely "ex-centric positional" character of human being: the nothing is both within and without subjectivity and functions as the very ground of existence. He also cites Jaspers to explain how we face the nothing in "limit situations" (*Grenzsituationen*, such as death), but goes on to assert that this is the same nothing that Nishida's "place of nothing" (無の場所) is the same nothing we experience when confronted with our own finitude or the self-forming formlessness that lies in the background of the entire discussion. For both Nishida and Miki, the place of nothing not only envelops and transcends subject and object, it is

31. According to Funayama Shin'ichi, it is likely that Nishida's and Miki's logic of *poiesis* influenced each other. See Funayama 1984, 284.

32. MKZ 18: 340.

33. MKZ 18: 266–7.

what allows for creativity to break through determinacy.[34] In Miki's case, the appeal to a *creatio ex nihilo* is more of an attempt to locate the source of formation from the formless in the creative imagination of the epistemological subject. As one would expect, Miki's later years can be described as a return to Nishida,[35] albeit in the sense that he sought to go through Nishida only to move beyond him.[36]

The consequences of Nishida's and Miki's logic of *poiesis* is that they not only reject the bifurcation of subject and object, but also affirm the importance of the bodily actions of a conscious agent as an instrument for constructing and altering historical reality. Nishida thought he was responding critically to Marxism's failure to properly attend to the creative capacity of the individual. From Miki's point of view, however, it seemed clear that Nishida had not sufficiently engaged with historical materialism due to his underestimation of historical change at the institutional level. We might say Miki positioned himself midway between Marx and Nishida: while conceding that Marx emphasized bodily activity as central to the production of thought and the unfolding of history, Miki underscored Nishida's claim that Marx had failed to elaborate on the creative freedom of the agent of history. Miki sought to complete what was wanting in the Marxist view by way of an appeal to the humanist-subjective element, while having the Marxist critique confront Nishida's conception of history more directly. He did this by weaving creative subjectivity and material production into the fabric of the imagination. What precisely does this entail?

Along the lines of Nishida's critique of objectivism, Miki insists that human relationships are irreducible to anything objective and material for

34. Krummel 2019, 271–3.

35. Curley 2018, 460.

36. Tempting as it is to think that Miki's idealistic tendencies stem from Nishida, this is hardly the case. Nishida's early years are often characterized as a kind of quasi-idealism because of his appeal to a pure form of psychological experiences, and his later years as a kind of crypto-idealism because the contradictory unity that is the basis of his cultural, political, and religious philosophy depends on an "ideal" realized in the particulars. None of this stands up to textual scrutiny. His logic of *basho* resists all reification of singular nouns as categorical markers. The oppositional standpoints of idealism and realism (or form and formless, subject and object) emerge from within a deeper *basho* of nothing, which means that the structure of reality is non-dualistically organized. In this sense, there can be no transcendent "ideal" or "monistic spirit" that drives historical change.

the simple reason that a subjective interiority lies at the roots of physical human existence. Sympathizing with Maine de Biran's "science of the interior," both Nishida and Miki call for an anthropology capable of accounting for lived bodily experience in self-awareness.[37] For Miki, any account of self-awareness that begins from a material or objective standpoint will inevitably fail, because if consciousness were basically the same as the rest of the world around it, its activity would be no more than a reflection of what is outside of itself, which means that nothing creative could arise from within subjectivity.[38] This would render Miki's account of self-awareness a hitching post for notions of agency as part of the broader material production of social history.

There may seem to be a direct correlation between Miki's notion of self-awareness and Nishida's notion of action-intuition, but there is a "dual transcendence" that sets it apart. In addition to the interior transcendence that occurs within subjectivity as it moves beyond ego consciousness and deeper into the recesses of mind, there is also an exterior transcendence that moves the subject outwards, towards the world of matter.[39] Thus self-awareness is mediated both subjectively and objectively in Miki's scheme, so that all historical action is a form of expressiveness both within and without. In a word, human beings are both objectified expressions of society and particular individuals, each with its own subjectivity.[40] Miki's interlacing of the matterial world and the world of a socially constructed self-awareness stands in stark contrast to Nishida's grounding of history on action-intuition, where it becomes difficult to see distinct historical forms (e.g., political, social, and economic institutions or class-based systems) as deriving from collective behavior.

It is hard to overstate Miki's desire to link the internal dimension of subjectivity with material reality. In fact, he sees history as originating from human desire and relates subjectivity to the material world on that basis. The body belongs to *pathos*, the seat of passions, impulses, hopes, fears, cravings, and everything else we refer to as "emotions." But *pathos* is not simply

37. Nishida and Miki would both criticize de Biran's anthropology for failing to develop this "interiority" into something that can be grasped socially and historically. For more on this connection, see FUJITA 2011, 309–11.

38. MKZ 6: 207.

39. For a further clarification of this process, see NAGATOMO 1995, 29, 47–9, 64–5.

40. MKZ 18: 147, 167, 172.

a passive state or disposition to be acted upon by another.[41] It is also active as the very desire for existence itself, the impulse that drives activity and impels us to create the social historical world through the mediation of our bodies.[42] This line of argument shows how the dialectical unity of *logos* and *pathos* posited by Miki takes into account the relations of production so important to Marxist literature without abandoning the role of the agent in directing the course of social history. On the contrary, his dialectic situates the creation of historical forms squarely within the subjective imagination. In short, the synthesis of *logos* and *pathos* at once corrects Nishida's failure to include the movement of history from one historical form to another and reaffirms Nishida's notion of the historically active self against the tendency in orthodox Marxism to reduce the conscious historical agent to relations of production.

The shadow Nishida's thought cast over Miki's dialectics is further manifest in the attempt to bring the essence of religion to the forefront in discussions of overcoming the duality of East and West. Viren Murthy has argued that both Nishida and Miki, together with Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig, are examples of historical actors seeing to resist Western modernity by deploying their own religious categories as weapons against a secularist view of time that subordinates the role of religion in history.[43] In both cases, as other scholars have noted, such attempts to "overcome modernity" were powered by a rereading of Buddhist history to counter the Christian teleology undergirding Hegel's (and, I would add, Marx's) esteem for historical progress. This was particularly so with Miki. As Melissa Curley suggests, his piece on Shinran—the last of his published writings—was to some extent a camouflage for a Marxist reading of history.[44] As a clever way to critique progressive views on the end of history, Curley claims, Miki's comparison of Shinran's and Hegel's eschatological visions accentuated the role Shinran gave to human agency in the mission to realize the Kingdom

41. *Pathos* is a derivative of the Greek word of πάσχειν, meaning "to be acted upon" by another or "to suffer."

42. MKZ 18: 152, 399; Fujita 2011, 311.

43. See Murthy 2014, 236–41.

44. Curley 2008, 80.

of the Buddha on earth.[45] The allusion to Shinran's reading of history was Miki's way of creating a social myth for the world to come. By drawing on Pure Land Buddhism, he hoped to inspire, prompt, and direct the proletariat to action in the world.[46]

Curley's instincts here are right on the mark. After all, Miki was raised as a devout Pure Land Buddhist and taught to read Buddhist sutras. Furthermore, there is textual evidence that he was determined to save religion from collapsing into a kind of "false consciousness." Miki recognizes that religion reinforces the economic interests of the capitalist class by disregarding material reality, but its origins cannot be reduced to a logic that accuses its teachings of justifying oppression and poverty. In fact, he distinguishes "pure religion" (純粋な宗教) from "institutional religion" (宗教制度) and argues that while the latter serves the interest of the ruling class, the former alludes to the natural human desire for happiness. The task for religion is to invite those committed to religion to serve the proletarian movement by joining the ranks of those engaged in the class struggle to help promote classless society.[47] This may seem like a total secularization of religion that forfeits its true purpose, but we should remember that Miki was never committed to *all* forms of Marxism (one thinks of his ongoing dispute with Marxist-Leninist theory)[48] and explicitly described himself as an inherently religious person:

> Let me first say this: I am a someone with a natural religious inclination.... That is why my religious sentiments in particular make it ultimately impossible for me to identify as a Marxist philosopher.[49]

Following up on Murthy's claims, one may see Miki, like Nishida, as an actor on the stage of history actively resisting the objective rationality and nationalist attitudes of Western modernity, but there are clear differences between them when it comes to the interpretation of Buddhism and its role in history. Leaving aside the apparent favoritism that Nishida showed Zen and Miki the Pure Land tradition,[50] there is a more important difference:

45. Ibid., 88–90.
46. Curley 2017, 152.
47. MKZ 13: 4–19.
48. Tairako 2019, 60.
49. MKZ 18: 104.
50. I say "apparent," because there is no clear-cut distinction here. Nishida himself was a prac-

Nishida refused to give up on religion as a logic to structure the movement of the dialectic, whereas Miki tried to sublate the essence of religion into the dialectic by wrapping its logic in the robes of mythology. To put it another way, in his final essay, "The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview," Nishida argued that there is a logic to religion that illuminates and structures the creative expression of sociohistorical reality.[51] Hence, religion as such represents a form of awareness that cannot be reduced without remainder to scientific reason.[52]

To Miki's way of thinking, such a view of religion presents itself as too elitist and idealistic, and its otherworldly inclinations are too far removed from the lives of ordinary people.[53] It is more *pathos* than *logos*.[54] His point is not to refute Nishida but to liberate his dialectics from reliance on German thought. That said, Nishida's thought had sunk such deep roots in Miki's own dialectics that, in the end, it is hard to determine which had the upper hand. Perhaps the key to understanding Nishida's spiritual dominion is to recognize that what Miki perceived to be lacking in Nishida's dialectics turned out to be the cornerstone of his own social history. Nonetheless, Miki would eventually return to the world of German philosophy to make sense of the contradictions of social life.

Resistance and sublation: the inner voice of german idealism in miki's dialectics

After completing his studies in Europe, Miki returned to Kyoto in 1925, where he set out to synthesize what he considered the strongest elements of European and Eastern thought. From his close acquaintance with Gadamer, Heidegger,[55] and Löwith, Miki understood the critical need for

titioner of Zen Buddhism, yet there are references and passages throughout his work suggesting his appreciation of Pure Land Buddhism. The same can be said of Miki. Though less explicitly, there are aspects of Zen at work in his thought, among them the idea of creation out of nothing.

51. NKZ 2: 455.

52. Dilworth 1987, 6–10.

53. MKZ 13: 29.

54. MKZ 13: 29.

55. Heidegger's role in shaping Miki's thought has been little discussed. For a more detailed account of their relationship, see Nishiyama 2016, 893–910.

hermeneutical theory for Japanese philosophy.[56] He advocated that the nature of human beings is best studied not by scientific methods nor even by phenomenological description, but by interpretation.[57] Upon being appointed professor at Hōsei University in 1927, Miki began to apply the same hermeneutical method he had used to study Pascal to his reading of Marx.[58] The aim of this approach was to interpret modes of thought in German philosophy—for example in Marx and the Neo-Kantianians—in such a way as to free them from the fixed, uncompromising forces of material structures and objective rationality. In a move similar to Shinran's reinterpretation of Pure Land teachings, Miki radically reimagined Western subjectivity by bringing into relief its primal, demonic urges and exposing them as the irrational powers at work in the structuring of history. The *Logic of Imagination* marked an important milestone in this project by offering to overcome the underlying dualities at work: subject-object, rational-irrational, active-passive, and intellect-emotions.[59] Behind it all stood Hegel's dialectical method.

Taking leave of Hegelian dialectics

Hegel's phenomenology was designed to trace the logic of thinking behind historical consciousness. The fundamental idea behind his dialectic was that every moment of every logical concept is destabilized and yet somehow preserved as it changes places in the advance of time through history. Hegel's notion of "sublation" (*Aufhebung*) rests on the capacity of conceptual reason to embrace the contradictory opposite of everything that can be thought. In the Hegelian world, what appears to be contradictory turns out to be logically correct once dialectical reason has been applied. This follows from the conviction that, when all is said and done, the world is a rational place and the goal of all our inquiries in its regard it is to become aware of this rationality. Still, Hegel did not champion knowledge for knowledge's sake. In his view, philosophy's greatest contribution is to make us feel "at home" in the

56. Townsend 2009, 139–40.

57. Muramoto 2011, 194.

58. What this means in Miki's case is that Marx is used more as an analytical tool for theorizing action than as a manifesto for directing it.

59. MKZ 8: 4. We may also think of Miki's *Logic of Imagination* as a grand synthesis of the dialectics of Marx, Hegel, Nishida, and Pascal.

world by restoring confidence that the world can be known rationally. Hegel put it this way:

> The ignorant man is not free, because what confronts him is an alien world, something outside him and in the offing, on which he depends, without his having made this foreign world for himself and therefore without being at home in it by himself as in something his own. The impulse of curiosity, the pressure for knowledge, from the lowest level up to the highest rung of philosophical insight arises only from the struggle to cancel this situation of unfreedom and to make the world one's own in one's ideas and thought.[60]

The point at which Hegel's idealism intersected with Miki's early concerns with humanism was the fundamental human problem of alienation. In the spirit of Hegel, Miki recognized that "within humans, there is a fierce demand for a unity and synthesis of subject and object"[61] that would enable to grapple with the problem of unfreedom and despair through self-understanding. He went so far as to refer to Hegel's logic as a psychology that penetrates to the inner recesses of the heart.[62]

Miki locates his dialectics within the structure of human existence, as had Hegel, but when it came to the demand for liberation he turned to Marx. For Miki, the notion of liberation, whatever form it took, was predicated on the regulative power of physical labor and its goal was to transform social life in a such a way as to loosen those shackles. To have invested that degree of trust in a system of rational ideals à la Hegel would hardly be enough to unleash the creative power of subjectivity. Human beings do not exist in history in the abstract but are born into society and shaped through their actions.[63] Mike would no doubt reject the idea of knowledge for knowledge's sake as unequivocally as Hegel had, and in fact he had criticized Nishida on that very point. His disagreement has to do with what he thought knowledge was ultimately for: to generate new historical forms through our bodily activity

60. Hegel 1975, 98.

61. mkz 5: 171.

62. Muramoto 2010, 20.

63. Here Miki appears to have been inspired by Marx's views on the relationship between subjectivity and society: "What is to be avoided above all is the reestablishing of 'society' as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual *is the social being*. His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a *communal* life carried out together with others—is therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*" (Marx 1978, 86).

that will disclose a new type of human being.[64] This seems very much in line with Marx's view of praxis, but unlike Marx, Miki did not think that the liberation of subjectivity could be the result of mere political actions, such as violent revolution. There is also an existential need for human nature to reveal itself in the *logos* of a historical time.

From Hegel, Miki borrowed the dialectical method of self-understanding, with its concern for the development of historical forms through the synthesis of contradictions. Paradoxically, his aim was to shed light on the limitations of Western rationality and its accompanying historical forms by rethinking the notion of cosmopolitanism. Nishida had taken over Hegel's dialectics for the same reason. In opposition to Hegel's anti-Aristotelian logic, Nishida continued to nudge Hegelian dialectics in the direction of a Buddhist nondual reality. He argued that Western philosophy had been unable to come to terms with a logic of *soku-hi* and the possibilities it offers for a new world order beyond the universals formulated by Kant and Hegel. Miki was in concert with Nishida's assault on Western rationality, describing Kant's philosophical method as too rational and formalistic to deal with the problems of history. Yet, he went on to disagree with Nishida's view of Aristotle, arguing instead that Greek philosophy had never separated formal logic from ontology.[65]

Meanwhile, Miki continued to draw on Hegel's work, deriving his view of *Logos* and *Pathos* from Hegel's core ideas only to use those ideas against him. While historical forms are realized in and through the particular, which is important for both Hegel and Miki, they are not expressions of the Absolute spirit and its accompanying absolute *Weltgeist*. He saw these forms as more particularized, (im)placed within the nothing, similar to Nishida's approach. The distance between Hegel and Miki is still more apparent in the way Miki pitted Marx against Hegel. For Miki, it was Marx who succeeded in overcoming the social contradictions in Hegelian dialectics, not Nishida. If we take Hegel's notion of experience as the model of existence, the notion of basic experience would turn pantheistic and contemplative, rendering it wholly inadequate.[66] The reinsertion of what is negated in the

64. Akamatsu 2018, 76.

65. On Miki's account of Aristotle, see MKZ 9.

66. Yagi 2019, 165.

philosophies of Hegel and Nishida is explicit in Miki's anthropology and logic of *poiesis*, but how is Marx's account of material production sublated in Miki's view of social history?[67]

Miki's hermeneutical reading of Marx

After returning to Japan in 1925, Miki immediately began studying Feuerbach and Marx. It may be that, like many other intellectuals in Japan and abroad, his interests in historical materialism reflect the social, economic, and political climate of the time. The organized resistance of labor to capitalist production as well as the growing threat of imperialism in Asia had led many not only to question the dominant politico-economic system but also to theorize about a future without the forms of domination that marked contemporary history. From 1926 to 1930, Miki published several articles and books on Marxist views of existence while committing himself to the socialist movement in Japan, which included his active participation as an editor-in-chief of the magazine *Proletariat Science* (『プロレタリア科学』). Inspired by the approach to Marx of Karl Mannheim, who was in turn influenced by György Lukác, Miki sought to bring Marxism into the fold of anthropological humanism. This, he believed, would help ensure that the paradigm of historical materialism itself would not bury the problem of human nature in the relations of production. Indeed, he viewed Marxism as just one ideology among others.[68] Arrested in 1930 on suspicion of providing financial contributions to the Japanese Communist Party, Mike ended up resigning his position at Hōsei University.[69] In response to the intensifying presence of the thought police, Miki tempered his language regarding political commitments, but he never fully renounced his appreciation of the Marxist view of history.

In fact, it is likely that Marx's formulation of social reality partially laid

67. One may ask if there was any sublation at all. Given that Miki had only used Marxist categories explicitly for a few years, it is possible to see an "epistemological break" in Miki's philosophy, similar to Althusser's assertions about the differences between the early and later Marx. While there is some truth to the claim that Miki was never a proper Marxist, it is also clear that the questions Marx wanted to solve never vanished from Miki's later philosophy.

68. MKZ 3: 73.

69. Akamatsu 2018, 66. There is documented proof that Miki was reported on by a spy within the Japanese Communist party.

the groundwork for Miki's view of the I-Thou relationship. According to Miki, a proper view of self-awareness requires a view of human beings as agents who make and remake social history in and for themselves. If this were not so, self-awareness would risk a reduction of its own subjectivity, positioning itself against an external object with no possibility of unification. Hence self-awareness is not to be identified as an I-it relationship but needs to be situated within an I-Thou relationship. The former reduces human existence to simple consciousness; the latter formulates the relationship as an ontology rooted in a common ground. The I-Thou relationship is an ethical-social relationship in that the I and the Thou emerge from the same existential place. This means that the self-awareness formed within the I and the Thou are therefore fundamentally the same.[70]

We should keep in mind here that Miki was not attempting to prioritize the social ontology of I and Thou over individual expressions of the relations. He did not see individuals as slaves to the whole, but neither did he reduce the I-Thou relationship to a reciprocal exchange among particulars who happen to share a common aim. Rather, humans are simultaneously individual and social. Individual responsibilities to oneself and to society are conjoined.[71] From Miki's view, then, to locate self-awareness in an I-Thou relationship is to assert a "logic of equality" in each instance of individualized self-awareness formed in society. Eventually, this "logic of equality" was fundamental to the formation of self-awareness and became an important principle for Miki's theory of cooperative action,[72] where this "equally

70. MKZ 18: 142–45.

71. MKZ 17: 574.

72. According to Miki, individual cooperation in the public interests of society allows each person's individuality and freedom to be realized in and through social relationships themselves. If one's personal interests are pursued to the neglect of social interests, individual egos will come into conflict and impede the development of individual creativity. In Miki's words:

> Individualism in the form of egotism must be negated where cooperatives are concerned. It goes without saying that an individualism that always places one's [self-interest] above society and ignores the whole [of society] while attaching itself to the self is an incorrect [form of] individualism. (MKZ 17: 524)

In order to make a cooperative system work, however, Miki believed that leaders were required to organize and guide the actions of individuals. Such leaders must not to be dictators but rather educational leaders who respect the spontaneity of the individual (MKZ 17: 587–88). For more on Miki's cooperativism, see his essay on "Cooperativism" (「協力主義」, MKZ 15:

shared ground" is reconfigured ontologically to legitimize the realization of the creative freedom of human nature in these egalitarian fellowships.[73] As mentioned above, Miki borrowed a great deal from Marx's social ontology, but he was also dissatisfied with Marx's reduction of the human being to social and political categories. Any dialectic of social history that seeks to accommodate the humanist and Marxist agenda must at the same time conjoin the need for individual self-understanding and the need for a cooperative praxis aimed at overcoming capitalism. Whatever is theoretically abstracted from historical existence would have to include a theory of the self if a dialectic were to have any real transcendence,[74] since the development of individual creativity can only be actualized in the *logos* of social history. Unfortunately, it was this merging of elements that led to his banishment from the ranks of the Japanese Marxists, who deemed his notion of individuality to be nothing more than bourgeois idealism.[75]

The standard view in Marxist accounts of social reality is that the subject and the material environment coexist in a kind of feedback loop, which is reinforced by the internalization of an ideology. But the driving force of this co-constitutive cycle lies in the productive powers that determine material production. Marx writes,

> In production, men do not relate to nature alone. They produce insofar as they cooperate in a determinate way and exchange their activities with one another. In order to produce they must address each other in determining relationships, and it is only within these relations that their relations to nature, their production, take place.[76]

258–63). For his thinking on how the principle of co-operation among East Asian countries can bring about a new world order, see also "After Liberalism" (「自由主義以後」, MKZ 13: 168–75), "The Foundation of East Asian Thought" (「東亜思想の根拠」, MKZ 15: 308–25), and "The China Affair and Japanese Thought" (in English, MKZ 20: 297–309).

73. Miki thought that his principle of cooperativism would overcome the bourgeois evils of capitalism and class conflict because it would expose "class" as a constructed category of social existence by showing how public interests can override the narrow interests of each social-economic class. Such a system of cooperatives could make room for new divisions of labor based on new skills and knowledge, thus replacing the normal mandates that capitalism imposes on particular classes.

74. MKZ 3: 40.

75. Curley 2018, 448.

76. Quoted in Wood 1981, 67.

The materialist side of Miki made him consider the basic logic in this structural relationship essential to understanding a dialectic of social reality. He recognized that there is an inextricable relationship between subjectivities, but also that there is an inextricable relationship between subjectivity and its environment.[77] In contrast to Marx's claim that material production begins with the productive powers of determination (a reference to the internal class structure of the relations of production), Miki's hermeneutical method led him to ask a more fundamental question about the framing of the subject-object problem itself. This may have prompted him to absorb the issue of class into his view of cooperative praxis.[78] Since all institutions—such as language, morality, law, art, politics—take shape through human interaction with the environment, the environment itself cannot be thought of as a mere canvas for human expression. Neither can it be thought that humans are mere adaptations of what is going on in the environment. At the most basic level, "the human being is worked on by the environment, and conversely, the human being works on the environment."[79] Yet, Miki warns us against viewing this mutual constitution of subject and environment as an abstract correlation, because such a formulation would fail to take into account the human activity that constitutes the relationship between subjectivity and the environment.[80]

Like Marx, Miki described the relationship of the subject with the environment as one of technical production, and subjectivity as the place where activity in the environment occurs. The environment is always something that human beings work on, and it is there that meaning is created. As a subjectivity related to the environment, the human being is a somatic form of consciousness that is not only (im)placed in an environment but acts within it and on it. Subjectivity also shapes itself through its work on the environment. Actions lead to a subjectification of the object as well as to an objectification of the subject. Therefore, Miki maintained, it is not only that the environment has a role in the determination of subjectivity, but also that the

77. Miki's notion of the environment (環境) refers not only to the mere material or physical environment but also to institutions (social, political, economic, and so forth).

78. In general, Miki thought that philosophy should focus less on class and more on developing a new human being. See MKZ 8: 133–56.

79. MKZ 7: 10.

80. Ibid., 12.

environment becomes an object of somatic production. What is popularly known as Miki's "theory of action" is in fact his account of how the environment—or more precisely, the socio-historical world—is created through the technical actions of embodied subjectivity.[81] In short, from Miki's view of the subject and the environment, the actions that constitute human life cannot be understood apart from the structures and activities of social history.

At this point we see Miki beginning to distance himself from cruder forms of Marxism. If production consists of embodied subjectivities that act within and on the environment, as both distinct and distinguishable from the environment and yet an object acted upon by it, then subjectivity cannot be reduced to the relations of production. In other words, subjectivity is a distinct existential subject that forms things through its actions and at the same time remains a distinct object that is shaped and conditioned by the environment. Furthermore, the exchange of creative activities that takes place between historically linked independent subjectivities as both subjects and objects is what makes ideal historical forms possible. The human being is therefore an entangled existential creature who is within history as a maker of history. If we think of subjectivity merely as the presence of subjectivized objects in an environment, there is a tendency to think of subjectivity as no more than a conscious object absorbed into the effect it has on the material environment. This is often the case in orthodox Marxism, where subjectivity is thought of as only one more product of general material production. Miki would eventually come to accept subjectivity as a material substance, but his idea of human embodiment was more in the nature of an "inner substance" (or occasionally, an "inner body") deep inside the person as a formless something that gives rise to artistic expression. Moreover, he stated explicitly that "animal spirits" (動物精気) do not belong to the external body, that *pathos* belongs to the subjective interiority that urges us to praxis.[82]

The subject-object relationship is one point on which Miki challenges Marx. Marx's triadic system is another. In his 1927 essay, "A Marxist Form of Anthropology" (「人間学のマルクス的形態」), Miki reinterprets the infrastructure-structure-superstructure triad in terms of basic experience, anthropology, and ideology. He proposed two types of *logos* that take us

81. For a brief account of his theory of action, see MKZ 7: 155–95.

82. MKZ 9: 210.

beyond the realm of the everyday. The first is pre-theoretical experience of anthropology *qua* the human being's self-understanding. This "primary *logos*" derives from the interpretation of one's basic experience. The second is ideology *qua* scholarship, science, and the intellectual thought of a given time period or what he called "secondary *logos*."[83] While anthropology deals in abstractions articulated from historical existence, the discourse of ideology dominates the public sphere in the form of critiques and theoretical arguments. Miki insisted that anthropological self-understanding regulate the structure of ideology,[84] for only then can the basic proletarian experience (無産者的基礎経験) discover its true nature and open itself to the influence and guidance of an ideal.[85] Absent negotiation with basic experience, ideology remains an abstract barrier between the human being and the world. It becomes a reified, ahistorical ideal that could well end up dominating the very ones who ought to be creating it. Miki's idea of basic experience required that the self be revealed naturally, without coercion by *logos*. Basic experience needs rather to recognize itself in *logos* and return to itself in order for it to continue to negotiate.[86] The whole process is meant to be developmental and purposeful, not authoritative.

We may note that Miki's view of praxis coincides with Marx's dictum that the conversion of consciousness alone is not enough to overcome the depravity of material existence. Real change in material conditions is needed to bring about a new world. Unlike Marx, however, Miki asserted that revolution can only take place in certain circumstances, for example, when the basic proletarian experience has discovered its true nature as ideology. Insofar as as the categories of basic experience and ideology are mutually conditioning, the basic proletarian experience resists theoretical formulation and hence refuses to be sublated as such.[87] This set up a a collision between the economic deterministic aspects of Marxist dialectics and Miki's hermeneutical Marxism: Miki's notion of basic experience could not be "explained away" by mere systemic analysis.

83. MKZ 3: 5–19.
84. Ibid., 8–10, 37, 119–20.
85. Ibid., 40.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 39–41.

Miki's final sublation

From Miki's middle period and into his later thought, we see a shift from an explicit use of Marxist terminology to an implicit one. In his *Logic of Imagination*, one of his central pivots for the subsumption of historical materialism is the idea that all human activity can be framed as a technical production arising out of a unity of *logos* and *pathos* within the creative imagination. This "creative imagination" is more than mere fantasy or conceptualization. The creative powers of the imagination are expressed in the embodied activity that accounts for the creation (制作) of historical forms. He describes this activity as "technical" (技術的) to indicate that historical forms are created out of the formless, something made out of nothing but given meaning as the dwelling place human beings create through their actions. As noted earlier, the decisive element in this creative force is *pathos*, which then unifies with *logos* to give the formless its form.[88] Fujita Masakatsu nuances this idea for us by observing that Miki's

> *pathos* thus implies being determined by the "nothingness" that lies at the base of our existence. All creative activity is supported and carried forth—not, for example, by mere mimesis—but rather by this "pathos" and moreover, by the "nothingness" that lies as its ground.[89]

Miki's reference to "technique" is thus an attempt to elucidate the logical structure of transformation of what we call social history.[90] "Technique" points to more than socio-cultural forms. Since human life evolves through its adaptation to the environment, all the various activities of life can be thought of as "technical," drawing the term into the biological domain as well.[91] If humans are also constituted by the "natural environment," then nature itself may also be said to create forms and therefore to be characterized as a "technical production." Given this framework, Miki's logic of imagination as "technique" is not only liberated from the domain of aesthetics,[92] it begins to cast doubt on Marx's entire infrastructure-structure-superstruc-

88. MKZ 8: 7, MKZ 18: 340.
89. FUJITA 2011, 315.
90. MKZ 8: 237.
91. Ibid., 234–6.
92. Ibid., 18.

ture triad, which excludes the agency of subjective imagination. Technological production refers to more than the manufacturing tools that form the infrastructure of a social-economic system. It points to all cultural and artistic forms—including the rhetoric of language—that effect and reflect a transformation of the world.

We may draw a connection here between Miki's attempt to sublate Marx's triad through a logic of creative imagination and Gramsci's attempt to combine Hegel and Marx into a non-deterministic theory of political reality. Gramsci replaced *ideology* as a super-structural force with *hegemony*, arguing that the achievement of consent in society is reflected in cultural, political, and economic forms, as well as their accompanying rhetorical expression. In the "The Spirit of Rhetoric," (「レトリックの精神」, 1934), Miki viewed rhetoric as indispensable for directing the course of change in society,[93] because

> rhetoric is social. It is founded on the person-to-person relationship. Therefore, it is not merely logical, but rather ethical,[94] and its proof must contain ethical proof.[95]

In this respect, "rhetoric can be thought of as the heart of affectivity"[96] by virtue of its appeal to the *pathos* of subjectivity, thus combining with logic in the effort to persuade society. Not unlike Gramsci, Miki not only refuses to use "ideology" as a purely negative form (*qua* form of false consciousness)[97] but also sidesteps any reference to a superstructure. "Technique" thereby entails a logic of *poiesis* to sublate the processes underlying Marx's account of social reality. Consequently, reference to the creative elements allows for introducing ideology correctly into the public sphere so that subjectivity can realize itself in the *logos* of social history.

This last point can be seen most clearly in the opening chapter on "Myth" in the *Logic of Imagination*. In 1938, at the time Miki was writing,

93. See MKZ 7: 131–47.

94. What Miki means by "ethical" does not connote any Western allusion to good vs evil. It is rather the sense of freedom that arises from within the network of social relations. Note the similarity here to Watsuji's notion of ethics.

95. MKZ 18: 327.

96. Ibid.

97. Ideology, for Miki, can be thought of more as alluding to prescriptive ideas that naturally develop within the very unfolding of history.

the political milieu was endorsing a *pathos* of ultra-nationalism in favor of a *logos* of rational discourse, mythologizing the ideal of citizenship in wartime Japan. As John Krummel argues, we may read this particular chapter in the *Logic of Imagination* as a critical analysis of the public ideology of the intensifying military structure of the Japanese state.[98] The central thesis of the *Logic of Imagination* was to demonstrate how the imagination itself functions as a source of power for the creation of historical forms out of formlessness. The attention to mythology was intended to apply this to a number of other philosophical issues, among them the problem of reality and unreality (or what we might call "the problem of ideology"). He showed how the collective body creates a meaningful world by way of a mythology in order to unite *logos* and *pathos* and thereby motivate and guide action in history.

Miki did not use the word "myth" to denote fictional tales, as is often the case today. Even where the mythical is fictional,[99] it is nonetheless real and possesses a logic of historical creativity by virtue of its capacity to carve out a new and symbolic reality out of the natural world. He explicitly states that "in the historical world, myth precedes utopia, utopia precedes science, and the imagination is more primordial than reason."[100] Not only do utopian visions of the future precede scientific endeavors to verify them, but at the basis of all institutional forms—myths, utopian visions, scientific endeavors—the imagination is at work. Theories become historical forms through practice, and insofar as myths motivate and guide action, the theories supporting practice "become myth by means of the imagination."[101] Miki mentions the work of Durkheim, Malinowski, Lévy-Bruhl, and above all Sorel in his attempt to illuminate the creative power of myth. But his aim was ultimately to put Marx's notion of "false consciousness" to rest by arguing that "without the use of myth we cannot explain the shift from principle to action."[102] In the end, myths need to be seen as ideological forms.

If Marx's dialectics were in the background of Miki's discussion, so was

98. Krummel 2016, 15.

99. The word "fictional" is used here in the ordinary sense it has in the world of literature.

100. MKZ 8: 50; Miki 2016, 44.

101. MKZ 8: 54; Miki 2016, 45.

102. MKZ 8: 54.

Hegel's approach to the way history becomes actualized through praxis. He also returns to Kant's first critique for inspiration on the synthetic function of imagination. The German word for imagination, *Einbildungskraft*, indicates the "formation of images," but its more general sense is also implied in Miki's discussion of the root source of power to schematize the images necessary for the production of forms. For example, at the same time as his logic of the creative imagination overcomes the duality of reality and unreality, it plants the seeds of a quasi-idealism.

For Hegel, rationality was the locus of the real; for Miki, the real belonged to the realm of the imaginary. In opposition to Hegel, he disavowed apprehension of the real by way of reason for the simple reason that the power of the imagination is always at work. He found Hegel's idealism too abstract and too quick to grant authority to reason in the dialectics of history.[103] Whenever *logos* is favored over *pathos*, he claimed, people become puppets to the rational aims of history and the body is subjugated to mechanical aims. In a word, Miki's view of mythology, although echoing Hegel's call for a new mythology, represented a radical departure by refusing to submit the future to a "mythology of reason."[104] Miki was certainly aware of the dangers of myth as a form of political power, but to reduce all mythology to fictional propaganda was no less problematic.[105] If myths are to be revived, it is in order to sharpen their critical edge.[106]

For Marx, ideology was a form of false consciousness to be transcended through collective praxis. For Miki, myths themselves are a form of ideology that create the reality in which we live. At no time in history have people been without myths, but neither have they been without a sense of a reality

103. MKZ 14: 250–52.

104. According to Hegel, this new mythology must be philosophically formulated in order to make people more rationally minded. He writes:

> This mythology must be in the service of Ideas; it must be a mythology of *Reason*. Until we express the Ideas aesthetically, that is, mythologically, they have no interest for *the people*; and conversely, until mythology is rational the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus in the end, enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands: mythology must become philosophical in order to make people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make the philosophers sensible" (cited in EAGLETON 1994, 221).

105. WIRTZ 2019, 220.

106. MKZ 10: 325

outside of myths, and hence without ideology.[107] This is why Miki thought it unlikely that people would ever give up religion. Louis Althusser's questioning of Marx's reduction of ideology to material production come to mind here. His attempt to reinterpret ideology as "a relationship of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence"[108] resonates with Miki's suggestion that since myths are produced from our imagination and therefore belong to the fabric of historical production, ideology (myths *qua logos*) cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon of material production.[109] Like Althusser's hermeneutic rectification, Miki's logic of creative imagination opposes orthodox Marxism both in its refusal to privilege a view of social history that can be read as economically or materially deterministic, but also in its relocation of "technical production" within subjectivity.

Where do we then locate Miki's dialectics in the intellectual histories of East and West? John Krummel, for instance, has discussed the ontological similarities between Miki's creative imagination and more recent thinkers like Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), who discusses the power of metaphorical images in the production of meaning and ideology; and Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997), whose idea of "imaginary signification" is an attempt to thematize the creativity of the imagination in the formation of the social and the historical.[110] Castoriadis's other theoretical work that deals with institutions, autonomous self-reflection, cooperatives, and *creatio ex nihilo*, also shows an uncanny resemblance to Miki's quest to overcome German thought and Nishida philosophy. I think particularly of his break with orthodox Marxism and attempt to correct the Marxist view of social history by arguing that subjectivity determines the laws of history and is not simply determined by them, and that society must find a way to unify the

107. Although this view of ideology as something that cannot be transcended was already present in his earlier work, Miki's logic of creative imagination carried it further.

108. Althusser 1994, 123.

109. There are definite similarities between Althusser and Miki in their claims that although ideology is fictional and therefore imaginary, it is nonetheless real. One striking difference is that Miki does not refer to ideology as fantastical or illusory as Althusser does. Althusser shows a Lacanian reading of the discursive imaginary, extending the boundaries of ideology to reference all of historical existence to the extent that "ideology is now not just a distortion or false reflection, a screen which intervenes between ourselves and reality or an automatic effect of commodity production." See Eagleton 1994, 218.

110. See Krummel 2017, 258–60.

singular individual and the collective dialectically. Castoriadis and Miki did not accept the traditional Marxist creed that the struggles of the working class arose jointly with capitalism. They trace the struggle further back, into deeper forces within human nature and history, that is to say, into the human desire to gain mastery and ownership over oneself in the world.

In Miki's case, the break with Marxism opened him up to criticism. The Marxist philosopher Hiromatsu Wataru (1933–1994), for instance, criticized Miki for failing to explain how social practices become reified and for overemphasizing the individual to the point that there is little discussion of how the individual and the social are connected and how the move is to be made from the individual to proper social practice.[111] In his view, Miki's ontological foundation did not constitute a truly relational system of thought but was rather a "substance-based doctrine" that reified the nation state and therefore provided a pretext for Japan's East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[112]

This last point calls for further attention. There seems to be a divide between the political implications of Miki's wartime writings and those of his philosophical writings that sought to transcend the East-West dichotomy by liberating subjectivity throughout East Asia from capitalistic and colonial domination. It remains for us to consider how Miki's attempt to overcome German thought and Nishida philosophy relates to his tacit support for colonial invasions by the Japanese state. Accordingly, we now turn to the roots of the wartime jingoism in Miki's political discourses and its ties to his quasi-idealism.

The quasi-idealism of miki's wartime writings

At heart, Miki's quest for a dialectic to overcome German thought and Nishida philosophy sought to unify the interiority of subjectivity and the objective materials of the external world. His dialectic may have been grounded in Nishida's logic of nothing and its deontologizing of all particular standpoints (cultural, philosophical, individual, and so forth), but it was also an attempt to restore the role of subjectivity as the maker of history. He was

111. Nakajima 2011, 118–19.

112. For more on Hiromatsu's discussion of Miki Kiyoshi and his notion of "overcoming modernity," see Hiromatu 1989, 142–55.

convinced that the construction of a more truly cosmopolitan world hinged on the activity of *making*, which of course required a *maker* to realize itself as the subject of history. But how could a subjectivity that creates the historical world *ex nihilo* end up becoming a tool for the political right in spite of its theoretical commitment to global world free of colonial ambitions?

According to Iwasaki Minoru, Miki's theory of technology, originally intended to bolster the resistance to Western encroachment, disintegrated into enthusiasm for a meta-subject to embody the regional identity of East Asia.[113] Lewis Harrington has argued that Miki's writings during his time as a member of the Shōwa Study Group (昭和研究会) in fact supports this particular view in that Miki's vision of a New East Asian Order based on a cooperative particularism amounts to a form of Japanism disguised as a new kind of universalism by virtue of its abstract cast and lack of concrete detail.[114] In other words, the ideology behind the culturalist and nationalist chauvinism of Japanese militarism lay in the background of Miki's theory of culture with its essentialized differentiation of East and West. By positing the East as "ethical," "intuitive," "humble," "harmonious," and "progressive," and the West as "epistemological," "scientific," and "self-objectifying,"[115] Miki inferred that the world-historical role of leading the East Asian bloc against Western imperialism fell to Japan.[116] His theory of technology was anti-essentialist in its view of culture as inherently transformative; what is substantialized is the imagination that grounds subjectivity as the maker of historical forms.

What all of this tells us is that Miki's pioneering attempt to ground myth

113. Iwasaki 1998, 177.

114. Harrington 2009, 68–9.

115. Kim's reading of Miki's theory of culture (see note 116) contrasts with Kazashi Nobuo's reading of Miki's philosophy. Drawing on Akamatsu's critique of Miki, Kazashi claims that Miki erred in essentializing human nature in advancing a theory of culture without entering into cultural differences, as well as in a theory of technology that assumed a pre-established harmony within the individual. For both Akamatsu and Kazashi, there seems to be little to no discussion in Miki's work of potential problems arising from a "conflict between *logos* and *logos*" or a "clash of *pathos* with *pathos*" among opposing individuals or groups (Kazashi 2011, 95–9). I question this interpretation, given Miki's attention to "conflicts between *logos* and *logos*" in the very East-West narrative he had inherited from Nishida. Miki's cultural resistance to Westernization and his support for an East Asian bloc underscore the point.

116. Kim 2011, 77, 84–5, 87.

in a logic of creative imagination allowed for a slip from liberator to colonial invader. His view of myth did not entail a teleological view of history unfolding in the direction of a predetermined end, but it did embrace a view of the future based on the inevitable emergence of certain historical forms that had been "rehearsed" and "prepared" in the imagination of the collective body.[117] In other words, built into his idea of the creative power of the imagination was the assertion that social myths (for example, Sorel's myth of the general strike and revolution) were already en route to becoming historical forms.[118] It would appear that Miki had abandoned Nishida's conception of history and even his own Pure Land Buddhist framework[119] in favor of a reading of historical time piloted by Marx and then hijacked by Hegel (and Kant)—and at a devastating cost. Hiromatsu may be correct in his conclusion that Miki treated East Asia like a malleable substance, a historical form that could be molded and guided by the Japanese spirit. Indeed, Miki himself seems to suggest as much:

> Japan must rise to a leading position in the construction of a new East Asian order. Of course, this does not mean that Japan [should] subjugate the various ethnicities of East Asia. Rather, it will be the linchpin that unites the peoples of East Asia. The formation of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere will not be dependent on the ethnic egoism of Japan. On the contrary, it will be based on the ethical mission of Japan vis-à-vis present conditions. Awareness of this mission is indispensable. With the creation of a new culture based on this principle, Japan can, for the first time, become a true leader, at which point Japanese culture will be exposed to reality.[120]

In short, Japan, like subjectivity, is destined to become a maker or subject of history, and the myth of the future cosmopolitan world, like technology, is said to grow out of historical forms enacted by the Japanese subject in its mission to save the world (and in particular, East Asia) from the twin evils of capitalism and imperialism.

117. Curley 2018, 454.

118. Ibid., 452.

119. The challenge for Miki perhaps was uniting the cyclical nature of Pure Land Buddhism, where there is no end towards which things move, and his return to German philosophy, whose idealist and progressive character led him to treat the notion of a creative society based on a system of cooperation as an end in itself.

120. MKZ 17: 533.

We have every reason to describe Miki as a "bona fide intellectual"[121] who tried to write progressive or liberal ideas into policy at a time when the current trend was towards fascism. At the same time, we cannot escape the fact that his new conception of cultural subjectivity as the groundwork for an alternative global order based in East Asia supported the drive toward a colonialism "legitimized in the name of culture as resistance against Eurocentrism."[122] Miki's dialectics did indeed seek to advance a logic of historical creativity that is neither idealist nor materialist in order to correct what he saw as limitations in the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, and Nishida. In the end however, he smuggled in a quasi-idealist account of social history through the logic of imagination that rehabilitated Japanese nationalism under the guise of liberation.

The legacy of German thought left a quasi-idealistic imprint on Miki's work that allowed for support of an ideal ethical order, while Nishida's logic of nothing, which formed the foundation of Miki's dialectics, provided little or no moral direction other than to romanticize the cultural spirit of Japanese particularism. In its resulting constellation, Miki's dialectical logic was autocatalytic, reorienting itself to an idealization of a universal-particular model founded on Japanese leadership. His quasi-idealism may have been grounded in a logic of creative imagination, but its underlying inclination toward historical forms hastened its transformation into raw material for the technical production of Japanese colonialism. As a result, his notion of (cultural) subjectivity came to behave like an essentialized entity, even if not identified as such by Miki himself.

To defend Miki's philosophical vision, we need to find a way to rescue his dialectics from serving as an instrument of domination. What if Miki had further developed the vertical dimension of subjectivity along the lines of Nishida's thought to complement the horizontal dimension of the social body along the lines of Tosaka Jun's idea of "the people"?[123] Had Miki fully

121. See Campoamor ii 2017, 1–38.

122. Koyama 2016, 784.

123. What Tosaka Jun refers to as "the people" are the democratic masses on the periphery striving to defend themselves against the ruling class. See also tjz 5: 3 and Nakajima 2011, 125–6. We may also note the similarity between Tosaka Jun's concept of "the people" and the Argentinian philosopher Enrique Dussel's concept of "el pueblo," which refers to the political power emanating from subaltern classes and communities. Like Tosaka, Dussel saw his phi-

adopted Nishida's principle of absolutely contradictory self-identity (絶対矛盾的自己同一の論理) as part of his dialectic of social history, and reinterpreted it as a strategy for resistance more along the lines of Takeuchi's "Asia as method,"[124] perhaps his idea of subjectivity as a realization of its own "empty nature" would have driven him to prevent any form of reification from creeping back into the picture and prompted him to open subjectivity up to the neglected periphery.

To be sure, Nishida's philosophy has also been judged severely for its flirtations with Japanism. This is mainly due to his unwillingness to reject the nation state as an objective category, rendering his "non-essentialist" philosophy vulnerable to expropriation by the apparatus of the state for its own political ends. Miki made the same mistake, but he also failed to question the moral destiny of Japan to lead in the cultural formation of a new history. His harshest critics have described this aspect of his philosophy as little more than a covert form of fascism. This seems a bit of a stretch, given that Miki was critical of Heidegger and the kind of state-sponsored violence common in fascist Germany.[125] There is no doubt he intended to reject the egoistic impulses of Japanese culture and attempts to mimic Western colonialism. Unfortunately, the germ of quasi-idealism in his account of social history was to metastasize into a standpoint pulling him into the de facto ideology of the Japanese war machine.

At the same time, one cannot help wondering if Miki would have recognized the seeds of reification in his quasi-idealism that enabled a Hegelian takeover of his idea of historical time if Nishida's logic of absolute contradiction had been allowed to provide the dialectical structure for his resistance to Western domination and the building of cooperatives. If Miki had accepted

losophy as a defense of the victims of domination. See Dussel 2006, 24–30.

124. In "Asia as Method," Takeuchi Yoshimi asserts that if Asia were thought of as a *subject* of resistance rather than as a *substantive entity*, it could be envisioned as a subject forming and transforming itself in every act of resistance against modernity. Such resistance would engender a plurality free of the dominion of a single leadership. See Takeuchi 2005, 165.

125. See MKZ 19: 594–602, 664–72, and MKZ 1:, 241–69. For secondary literature, see Parkes 2011, 247–68 and Yusa 1998, 68–70. According to Ken Nakata Steffensen, Miki, along with Nishitani and Nishida, can be thought of as an anti-systemic collaborator straddling the roles of resistance to systems of power and provider of elements useful for state propaganda. See Nakata Steffensen 2017, 65–103.

the view that history is without a telos and lacks "temporal inevitability," as suggested in the contradictory logic underlying Nishida's view of global history,[126] then perhaps he would have been able confront the contradiction between his desire for a universal myth of cooperativism on one hand, and his idealization of Japan as leader of the resistance against Western colonization on the other. Because he failed to acknowledge the conflation, his support of the Japanese state and its cultural leadership were doomed to take over his dialectics of social history. At the same time, had Miki recognized this contradiction and kept the "people on the periphery" in mind, he might conceivably have prioritized cooperativism among the particulars without having to associate with a substantive center. The pursuit of realizing one's true self as an absolute contradiction would have required abandoning the idea of attaching one's ego to the nation-state and its cultural identity and identifying the selfless self with the movements of the particulars at the periphery in order to strengthen cooperation in resistance.[127]

Given Nishida's failure to sever his existential identity from its ties to the nation state, part of the drift towards nationalism to be seen in his work seems to be the result of an underdeveloped social ontology and of a personal failure to follow through on a principle of self-negation that might have prompted him to reject the idea of the nation state as an objective category. Miki's case is slightly different. His vision of a social economy was concerned with accommodating the totality of internal differences in each particular, but without a more robust logic of contradictory identity as the ground of historical reality, one that would allow for a more radical negation of subjectivity and its relationship to temporality so as to take the form of concrete resistance, Miki's dialectics would seem to remain to be an account of liberation aimed at only those already prepared to welcome it.

126. The logic structuring Nishida's view of global history is that of an absolutely contradictory self-identity articulated in his concept of *basho*. See Krummel 2014, 107–29.

127. The suggestion made here is not intended as covert support for Nishitani's idea of a "non-ego nation," which also failed to negate an essentialist view of the state.

References

Abbreviations

MKZ 『三木清全集』[The complete works of Miki Kiyoshi] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), 20 vols.

NKZ 『西田幾多郎全集』[Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 19 vols.

TJZ 『戸坂潤全集』[Complete works of Tosaka Jun] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1967), 5 vols.

Akamatsu Tsunehiro 赤松常弘

2018 "The Philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi," trans. by Robert Chapeskie and revised by John Krummel, in Masakatsu Fujita, ed., *The Philosophy of the Kyoto School* (Singapore: Springer), 65–80.

Althusser, Louis

1994 "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus: (Notes Towards an Investigation)," in Slavoj Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideologies* (New York and London: Verso), 100–40.

Campoamor ii, Gonzalo

2017 "Re-Examining Japanese Wartime Intellectuals: Kiyoshi Miki during the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines," *Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia* 53/1: 1–38.

Curley, Melissa Anne-Marie

2008 "The Subject of History in Miki Kiyoshi's 'Shinran,'" in Victor Sōgen Hori and Melissa Anne-Marie Curley, eds., *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 2: Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations* (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture), 78–93.

2017 *Pure Land, Real World: Modern Buddhism, Japanese Leftists, and the Utopian Imagination* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

2018 "Marxism, Humanism, and the Power of the Imagination," in Bret Davis, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press), 447–65.

Dilworth, David

1987 "Introduction: Nishida's Critique of the Religious Consciousness," trans. by David Dilworth, in *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press), 1–45.

Dussel, Enrique

2006 *20 Tesis de Política* (México, DF: Siglo XXI-CREFAL).

Eagleton, Terry

1994 "Ideology and its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism," in Slavoj Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideologies* (New York and London: Verso), 179–226.

Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝

2011 "Logos and Pathos: Miki Kiyoshi's Logic of Imagination," trans. by Bret Davis with Moritsu Ryū and Takehana Yōsuke, in Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason Wirth, eds., *Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with Japanese Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indian University Press), 305–18.

Funayama Shin'ichi 船山信一

1984 『ヘーゲル哲学と西田哲学』[The philosophies of Hegel and Nishida] (Tokyo: Miraisha).

Goto-Jones, Christopher

2004 "The Left Hand of Darkness: Forging a Political Left in Interwar Japan," in David Williams and Rikki Kersten, eds., *The Left in the Shaping of Japanese Democracy: Essays in Honor of J. A. A. Stockwin* (London: Routledge), 3–20.

Harrington, Lewis

2009 "Miki Kiyoshi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai: The Failure of World History," *Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique* 17/1: 43–72.

Haver, William

2012 "Introduction," trans. by William Haver, in *Ontology of Production: Three Essays* (Durham and London: Duke University Press), 1–34.

Hegel, G.W. F

1975 *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松 渉

1989 「〈近代の超克〉論：昭和思想史の一視角」[The discourse on "Overcoming Modernity": A perspective on the intellectual history of the Shōwa era] (Tokyo: Kōdansha).

Iwasaki Minoru 岩崎 稔

1998 "Desire for a Poietic Metasubject: Miki Kiyoshi's Technology Theory," in Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narta, eds., *Total War and "Modernization"* (Ithaca: East Asian Program, Cornell University), 159–80.

Kazashi Nobuo 嘉指信雄

2011 "Acting-Intuition and Pathos in Nishida and Miki: For the Invisible of the Post-Hiroshima Age, or Irradiated Bodies of Power," *Diogenes* 57/3: 89–102.

Kim, John Namjun

2009 "On the Brink of University: German Cosmopolitanism in Japanese Imperialism," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 17/1: 73–95.

Koyama Hitomi 小山仁美

2016 "Historicism, Coloniality, and Culture in Wartime Japan," *Contexto Internacional* 38/3: 783–802.

KRUMMEL, John

2014 "World, Nothing, and Globalization in Nishida and Nancy," in Leah Kalmanson and James Mark Shields, eds., *Buddhist Response to Globalization* (London: Lexington Books), 107–29.

2016 "Introduction to Miki Kiyoshi and his Logic of Imagination," *Social Imaginaries* 2/1: 13–24.

2019A "Creative Imagination, Sensus Communis, and the Social Imaginary: Miki Kiyoshi, Nakamura Yūjirō in Dialogue with Contemporary Philosophy," in Michiko Yusa, ed., *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic), 255–87.

2019B "Introduction," in John Krummel, ed., *Contemporary Japanese Philosophy: A Reader* (London and New York: Roman and Littlefield), 1–38.

MARX, Karl

1978 "1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," trans. by Robert Tucker, in Robert Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company), 66–125.

MIKI Kiyoshi 三木 清

1998A "An Analysis of Man," trans. by Agustín Jacinto Zavala, in David Dilworth, Valdo Viglielmo, and Agustín Jacinto Zavala, eds., *Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents* (Westport: Greenwood Press), 298–315.

1998B "On Tradition," trans. by Agustín Jacinto Zavala, Ibid., 316–20.

2011 "The Study of the Human Being," trans. by Gereon Kopf, in James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, eds. *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 702–5.

2016 "Myth," trans. by John Krummel, *Social Imaginaries* 2/1: 25–69.

2020 "Institutions," trans. by John Krummel, in *The Logic of Imagination*. Currently unpublished.

MURAMOTO Shōji 村本詔司

2010 "Kiyoshi Miki (1897–1945): Age, Life, Works and Implications for Jungian Psychology," *Journal of Foreign Studies* 61/6: 7–29.

2011 "Jung and Miki: Similarities and Differences," in Raya Jones and Masayoshi Morioka, eds., *Jungian and Dialogical Self Perspectives (*New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 185–205.

MURTHY, Viren

2014 "Critical Theories of Modernity," in Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy, and Andrew Sartori, eds., *A Companion to Global Historical Thought* (Chichester: Wiley and Sons), 228–42.

NAGATOMO Shigenori 長友繁法

1995 *A Philosophical Foundation for Miki Kiyoshi's Humanism* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press).

Nakajima Takahiro 中島隆博

2011 "'Asia' as a 'Relational' Concept from the Perspective of Japanese Marxist Philosophers: Hiromatsu Wataru, Miki Kiyoshi, and Tosaka Jun," in *Practicing Philosophy between China and Japan* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy), 115–30.

Nakata Steffensen, Kenn

2017 "The Political Thought of the Kyoto School: 'Beyond Questionable Footnotes' and 'Japanese Style Fascism,'" in Michiko Yusa, ed., *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook in Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Bloomsbury Academic), 65–103.

Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎

1970 *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*, trans. by David Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia University).

1990 *Inquiry into the Good*, trans. by Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Nishiyama Tatsuya 西山達也

2016 "Facticity and Poietics in History: Miki Kiyoshi's Reading of Heidegger." *Philosophy Today* 60/4: 893–910.

Parkes, Graham

2011 "Heidegger and Japanese Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection," in Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, eds., *Japanese Philosophy and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 247–68.

Tairako Tomonaga 平子友長

2019 「哲学の外に出る哲学の可能性の探究：三木清を切り口として」[The search for the possibility of philosophy to move beyond philosophy: Miki Kiyoshi as a point of entry], in Tanaka Kyūbun 田中久文, Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝, and Muroi Michihiro 室井美千博, eds.,『再考三木清: 現代への問いとして』[Reconsidering Miki Kiyoshi from questions of the present day] (Kyoto: Shōwadō Publishing Company), 49–65.

Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内 好

2005 "Asia as Method," in Richard Calichman, trans., *What is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi* (New York City: Columbia University Press), 149–65.

Townsend, Susan

2007 *Miki Kiyoshi, 1897–1945: Japan's Itinerant Philosopher* (Leiden: Brill).

Wirtz, Fernando

2019 "Presentación: Miki Kiyoshi: Consciencia Histórica y Consciencia Mítica." *European Journal of Japanese Philosophy* 4: 218–22.

Wood, Allen

1981 *Karl Marx* (New York and London: Routledge).

YAGI Kiichirō 八木紀一郎

2019 "Quest for the Consciousness of Historicity by Kiyoshi Miki: Hermeneutical Anthropology and Philosophy of History," *Revue de philosophie économique* 20/1: 159–74.

YUASA Yasuo 湯浅泰雄,

1987 "Modern Japanese Philosophy and Heidegger," in Graham Parkes, ed., *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 155–74.

YUSA Michiko 遊佐道子

1998 "Philosophy and Inflation: Miki Kiyoshi in Weimar Germany, 1922–1924," *Monumenta Nipponica* 53/1: 45–71.